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1
Performance Standards and 
the Potential to Improve 
Government Performance 
James J. Heckman 
Carolyn J. Heinrich 
Jeffrey Smith 
A number of recently implemented reforms to public sector incen-
tive systems have sought to reorient them toward a focus on measuring 
results and inducing public agencies to become more efficient, respon-
sive, and accountable to the public. They share at least two features. 
The first is a system of performance measures and standards designed 
to create clear expectations for government performance and to assess 
results. A second feature is a means for rewarding individuals, teams, 
or entire organizations for achievement relative to the established per-
formance goals, primarily through budgetary allocations. By clearly 
defining goals and developing explicit rewards for their attainment, 
these systems have aimed to replicate, in a nonmarket setting, the in-
centive structures, competition, and resulting high performance and 
efficiency of private markets (Light 2005). 
Among its first steps in advancing these reforms, the Obama ad-
ministration has required federal agencies to identify a limited number 
of high-priority performance goals for which performance trends will 
be tracked, and through its new Open Government initiative, it will 
make these data publicly available and promote the use of new meth-
ods in the analysis of them. The government is also now compelling 
the private sector to provide more information on its performance for 
transparency and accountability (beyond longer-standing areas of pub-
lic scrutiny such as health care and the environment), and has devised 
incentives for cooperation and penalties for withholding information 
(Cukier 2010). For example, it is now possible for the public to get sta-
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2 Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 
tistics on job-related deaths that name employers and to see restaurants’
health inspection scores online. 
As the use of performance measurement and incentive systems 
has expanded in the public sector, so has the number of studies calling 
attention to their problems and unintended effects (Bevan and Hood 
2006; Brooks 2000; Courty and Marschke 2004; Heckman and Smith 
2004; Heinrich 2004, 2007; Heinrich and Marschke 2010; Koning and 
Heinrich 2010; Propper and Wilson 2003; Radin 2000; Smith 1995; 
General Accounting Office [GAO] 2002). Performance standards sys-
tems and bonuses are (or have been) used in Food Stamps (now the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) and welfare-to-work 
programs, employment and training programs, public school account-
ability systems under No Child Left Behind, child welfare agencies and 
child support enforcement programs, Medicaid and SCHIP programs, 
and other social programs, although not without some degree of con-
troversy and ongoing challenges in their design and implementation. 
The development of performance incentive systems in public bureau-
cracies also continues to advance in Europe, led by Great Britain’s 
early exploration, and with some governments (such as Australia and 
the Netherlands) now implementing incentive systems with fully (100 
percent) performance-contingent pay/contracting arrangements (Finn 
2008; Struyven and Steurs 2005). 
While the broad introduction of incentive systems in many gov-
ernment agencies is new, U.S. employment and training programs 
have used both performance standards and monetary bonuses for over 
two decades. Klerman (2005, p. 347) describes the Job Training Part-
nership Act (JTPA)/Workforce Investment Act (WIA) performance 
measurement system as one of the “most mature implementations of 
performance-based management.” It is also one of the most studied 
systems, in part because of the randomized experimental evaluation of 
the JTPA program that produced important information for assessing 
the performance of these performance standards systems in measuring 
program impacts (Bloom et al. 1993; Dickinson et al. 1988; Heckman, 
Heinrich, and Smith 2002; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999; Orr 
et al. 1995). Policymakers have looked to the results of these studies to 
guide changes to these systems in employment and training programs 
and to also inform the design and operation of performance standards 
systems in other government programs. 
  
 
 
  
Performance Standards and Improving Government Performance 3 
At the same time, one of our motivations for assembling the research 
presented in this book is that despite decades of study and practice, 
some of the important lessons that have been learned are not reflected 
in the current design and implementation of performance standards sys-
tems. Bevan and Hood (2006), for example, describe the development 
and use of performance targets in the English public health care system, 
along with the perverse incentives they generated, as “hitting the target 
and missing the point.”1 And despite the long tenure of performance 
standards in U.S. employment and training programs, a 2002 GAO re-
port (p. 14) confirms the persistence of gaming responses that influence 
who gets access to program services as well as service intensity, con-
cluding that “the need to meet performance levels may be the driving 
factor in deciding who receives WIA-funded services at the local level.” 
It may be that some of the more rigorous empirical evidence from 
past studies has not been effectively communicated or penetrated 
policymaking and public management circles deeply enough.2 Or, as 
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith comment in Chapter 3, it may be that 
policymakers who have mandated such systems (and administrators 
involved in their implementation) have not fully appreciated the chal-
lenges of designing a performance management system that generates 
incentives for improving program impacts. Research in this area has 
also continued to evolve, with advances in theoretical conceptions, 
modeling, and data, and of course, changes in the incentive systems 
over time have facilitated analysis of their implications for performance 
standards system design and functioning. The chapters included in this 
volume embody a number of these important advancements, and yet 
our primary aim is to make the lessons of our research clear to those 
who design and implement these incentive systems in the public sector. 
The nine chapters that follow use U.S. employment and training 
programs as a “laboratory” for investigation. They draw extensively 
from the data and experiences of the earlier JTPA performance stan-
dards system, both because of its longer tenure and the availability of 
experimental data. Using a variety of data sources on these incentives 
systems, the authors of these chapters explore how performance stan-
dards and incentives affect the behavior of public managers and agency 
employees, their approaches to service delivery, and ultimately, the out-
comes for participants. Both the JTPA and WIA programs have allowed 
state and local administrators and their governing boards substantial 
     
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 
discretion, within broad limits, to determine performance goals, stan-
dards, and bonus systems. This administrative flexibility is reflected in 
the range of incentive systems that have been implemented by different 
states and by the same states over time. It is this variation that serves as 
the grist for our empirical mill and is used to extract general lessons that 
can be applied on a wider scale to both existing and newly developing 
performance incentive systems. 
KEy qUESTIOnS AnD ChARACTERISTICS OF
PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS SySTEMS In U.S.
EMPLOyMEnT AnD TRAInInG PROGRAMS 
While investigating formal incentive structures and organizational 
behavior within U.S. employment and training programs, the authors in 
this volume address the following six fundamental questions: 
1) How do performance standards and measures operate to in-
clude or exclude individuals with different characteristics in 
these programs? 
2) How do performance standards and measures affect the types 
of services offered? 
3) How do the processes for setting standards and weights for 
performance goals and for recognizing and rewarding perfor-
mance affect system incentives and bureaucratic responses? 
4) Are the performance standards, measures, and incentives 
effective in motivating bureaucratic behavior toward the 
achievement of program goals? 
5) Do short-term outcome measures used in the performance stan-
dards systems predict long-term impacts of the programs on 
participants? 
6) What general lessons can be learned from a study of these 
performance standards systems and the variation in the rules 
governing their administration over time? 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Performance Standards and Improving Government Performance 5 
In the next chapter, the JTPA and WIA performance standards 
systems are described in greater detail. Below, we briefly list four key 
features of the programs that are pertinent to understanding the contri-
butions of this volume. We follow with an overview of the chapters and 
their salient findings. 
1) Federal job training programs (formerly JTPA and currently 
WIA) are highly decentralized. Local level governing boards 
include local business officials along with other government, 
community, and labor leaders. States control most aspects of 
the performance standards system that guides training activi-
ties, including determining the rules that govern how outcome 
measures count and how performance awards are made. 
2) Workforce development programs generate relatively easily 
measured outcomes such as employment, wages, completion of 
education programs, enrollment in the military, and continued 
schooling. More difficult to assess, however, is the value added 
produced by the programs, which, as we show, does not neces-
sarily correlate strongly with shorter-term outcome measures. 
3) Most performance standards have been formulated in terms 
of levels of achievement, rather than in terms of achievement 
gains resulting from program participation. This practice gives 
rise to the potential for “cream skimming,” which results when 
centers enroll persons who are likely to have high outcome 
levels rather than those whose outcomes would improve most 
through participation in the program. 
4) Training centers (or states under WIA) that meet or exceed their 
performance standards typically receive budgetary rewards. 
Training centers have shown, however, that they can manipu-
late the performance standards system in ways that improve 
measured performance but may not contribute to value-added 
or individual gains. The ability of program managers and staff 
to manipulate the data used to monitor them poses a major 
challenge to the successful design of performance standards 
systems. 
       
   
 
 
  
   
 
6 Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 
OvERvIEw OF ThE ChAPTERS AnD ThEIR
RELATIOnShIP TO PREvIOUS RESEARCh 
The studies in this volume take advantage of data that are superior 
in scope and detail to some of the data used in the existing literature or 
available on a regular basis for assessing program performance. The 
research described in Chapters 4, 6, 8, and 9 benefitted from detailed 
longitudinal, microlevel data that were collected in the National JTPA
Study (NJS) and through other administrative data sources. The NJS 
data also include information on JTPA-eligible nonparticipants in four 
experimental sites. These data have two important advantages over 
samples of eligible populations constructed from large public-use data 
sets: 1) they are collected from eligible nonparticipants residing in the 
same geographical area as participants, and 2) the data are gathered us-
ing the same survey instruments as those used for participants. 
In addition, the authors collect and analyze complete information 
about state-level variation in the JTPA and WIA performance standards 
systems. Chapters 4 and 5 show that state incentive systems are highly 
complex and differ widely across states and over time within states. They 
are not easily characterized by small dimensional summary measures as 
used in previous studies (see, for example, Anderson, Burkhauser, and 
Raymond [1993] and Dickinson et al. [1988]). This wealth of data is 
very helpful in assessing the implications of changes and differences in 
performance standard regimes, and a variety of analytical strategies are 
applied to learn from these data. 
Before addressing the key questions listed above, the contributing 
authors provide some basic information in Chapter 2 about the design 
and implementation of the JTPA and WIA programs to aid our readers’
understanding of the research that follows. Chapter 2 describes the ori-
gins and organizational structure of these programs, eligibility rules and 
the types of services made available to participants, details of the per-
formance measures, and other aspects of these performance standards 
systems’ design. Chapter 2 also highlights some of the changes in these 
systems over time, particularly in the shift from JTPA to WIA. 
In Chapter 3, James Heckman, Carolyn Heinrich, and Jeffrey Smith 
set up a formal model of a performance standards system that theo-
retically frames many of the fundamental questions and issues that are 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Performance Standards and Improving Government Performance 7 
addressed in this book. For example, their model demonstrates how the 
JTPA and WIA program goals to promote equity and efficiency inter-
act with a performance standards system based on short-term outcome 
measures. As such, they show that whether or not cream skimming is 
at odds with equity or efficiency (or both) is an empirical question that 
depends on the relationship between the benefits of program services 
and the location of trainees in the skill distribution of applicants. Im-
portantly, the broad conceptual framework that they develop provides 
a foundation for future investigation about when (and if) performance 
standards systems in active labor market programs will increase labor 
market impacts, and when (and if) they are more likely to have unin-
tended consequences due to responses by program staff to the incentives 
they provide. 
In Chapter 4, Courty and Marschke describe the structure of the 
JTPA performance standards system and highlight important details 
that go into developing a performance-contingent budgeting scheme. 
They describe the performance measures upon which awards were con-
tingent, the nature of the awards, and how performance awards were 
computed in JTPA; they also show how crucial the handling of these de-
tails can be to the success of performance funding. Courty and Marschke 
find that interstate differences in the implementation of the performance 
incentives system grew over time, reflecting the substantial discretion 
federal authorities gave to state and local agencies in its management. 
Their findings suggest that the objectives of states’ incentive systems 
increasingly diverged from the original federal ones, leading to some 
unintended consequences. 
Courty, Heinrich, and Marschke draw from the information eco-
nomics, contract theory, and public administration literatures to derive 
theoretical implications for the establishment of appropriate benchmark 
levels of performance (i.e., performance standards) in Chapter 5. They 
then assess alternative methods that are commonly used to construct 
performance standards and evaluate their application in the JTPA and 
WIA systems. They find evidence that performance measurement sys-
tem designers have attempted to “level the playing field” over time to 
provide equivalent performance incentives across states and localities. 
However, they also identify some negative dynamic properties of the 
JTPA and WIA performance measurement systems. The dynamics of 
performance benchmarking, and the politically motivated ambition to 
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demonstrate continuous performance improvement, likely introduced 
inefficiencies and generated incentives to influence performance in 
ways other than increasing effort. These potentially harmful behaviors 
include selecting trainees according to observed characteristics associ-
ated with their labor market success, limiting the availability of more 
intensive training services and demonstrating lower performance early 
on to allow for performance improvements over time. 
In Chapter 6, Heckman and Smith present a detailed, step-by-step 
analysis of the process by which individuals become participants in 
employment and training programs. Using data from the JTPA system, 
the goal of their analysis is to determine the sources of demographic 
disparities in participation rates and to isolate the roles of personal in-
formation, program eligibility rules, and administrative discretion in 
determining the probability of program participation. Disparities aris-
ing from voluntary decisions not to participate by informed persons 
raise different policy concerns from disparities arising from inequitable 
administrative practices or bureaucratic treatment. Models for the de-
termination of eligibility, awareness of the program, and application 
and acceptance into the program are estimated. Bureaucratic discretion 
is assumed to play the major role in the final stage of the process. The 
evidence reported in this chapter indicates that while cream skimming 
is an important feature of the JTPA program, program eligibility rules, 
the personal choices of potential participants, and informational con-
straints are also important determinants of demographic disparities in 
JTPA participation. 
Another important lesson from the incentive literature is that ex-
plicit incentives may elicit unintended and dysfunctional responses, 
also known as gaming responses. In Chapter 7, Courty and Marschke 
present a comprehensive overview of the literature on dysfunctional 
responses and develop a theoretical framework to classify the vari-
ous dysfunctional responses that have been identified in practice. 
They distinguish three types of dysfunctional responses: 1) account-
ing manipulations that have no impact on the organization, 2) gaming 
responses that boost performance outcomes but have a negative impact 
on the organization, and 3) marginal misallocations that have positive 
impacts but are suboptimal because alternative allocations would have 
a higher impact. They then summarize the empirical evidence of dys-
functional responses in the JTPA system and assess the extent to which 
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such responses may impede the effective functioning of performance 
measurement systems. 
A widely cited GAO report (1991) claims that the JTPA perfor-
mance standard system produced inequities by encouraging frequent 
routing of minorities and women into the least productive training ac-
tivities and by denying them training altogether. The GAO alleges that 
training centers’ pursuit of incentive payments and recognition for high 
performance has a perverse effect on participant selection as well as on 
trainees’ access to services. In Chapter 8, through an extensive analysis 
of a JTPA training center in Illinois, Heinrich shows that bureaucratic 
decisions involving the selection of participants and their assignments 
to JTPA program services are frequently interdependent. She combines 
case-study and econometric approaches to investigate the screening 
decisions made by program staff and the influence of performance stan-
dards on these decisions. Heinrich finds evidence that these frontline 
staff cream-skim in making their enrollment and treatment-assignment 
decisions, and she also documents how shifts in federal policy fostered 
a movement away from more costly but higher value-added services 
toward less costly services. In the face of declining JTPA budgets, it 
appears that bureaucrats sought to preserve their client load and main-
tain low costs by offering cheaper but less cost-effective services. The 
resulting effect, most likely unintended, is that bureaucrats cut service 
quality to keep program costs low and maintain service quantity. 
In Chapter 9, Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith use data from the 
NJS to examine the relationship between the short-run performance 
measures used in the JTPA performance standards system, such as em-
ployment and wages at termination from the program (or 13 weeks after 
termination), and experimental estimates of the impact or value added 
of the program on employment and earnings. In most cases, the data 
reveal a very weak relationship between the short-run measures and 
the long-run impacts. In fact, this relationship is often perverse, so that 
higher short-run measures are associated with lower long-term impacts 
from training. The JTPA performance standards system was, and the 
current WIA system is, based on measures that are not highly correlated 
with the gains from the program. Thus, evidence presented in the other 
chapters that the performance standards system “works” in the sense 
that it motivates bureaucrats to achieve certain standards does not imply 
that the performance standards system leads training centers to choose 
  
 
	 	 	 	
10 Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 
the combination of persons served and services offered that maximizes 
total gains obtained from the program. 
In Chapter 10, Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith summarize three 
main lessons of the volume regarding the effectiveness of performance 
standards in public organizations and the need for further research. 
First, organizations respond to incentives, but sometimes the responses 
are perverse. In the first iteration of an incentive system’s design, well-
meaning designers of the performance standards system are unlikely to 
anticipate the shrewd responses of program administrators and frontline 
workers to system incentives, or the many possible ways they might 
influence measured performance without necessarily adding to (or pos-
sibly even detracting from) program value or impact. For example, 
individuals’ access to program services and the nature and duration of 
the services participants receive are sometimes adversely affected by 
bureaucrats’ responses to the performance incentives. 
Second, the short-term outcome measures that continue to be used 
in the WIA performance standards system are only weakly related to 
the true long-run impacts of the program on earnings and employment. 
Measures of changes in earnings were tried under WIA but were dis-
continued, and the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) continues with 
measures of entry into unsubsidized employment, retention in unsub-
sidized employment six months after entry into the employment, and 
earnings levels six months after entry into the employment. Research-
ers and policymakers have yet to identify performance measures that 
will promote key, long-term program objectives while simultaneously 
generating more readily available performance information for ongoing 
program management. 
Third, the importance of the cream skimming issue has been over-
stated in popular discussions. In the provision of employment and 
training services, the trade-off between efficiency and equity is mod-
est at best. Personal choices and informational constraints play an 
important role in accounting for demographic differences in program 
participation among those eligible, while the effect of administrative 
discretion in accounting for demographic disparities among the eligible 
population is relatively limited. Chapter 10 includes a brief discussion 
of some policy implications of these findings. 
In his book The Dynamics of Performance Management, Donald 
Moynihan (2008, pp. 4–5) argues that performance management re-
              
           
             
          
         
 
	 	 	 	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	
      
	 	 	
 
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Performance Standards and Improving Government Performance 11 
forms have become so central to recent public management agendas 
that it “is only a slight exaggeration to say that we are betting the fu-
ture of governance on the use of performance information.” Clearly, 
the design and implementation of performance standards and incentive 
systems in the public sector will continue to be a dynamic pursuit, and 
it is our hope that the lessons distilled in this volume will have a role in 
shaping and speeding their evolution and the improvement of govern-
ment performance. 
notes 
1. In the effort to achieve hospital accident and emergency waiting time targets, hospi-
tals cancelled operations and required patients to wait in ambulance queues outside 
the hospital until they were confident the patients could be seen within the targeted 
(four-hour) time. Bevan and Hood also find discrepancies between official reported 
levels of performance and those from independent surveys of patients. 
2. Or, it may be the case that some of the fundamental lessons from studies to date 
have been ignored or deferred in pursuit of other objectives (political or other-
wise); see, for example, Radin (2000). 
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U.S. Employment and Training
Programs and Performance
Standards System Design 
Pascal Courty 
Carolyn J. Heinrich 
Gerald Marschke 
Jeffrey Smith 
Prior to the recession that began in 2007, public expenditures on 
employment and training services were declining. For example, in fis-
cal year 2007, the total U.S. federal government appropriations for WIA
programs—youth employment, adult job training, dislocated worker 
assistance, Job Corps, and other national activities—was $4.4 billion, 
down 18 percent from fiscal year 2005. Within the WIA program, the 
number of adults receiving training was likewise declining appreciably 
relative to its predecessor, JTPA (Frank and Minoff 2005). Further-
more, the JTPA program had substantially reduced the size and scope 
of federal public employment and training programs relative to its pre-
decessors, the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) and 
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). 
In 2009, the Obama administration reversed these trends of dimin-
ishing public expenditures on employment and training. The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) injected an unprecedented 
level of funding (an addition of more than $3.5 billion) into the pub-
lic workforce development system and associated employment and 
training programs.1 This infusion of resources to aid unemployed and 
underemployed workers nearly doubled U.S. federal government fund-
ing for WIA programs and rejuvenated public interest in improving the 
effectiveness of the workforce development system. 
This book focuses on the two most recent workforce development 
programs, JTPA and WIA. JTPA is widely known for having intro-
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duced outcomes-based performance standards to public employment 
and training programs (in 1982). WIA has retained the basic structure 
of its predecessor while making important operational changes in the 
performance standards system (in 2000).2 This chapter aims to provide 
basic information about U.S. employment and training programs to aid 
our readers in understanding the research and analyses presented in this 
book. In the following sections, essential features of these programs are 
described, including their origins and organizational structures, eligibil-
ity rules and the types of services made available to participants, and the 
design of the performance standards systems. 
ORIGInS AnD ORGAnIzATIOnAL STRUCTURE
OF JTPA AnD wIA
During the period in which it operated, JTPA constituted the larg-
est federal employment and training program for disadvantaged U.S. 
workers. The act mandated the provision of employment and train-
ing services to “those who can benefit from, and are most in need of, 
such opportunities.” It also required that the basic return on training 
investments “be measured by the increased employment and earnings 
of participants and the reduction in welfare dependency” (U.S. Con-
gress 1982). Designed in the Reagan era of New Federalism, JTPA
was distinguished by a more decentralized administrative structure that 
included a larger role for the private sector; a performance standards 
system developed to measure program outcomes, increase local-level 
accountability, and encourage more efficient program management; and 
lower program costs per participant, in part due to elimination of public 
service employment and participant stipend components. Dickinson et 
al. (1988), LaLonde (1995), and O’Leary, Straits, and Wandner (2004) 
provide more detail on the history of employment and training pro-
grams in the United States. 
The original titles of the JTPA legislation established four differ-
ent programs.3 Title IIA authorized the largest of these programs to 
serve economically disadvantaged youths and adults, accounting for 
the majority of JTPA client enrollments and training expenditures.4 The 
primary services provided under JTPA Title IIA—vocational training, 
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on-the-job training, basic/remedial education, job search assistance, 
work experience, and other services such as counseling and assess-
ment, job-readiness activities, and case management—continue to be 
available in WIA, although training priorities and service access have 
changed. While amendments to JTPA had shifted service provision 
away from low-cost job search activities and toward more intensive 
(e.g., classroom) training, WIA made important changes to refocus 
the program toward assessment and job search assistance services that 
are made available to a broader population. WIA, enacted in 1998, of-
ficially superseded the JTPA program in July 2000. See O’Shea and 
King (2001) for a comprehensive discussion of the WIA provisions and 
changes, Social Policy Research Associates (2004) for a comprehensive 
report on WIA implementation. 
In both JTPA and WIA, responsibility for the interpretation and im-
plementation of program provisions was delegated to the USDOL. The 
USDOL communicates some specific policy directives to states, but the 
interpretation of many critical provisions and the major responsibility 
for program administration and service delivery lie with state and local 
job training agencies. Under JTPA, the distinct (nonoverlapping and ex-
haustive) program jurisdictions were known as service delivery areas; 
in WIA, they are called workforce investment areas. 
Federal funding for these programs is allocated to states in propor-
tion to measures of economic need, e.g., the number of unemployed 
and economically disadvantaged individuals residing within them.5 
And although states are required to expend the recent federal stimulus 
funding by the end of June 2011, the Obama administration encouraged 
them to spend the funds in “transformational efforts” to realize the “full 
capacity” of the system to innovate and improve the effectiveness of 
workforce development programs (USDOL 2009a). 
The organizational forms of the job training centers and their ap-
proaches to service delivery have varied across states and localities 
under both JTPA and WIA.6 Some job training centers are public enti-
ties at the state, county, or municipal government level, and others are 
private, not-for-profit, or for-profit organizations. Under WIA, states 
are required to establish a State Workforce Investment Board, includ-
ing the governor, members of the state legislature, and representatives 
of business, labor, educational entities, economic development agen-
cies, and community-based organizations. A major responsibility of the 
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board is to develop a state plan that outlines a five-year strategy for 
the statewide workforce investment system. At the local level, all job 
training centers are directed and supervised by a board of representa-
tives from business, labor, the community, and local elected officials, 
known formerly as Private Industry Councils under JTPA and currently 
as Workforce Investment Boards under WIA. These boards determine 
who is served, the types of services made available, and who should 
provide the services (within the limitations of the statute). 
The particular structure of local program administration depends 
on a number of factors, including the size of the job training juris-
diction and its population, urban versus rural location, local political 
configurations, and state-level administrative policies. In the JTPA
program, some agencies provided training services directly to eligible 
clients, while a majority contracted with independent service provider 
organizations to select participants and deliver program services (see 
Dickinson et al. 1988). Workforce Investment Boards in the current 
program are required to operate at least one One-Stop Career Center 
in their service area, with the objective of colocating programs of the 
USDOL, Department of Education, Department of Health and Human 
Services, and Department of Housing and Urban Development (e.g., 
employment services, unemployment insurance, vocational rehabilita-
tion, adult education, welfare-to-work, and postsecondary vocational 
education). The local boards develop and enter into a “memorandum of 
understanding” with the One-Stop partners that specifies the services to 
be provided through the One-Stop delivery system, how the service and 
operating costs of the system will be funded, and methods for referral of 
customers between the One-Stop operator and the partners. 
WIA also uses a form of vouchers for some participants, called 
individual training accounts (ITAs), which allows them to purchase 
training services directly from certified providers, a provision intended 
to increase “customer choice” over the JTPA approach of using subcon-
tracted providers. Implementation of ITAs varies on several dimensions, 
including how the amount of the ITAs (or customers’ spending) is 
determined, whether counseling in the use of the ITAs is required or 
voluntary, and how much local staff restrict customers’ training choices. 
D’Amico and Salzman (2004), Decker and Perez-Johnson (2004), and 
McConnell et al. (2006) provide more detail on ITAs and also describe 
an experimental evaluation of alternative ITA implementations. 
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The research presented in the subsequent chapters of this book 
conveys how critical these structures and processes are (as well as the 
allocation of authority and discretion within them) in determining ser-
vice access and program effectiveness.
PROGRAM ELIGIBILITy AnD SERvICES 
Although JTPAand WIAdiffer considerably in their eligibility crite-
ria, they have in common the voluntary nature of program participation. 
The JTPA Title IIA program was more narrowly focused on serving the 
disadvantaged, requiring 90 percent of all enrollees to be disadvantaged 
and minimum levels of service to particular segments of the popula-
tion, including youths, high school dropouts, and welfare recipients.7
At the same time, Devine and Heckman (1996) show that the federal 
eligibility rules defined a fairly broad JTPA-eligible population, and lo-
cal job training centers retained discretion to enroll noneconomically
disadvantaged persons who satisfied other “hardship” criteria defined 
in the act (e.g., displaced homemakers, persons with limited English 
proficiency, etc.) for the other 10 percent of their participant popula-
tions. Because annual program funding levels afforded services to less 
than 3 percent of the JTPA-eligible population (Heckman and Smith 
1999), state and local administrative entities had considerable leeway in 
identifying specific target groups and developing additional participant 
selection criteria within the eligibility guidelines (i.e., being eligible did 
not guarantee one the opportunity to participate). 
Under WIA, the most basic “core” services—outreach, intake/ 
assessment, job search assistance/placement, and labor market infor-
mation—are made available to the general public with no qualifying 
criteria/eligibility requirements. The USDOL does not require monitor-
ing and tracking of participants using the self-directed core services or 
non-WIA services at the One-Stop centers, but rather only those par-
ticipants who receive substantial staff assistance in the WIA programs. 
Individuals’access to intensive or training services (e.g., comprehensive 
assessment and case management, vocational, or on-the-job training) 
proceeds sequentially if they are “unemployed and are unable to obtain 
employment through core services provided” (WIA, Section 134 3.A.i). 
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However, as Eberts, O’Leary, and DeRango (2002) note, the USDOL
offers little guidance to One-Stop center workers on how to identify the 
needs of this broader target population and how to refer customers to 
the various levels of service in a cost-effective manner. Wandner (2002) 
nicely summarizes the differences in JTPA and WIA “service referral 
principles,” and argues that there is a greater need for the use of target-
ing tools under WIA to aid frontline staff in determining appropriate 
service levels for customers. 
PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS SySTEM DESIGn 
Under both JTPA and WIA, the performance standards system is 
designed to reward job training centers or state workforce development 
programs, respectively, that achieve performance goals with incentive 
(budgetary) awards and external recognition. The USDOL, state job 
training agencies, and local job training centers have together defined 
and enforced these incentive policies. 
The federal government is primarily involved in defining the basic 
structure of the performance standards system in public employment 
and training programs. These responsibilities of the USDOL include 
defining mandatory performance measures to be used by states and lo-
cal areas, setting state accounting and reporting rules, and monitoring, 
rewarding, and/or sanctioning job training center performance. Table 
2.1 shows the performance measures currently in effect under WIA and 
also indicates which of these are new to WIA (i.e., were not used in 
JTPA). Though the majority of these measures are common to JTPA
and WIA, there were a number of changes made in JTPA that shifted the 
focal point of performance measurement from enrollees’ labor market 
status at the time of program completion to three months after termi-
nation from the program. Under WIA, the follow-up period has been 
extended to six months after program completion. Chapter 4 includes 
additional discussion of the evolution of the performance measures un-
der JTPA. 
States are also now required to calculate performance outcomes us-
ing Unemployment Insurance (UI) data. An earlier GAO report (2002) 
indicated that some states were experiencing difficulties in getting 
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access to these records and developing or modifying data systems to 
produce this information. The USDOL has since been working to pro-
mote data exchange between states via the Wage Record Interchange 
System (WRIS), which specifically facilitates the exchange of wage 
data for the purpose of assessing and reporting on state and local em-
ployment and training program and provider performance. As of August 
2009, all states were participating in the WRIS.8 
Performance standards are the numerical goals that job training 
centers must achieve to become eligible for incentive awards and to 
avoid sanctions. In JTPA, the USDOL exercised greater authority in 
the determination of performance standard levels (or targets). It estab-
lished expected performance levels in JTPA using a regression-based 
model with national departure points. States could use the optional 
Labor Department adjustment model or develop their own adjustment 
procedures, although state-developed procedures and adjustments had 
to conform to the department’s parameters (Social Policy Research 
Associates 1999). A majority of states adopted the optional USDOL ad-
justment model and used the USDOL-provided performance standards 
worksheets to determine performance targets, although sometimes with 
modifications. Chapters 4 and 5 present additional information about 
how performance standards were adjusted under the JTPA program. 
Under WIA, states negotiate with the USDOL and local service de-
livery areas to establish performance targets, using estimates based on 
historical data that are similarly intended to take into account differ-
ences in economic conditions, participant characteristics, and services 
delivered. Since performance data were collected in JTPA, more than 
half of the states used these baseline data to determine appropriate levels 
for the WIA-negotiated performance standards or to inform negotia-
tions with local workforce development officials. The informal process 
of making these adjustments during negotiations in WIA contrasts no-
ticeably with the standardized regression-based approach used by states 
under JTPA. States’ own reports of procedures used to determine WIA
performance standards suggest that there is substantially greater discre-
tion and variation in both the processes and types of information used 
to establish the state-level standards (Heinrich 2004). The pretext for 
making this change to a system of negotiated standards was to promote 
“shared accountability,” described as one of the “guiding principles” of 
WIA (USDOL 2001, p. 8).9 
Table 2.1  Performance Measures—JTPA and wIA 
Performance measure Description 
Adults 
Entered employment rate 
Employment retention rate at 6 months 
Average earnings change in 6 months 
Employment and credential ratea 
Dislocated workers 
Entered employment rate 
Employment retention rate at 6 months 
Earnings replacement rate in 6 months 
Employment and credential ratea 
Older youths (19–21) 
Entered employment rate 
The percentage of adults who obtained a job by the end of the first quarter after program 
exit (excluding participants employed at registration). 
Of adults who had a job in the first quarter after exit, percentage with a job in the third 
quarter after exit. 
Of those who had a job in the first quarter after exit, the postprogram earnings increases 
relative to preprogram earnings. 
Of those adults who received WIA training services, the percentage who were employed in 
the first quarter after exit and received a credential by the end of the third quarter after exit. 
The percentage of dislocated workers who obtained a job by the end of the first quarter 
after program exit (excluding those employed at registration). 
Of those who had a job in the first quarter after exit, the percentage of dislocated workers 
who have a job in the third quarter after exit. 
Of those who had a job in the first quarter after exit, the percentage of preprogram earnings 
that are earned postprogram. 
Of those dislocated workers who received WIA training services, the percentage who were 
employed in the first quarter after exit and received a credential by the end of the third 
quarter after exit. 
The percentage of older youths who were not enrolled in postsecondary education or 
advanced training in the first quarter after program exit and obtained a job by the end of 
the first quarter after exit (excluding those employed at registration). 
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 Employment retention rate at 6 months Of those who had a job in the first quarter after exit and were not enrolled in postsecondary 
education or advanced training in the third quarter after program exit, the percentage of 
older youths who have a job in the third quarter after exit. 
Average earnings change in 6 months Of those who had a job in the first quarter after exit and were not enrolled in postsecondary 
education or advanced training, the postprogram earnings increases relative to preprogram 
earnings. 
Older youths employment/education/ The percentage of older youths who are in employment, postsecondary education, or 
training and credential ratea advanced training in the first quarter after exit and received a credential by the end of the 
third quarter after exit. 
Younger youths 
Retention rate In employment, postsecondary education, advanced training, apprenticeships in third 
quarter after exit. 
Skill attainment rate Attain at least two goals relating to basic skills, work readiness, skill attainment, entered 
employment and skill training. 
Diploma rate Earn a secondary school diploma or its recognized equivalent (GED). 
Customer satisfaction 
Participant satisfactiona The average of three statewide survey questions, rated 1 to 10 (1 = very dissatisfied to 10 = 
very satisfied), asking if participants were satisfied with services, if services met customer 
expectations, and how the services compared to the “ideal set” of services. 
Employer satisfactiona The average of three statewide survey questions, rated 1 to 10 (1 = very dissatisfied to 10 =
very satisfied), asking if employers were satisfied with services, if services met customer 
expectations, and how the services compared to the “ideal set” of services. 
aNew to WIA. 
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In JTPA, 6 percent of the federal government’s JTPA appropriation 
to states was designated for performance incentive awards to local job 
training centers. Some states made the incentive awards for job train-
ing centers dependent on their performance relative to other service 
delivery areas. Other states defined a maximum incentive payment for 
each job training center, with the fraction awarded depending on the 
difference between the center’s measured performance and the state 
standards. Until recently in the WIA program, the Secretary of Labor 
awarded incentive grants to states that achieve at least 80 percent of 
their negotiated performance levels on each performance measure and 
at least a 100 percent cumulative program area score for each of the 
program areas (adults, dislocated workers, and youths) and the cus-
tomer satisfaction measures.10 States were required to apply for the 
incentive grants and may receive a minimum grant award of $750,000, 
up to a maximum amount of $3,000,000 (conditional on the availabil-
ity of funds), for use in innovative programs. States that did not meet 
their performance goals for two consecutive years may be sanctioned 
with a 5 percent reduction in their WIA grants. In addition to the mon-
etary incentives and penalties under JTPA and WIA, states have also 
recognized high performers and innovative programs with special non-
monetary awards. In general, the performance standards system serves 
as the primary means for federal- and state-level monitoring and moti-
vation of local job training center operations and performance. 
SUMMARy 
The goal of this chapter is to provide the basic information es-
sential to understanding the more in-depth and rigorous analyses of 
the performance standards systems in U.S. employment and training 
programs that follow in this book. The subsequent chapters delve into 
the complexities and challenges of operating an efficient, informative, 
and accurate performance standards system, and the implications of 
basic program design elements—i.e., legislative objectives, organiza-
tional structures, accountability requirements, reporting relationships, 
and funding—for the effective functioning of a performance standards 
system. And importantly, the research presented in this book also ad-
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dresses the implications of these systems for the programs’ outcomes 
and impacts on participants’ employment and earnings. The majority of 
the following chapters focus primarily on JTPA, in part because it was 
the longest running public sector employment and training program in 
the United States and has had the longest history of any public sec-
tor program with an outcomes-based performance standard system; in 
part because of the unique data available from the experimental evalu-
ation of the JTPA program; and in part because it is similar enough 
to yield important lessons for current WIA programs and their future 
adaptations. 
notes 
1. “Agency Reported Data,” Recovery.gov, accessed February 22, 2010, http://www 
.recovery.gov/Transparency/agency/reporting/agency_reporting3.aspx?agency_
code=16&dt=02/12/2010. 
2. According to Franklin and Ripley (1984, pp. 176–177), performance standards 
were under development for JTPA’s predecessor, CETA, but were not implemented
prior to CETA’s replacement by JTPA. 
3. Title IIB authorized a summer youth program, Title III funded a program for dis-
located workers, and Title IV governed various federally administered programs. 
Title I of the act described JTPA’s administrative structures, and Title V contained 
amendments and miscellaneous provisions relating to the interaction between 
JTPA and other programs such as the former Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children. 
4. In the early 1990s, Title IIA was split, and a new Title IIC was created specifically 
for economically disadvantaged youth, while IIA was reauthorized to serve adults 
only. 
5. In both the JTPA and WIA programs, one-third of the funds received by states 
depends on the relative number of unemployed individuals in the state; another 
third depends on the relative excess number of unemployed individuals (over 4.5 
percent), and the final third depends on the number of economically disadvantaged 
persons (as defined by the act). 
6. The term job training center is used interchangeably with service delivery area and 
workforce investment area in this book. 
7. Section 4.8 of JTPA specifically defined economic “disadvantage” and was the 
basis from which the program eligibility criteria were derived. An individual was 
eligible for JTPA services if 1) the person or another member of his or her family 
received cash public assistance; 2) the person’s family income did not exceed the 
higher of the poverty level, or 70 percent of the lower living standard level; 3) the 
person was a handicapped adult whose own income met these criteria even though 
his/her family income may not have; 4) the person was eligible for food stamps 
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sometime during the six months prior to applying to JTPA; or 5) the person (a 
youth applicant) was a foster child. 
8. “WRIS Membership, August 7, 2009,” accessed March 4, 2010, http://www.doleta 
.gov/performance/pfdocs/WRIS_MAP_08_07_09.pdf. 
9. The USDOL is currently testing regression models for the WIA performance 
standards with the goal of returning to a system of regression-based adjustments 
beginning in July 2011 (USDOL 2009b).
 10. For example, if a state negotiates a 70 percent adult entered employment rate 
standard and then achieves actual entered employment rate performance of 75 
percent, it will have a score of 107 percent for that measure. If it does less well 
on its adult employment retention rate, say, achieving 60 percent instead of the 62 
percent standard, its score of only 96.8 percent on this measure will be offset by 
its exceptional achievement on the entered employment rate measure (or possibly 
one of the other two adult measures as well). Among the four adult performance 
measures, the cumulative score must be 100 percent (determined “by simple or 
weighted averaging”). 
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A Formal Model of a 
Performance Incentive System 
James J. Heckman 
Carolyn J. Heinrich 
Jeffrey Smith 
This chapter presents a model of training center behavior in an en-
vironment that includes a generic performance management system for 
active labor market programs (ALMPs), such as those funded under 
JTPA and WIA in the United States. The model builds on the work of 
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002) and provides more intuition and 
discussion of the model and its implications, along with some useful 
extensions.1 Additionally, our model offers an essential conceptual con-
text for the detailed analyses of the JTPA and WIA programs that follow 
in the remaining chapters of this volume. 
The model we develop assumes that training (or workforce de-
velopment) centers seek to maximize the present discounted value of 
earnings (or employment) impacts from the services they provide, as 
well as, potentially, goals related to the characteristics of participants 
and to the effort levels exerted by program staff.2 The JTPA and WIA
programs both have formally stated equity (service to particular sub-
groups) and efficiency (improving labor market outcomes relative to 
what would have occurred without the program) goals. Our model dem-
onstrates how these objectives interact with a performance standards 
system based on short-term outcome measures, and we discuss in de-
tail why all of the performance standards systems we know of rely on 
performance measures based on outcome levels measured in the short 
term rather than on impacts (“value added”) over the long run. The use 
of short-term outcomes as performance measures has the potential to 
misdirect activity by focusing training center attention on criteria only 
loosely (or even perversely) related to long-run net benefits, long-run 
equity criteria, or both. For example, if program activities encourage 
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further training and schooling, they may reduce employment and earn-
ings in the short run but raise them in the long run. 
Most discussions of performance standards focus on cream skim-
ming, sometimes defined as selecting persons into a program who 
would have done well without it. Anderson et al. (1992) and Barnow 
(1992) represent early examples of this literature, while Courty, Kim, 
and Marschke (forthcoming) provide an important recent contribution. 
In the context of a system of performance standards, cream skimming 
occurs when training centers serve individuals who will increase their 
measured performance rather than basing service provision decisions 
on individuals’ expected long-run benefits from participation. In this 
chapter, we provide a concise formal definition of cream skimming in 
terms of our model notation, show how performance standards based 
on participant outcomes in the short run encourage it, and discuss the 
conditions under which it does or does not lead centers away from the 
goal of maximizing discounted impacts. 
The model we introduce allows responses to performance stan-
dards in terms of who gets selected into the program from among the 
eligible population and how program resources get allocated among 
participants, as well as strategic responses that seek to increase mea-
sured performance conditional on actual performance, such as those 
considered in Chapter 7. More generally, this model provides a clear 
conceptual framework within which to think about when (and if) per-
formance standards systems in ALMPs will increase the labor market 
impacts they produce, and when (and if) they will have unintended 
consequences due to responses by program staff to the sometimes mis-
guided incentives they provide. 
A MODEL OF TRAInInG CEnTER ChOICES 
Training centers face three choices in each period: 1) how many 
people to train, 2) which particular people to train, and 3) how many 
resources to devote to each trainee. In the current WIA program, ac-
cess to “core” workforce development services (such as labor market 
information and job search assistance) is universal, but access to more 
intensive levels of service (such as comprehensive assessment and case 
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management, vocational training, and subsidized on-the-job training) 
still involves some degree of selection by caseworkers in light of the 
available training resources for individual clients and services (see So-
cial Policy Research Associates [2004] for more institutional details on 
WIA). Thus, in the WIA context, our model applies to these more inten-
sive services. Adding a requirement that all eligible individuals receive 
some very small level of service would not change any of the basic 
results from the model. 
For simplicity, we assume that training centers face a completely 
new cohort of potential trainees in each period; this avoids potential 
complications associated with training centers making choices about 
when to serve particular people. More generally, we assume that train-
ing centers operate in a “stationary” environment, which means that 
the center’s decision rules do not change over time. Put differently, if 
a center faces the same set of potential trainees, the same technology 
for producing trainee outcomes, and the same budget constraint in two 
different periods, it will make exactly the same choices in those two 
periods. We assume that the set of potential trainees and the technology 
stay the same, and, in later sections, that the budget varies only as a 
result of performance awards. 
We ignore the individual application decision in our model and sim-
ply assume that the training center can choose to serve any or all of the 
eligible individuals in each cohort (given its budget constraint). In so 
doing, we abstract from center choices regarding marketing, outreach, 
contractor selection, and other factors that might affect who applies to 
the program, even though the presence or details of a performance stan-
dards system might affect these choices. 
We also assume that individuals participate or not in the first pe-
riod of their adult lives, which we denote age zero, and that training 
takes exactly one period for all trainees. Thus, we implicitly ignore 
individual choices regarding the timing of training.3 Each individual 
has two potential outcomes at each age: a benchmark (or untreated) 
outcome that arises if the individual does not participate (at age zero), 
and a treated outcome that arises if the individual does participate (at 
age zero). In terms of the usual notation, we denote the participant out-
comes by Ya 
1, a = 0,, A, where A is the final period of the person’s 
life, and denote the nonparticipant outcomes by Ya 
0 , a = 0,, A. The 
per-period treatment effect equals Ya 
1 −Ya 
0 = Da . The treatment effect 
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can be negative in the short run if, for example, program participation 
leads to additional schooling or distracts the individual from useful job 
search.4 We abstract from potential general equilibrium effects in our 
discussion.5 In the language of the treatment effects literature, we make
the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which means that 
the treated and untreated outcomes just defined do not depend on who 
participates or on how many individuals participate. 
To allow our analysis to fit into a standard cost-benefit framework, 
let Y denote earnings; we can easily generalize the model to include 
employment or education outcomes. The net (of costs) present value of 
the program impacts (hereinafter just “net impacts”) measured at time 
zero for participant i then equals 
A Dai(3.1) PVi = ∑ a − ci , 
a=0 (1+ r) 
where ci denotes the costs associated with participant i. We assume that 
(Da ,c)  varies among individuals but the interest rate r does not.6 
The model assumes that training centers can apply different amounts 
of input, e, to each participant. In the context of JTPA or WIA (or simi-
lar programs), the input variable represents the value of staff time and 
the direct costs of the services provided. The inputs affect the outcomes 
experienced by participants. In particular, input e yields 
(3.2) Ya 
1 = f (Ya 
0 ,e) , 
at cost c(e), where c(0) = 0. The total cost for participant i is given by 
c = c (e ) + k, where k denotes a per-participant fixed cost. Note that i i i 
we allow both the amount of the inputs and the marginal cost of the 
inputs to vary among participants. 
By choosing to model a continuous input e, we abstract from reality 
on two important dimensions. First, most of the services provided by 
ALMPs come in discrete chunks of a particular type. For example, JTPA
offered, and WIA currently offers, classroom training in occupational 
skills, job search assistance, and subsidized on-the-job training at pri-
vate firms, among other services. Classroom training consists of various 
types of courses, each aimed at a particular occupation and each having 
a specific duration. The other service types vary in a similar way. Rep-
resenting this complex mix of discrete services by a continuous input 
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simplifies our model considerably, but at the cost of abstracting from 
the potential impact of performance standards not only on the amount of 
services provided but on their type and duration. For example, Heinrich 
(1999), Barnow and Gubits (2002), and D’Amico and Salzman (2004) 
(and many others) have argued that a focus on short-term outcomes 
in performance standards pushes training centers toward providing 
shorter, less-intensive services such as job search assistance to a larger 
number of trainees. Second, we ignore the fact that inputs often get al-
located to participants dynamically in response to their experiences in 
particular treatments and in response to their labor market outcomes. 
For example, at the end of a classroom training course, participants with 
a job lined up do not receive job search assistance, while those without 
a job lined up often do. Our simplifying assumption means that our 
model also fails to capture any effects of performance standards on this 
dynamic service allocation process. 
Given these assumptions, training centers have several degrees of 
freedom in regard to whom to serve and how many inputs to devote 
to each participant. First, for a fixed set of inputs, a training center 
can choose to serve individuals with different (Da ,c) combinations. 
Second, holding the set of participants fixed, the training center can 
choose the inputs it provides to each participant, which has the effect of 
changing their potential outcomes given participation (and, necessarily, 
changing their impacts of participation as well). Third, a training center 
can choose the number of participants by trading off between the fixed 
cost k and the variable input cost ci (ei ). 
If the training center maximizes the ex post present value of the 
net earnings impacts realized by its trainees, it solves a constrained op-
timization problem. Maximizing the present value of the net impacts 
corresponds to a social goal of efficiency in the economic sense; it means 
making the economic “pie” as large as possible while ignoring equity 
concerns other than those implicit in the program’s eligibility rules. In 
the absence of a budget constraint, the center would simply find the e
that maximizes the present value of net impacts for each participant: 
A 1 0(Ya − Ya )(3.3) eˆ = arg max − c( )e − k.∑ a 
e (1+ r ) 
In the real world, and in our model, training centers operate under a 
budget constraint. Let B denote the center budget in each period. With a 
a=0 
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budget constraint, centers face a trade-off between serving more clients 
and devoting more inputs to each client. Let{1,..., I}be the index set 
of eligible individuals; put differently, label each eligible person with 
a number from 1 to I. Person i has associated variable costs ci(ei) and 
fixed cost k.We assume that technology (3.2) is common across persons 
although this assumption can easily be relaxed. 
The training center solves its maximization problem in two steps. 
In the first step, for each possible set of trainees S ⊆ {1,..., I} in the cur-
rent cohort it determines the optimal choice of inputs to devote to each 
member of the set. Formally, for each possible set S, the center solves 
the problem 
 A Y 1 0 ( a,i −Ya,i )
(3.4) max  a − c (e ) − k ,∑ ∑ i i e ,i∈S 
i∈S  a=0 (1+ r ) i   
subject to Equation (3.2), and 
(3.5) B ≥ ∑(ci (ei ) + k ) . 
i∈S 
For LaGrange multiplier λ attached to the constraint in (3.5), solv-
ing the optimization problem produces the first order condition 
A f Yi,0 a ,ei   1 c e (3.6)     i i 
a0  ei  1 r a ei  
for each observation i ∈ S. Condition (3.6) represents the standard ef-
ficiency condition for ei which sets marginal benefit equal to marginal 
cost. In the absence of a budget constraint, λ = 1 at an interior optimum. 
In general, λ ≥ 1, reflecting the scarcity of the resources available to the 
center, and the center invests less in each person than it would in the 
absence of resource constraints.7 
The second step to solving the overall optimization problem for 
each cohort consists of comparing the optimal value of the present value
of net impacts for each subset S and choosing the subset S* that has the 
highest one. Formally, write the maximized present value implied by 
the solution to the constrained optimization problem in Equation (3.4) 
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as ψ(S,B), where this notation shows the dependence of the optimum on 
both the set S of participants selected and the available budget B. The 
center chooses the optimal S, which we denote by S*, so that 
ψ(S* ,B) = arg max ψ (S,B).8 
S 
Implementing this ex post optimal solution requires information 
that both the centers and (to a lesser extent) the individuals themselves 
do not possess at the time of participation. In particular, they do not 
know future values of (Ya 
1,Ya 
0 ), although they may have other infor-
mation useful for predicting these values. For example, most ALMPs 
collect information on observable characteristics associated with out-
comes from prospective participants, and some may also have access to 
administrative data on past labor market outcomes. 
The available evidence suggests the difficulty of forecasting future 
D 
a 
. In particular, Bell and Orr (2002) show that caseworkers do a very 
poor job of predicting D 
a 
in a program that provides job training to 
welfare recipients, and Lechner and Smith (2007) show that Swiss case-
workers also do not perform well at this task. Carneiro, Hansen, and 
Heckman (2003) demonstrate that individuals cannot forecast most of 
the variation in the earnings impact associated with attending college. 
Let Ji denote the center’s information set for individual i. Taking 
into account the lack of complete information, the criterion for ex ante 
optimality for each S becomes 
1 0  A E (Ya,i −Ya,i | Ji )  
(3.7) Max ∑∑ a  − ci (ei ) − k  , 
i i∈S  a=0 (1+ r )  e    
subject to Equation (3.2), Equation (3.5), and the individual-specific 
information sets{Ji } . For each S,{Ji } , B, and r, we may write the i∈S i∈S 
solution to this present value maximization problem as ψ (S , B, J ), 
where J = {J1,..., J I}. The training center seeks to maximize this crite-
rion with respect to S, so that 
*ψ (S , B, J ) = arg maxψ (S , B, J ) . 
S 
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In this model, training centers adjust at three margins: 1) which eli-
gible individuals become trainees (in WIA, which participants receive 
intense services), 2) the amount of inputs devoted to each trainee, and 
3) the number of trainees. While the exact trade-offs depend on the 
specifications of the technology for producing outcomes in Equation 
(3.2), the marginal cost functions, and the level of fixed costs k, a set 
of intuitive comparative static results follow directly from the model. 
For example, increasing the slope of the marginal cost function c(e), 
all else equal, leads centers to increase the number of participants and 
to serve each one less intensively. Increases in the fixed cost k have the 
opposite effect, reducing the number of participants and increasing the 
amount of resources devoted to each one. Individuals with higher mar-
ginal costs—i.e., larger values of ci ′(ei ) —will, all else equal, receive 
fewer inputs. Increasing the amount of complementarity between the 
untreated outcome and the costs in the production function in Equation 
(3.2) leads centers to devote relatively more inputs to participants with 
good untreated outcomes. Increases in the budget lead, in general, to 
both more participants and more inputs per participant. Finally, in a 
stationary environment, the training center makes the same decision in 
every period.9 
MOTIvATInG PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS 
The model in the preceding section assumes that training centers 
maximize the net present value of impacts and nothing else. In fact, 
training centers exist in a political context and they employ caseworkers 
and managers who care about outcomes other than just the maximiza-
tion of the present value of net impacts. Consider the politicians first. 
Politicians care about what training centers do. In particular, they care 
not only about present value maximization but also about other aspects 
of who, and how many, get served. For example, politicians may care 
about the absolute number of participants, based on the view that each 
participant will feel that he or she has received something from the 
politician, and so, perhaps, will vote accordingly. Politicians may also 
care about serving members of particular groups whose leaders support 
them or about serving highly visible individuals, such as those who lose 
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their jobs when a major plant closes; see, e.g., Heinrich (1999) on the 
role of politics in JTPA contract award decisions. 
We can summarize politicians’ preferences by the utility function 
UP[ψ(S),N(S),Q(S)], where ψ(S) denotes the expected present value 
of net impacts for participant cohort S (with the other arguments sup-
pressed for simplicity), and N(S) denotes the number of participants 
(≤ I ) served in cohort S. Q(S) denotes other qualities of the persons 
served such as demographic characteristics or their untreated outcomes, 
with the latter motivated by a desire to serve those least well off in the 
absence of the program due to equity concerns. 
Training center staff members also care about aspects of their work 
other than just present value maximization. For example, as discussed 
in Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996), caseworkers may prefer to serve 
the most disadvantaged (those with the lowest benchmark outcomes Ya 
0) 
or members of particular subgroups among the eligible. At the same 
time, they may prefer to serve fewer individuals than present value 
maximization would imply if, for example, they get utility from getting 
to know their clients in depth. Abstracting for simplicity from the fact 
that training center managers (some of them future politicians) may 
have different preferences than the line workers they manage, we can 
summarize the training center utility function by UT[ψ(S),N(S),Q(S)]. 
Given either utility function, we can define a constrained optimi-
zation problem similar to that defined in the preceding section. The 
problem consists of maximizing the utility function subject to the tech-
nology for producing participant outcomes in Equation (3.2) and the 
budget constraint in Equation (3.5) through choices about how many 
people to serve, which ones to serve, and how to allocate the inputs 
among those served. The equilibrium from this modified optimization 
problem will differ in simple and intuitive ways from that obtained un-
der present value maximization in the preceding section. For example, 
if we consider maximizing the training center’s utility and if the train-
ing center gets disutility from a larger number of participants, then the 
resulting number of participants will not exceed that chosen under pres-
ent value maximization. If the training center gets utility from serving 
some particular group, say unemployed musicians, then it will serve 
more of them (or at least no fewer of them) under utility maximization 
than under present value maximization, and so on. 
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In this setting, performance standards have no role to play, even if 
the training center has imperfect information about potential outcomes, 
so long as the utility functions of the politicians and the training center 
are similar enough (e.g., one is a linear transformation of the other) that 
they would reach the same solution to the ex ante utility maximization 
problem just described. A role for performance standards emerges when 
the two utility functions imply different choices. In that event, politi-
cians may want to provide additional incentives to training centers in a 
way that makes their choices closer to those implied by the politicians’
utility function. For example, if the training centers dislike having more 
participants at the margin and politicians like having more participants 
at the margin, then politicians will want to introduce performance stan-
dards in a way that rewards centers for having more participants. 
In one view, this situation, in which the politicians set up the local 
training centers, which then deliver services within the context of broad 
rules, represents a classic principal-agent problem. The politicians 
would like the training centers to choose an optimum that corresponds 
to their own utility, rather than that of the center staff. See the insight-
ful survey in Dixit (2002) and the references cited therein (as well as 
the other papers in the related special issue of the Journal of Human 
Resources) for further elaboration of this point. 
Politicians can bring center behavior in line with their own prefer-
ences in two basic ways.10 One obvious way consists of specifying the 
rules governing center behavior so narrowly as to leave center staff with 
little discretion to do otherwise than as specified by program rules.11 
The fundamental problem with this approach in the context of ALMPs 
arises from the complexity of the task at hand and the large amount of 
(often tacit) local knowledge, in the sense of Hayek (1945), required for 
the task. Most training centers under JTPA and now under WIA serve 
individuals with quite heterogeneous desires and abilities by matching 
them with a (wide) variety of services provided either directly by the 
center or a service provider under contract. Attempting to prespecify the 
matches between participants and services would require either numb-
ing levels of regulatory detail or a false simplicity that would likely
seriously degrade the quality of the resulting matches. Performance 
standards represent an alternative to micromanagement by the politi-
cians via program regulations. Here politicians define the goals they 
seek by defining the performance measures and the “reward functions” 
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(described in Chapters 4 and 5 for the JTPA program) that link observed 
performance to rewards and punishments. In so doing, they allow cen-
ters to continue using their local knowledge in choosing whom to serve 
and how to serve them, while at the same time directing the application 
of this knowledge toward the politicians’ own goals. 
An alternative view from a principal-agent perspective assumes 
that politicians and training centers share the same preferences about 
whom to serve and how to serve them, but differ in their desired level of 
training center effort. Put simply, politicians would like training center 
staff to work very hard, while training center staff would like to con-
sume some on-the-job leisure. This view links to the literature on piece 
rates, performance-based compensation for CEOs, and other types of 
incentives often found in private firms; this literature focuses almost 
exclusively on methods for tying remuneration to measured output as a 
means to increase unobserved effort (see Prendergast [1999] for an able 
survey, Lazear [1995] for a book-length treatment, and Chapter 5 for 
additional discussion in our context). We could incorporate this view 
into our model by breaking inputs e into two components, one repre-
senting staff effort and the other representing other inputs. The sum of 
staff effort would then enter negatively into the training center utility 
function, capturing the negative direct effect of staff effort; at the same 
time, staff effort would have an indirect positive effect on center utility 
through its effect on the present value of net impacts. 
A third view of performance standards emphasizes the information 
they provide rather than their role in solving (or attempting to solve) 
one or the other of the principal-agent problems just described. In this 
view—discussed, for example, in Smith (2004)—performance standards 
represent quick and dirty impact evaluations. They provide valuable 
feedback to training center managers and staff (and to politicians) about 
their progress at meeting equity and efficiency goals—feedback that, 
as Lechner and Smith (2007) note, training centers often otherwise 
never receive, because they rarely interact with those they serve after 
they serve them. Because the feedback comes quickly, it allows rapid 
responses to changes in performance due to changes in program opera-
tion, local economic conditions, or other factors. Our model does not 
capture this role for performance standards in a formal way; doing so 
would substantially complicate the model, as it would need to incorpo-
rate training center learning in response to the information provided by 
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the performance measures. We note in Chapter 9 some implications of 
thinking about performance measures in this way for the interpretation 
of the evidence on the correlation between performance measures and 
program impacts. Rather obviously, if performance measures exist to 
proxy long-run impacts, their correlation with those impacts becomes 
the paramount measure of their value. 
All three views about the role of performance standards appear in 
the literature; in our view, all three have empirical relevance. In this 
chapter, we focus our model mainly on the first of the three roles; gen-
eralizing our analysis to include the second is straightforward. 
PERFORMAnCE MEASURES In PRACTICE 
In practice, most performance measures M consist of participant 
outcomes in the short run. The focus on the short run stems from the de-
sire to provide prompt feedback to program managers and politicians. 
Feedback that arrives years after the corresponding actions by program 
staff does little to either motivate or inform. The focus on observed 
outcomes (i.e., did the participant get a job soon after finishing the pro-
gram?) rather than estimated impacts (i.e., did the participant do well in 
the labor market relative to what would have transpired had he or she 
not participated?) has several motivations. First, evaluations (experi-
mental or nonexperimental) that seek to estimate impacts by estimating 
the counterfactual outcomes of participants take a long time, typically 
on the order of years, to carry out. Even short-run impact estimates 
require considerable time to collect and prepare the necessary outcome 
data on participants (and, if required, a comparison group) for use in 
econometric analyses. Second, performance measures based on impacts 
often generate controversy, either because of uncertainty about the 
econometric method utilized, in the case of nonexperimental methods, 
or politically, in the case of random assignment. Finally, performance 
measures based on outcome levels generally cost much less to produce 
than measures based on impacts. As the literature on evaluating active 
labor market programs makes clear (see, e.g., Heckman, LaLonde, and 
Smith 1999), impact evaluation poses demanding technical problems 
that typically require the assistance of expensive experts and make the 
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process difficult to automate. In contrast, measuring outcomes presents 
much simpler problems and, once established, becomes a routine data 
collection and processing exercise. Costs matter, because an expensive 
performance management system, even if it accomplishes something, 
may not accomplish enough to justify the expense. 
The most common performance measure consists of employment 
rates in the period immediately following program participation. In 
terms of our notation, we can represent this measure as 
1 1 1 1(3.8) M (S0 ) = ∑1(Y1,i > 0) = ∑ E1,i ,N (S0 ) i∈S0 N (S0 ) i∈S0 
where the first subscript on Y1, 
1 
i denotes age 1, the 0 subscript on S0 
indicates the current cohort of trainees; 1(·) denotes the indicator func-
tion, which takes a value of 1 when its argument holds and a value of 
0 when it does not; and E1, 
1 
i = 1(Y1, 
1 
i > 0) is a dummy variable for em-
ployment (defined here as positive earnings) at age 1 (the first period 
after participation). A slightly different formulation captures measures 
such as those in JTPA and WIA that consider wages or earnings condi-
tional on employment. For example, in our notation, a measure based 
on earnings conditional on employment becomes 
1 1 1 1 1 1M (S0 ) = 1 ∑1(Y1,i > 0)Y1,i = 1 ∑ E1,iY1,i .∑1(Y1,i > 0) i∈S0 ∑1(Y1,i > 0) i∈S0 
i∈S i∈S0 0 
In this performance measure, the indicator function serves to con-
dition the average on the set of participants with positive wages or 
earnings. 
As described in Chapters 2 and 4, not all performance measures 
focus on labor market outcomes. Some capture the receipt of various 
educational credentials, such as the GED, or, in the WIA program, cus-
tomer satisfaction measures based on surveys (where customers include 
both participants and the firms that might hire them). Smith, Whalley, 
and Wilcox (2010a,b) discuss and provide evidence on the value of such 
participant self-evaluation measures. For many years, the WIA perfor-
mance standards system also included a measure based on before-after 
earnings changes, which took advantage of the well-known preprogram 
dip in mean earnings among participants to produce the (highly mis-
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leading) appearance of large program impacts. Heckman and Smith 
(1999) document the dip using the National JTPA Study data and show 
its implications for, among others, the before-after estimator of program 
impacts. Incorporating any or all of these alternative performance mea-
sures into our model requires no conceptual innovations. 
REwARD FUnCTIOnS In ThE MODEL 
The reward function R(M) links observed performance on the per-
formance measures to rewards and (much more rarely) punishments 
for training centers. In most performance systems for ALMPs around 
the world, rewards come informally, through praise and recognition. In 
contrast, Chapter 4 documents that rewards in the JTPA performance 
standards system took the form of budgetary increments determined by 
formal rules. The WIA system lies somewhere in between, with mon-
etary bonuses awarded to states that were probably more consequential 
for the recognition they accord than the funds they provide (see, for 
example, Heinrich [2007]). 
The simplest system assigns a discrete reward R to centers meeting 
a defined standard in terms of observed performance. In terms of our 
notation, this implies the reward function 
R if M (S) >τ ;
(3.9) R(M (S)) = 
0 otherwise.    
Here τ denotes some fixed level of attainment on the performance
measure, such as 60 percent of former participants employed in the pe-
riod after training. Training centers that exceed that level get the reward 
and those that fall below it do not. As noted in Chapter 4, many more 
complicated reward functions exist (or have existed) in practice, in-
cluding functions that reward relative rather than absolute performance, 
functions that require certain levels of performance on multiple mea-
sures, and functions that reward marginal improvements in performance 
above τ . Extending our model to incorporate such reward functions is 
straightforward. 
For nonbudgetary rewards, it makes sense to put the re-
ward function directly in the training center utility function, as in
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UT[ψ(S),N(S),Q(S),R(M)] where we leave the dependence of M on train-
ing center choices regarding whom to serve (S) and how to allocate the 
inputs e among those they serve implicit. Almost by definition, we as-
sume a positive partial derivative. 
In the case of budgetary rewards, things become a bit more com-
plicated. In that case, as in the JTPA and WIA programs, recognition 
remains part of the reward for good performance, and thus it makes 
sense to keep the reward function in the utility function. At the same 
time, receiving a budgetary reward changes the underlying choice prob-
lem in the next period by allowing the center to serve more individuals, 
to direct more inputs to those it would have served in any case, or both. 
Exactly how the additional budget affects choices depends in part on 
whether individuals served with the reward money count toward mea-
sured performance in the following period. If they do not, this allows 
centers to focus on satisfying their preferences regarding Q(S) with the 
reward money; for example, they might devote additional attention to 
the “hard to serve” among their eligible population. In the JTPA and 
WIA systems, individuals served with reward money do not, in fact, 
count toward measured performance; nonetheless, later in this chapter 
we assume for simplicity in our discussions of dynamics that they do, 
so that we can simply add the reward money R to the original budget B
and proceed as before. 
ThE EFFECT OF PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS On
CEnTER BEhAvIOR: CREAM SKIMMInG 
This section outlines the implications of our model for center be-
havior in the presence of a performance standards system that uses the 
mean earnings (including the zeros) of participants at age “1” (i.e., in 
the period after program participation) as the performance measure and 
includes a reward function that increases in measured performance. To 
make things even simpler, in this section we suppose that training cen-
ter utility depends only on the present value of net impacts and the 
reward, corresponding to the utility function UT[ψ(S),R(M)]. 
Adding the basic performance management system just described 
to the model changes all of the first order conditions. In each case, when 
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choosing how many to serve, whom to serve, and how to allocate inputs, 
the training center now considers the effect of the choice on both ψ (S)
and R(M ) . Thus, when it evaluates a potential participant, instead of 
just considering their expected discounted stream of net impacts, the 
center also considers their expected earnings in the period immediately 
following participation. A potential participant who wants to enroll in, 
say, a two-year vocational training program after getting a GED with 
the help of the program becomes less attractive in the presence of the 
performance standards system laid out in the preceding paragraph. On 
the other hand, a potential participant who will find a job with high 
earnings one or two weeks earlier with the program’s help but otherwise 
derives no benefit from it becomes more attractive. This new emphasis 
on short-term outcomes in choosing whom to serve and how to allocate 
inputs leads to the common criticism that performance standards sys-
tems generate cream skimming (see, e.g., Barnow and Smith [2004]; 
Radin [2006]; Trutko et al. [2005]; GAO [2002]). 
Before turning to a discussion of the effects of cream skimming on 
the efficiency and equity of training center operation, we now formally 
define cream skimming. The policy literature often defines cream skim-
ming rather casually to mean serving the least “hard to serve” among 
the eligible population. In terms of our model’s notation, the simple per-
formance system described above creates an incentive to serve persons 
with high values of Y1, 
1 
i , regardless of whether that high value results 
from a high value of Y1, 
0 
i  or a high value of D 1,i . 
The existing literature is vague about whether cream skimming 
should be defined in terms of Y 1 or Y 0 . Our model, and the logic of per-1,i 1,i 
formance measurement systems more generally, suggests a definition in 
terms of Y 1 , as it is Y 1 that the performance standards incentivize train-1,i 1,i 
ing centers to take account of in their decisions.12 Of course, given the 
evidence in Bell and Orr (2002) that caseworkers do reasonably well at 
forecasting Y0, 
1 
i and reasonably poorly at forecasting D1,i , as well as the 
evidence in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) that, at least for the 
JTPA program, most of the variance in Y1, 
1 
i corresponds to variance in Y1, 
0 
i 
(or, put differently, the variance of D1,i is small relative to that of Y1, 
0 
i ), 
the distinction may not matter much empirically.13 
We now consider the implications of cream skimming for pro-
gram equity and efficiency in the context of our model. To keep the 
discussion simple, for the purposes of this section we make the simpli-
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fying assumption that untreated outcomes do not vary with age, so that 
Y0, 
a
i = Y0,i for all “a.” This assumption allows us to summarize equity 
concerns in a single number, where we define equity as serving those 
with the lowest values of Y0,i  among the eligible. 
Consider first an important special case. As noted in Heckman 
(1992); Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997); and Djebbari and 
Smith (2008), conventional models of program evaluation assume that 
1 0 1 0Ya,i  and Ya,i differ by a constant, so that Da,i = Ya,i −Ya,i = Da  for all i. 
Put differently, they assume that everyone has the same impact of 
treatment—the so-called common effect model.14 In the common ef-
fect world, a high Y1
1
,i goes hand in glove with a high Y1
0
,i , and picking 
persons with a high Y1
0
,i helps toward satisfying Equation (3.8). In the 
context of our model, the common effect assumption simplifies the pro-
duction function in Equation (3.2) to 
1 0 0(3.2') Y = f (Y ,e) = Y + D ,a a a a 
which removes the input choice decision from the problem (and with it 
the variable cost portion of the cost function). 
Assuming equal fixed costs for all trainees, training centers in a 
common effect world serve only the individuals at the top of the dis-
tribution of untreated outcomes among the eligible. In this world, the 
discounted stream of impacts does not depend on who gets served, leav-
ing the center free to maximize their measured performance. Thus, in 
the common effect world, our simple performance standards system has 
no effect on economic efficiency but very unattractive equity effects. 
A mild generalization of the common effect world illustrates an-
other important point. Suppose that all individuals share the same 
discounted sum of impacts 
1 0 A (Ya,i −Ya,i )  Dd ,i = ∑ a  , a=0 (1+ r )   
but that the timing of the impacts varies. To keep things very simple, 
suppose that one random half of the eligibles have impacts of zero in 
periods 0 and 1, the period of participation and the period just after, 
while the other random half has impacts of zero in period 0 but positive 
impacts in period 1 and all future periods, with the impacts just a bit 
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smaller than those in the first group so that the discounted sum comes 
out the same. Training centers will now prefer, at the margin and to 
the extent that they can identify them, the individuals with the earlier 
impacts. Put differently, given the same value of Y1, 
0 
i , an individual with 
a positive impact the period following participation adds more to a cen-
ter’s measured performance than an individual with no positive impacts 
until the second period after participation. Thus, performance measures 
based on outcomes in period 1 encourage the provision of services that 
yield quick improvements in outcomes relative to later improvements 
in outcomes, even conditional on the same discounted sum. At the mar-
gin, the center would even trade off some of the discounted impacts to 
get a larger impact in the period of performance measurement, an incen-
tive that those who complain about an overemphasis on low-intensity 
“work first” strategies clearly have in mind. 
Another simple model inspired by Heckman, Smith, and Clements 
(1997) assumes independence between impacts and untreated outcomes, 
while continuing to assume no variable inputs and constant fixed costs. 
The production function becomes 
1 0 0(3.2') Ya,i = f (Ya,i ,e) = Ya,i + Da,i , 
with Da,i independent of Ya 
0
,i for a = 1,..., A. In this world, in the ab-
sence of performance standards the training centers rank individuals 
by their discounted impacts and start serving individuals from the top, 
continuing down the distribution until the budget runs out from paying 
fixed costs. In contrast, adding in our simple performance standards 
system makes the problem two-dimensional, with centers now serv-
ing those individuals with good present values of impacts and good 
outcomes in the period following participation, whether due to a large 
impact or to a good untreated outcome (or both) in that period. As in 
the common effect model, the introduction of performance standards 
leads centers to move toward serving individuals who, on average, have 
better outcomes in the untreated state. Thus, once again, it has prob-
lematic equity effects. In this model, the performance standards clearly 
reduce efficiency, as centers will now, at the margin, implicitly trade 
off discounted impacts for good untreated outcomes in the period of 
performance measurement. 
  
 
 
 
A Formal Model of a Performance Incentive System  47 
Finally, consider the same simple world as in the previous example, 
with production function (3.2') and so on, but assume that impacts and 
untreated outcomes have rank correlation γ. We have already consid-
ered the case of independence, which implies a rank correlation of zero. 
With a positive rank correlation equal to one, training center behavior 
does not change at all with the introduction of performance standards 
because, given our simplifying assumptions, the same individuals have 
both the largest impacts and the largest outcomes in the period follow-
ing participation. More generally, with a positive rank correlation of 
less than one, we expect relatively small reductions in both the equity 
and efficiency associated with training center choices. This is because 
some individuals with good discounted impacts but bad outcomes in 
period 1 get dropped in favor of individuals with good untreated out-
comes in period 1 but smaller discounted impacts; at the same time, 
most individuals either participate or not both with and without the per-
formance standards. In contrast, with a negative rank correlation, the 
introduction of performance standards should lead to greater losses on 
both dimensions, as there is more scope for training centers to trade off 
impacts and outcomes. A negative correlation implies more individuals 
below the cutoff (in terms of discounted impacts in a world without 
performance standards) with high values of the untreated outcome, who 
can therefore add substantially to measured performance in the world 
with the performance standards. 
If we now undo some of our simplifying assumptions by restoring 
variation in untreated outcomes over time and in marginal inputs costs, 
the model becomes much more complicated but the same intuition ap-
plies. In general, if we start from a situation where training centers care 
only about discounted net impacts, adding performance standards to 
the model reduces efficiency. The common effect case constitutes an 
interesting but empirically irrelevant exception. The effects on equity 
depend on the correlation between impacts and untreated outcomes 
in the period of performance measurement. With no correlation or a 
positive correlation, performance standards lead to cream skimming, 
implying negative equity effects. 
The final relaxation of our assumptions occurs when we return 
to assuming that the training center utility function includes not just 
discounted impacts and performance rewards but also trainee character-
istics and the number of trainees. With this utility function as the starting 
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point, it becomes possible to describe cases in which performance stan-
dards increase efficiency. For example, if frontline workers have the 
“social worker mentality” described in Heckman, Smith, and Taber 
(1996) and prefer to serve those with the lowest untreated outcomes, 
and if impacts have a positive correlation with untreated outcomes as 
suggested in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), then performance 
standards based on short-term outcomes may increase efficiency com-
pared to the status quo, even though they reduce efficiency relative to 
the case of net impact maximization. 
In the end, the effect of introducing performance standards on effi-
ciency becomes an empirical question, as it depends on the relationship 
between impacts and untreated outcomes, on the relationship between 
short-run and long-run impacts, and on the extent to which training cen-
ters pursue objectives other than maximizing discounted impacts in a 
world without performance standards. Chapter 6 considers how to mea-
sure cream skimming and discusses the available empirical evidence. 
Chapter 9, as well as Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), consid-
ers the relationship between outcomes and impacts. Hotz, Imbens, and 
Klerman (2006); Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004); and Dyke et al. 
(2006) (among others) consider the relationship between short-run and 
long-run impacts. 
STRATEGIC RESPOnSES TO PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS
Until now, we have not considered strategic responses of the sort 
documented in Chapters 7 and 8 in our model. This section considers 
“static” strategic responses related to measurement; we consider dy-
namic responses related to the manipulation of termination dates later 
on in the chapter after introducing the dynamic version of our model. 
The static responses we have in mind include the strategic enrollment 
decisions in the JTPA program documented in Doolittle and Traeger 
(1990) and the apparent manipulation of the telephone surveys origi-
nally used to measure employment shortly after termination in the JTPA
program, which the USDOL sought to end with stricter procedural di-
rectives.15 In regard to the former, only individuals formally enrolled in 
JTPA (or, in WIA, those receiving more than core services), count for 
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the performance measures. The evidence makes it clear that, in the early 
years of JTPA prior to the tightening of the rules on enrollment, training 
centers sometimes provided services to individuals but did not formally 
enroll them until their prospects for contributing positively to the cen-
ter’s measured performance looked good. In regard to the latter, until 
response rate requirements appeared (and then, later, administrative 
data replaced telephone surveys for this outcome), centers appeared to 
selectively survey their recent terminees with the goal of maximizing 
their measured performance. 
A simple extension of the model to incorporate this strategic be-
havior begins by making a distinction between actual performance and 
measured performance. Actual performance, denoted by M (S), consists 
of what the performance measure would equal if measured by a neutral 
outsider objectively applying program rules, while measured perfor-
mance, denoted by M *(S), consists of performance as measured and 
reported by the training center. Now assume that centers can incur some 
cost to improve their measured performance. Formally, let 
M*(S) = g[M(S),cs], 
where cs denotes the cost of manipulating the measured performance 
numbers in terms of both staff time and effort and the present value of 
any political fallout from doing so. Further assume positive first de-
rivatives, as well as a negative second derivative with respect to cs , so 
that additional costs increase measured performance but at a decreasing 
rate. This production function will likely differ among training centers 
depending on the types of services they provide and the honesty of their 
staff (which affects their psychic costs of strategic behavior and thus the 
compensation they must receive for engaging in it). For example, under 
JTPA, centers that specialized in job search assistance and subsidized 
on-the-job training at private firms, both of which provide clear signals 
of likely success at obtaining employment, may have had an easier time 
manipulating enrollment decisions than centers that provided more 
classroom training, where employment outcomes typically do not get 
realized until course completion but where payments to providers may 
have necessitated enrollment. 
Incorporating these costs into the model by replacing actual perfor-
mance in the reward function with measured performance as determined 
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by this production function adds an additional first order condition to 
the solution of the training center optimization problem. Training cen-
ters now select cs to balance the marginal benefits and marginal costs 
of altering their measured performance relative to their actual perfor-
mance. Because their actual performance enters the production function 
for measured performance and the cross-partial of the production func-
tion need not equal zero, and because centers will choose to spend real 
resources on manipulating their measured performance, the possibility 
of strategic misrepresentation also alters centers’ actual performance. 
PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS AnD BUDGETARy
DynAMICS In A TwO-PERIOD MODEL 
We now consider the dynamics that arise in our model when train-
ing centers receive budgetary rewards for performance (as with the 
bonus awards under WIA). In particular, assume that reward R aug-
ments the center budget for the next cohort of trainees but cannot be 
used as direct bonuses to center administrators or line workers. The 
possibility of receiving a budgetary reward directs attention toward the 
short-run goal of maximizing performance on M (S0), and may or may 
not serve to maximize the present value of net impacts ψ (S , B, J ) for 
the current cohort of participants. We begin with an analysis of a model 
for a training center that serves only two cohorts of trainees, with the 
first served in period 0 and the second served in period 1. This simple 
model provides a useful point of departure for the more complicated 
model we analyze in the next section. 
In this context, the incentives provided by performance standards 
create a new intertemporal dynamic. Decisions by the center today af-
fect the quality and quantity of participants in the first period as well 
as the resources available to the center to serve the second period co-
hort. In addition to this intertemporal connection, the center’s decision 
problem changes in character because center performance M (S0) is a 
random variable as of date 0. Thus, when making decisions in period 1, 
the center faces a fixed budget B for period 1 but a stochastic budget for 
period 2, call it B , with the budgetary uncertainty resolved only after 
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the center chooses S0 and e in the first period and the resulting labor 
market outcomes for the first period participants are revealed. 
Assuming a simple reward function that pays out B for performance 
above a threshold earnings target, we can write 
 B if M (S0 ) <τ ;
B =  
B + R if M (S0 ) ≥τ . 
In this simplified two-cohort model, the center picks S0  to maximize 
(3.10) U [ψ (S , B, J ), N (S ),Q(S )]0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1+ Pr[M (S0 ) ≥ τ | S0 ]maxU ψ (S1 , B + R, J ), N (S1 ),Q(S1 )1 
11+ ρ S 
1 0 0 0+ Pr[M (S0 ) < τ | S0 ]maxU ψ (S1 , B, J ), N (S1 ),Q(S1 ) ,01+ ρ S1 
where 1/(1+ ρ) is a discount rate, S1
1 denotes the participants selected 
in the second period if M (S0 ) ≥τ , and S1
0 denotes the participants 
selected in the second period if M (S0 ) <τ . 
Centers can solve this maximization problem in two stages. For the 
second period cohort, there are two possible states, corresponding to 
whether the first cohort succeeds or fails relative to the performance 
standards. In the first stage, the center solves the second period optimi-
zation problem for both possible budgets. Given these optimal values, 
in the second stage it picks S and to maximize the criterion Equation 
0 
e0 
(3.10) given the values for the second period selected in the first stage. 
Heuristically, if S0 were a continuous variable, and Equation (3.10) 
were differentiable in S0 , the first order condition for S0 would be 
∂U [ψ (S , B, J ), N (S0 ),Q(S ), R(S0 )] ∂ Pr[M (S ) ≥ τ | S0 ]0 0 00 = +
∂S0 ∂S0 
1 1 1 1 maxU ψ (S , B + R, J ), N (S ),Q(S ), R(M S ){ S  1 1 1 { 1 } 
 
1 
 
1 
0 0 0 0− maxU ψ (S , B, J ), N (S ),Q(S1 ), R(M {S }) .}1 1 1  S0 1 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
52 Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 
The first term reflects the value of S0 in raising the current util-
ity of the training center. The second term captures the dynamic effect 
of budgetary rewards, which link current period performance to future 
period utility. This effect equals the marginal effect of S
0 
on the prob-
ability of winning the award times the increase in center utility from 
winning.16 Of course, the actual solution is more complicated because 
the criterion is not differentiable in S
0
. A similar condition holds for the 
choice of inputs e0 in the first period. As the two-cohort model includes, 
by definition, no third cohort, the center’s second period choices have 
no intertemporal aspect. 
In this two-cohort model, performance standards may distort center 
choices in two ways. The first consists of the static distortions already 
discussed. The second results from the intertemporal linkage induced by 
the budgetary rewards. For certain values of the parameters, the center 
may choose to trade off first period utility for second period utility by 
distorting its first period choices so as to obtain the performance reward 
and thereby a larger budget in the second period. This scenario becomes 
more likely as the reward increases and ρ > 0 decreases, because both 
of these increase the value in the first period of having a larger budget to 
spend in the second period. The substantive importance of this scenario 
also depends on having a sufficiently small positive (or even negative) 
correlation between the performance measure and discounted impacts. 
As discussed above, if discounted impacts have a large positive correla-
tion with the performance measure, the center does not face much of a 
trade-off between the two. 
PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS AnD BUDGETARy
DynAMICS In A STATIOnARy EnvIROnMEnT 
This simple two-cohort model abstracts from the fact that training 
centers serve multiple cohorts over many time periods. In this section, 
we examine our model under the extreme (but analytically simple) 
assumption that training centers operate forever in a stationary environ-
ment; that is, other than the potentially time-varying budget induced 
by the performance system, the key aspects of the center’s decision 
problem, such as the distribution of eligibles, the budget constraint in 
01
ρ
] 0V
R+
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Equation (3.5), and the production function for treated outcomes in 
Equation (3.2), all remain the same. 
In each period, training centers can be in one of two states: 1) in 
receipt of a bonus R, so that they have budget B+R to spend in the 
current period, or 2) without the bonus, so that they have budget B. 
The budget in each period depends on the center’s choices regarding 
S and e in the preceding period. As the model assumes a stationary 
environment and only two states of the world, the centers face what the 
technical literature calls a Markovian decision problem. In this type of 
decision problem, the center’s optimal decision depends only on which 
of the two budget states it occupies in the current period; as a result, the 
choices S and e require subscripts for the state of the world but not for 
the time period. 
Let V0 denote the center’s value function with budget B in the cur-
rent period, and let V1 denote the value function for a center budget B + 
R in the current period. Then, 
[ S B J  N S  Q S ] 1 [ ( )  ] 1
1 [M S( )  <τ ]VV = arg  maxU ψ ( , , ),  ( ),  ( )  + Pr  M S ≥τ V + Pr  
S0 1 + ρ 1+ ρ 
Pr(M S( ) ≥τ )V + 1 Pr[M S( ) <τ ]V. .1 1+ ρ 0 
Similarly, we have 
1 = arg  maxU [ ( , + , ),  ( ),  ( )] + 
1 Pr  ( )  ≥τ ] 1
1 ( )  <τV ψ S B  R J N S Q S  [M S  V + Pr[M S  
S 1 + ρ 1 + ρ 
J  N S  Q S  +, ),  ( ),  ( )] 1 Pr[M S( )  ≥τ ]V + 1 Pr[M S( )  <τ ]V .
1 + ρ 1 1 + ρ 0 
It follows from the usual assumptions about the utility function that 
V V ; in other words, centers prefer to have more resources available. >1 0 
The optimal choice of S depends on the rewards, the preferences, and 
the constraints facing centers. 
We now present some intuitive analysis of some of the effects of the 
incentives induced by the performance standards in our simple dynamic 
model. First, let P01 indicate the probability of not receiving a reward in 
one period and receiving one in the next period and let P11 indicate the 
probability of receiving a reward in two consecutive periods. As having 
  
   
 
 
  
54 Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 
more resources makes it easier to attain all center objectives, including 
11 01meeting the performance standards, it follows that P > P . Perfor-
mance standards with budgetary rewards impart a value to incumbency. 
Second, the analysis of the two-period model carries over in part in 
this more general setting. With sufficiently large R, sufficiently small 
ρ, and sufficiently misdirected performance incentives (incentives not 
aligned with maximizing the present value of net impacts), centers may 
sacrifice utility in the current period in order to obtain the budgetary 
reward and thereby increase their utility in the next period. 
Third, consider the special case of centers that, in the absence of the 
performance standards, care only about maximizing the present value 
of net impacts (and thus not about N(S) or Q(S)). For certain values of 
the parameters, such centers may divert resources away from that goal 
in low budget (nonreward) periods. They will do so in order to get the 
budgetary reward in the following period, which can then be spent on 
generating a larger total discounted stream of net impacts than would 
period-by-period net impact maximization. 
Fourth, continuing with the same special case, with a sufficiently
low probability of attaining the reward threshold and a sufficiently 
high reward R, the introduction of performance standards can lower the 
aggregate net impacts produced by all centers. Unsuccessful centers di-
vert their activities away from productive uses and toward meeting the 
performance targets but reap no budgetary rewards. Successful centers 
produce more net impacts in the next period because they have more re-
sources, but these additional impacts may not suffice to make up for the 
reductions in impacts in the current period from the centers that failed 
to reach the performance targets despite diverting resources away from 
present value maximization. If the increases in the present value of net 
impacts from the successful centers do not exceed the decreases from 
the unsuccessful centers, then aggregate output falls. 
PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS AnD BUDGETARy
DynAMICS: ThE REAL wORLD 
As described in Chapters 2 and 4 and in more detail for WIA in 
Heinrich (2007), both JTPA and WIA built budgetary rewards into 
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their performance systems. However, in both programs, the budget-
ary awards did not simply get added to the budget for the following 
period, as we have assumed for simplicity in our model. Instead, in 
JTPA, individuals served using the budgetary reward money did not 
count against the performance measures in the following period. This 
allowed centers to focus these funds on, in most cases, the hard to serve. 
In the context of our model, they spent them to maximize their util-
ity in terms of ψ (S , B, J ) , Q(S) , and N (S) without worrying about 
R[M(S)]. Similarly, under WIA, most states spend their bonus funds 
on program improvements, either in the form of new initiatives or en-
hancements to current program infrastructure and services (e.g., trying 
to develop learning programs that engage dropouts, at-risk youth, and 
disadvantaged adults, improving outreach activities, and so on). Tak-
ing into account the realities of the programs does not change the basic 
dynamics outlined in the preceding two sections. For certain parameter 
values, centers might still find it optimal to take a hit in terms of current 
period utility in order to obtain the reward money, provided the addi-
tional utility obtained in the next period more than makes up for the loss 
when discounted back to the current period. 
Moreover, with economies of scale in center operations, the real 
world budgetary rewards in JTPA and WIA may still generate the sort 
of incumbency effects described in the preceding section. Centers in 
JTPA and WIA could spend their reward money in part on adminis-
trative costs. If, for example, they would buy productivity-increasing 
office equipment or hire better managers with this money, this should 
spill over to the participants served under the regular budget B. In the 
model, we could capture this by making c(e) declining in N(S) to re-
flect economies of scale that arise from using physical or human capital 
more intensively. 
STRATEGIC BEhAvIOR In A DynAMIC EnvIROnMEnT 
Another dynamic incentive induced by performance standards
arises when centers have some flexibility over the period in which their 
participants count for the purposes of the performance measures. As 
documented for JTPA in Chapter 7, centers have some flexibility in the 
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timing of termination decisions for their participants. Thus, around the 
end of one period (a program year in JTPA or WIA) they have some 
choice regarding whether to count particular participants in the current 
period or in the next period. When centers face nonlinear reward func-
tions, like the simple one considered above in which the center receives 
R for attaining some threshold level of performance τ but has no incen-
tive to do better at the margin either above or below τ, centers above the 
cutoff in the current period will want to move “good” participants to the 
following period. In contrast, a center with performance well below τ in 
the current period will want to move “bad” participants who might oth-
erwise finish participating in the next period back to the current period, 
where they can do no harm to a “lost cause.” 
Our formal model does not capture this particular strategic response 
to performance standards, though we could modify it to do so. The sim-
plest change would add the capacity for centers to count some current 
period participant realizations against performance in the following pe-
riod. Doing so would have some per-participant cost that increased with 
the number of current period participants counted in the next period. 
The increasing per-participant cost captures the effect of rules, such as 
those in JTPA and WIA, that govern how long centers can keep partici-
pants “on the books” without spending money on them, as well as the 
fact that some program services (such as occupational training courses) 
have fixed durations, thus limiting flexibility. A set of more complicated 
changes to the model would also allow centers to bring forward good 
outcomes from the following period. 
SUMMARy AnD COnCLUSIOnS
This chapter has laid out a (relatively) simple model of training cen-
ter behavior in the context of a generic performance standards system 
similar to those used in active labor market programs around the world. 
Such performance standards systems have a variety of justifications, 
including aligning center behavior with the preferences of politicians 
who fund but do not operate them, solving a principal-agent problem 
by increasing the effort levels of center staff, and providing “quick and 
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dirty” pseudo-evaluations of the extent to which the program improves 
the labor market outcomes of participants. 
This model clarifies the ways in which performance standards 
systems affect center behavior, and the conditions under which those 
changes will increase the earnings or employment gains from partic-
ipation, as well as the conditions under which they have positive or 
negative equity effects by changing the set of persons served among the 
eligible. We clarify the discussion of cream skimming in the literature 
in the context of our model. We show that the effects of introducing 
a performance standards system depend in part on center preferences 
and in part on empirical parameters such as the correlation between 
the short-term participant outcomes typically utilized as performance 
measures and the long-term behavioral impacts that represent the real 
goal of most programs. 
We extend our simple model to include strategic behavior by train-
ing centers seeking to “game” the performance measures, whether by 
playing tricks with measurement in a static context or by manipulating 
the period in which participants count against the performance mea-
sures in a dynamic context. We examine two dynamic versions of our 
model in which centers receive budgetary rewards in each period based 
on their measured performance in the prior period. In this dynamic con-
text, further distortions of center choices can result, as they may have 
an incentive to trade off utility (and perhaps discounted net impacts) in 
one period to achieve high performance and thus a larger budget in the 
following period. 
Overall, this model provides a framework for thinking about the 
effects of performance standards on organizational behavior in the con-
text of ALMPs and in broader contexts such as schools. In so doing, it 
motivates and provides a theoretical context for the empirical investiga-
tions presented in the later chapters of this book. Finally, in our view, 
the analysis in this chapter, along with the empirical evidence presented 
elsewhere in the book, suggests that policymakers who have mandated
such systems, as well as the administrators who have determined their 
details and undertaken their practical implementation, have often failed 
to appreciate the difficulty of designing a performance system that 
makes things better (rather than making them worse), as well as the 
dependence of the effects of performance standards systems on empiri-
cal parameters that remain generally unknown and little investigated. 
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notes 
1. See Hanushek (2002) for a discussion of accountability systems in edu-
cation based on performance standards at the teacher and school level. 
See, for example, Barnow (1992) and Barnow and Smith (2004) for addi-
tional discussions of performance standards in publicly provided training 
programs. 
2. Wilson (1989) and Dixit (2002) discuss conflicts regarding the objectives 
of programs as outcomes of a political process. 
3. On the issue of the timing of participation, see, for example, Sianesi 
(2004), Heckman and Navarro (2007), and Fredrikkson and Johansson 
(2008) and the papers cited therein. 
4. It can also be negative in the long run, as indeed it was for male youth 
in JTPA. Bloom et al. (1993), Bloom et al. (1997), and Orr et al. (1996) 
provide more detail regarding the experimental impact estimates from the 
National JTPA Study. 
5. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) present evidence on the importance 
of general equilibrium effects in evaluating large scale educational pro-
grams and Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2004) provide evidence of such effects 
in an earnings supplement program. 
6. Note that r may represent a social discount factor. 
7. We assume interior solutions. Sufficient conditions for an interior solu-
tion are concavity of Equation (3.2) in e for all Ya 
0
,i , convexity of ci(ei) for 
each i, and Inada conditions on both cost and technology. For some S, the 
constraint in Equation (3.4) may be slack (that is, λ = 1 can be obtained). 
8. There may be more than one S that qualifies. If so, we assume the training 
center picks one of them at random. 
9. There is an additional stage to the allocation process that we do not con-
sider, namely, the allocation of the overall program budget among centers. 
From the standpoint of economic efficiency, the budget should be allo-
cated to equate returns at the margin for all centers. 
10. We ignore other methods for aligning training center behavior with poli-
ticians’ preferences, such as developing a professional culture among 
caseworkers. See, for example, Wilson (1989) for further discussion. 
11. See the related discussion in Sosin (1986) regarding the interaction be-
tween rules and caseworker discretion in the old Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. 
12. In thinking about cream skimming from a policy perspective, two other 
facts should be kept in mind. First, as shown in Chapter 6, even if cream 
skimming occurs, the operation of program eligibility rules means that 
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even the cream consists of relatively disadvantaged individuals. Thus, at 
least in programs like JTPA or WIA, cream skimming does not generally 
mean that program resources were spent on, for example, middle-class 
people. Second, in the United States, many federal, state, local, and vol-
untary sector employment and training programs coexist at any given 
point in time. For example, National Commission for Employment Policy 
(1995) documents that dozens of other programs coexisted with JTPA. 
When thinking about cream skimming in a particular program, such as 
WIA, it should be kept in mind that other programs may provide services 
better suited to the hardest to serve among that program’s eligible popula-
tion. Determining whether cream skimming, should it occur, is good or 
bad, requires more thought than the literature typically devotes to it. 
13. The finding in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) will hold in general 
for programs with small mean impacts relative to the mean untreated out-
come, so long as the impacts are not strongly negatively correlated with 
the untreated outcome. 
14. In models with regressors, this assumption is Δa,i (X) = Ya,i 
1 − Ya,i 
0 = Δ fora 
all i, yielding equal impacts for all persons with the same X. 
15. See JTPA Directive No. D98-15, February 22, 1999. 
16. In this heuristic problem, we assume that the second order conditions are 
satisfied. 
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4 
The JTPA Incentive System 
Implementing Performance 
Measurement and Funding 
Pascal Courty 
Gerald Marschke 
This chapter outlines the specifics of JTPA’s performance incen-
tives, which provide necessary background information for subsequent 
chapters in this monograph. It also speaks generally to the challenges 
that must be met in formulating performance measures and incentives 
anywhere in government.1 In particular, we argue that the decisions 
about what should be measured, and how, when, and by whom it should 
be measured, make a critical difference for the success of incentive-
backed performance measurement. 
The JTPA organization was conceived in the spirit of New Federal-
ism. Proponents of New Federalism have argued that more decentralized 
decision making leads to “laboratories of the states” that foster innova-
tion and creativity and hence, in the end, superior policies. In JTPA, 
states indeed used their discretion to produce a wide variety of perfor-
mance measurement and incentive structures. The federal government 
retained control over some important aspects of the incentive system. 
The discretion left to the states, however, was important for determin-
ing the character of performance measurement and the incentives. 
By providing an analytical description of performance measure-
ment in JTPA, this chapter complements the institutional literature on 
the JTPA bureaucracy (Barnow 1992; Svorny 1996). Although this 
literature provides a good understanding of how JTPA’s performance 
incentives worked at the federal level, it has little to say about its imple-
mentation at the state level. By offering a more complete description of 
JTPA performance incentives, this chapter lays the foundation for under-
65 
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standing how the JTPA incentive system determined bureau-cratic behavior 
and program outcomes. Previous studies of the impact of JTPA’s perfor-
mance incentive scheme on bureaucratic behavior (Anderson, Burkhauser, 
and Raymond 1993; Courty and Marschke 2004; Heckman, Smith, and 
Taber 1996; and Marschke 2002) have used only the federal guidelines, 
which provide an incomplete and possibly misleading representation of 
the true incentive systems.2 Along with others (see, e.g., Wholey 1999, 
p. 305), we believe that such case studies of operational performance 
measurement systems are important inputs into developing theories to 
understand and recommendations to improve performance measure-
ment in the public sector. 
We limit our description to the state incentive and performance 
measurement policies for the years 1987–1989 for a sample of 16 states 
(identified in Table 4.1).3 In describing JTPA’s performance-based in-
centive system, we address three questions. First, what was the nature 
of the training center’s incentive? Or, how much was at stake? Sec-
ond, which dimension of performance did JTPA reward? That is, what 
mattered? According to the act, Congress intended the performance 
incentives to measure the training centers’ success in developing par-
ticipants’ labor-market specific human capital (U.S. Congress 1982, 
Section 106[a]). Because direct measures of human-capital value-added 
are unavailable, the program’s federal overseers have resorted to prox-
ies of value-added. At the heart of the JTPA incentive system is a set of 
performance measures based on the labor market outcomes of enrollees 
at or shortly after training. We describe these performance measures.
Third, what is the relationship between performance and awards? In 
JTPA, states determined awards in three steps. First, they standardized 
the performance outcomes to make them comparable across training 
centers. States rewarded training centers not for the absolute level of 
performance but for their performance in excess of a numerical thresh-
old, or performance standard. The performance standard depended on 
factors that were specific to each training center and outside the centers’
control. The performance standards were intended to establish reason-
able counterfactual levels of performance that one would expect given 
the environment in which the training center operated. The second step 
was to establish the training center’s eligibility for an award. Train-
ing centers were usually eligible only if they exceeded the standards 
associated with all or a defined subset of the performance measures. 
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Finally, the states formulated award functions that translated training 
centers’ excess performances into budgetary awards. The sensitivity of 
the award to excess performance determined the strength of the incen-
tive and varied across states and over time. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section investigates 
the bureaucrats’ motivations for seeking awards. The second section 
explains the JTPA performance measures and also how performance 
outcomes across the population of training centers were adjusted to 
level the playing field. The third section describes the incentive award, 
and the last section concludes and summarizes our main findings.
AwARDS AnD BUREAUCRATIC PREFEREnCES 
The JTPA incentive system takes the form of increases in training 
centers’ training budgets. We start by describing the sizes of these in-
creases. By focusing solely on the absolute award amounts, however, 
one risks overlooking potentially important influences of performance 
awards on bureaucratic behavior and program outcomes. These non-
financial reasons are reviewed next. 
Award Size 
The act required that states allocate about 7 percent of their total 
JTPA training budget to their incentive programs.4 States then decided 
how to allocate this sum among the three categories of expenditures: 1) 
awards for successful training centers, 2) administration of the incen-
tive programs, and 3) “technical assistance” for unsuccessful training 
centers. JTPA mandated that the state set aside funds for technical assis-
tance, but left the amount set aside up to the state. Technical assistance 
provided resources to improve managerial performance to training cen-
ters that failed to meet performance standards. 
While the act intended that the training centers use the awards pri-
marily for training, awards could also be used for staff bonuses and 
payroll increases. A training center was required to spend at least 70 
percent of the award on training activities, leaving 30 percent, at most, 
for staff compensation. By comparison, training centers were permitted 
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Table 4.1  State Funding of the JTPA Incentive Program States of the national JTPA Study, 1987–1989 
Program year 1987 Program year 1988 Program year 1989 
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of 
award funds award funds award funds 
Award fund allocated to federal Award fund allocated to federal Award fund allocated to federal 
as percentage performance as percentage performance as percentage performance 
State of 6 % funds standards of 6 % funds standards of 6 % funds standards 
CA 85 100 85 88 85 88 
CO 95 100 85 100 85 100 
FL — — — — — — 
GA 75 100 75 90 75 90 
IA 75 99 75 99 75 99 
IL 75 100 75 100 75 100 
IN 93 40 92 60 78 60 
MN 85 50 85 50 85 50 
MOa 100 100 100 100 100 100 
MS 100 70 98 70 98 70 
MTa 66 100 66 100 66 100 
NE 85 60 85 60 85 60 
NJ 80 33 80 33 80 33 
OH 80 100 80 60 70 60 
RI 75 100 75 100 75 100 
TX 76 90 77 90 81 80 
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NOTE: JTPA allowed each state to use up to 6 percent of its JTPA appropriation for direct cash payments to job training centers for per-
formance on federal and state performance measures. The first column for each year lists the fraction of the 6 percent that was set aside 
for the award fund. This fraction represents the maximum amount that would be rewarded to training centers for performance relative 
to federal and state standards. The second column for each year represents the fraction of the award fund that is set aside for federal 
performance standards alone. — = data not available. 
aThe 1987 values for Missouri and Montana in the first column are taken from the NCEP-SRI survey, which interviewed training center 
personnel in 1986 concerning the program year 1986. They are not calculated from training center policy documents. 
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to spend no more than 15 percent out of budgetary funds on payroll. 
The higher cap for payroll expenses alone may have motivated training 
centers to pursue awards. 
Table 4.1 shows the share of the incentive fund set aside for the 
award for a sample of 16 states in the years 1987–1989. We collected 
data on these 16 states because they contained the 16 training agen-
cies that participated in the late 1980s USDOL-commissioned National 
JTPA Study (NJS). The NJS was an important experimental study in-
volving approximately 20,000 enrollees that was designed to measure 
the impact of job training in JTPA on participants’ earnings and em-
ployment prospects. The analyses contained in Chapters 5, 6, and 9 
are at least in part based on the NJS data. The second, fourth, and sixth 
columns show the award size as a percentage of the 7 percent incentive 
fund for 1987, 1988, and 1989, respectively. Although states varied in 
the portion set aside for awards, as Table 4.1 shows, most states made 
available a majority of the incentive fund to training centers as potential 
awards. Montana set aside the smallest share—66 percent of the incen-
tive fund—while Missouri and Mississippi (in 1987) set aside the entire 
fund to be paid out as an incentive award. While the portion set aside 
varied significantly across states, it was stable over the 1987–1989 pe-
riod. For example, between 1987 and 1989, Illinois devoted 75 percent 
of its 7 percent fund to the award fund. It reserved the other 25 percent 
for technical assistance. Only in Indiana did a significant change take 
place. Between 1987 and 1989, Indiana lowered the portion set aside 
for the award from 93 percent of the incentive allocation to 78 percent. 
The other states devoted a constant (or nearly constant) share of the 
incentive funds to awards. 
In some states, not all of the funds that the state made available 
for awards were paid out. Not all funds were awarded because many 
training centers did not perform well enough to meet the states’ award 
eligibility requirements. Nevertheless, as Table 4.2 shows, the amounts 
paid out were substantial. Table 4.2 shows the actual award amounts 
disbursed as a fraction of the training center’s budget for a sample of 
448 training centers in program year 1987. The average disbursement 
was equivalent to 7 percent of the training center’s budget.5 The high-
est disbursements were equivalent to 60 percent of the training center’s 
budget. Rewards this large, however, were not possible in all states. 
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Table 4.2  Size of Incentive Award 
Fraction of training 
Allocation ($) Incentive award ($) center’s budget 
Mean 2,326,191.42 119,663.79 0.07 
(Std. dev.) (3,043,936.68) (145,751.12) (0.07) 
First quartile 1,003,308.50 33,000.00 0.03 
Median 1,627,151.50 93,550.00 0.06 
Third quartile 2,398,462.00 160,534.00 0.09 
Maximum 29,408,455.00 1,407,853.00 0.57 
Number of obs. 448 385 385 
NOTE: Data are from the National Commission for Employment Policy and SRI, Inc. 
(see their description in Dickinson et al. [1988]). 
We expect that if incentives matter, the intensity of the behavioral 
responses to the incentives should depend on the size of the award. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that the award amounts available varied sig-
nificantly by state. Everything else equal, we might expect that JTPA
incentives produced greater responses among training centers in Mis-
souri than Montana where the award disbursement was the greatest 
(i.e., 100 percent of the award fund). In addition, the kind of behavioral 
response we observe would likely have depended upon how states di-
vided award money between state and federal measures of performance. 
The division matters because state and federal performance measures 
stressed different aspects of training center output. 
why Should Training Centers Care about Awards? 
As a rough approximation, the awards might have increased sala-
ries by as much as 15 percent.6 This figure corresponds to the purely 
financial part of the incentive. This by itself represents a substantial 
increase even compared with private sector bonuses. There is, however, 
little evidence that training center administrators paid out such a large 
share of the award as salary bonuses.7 Why, then, should bureaucrats 
care about the awards? 
There are at least three reasons why a training center may wish 
to increase its budget. First, Niskanen (1971) and others argue that 
everything the bureaucratic manager desires (salary, staff, power, pro-
fessional reputation, and perquisites) derives from the bureau’s budget. 
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Because of their training and the orthodoxy of the social work pro-
fession, welfare bureaucrats—like the ones in JTPA—may behave as 
selfless advocates for their clients (Lipsky 1980). Nevertheless, even as 
client advocates, JTPA bureaucrats would desire extra award funds to 
expand their clients’ training resources. 
Second, performance levels and the awards they represent might 
have been used by local elected officials for political gain. The act gave 
local elected officials—often these are city mayors—some authority 
over the operation of training centers. The administrative headquarters 
of training centers were frequently situated in these elected officials’
offices. These elected officials often touted performance awards as mea-
sures of their administration’s success in the local fight against poverty. 
Third, bureaucrats might have sought performance awards for 
the professional recognition they convey. Bureaucrats faced no other 
objectives—and the public and bureaucratic superiors have no other 
evaluation criteria—as precisely defined, quantifiable, and available as 
these performance measures. Tirole (1994, p. 7) argues that govern-
ment bureaucrats might be “concerned by the effect of their current 
performance not so much on their monetary reward, but rather on their 
reputation or image in view of future promotions, job prospects in the 
private and public sectors.”8 Moreover, by performing well compared 
to the standards, bureaucrats could protect themselves against attack 
from outside critics and political enemies. 
As a final point, note that because awards were based on group 
performance, individual bureaucrats had an incentive to free-ride on the 
effort of colleagues. Free-riding may have muted the influence of incen-
tives at the level of caseworkers. Ultimately, the issue of the influence 
of budget-based awards and the significance of the free-riding problem 
must be resolved empirically. 
PERFORMAnCE MEASURES 
The act directed the USDOL to formulate measures of performance 
that captured the gains produced in the employment and earnings of 
participants and the reductions in their reliance on welfare programs 
(Chapter 2). Reliable measures of earnings and employment impacts of 
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job training, however, were prohibitively costly to obtain, and instead, 
the USDOL issued measures that assessed the effectiveness of job train-
ing through the labor market outcomes of enrollees at training end. 
JTPA required states to use the USDOL’s performance measures in 
constructing their incentive system. Nevertheless, the USDOL permit-
ted states to impose additional performance measures, and many states 
did. Whereas the federally designed performance measures were con-
cerned with labor market outcomes, state measures (described below) 
tended to focus on inputs. While many states developed their own mea-
sures, they typically devoted a disproportionately small share of the 
award to them, leaving the bulk of the award for the federally designed 
measures. 
The following section discusses the federal and state-designed mea-
sures and how states divided their awards between them. In addition, 
this section discusses the possible consequences of the construction 
of these measures for JTPA training practices. Over time, state and 
federal authorities replaced or redefined those performance measures 
whose effects were possibly counterproductive. We also discuss these 
modifications. 
Federal Performance Measures 
Table 4.3 defines the federal performance measures in place during 
the period 1987–1989. For the adult portion of the program, the sys-
tem’s performance measures were employment rate at termination, the 
average wage at termination, the cost per employment, the employment 
rate at 90 days after termination—i.e., at follow-up, the average weeks 
worked at follow-up, and the average weekly earnings at follow-up. For 
the youth portion of the program, the system’s performance measures 
were the employment rate at termination, the cost per employment, the 
positive termination rate, and the employability enhancement rate. The 
youth employment rate at termination and youth cost per employment 
were defined as for adults. Youth positive termination rate and youth 
employability enhancement rate evaluated the acquisition of certain 
kinds of general or labor market skills, such as the completion of a ma-
jor level of education, or completion of a GED certification (see Table 
4.3, especially the last part of the note). 
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Table 4.3  national JTPA Performance Measures in Effect in years 1987–1989 
Performance measure Definition 
Adult performance measures 
Employment rate at termination 
Welfare employment rate at 
termination 
Average wage at termination 
Cost per employment 
Employment rate at follow-up 
Welfare employment rate at 
follow-up 
Average weekly earnings at 
follow-up 
Average weeks worked by 
follow-up 
Youth performance measures 
Youth employment rate at 
termination 
Youth employability 
enhancement rate 
Youth positive termination rate 
Youth cost per employment 
Fraction of terminees employed at termination 
Fraction of terminees receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at 
termination 
Average wage at termination for terminees who were employed at termination 
Training center’s year’s expenditures on adults divided by the number of adults 
employed at termination 
Fraction of terminees who were employed at 13 weeks after termination 
Fraction of terminees receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at 
13 weeks after termination 
Average weekly wage of terminees who were employed 13 weeks after termination 
Average number of weeks worked by terminees in 13 weeks following termination 
Fraction of youth terminees employed at termination 
Fraction of youth terminees who obtained employment competencies (see note below) 
Fraction of youth terminees who were “positively terminated” (see note below) 
Training center’s year’s expenditures on youths divided by the number of youths 
positively terminated 
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NOTE: The date of termination is the date the enrollee officially exits training. A terminee is an enrollee after he has officially exited 
training. All measures are calculated over the year’s terminee population. Therefore, the average follow-up weekly earnings for 1987 
was calculated using earnings at follow-up for the terminees who terminated in 1987, even if their follow-up period extended into 1988. 
Likewise, persons who terminated in 1986 were not included in the 1987 measure, even if their follow-up period extended into 1987. 
A positive termination is entering unsubsidized employment, attaining youth employment “competencies” (through coursework, train-
ing and/or tests in work maturity, basic education, or job-specific skills), entering non-JTPA training, returning to school full time, or 
completing a major level of education. 
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All federal performance measures for adult participants had three 
characteristics in common. All performance measures were 1) year-end 
summaries of yearly cumulated performance, 2) based on aspects of the 
enrollee’s labor market status on the date the enrollee officially termi-
nated the program or at three months after termination, and 3) averages 
of outcomes over the population of the year’s terminees (not partici-
pants). Thus, training centers did not face a piece rate in the sense that 
training centers received compensation per unit of output: e.g., per en-
rollee employed, or per dollar increase in an enrollee’s earnings ability. 
Instead, training centers received awards for achieving high average la-
bor market outcomes. For example, the employment rate at termination 
for the fiscal year 1987 was defined as the fraction of persons termi-
nated between July 1, 1987, and June 30, 1988, who were employed on 
their termination date.9 Awards were thus independent of the number of 
persons who obtained high outcomes. 
The use of performance measures varied across states. In 1987, the 
USDOL required states to base incentives on seven termination-based 
measures: the adult employment rate at termination, adult welfare em-
ployment rate at termination, adult cost per employment, average wage 
at termination, youth employment rate at termination, youth positive 
termination rate, and youth cost per employment. In 1988–1989, the
USDOL extended the list of measures to the 12 described in Table 4.3
and required states to choose any 8 or more of these 12 measures. 
The years 1988 and 1989 marked the beginning of the phaseout of
termination-based performance measures and the cost measure.10 After 
1992, the USDOL prohibited the states from using any cost measures 
of performance. Moreover, after 1992, all performance measures based 
on measures of output became follow-up measures.11 
Performance measures based on labor market outcomes may have 
influenced training center behavior in several ways. First, because they 
measure aspects of an enrollee’s employment state and not the impact 
of job training, they may have led training centers to select enrollees 
most able to achieve high levels of employment at high wages, instead 
of the enrollees most likely to benefit from the program. This behavior 
has been called cream skimming (see Chapters 6 and 9). 
Second, the performance measures may have encouraged train-
ing centers to offer “quick fixes,” that is, employment-oriented job 
search or on-the-job training services. These services, rather than more 
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intensive kinds that result in greater skill development, would more 
frequently lead to employment on the measurement date, whether or 
not the employment match was suitable and likely to last beyond the 
end of training. The reason why quick fixes may have been preferred 
is because the employment and wage measures focused on labor mar-
ket success at a point in time rather than over a period of time. Cream 
skimming is an example of dysfunctional behavior that results when 
the performance measures are not well-aligned with the goals of the 
organization. If quick fixes generate smaller welfare gains per dollar 
spent than more intensive services they also constitute dysfunctional 
behavior (see Bloom et al. [1997] for evidence on the relative effective-
ness of different training types in JTPA). See Blau (1955) for an early 
discussion of unintended responses to performance measures. 
Third, because these measures were based on averages instead of 
aggregate outcomes, training centers had no incentive to spend their 
entire budget. Actually, the optimal training strategy from a pure perfor-
mance point of view was to enroll only the most promising applicant. 
More generally, enrolling a smaller than efficient population would 
typically be an optimal strategy in areas where able applicants were 
scarce. In these areas, rather than enroll less able enrollees who lower 
per capita scores, training centers would prefer to leave some of their 
budget unspent. 
Fourth, the role of the cost measure was ambiguous. The cost mea-
sure was defined as the total expenditure divided by the number of 
persons employed at training end. Holding spending constant, the cost 
measure becomes an incentive to produce as many employed terminees 
as possible. Bureaucrats could produce greater numbers of employed 
terminees either by increasing their employment rates at termination or 
by enrolling more applicants (holding the employment rate constant). 
Viewed in this way the cost measure would have countered the incen-
tive to serve small populations. The elimination of the cost measures in 
the last years of JTPA would have added an additional incentive to re-
duce the number of enrollees served. Training centers would enroll less 
than the efficient number of enrollees because small enrollee popula-
tions increased the per capita spending, and greater per capita spending 
increased the per capita performance outcomes (Barnow [1992] makes 
this point). 
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Federal Performance Standards 
The impact of the performance measures on bureaucratic behavior 
depended critically on the threshold the bureaucrat had to meet. For ex-
ample, a training center did not receive an award for the wage measure 
if its year-end average wage outcome (the average wage at termina-
tion) failed to meet the average wage standard. Thus, the wage measure 
would produce no effect on behavior if the wage standard was set too 
high so that no amount of effort would push the wage outcome over the 
standard. Another reason why the performance standards were crucial 
was because the performance awards did not depend on absolute per-
formance but on excess performance, that is, on the difference between 
the performance outcome and the performance standard. 
This subsection describes the heights of the standards and how they 
were tailored to the different environments faced by the training centers. 
The USDOL adjusted the performance standards to the local conditions 
faced by training centers in an attempt to level the playing field. 
For each performance measure, the numerical standard started with 
the national “departure point.” The USDOL set the departure point for 
all but the cost and wage measures at the 25th percentile of the distribu-
tion of performance in the system in the preceding two years. That is, 
75 percent of the training centers would have exceeded the performance 
standard on average. For the cost measure, good performances were 
low performances. Successful training centers had to produce an out-
come below the standard. The USDOL set the departure point for the 
cost measure at the 90th percentile. For the wage measure, the depart-
ment set the departure point at the 50th percentile.12 
Training centers faced different costs of meeting these departure 
points. Costs varied because labor markets, training costs, and the 
characteristics of the eligible populations varied. Imposing uniform 
standards would have favored low-cost training centers by increasing 
their resources relative to high-cost training centers. Only in the case 
that low-cost training centers tended also to be more efficient would 
such incentives enhance the efficiency of the allocation of training 
resources. Believing that this probably was not the case, the USDOL
established an adjustment model that took into account features of the 
training center’s environment that may be correlated with costs. For ex-
ample, by taking into account local unemployment measures and other 
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measures of the labor market, the adjustment methodology lowered the 
employment rate standard for training centers in depressed job markets, 
compared to training centers in robust job markets. 
Although the USDOL allowed states some flexibility in developing 
standards, most states used the department’s adjustment methodology.13 
All states participating in the NJS used the USDOL’s adjustment model 
during the NJS years. We describe this method here. 
USDOL adjustment model 
Consider an arbitrary performance measure and let Sl be the out-
come produced by training center l. The USDOL adjustment scheme 
posited that the following function generates performance outcome Sl . 
(4.1) S = a + β (x − x ) + β (x − x ) + ... + β (x − x ) + e ,l 1 1l 1 2 2l 2 M Ml M l 
where x , x , ..., x are training center l’s realizations for the M factors1l 2l Ml 
chosen, x1, x , ..., , are the average realizations of these factors over 2 xM 
all JTPA training centers, and εl is a site-specific error term. Biannually 
the USDOL estimated the coefficients β with the most recent two years 
of training center–level data using ordinary least squares. βm expresses 
the impact of an increase in the factor xMl , on the outcome Sl , holding 
other factors constant. The USDOL chose a different set of factors for 
each performance measure. It chose those economic factors and demo-
graphic variables based upon their availability and whether the factors 
were statistically correlated with the performance outcomes. In addi-
tion, political considerations may have played a role.14 
Table 4.4 presents an example of a JTPA worksheet for adjusting 
the adult employment rate at termination in 1987. The first six adjust-
ment factors in the table are enrollment population characteristics (the 
percentage of the participant population that is female, black, Hispanic, 
Asian, handicapped, and welfare recipients). The last two adjustment 
factors are measures of the local economy (unemployment rate and 
population density). Column B presents factor values for a hypotheti-
cal training center. Columns C and E present the actual national factor 
averages and the weights from the USDOL adjustment model for 1987. 
These weights are the estimated effects of each characteristic on the 
performance outcome adult employment rate at termination (estimated 
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Table 4.4  U.S. Department of Labor’s Performance Standard Adjustment Model Performance Standard: Adult
Employment Rate at Termination 
B. Training center C. National D. Difference F. Effect of
A. Local factors factor values averages (B − C) E. Weights local factors 
% Female 49.9 52.8 −2.9 −0.020 0.058 
% Black 41.2 23.8 17.4 −0.081 −1.41 
% Hispanic 30.1 7.9 22.2 −0.009 −0.20 
% Asian 2.1 2.4 −0.3 −0.022 0.01 
% Handicapped 9.5 9.1 0.4 −0.093 −0.04 
% Welfare recipient 35.0 29.8 5.2 −0.276 −1.44 
Unemployment rate 8.8 8.0 0.8 −0.623 −0.50 
Population density 0.21 0.6 −0.39 0.771 −0.3 
G. Total effect of local factors on performance expectations −5.77 
H. National departure point 62.4 
I. Model-adjusted performance level (G + H) 56.6 
NOTE: Local factors listed in column A are determined by the USDOL. Percentages are of year’s participant population. Values for col-
umns C, E, and H are given by the USDOL. Values for column B are for a hypothetical training center. 
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β’s from Equation 4.1). The training center’s realization of each of the 
factors is compared to the national average and the difference is multi-
plied by a weight. For example, suppose the hypothetical training center 
served 1,000 persons during 1987, of which 499 were female. Thus, its 
percentage female factor was 49.9 percent. To obtain the adjustment 
to the standard for the female participation factor, one multiplies the 
difference between the training center’s factor value and the national 
average (49.9 − 52.8 = −2.9) by the adjustment weight (−0.020). The 
adjustment weight reflects how the enrollment of women historically 
affected the employment rate outcome. 
For the other factors, weighted differences were calculated simi-
larly. The total effect of local factors on performance expectations 
(column F)—the sum of the weighted differences—was added to the 
national departure point. The departure point (the 25th percentile value) 
for the measure was 62.4. The final performance standard (56.6) is the 
sum of the departure point (62.4) and adjustment factor (−5.8). The 
state used the final standard to establish whether the training center had 
met its adult employment rate target. 
The USDOL intended that the bar be set to a height appropriate to 
the training center’s circumstances. Thus it included measures of the 
local unemployment rate and of local population density to capture as-
pects of the local labor market in which the training center operated. 
For example, as one can see from Table 4.4, the weight on the local 
unemployment rate measure was negative: a one-point increase in the 
local unemployment rate lowered the standard by about two-thirds of 
a point. Because training centers were small relative to the local labor 
market, the unemployment rate is an example of an influence on the 
performance outcome which was likely to be beyond the training cen-
ter’s control. 
As Table 4.4 also makes clear, an important class of characteristics 
for which the USDOL adjusted standards was the composition of the 
enrollment pool. While the enrollment pool reflected in part the compo-
sition of the local eligible population (an influence beyond the training 
center’s control), it was at least partly a choice variable. Adjusting the 
performance standard in this way may have encouraged the training 
center to enroll not only persons who would boost performance out-
comes, but also persons who would lower standards. 
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Table 4.4 also reveals that the USDOL adjustment model did not 
take into account training services as a relevant control variable, al-
though these data were available to the department. Thus, the nature of 
the adjustment procedure meant that the incentive system held training 
centers accountable for the kinds of training provided but not the kinds 
of enrollees enrolled; both choices have consequences for the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of training. Neither did the adjustment model 
directly control for the training services available in the training centers’
local area. This is more surprising; by not controlling for the availabil-
ity and costs of training facing training centers, the incentive system 
implicitly favored those training centers located in markets where there 
was a competitive and efficient training industry.15 
State Performance Measures and Standards 
States were permitted to develop their own performance measures. 
While state measures played a smaller role than federal measures in 
the determination of the awards, the number of NJS states using their 
own measures increased from 10 to 13 between 1987 and 1989. The 
increase in importance of state-formulated measures was apparently a 
nationwide trend. 
In Table 4.1, the second column under each year shows the per-
centage of the total award set aside allocated to federal measures, as 
opposed to state measures. Although state-defined measures were com-
mon among the NJS states, they comprised a relatively small fraction of 
the award. Excluding New Jersey, the average split between federal— 
or performance-based—measures and state measures was 82/18. The 
split ranged from a low of 50/50 to a full allocation of the money to the 
federal award. 
We broke down the state measures into four categories. The most 
important category of state measures comprised input or enrollment 
measures. In the mid-1980s, states became increasingly concerned that 
federal performance incentives were driving training center bureaucrats 
to enroll from the eligible population only those enrollees who were 
likely to get jobs at the end of training—i.e., who were “job ready.” 
Many states implemented a set of enrollment-based performance mea-
sures designed to encourage training centers to enroll the more difficult 
cases. In 1988, for example, 9 out of 16 states set up standards that com-
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pensated training centers for the number of or the rate at which persons 
in target groups were enrolled.16 These target groups varied by state 
but were typically the least successful in the labor market among the 
eligible and included high school dropouts, minority youths, Women/ 
Infant Nutrition program participants, and older workers. For example, 
in addition to compensating performance based on federal performance 
measures, Minnesota rewarded training centers for the fraction of en-
rollees who were receiving public aid. In these cases, compensation 
was contingent upon meeting a numerical standard, frequently based 
on the fraction of eligible persons in the local population who belonged 
to the target group. Studies of the effect of incentives on the enrollment 
decision can be further refined by allowing for these enrollment quotas 
to influence the enrollment decision. 
The other categories of state measures were more idiosyncratic. 
Some states compensated training centers for the fraction of their bud-
getary allotment spent. For example, in 1987 and 1988, Mississippi paid 
a portion of its award money to training centers that spent at least 85 
percent or more of their budgets. Training centers might have left por-
tions of their budgets unspent because, as we noted above, the kinds of 
applicants who would produce high-performance outcomes may have 
been scarce. Rather than enrolling less able enrollees who lower per 
capita scores, training centers might have enrolled fewer enrollees than 
the maximum their budgets would have allowed. 
Three of the 16 states sought to encourage JTPA training centers 
to coordinate their activities with other state agencies that helped the 
poor.17 In promoting these goals, states typically evaluated performance 
subjectively, without well-defined performance standards. Finally, 
although state performance measures usually were not based on par-
ticipant labor market outcomes, some states used their own measures 
to encourage training centers to seek longer-term employment matches 
before the USDOL began offering the follow-up measures in 1988. In 
1987, New Jersey used a separate measure for employment retention, 
similar to the federal employment rate at follow-up measure. 
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ThE JTPA AwARD 
This section describes how states used performance outcomes and 
standards to reward training centers. In particular, we discuss the states’
eligibility rules that determine which training centers received awards 
and the award functions themselves. The award functions translate the 
performance of eligible training centers to award amounts. 
The states were entirely free to design the eligibility rules and the 
performance awards as they saw fit, which led to great variation in both 
across states. In fact, no two award functions (or eligibility rules, for 
that matter) were identical. Because of space constraints, we do not 
report the exact computation rules for the awards. Instead, we define 
some broad dimensions that are important from a behavioral point of 
view, to categorize the different types of award functions, illustrating 
where appropriate with specific details from the state incentive systems. 
qualifying for Awards 
Here we discuss the qualifying criteria for the 16 NJS states in years 
1987–1989. Some states (such as Indiana) required training centers 
to meet all standards as a prerequisite for earning any award money.
Other states required training centers to exceed a subset of standards 
to qualify. For example, in 1987 Minnesota required training centers to 
exceed five of seven performance standards to qualify for awards. Other 
states had no qualification criteria. These states (such as Iowa) simply 
rewarded training centers for each performance standard exceeded. 
Some qualification criteria were quite complicated. For example, 
in 1987, Illinois divided the seven federal measures in place at the time 
into three groups. To qualify for an incentive grant, a training center 
had to meet both standards in the first group, one of two standards in 
the second group, and one of three standards in the third group.18 In ad-
dition, the training center had to meet a slightly higher version of the 
standards for at least one measure. 
The number and kind of standards a training center had to meet 
to win an award may have been an important determinant of the in-
fluence of incentives upon behavior. States that required the training 
center to meet all standards discouraged training centers from special-
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izing in the production of certain performance outcomes at the expense 
of others. Moreover, the greater the number of performance standards 
that training centers were required to meet, the lower their likelihood of 
obtaining an award. By lowering the chances to qualify for an award, 
such qualification criteria may have discouraged training centers from 
attempting to win awards. 
Award Function 
The award functions varied along several important dimensions. 
The three most important dimensions, discussed below, address three 
broad questions: Which performance measures mattered? How com-
petitive was the incentive system? Did excess performance cease to 
matter after some point? 
Performance measure weighting. By exercising their discretion 
over which measures they included in their awards (see Table 4.2) and 
in their construction of the eligibility criteria, states could emphasize 
some performance measures and de-emphasize others. In addition, 
states used explicit weighting schemes in the award function for the 
same purpose. Although many states weighted each measure used 
equally, some states weighted performance measures differently to em-
phasize some measures over others. 
Consider, for example, New Jersey in 1987 and 1988. While a train-
ing center there had to meet its cost standards to qualify for an award, 
its cost outcomes did not figure into the award’s calculation. More-
over, the award calculation up-weighted the follow-up-based measures 
compared to the termination-based measures. In de-emphasizing the 
cost- and termination-based measures, New Jersey intended to encour-
age training centers to provide more intensive training and enroll more 
difficult-to-train enrollees (see Note 12). 
Competition among training centers. In many states (such as 
Texas), a training center’s award depended only on its own perfor-
mance. In Illinois’s scheme, the size of a successful training center’s 
award depended on the number of training centers that qualified: the 
lower the number of training centers that qualified, the greater the al-
location to the successful ones. 
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Other examples of interdependence more closely resemble the rela-
tive performance evaluation schemes found in the incentive literature 
in economics. New Jersey is an example of a state that pitted training 
centers against one another in a form of head-to-head competition. In 
New Jersey’s tournament system, a training center received an award 
based not on an absolute level of performance but on its position in a 
ranking of its fellow training centers. 
Evaluating a training center on its relative performance may have 
stimulated competition between training centers by accentuating social 
comparisons. Another reason for relative performance evaluation is 
that it holds training centers harmless for influences that are beyond the 
training center’s control and that affect all training centers uniformly. 
Thus, relative performance evaluation should be most effective in states 
where training centers are homogeneous (e.g., operate in similar envi-
ronments) and if the performance standards do a poor job of controlling 
for factors that are outside the training centers’ control.19 
Marginal incentive. The marginal incentive measures the change 
in incentive award for a small change in performance. Marginal incen-
tives are constant when the award function is linear, as in a piece rate 
compensation system. However, they may depend on the level of per-
formance. When the marginal incentives vary with the level of perfor-
mance, incentives are said to be nonlinear. In JTPA, the main source 
of nonlinearity was the performance standard: in many states, train-
ing centers were paid only contingent upon achieving standards. Many 
states (such as Georgia) paid out the entire award merely for meeting 
the standards. Such states provided no pecuniary incentive to exceed 
the standards. Other states, however, compensated training centers for 
performance in excess of the standard, at least over some range of per-
formance. For example, in Illinois in 1987, a training center’s award 
increased with its performance, until its performance exceeded the stan-
dard by 40 percent. For performance in excess of 40 percent of the 
standard, the training center received no additional compensation. The 
marginal incentives for performances above 40 percent of the standard 
were zero. 
As with many incentive systems based upon attaining stan-
dards, training centers may have been able to manipulate the award 
intertemporally by selectively choosing when to report good and bad 
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performances. In this way, training centers would have been able to 
increase their performance outcomes without actually increasing the ef-
fectiveness of their training. Deadline effects have been described in 
the behavior of military recruiters whose bonuses depend on recruit-
ment quotas (Asch 1990), salespersons whose commissions depend on 
achieving sales targets (Oyer 1995), and CEOs whose bonuses depend 
on performance targets linked to measures of corporate earnings (Healy 
1985). See Courty and Marschke (1996, 1997) for evidence of deadline 
effects in JTPA, and Courty and Marschke (2004) for an attempted es-
timation of the efficiency costs of these effects. 
COnCLUSIOn 
This chapter details a description of the incentives in place under 
JTPA. The incentive awards amount to budgetary increases that training 
center bureaucrats valued for professional, personal, and political rea-
sons. The potential size of the bonus award varied by state and program 
year. In program year 1986, for example, the total bonus was about 7 
percent of the training budget. These awards, however, could have been 
a substantial added source of training funds. Depending on the state and 
the year, this amounted to as much as 60 percent of a training center’s 
yearly allocation of funds. 
The heart of the JTPA incentive system was the set of perfor-
mance measures and their standards. Job training programs illustrate 
the difficulty of devising performance measures that are aligned with 
programmatic goals. In the early years of JTPA, performance measures 
were based on employment outcomes measured at training end, thus 
possibly encouraging training centers to pursue high employment rates 
instead of increased earnings-capacities. Moreover, because they were 
based on average outcomes, performance measures may have reduced 
the number of disadvantaged people served, raised the expenditure per 
enrollee, and produced budget surpluses. In later years, some states
adopted expenditure-based performance measures, possibly to counter-
act the incentives created by federal measures to leave some of their 
budgets unspent. 
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Training centers received awards when the outcomes of perfor-
mance measures exceeded numerical standards. The USDOL attempted 
to adjust performance standards to reflect the environment in which 
the training center operated so that training centers in healthy and in 
depressed economies had to exert complementary levels of effort to 
achieve their standards. The USDOL’s adjustment scheme offers a real-
world example of strategies for adjusting performance measures that 
have been proposed in the literature (Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Schwartz 
1999). Performance standards were also adjusted for the characteris-
tics of persons enrolled, so as to discourage cream skimming, but not 
adjusted for the kinds of training offered. Excluding training from the 
adjustment method may have promoted employment-oriented services
—such as job clubs and on-the-job training—and these services may 
not have produced either stable employment relationships or significant 
improvements in the long-term employability of enrollees. This study 
has revealed numerous ways in which performance measures might 
have been misaligned with the agency’s goals. With the exception of 
some cream skimming studies and a study of deadline effects, these 
distortionary effects have not been investigated. We believe that further 
research on the behavioral responses to JTPA’s incentives would lead 
to much useful information for developing and refining performance 
measures for many kinds of public sector organizations. 
The federal government left the formulation of many of the details 
of the award to the states. Consequently, the form of the award varied. 
States established eligibility criteria that modified the JTPA incentive 
system by reducing the incentive to specialize in the production of one 
or two performance measures, lowering the training center’s likelihood 
of obtaining an award, holding effort constant, and emphasizing some 
performance measures over others. 
The strength of the award varied greatly across states, suggesting 
that the magnitude of responses to performance incentives depended 
on the state. States also differed in the degree of competition among 
training centers and in the interdependence of awards. Head-to-head 
competition among training centers in some states may have heightened 
the impact of the incentive system on behavior. States also differed in 
the extent to which they compensated exceptional performance. In 
some states, training centers received no more award money for meet-
ing standards than exceeding them. In other states, training centers 
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received additional money for higher performance. States also designed 
and implemented their own performance measures that promoted dif-
ferent goals than the goals implicit in the federal measures. Thus, the 
objectives transmitted to the training center depended on the state in 
which it operated. 
notes 
This chapter introduces features of the JTPA incentive system that will be used 
extensively in the remainder of this monograph. Some of these features have been dis-
cussed and analyzed in detail elsewhere (Courty and Marschke 1997, 2002, 2003, and 
2004), and parts of this chapter borrow from these sources. 
1. Discussions of general criteria for choosing performance measures and construct-
ing performance measurement systems, for example, are found in Hatry (1980), 
Hurst (1980), Usilaner and Soniat (1980), Wholey (1999), and GAO (1996). 
2. Cragg (1997) and Marschke (2002) are exceptions. 
3. We chose to limit the number of states and years for which we collected incen-
tive policies because of the difficulty and expense of obtaining these records. We 
collected data on these 16 states because they contained the training agencies that 
participated in the late 1980s USDOL-commissioned National JTPA Study, de-
scribed in Chapter 2. 
4. The JTPA funds were allocated in three subfunds: 1) 78 percent were set aside for 
training services, 2) 6 percent were set aside for the incentive system, and 3) the 
remaining 16 percent were set aside for other special services. The award fund as a 
fraction of total training budget was 7.1 percent (6/[78+6]) if one assumes that all 
award funds were eventually distributed as training budget. The actual figure may 
have been a little lower because some of the incentive set aside fund was spent on 
the administration of the incentive funds. 
5. These figures are based on the data set of SRI, International and Berkeley Plan-
ning Associates. See Dickinson et al. (1988) for a description of these data. 
6. Salary payroll represented at most 15 percent of training budget that was itself 
only 78 percent of total JTPA training funds (see Note 7). The award fund was 6 
percent of JTPA funds and at most 30 percent could be distributed as salary. The 
award salary bonus as a fraction of total salary was at most (0.06 × 0.3)/(0.15 × 
0.78) = 0.15. 
7. In a survey of 30 training centers conducted by Dickinson et al. (1988), only 
three administrators indicated that this was their practice. In a 1994 telephone 
survey administered to 11 of the 16 training centers of the National JTPA Study, 
all training center administrators that we spoke to denied that they ever distributed 
a portion of the award for salary bonuses. 
8. Thompson (2000) describes the merit pay system at the Social Security Admin-
istration, ushered in with the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 
Under this system one half of managers’ annual pay increases were determined by 
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their performance relative to a set of output indicators. While originally set up as 
a basis for rewarding pay increases, these indicators became the basis for promo-
tion decisions as well. According to one former manager, they became “the basis 
for your career . . . if you do well on those four measures. You can write your own 
ticket” (p. 270). 
9. Note that persons who entered the program already employed, and then terminated
employed, holding the same job they began training with, say, were numbered 
among the successfully trained—i.e., were employed at termination—for award 
accounting purposes. 
10. In the first years of JTPA (through 1987), the USDOL required states to use a 
cost measure. Nevertheless, some policymakers and analysts, alarmed at the short 
length of training (the average length of training is about five months in JTPA), 
instigated investigations by the GAO and other interested parties into the link 
between cost measures and short, low-intensity services. As a consequence of this 
inquiry, the USDOL encouraged states to phase out the cost measure, “to encour-
age [training centers] to provide more comprehensive programming and increased 
services for those individuals who are most in need’’ (Division of Employment 
and Training, New Jersey Department of Labor 1990). Moreover, in response to 
a number of Labor Department investigations, which concluded that training cen-
ters were emphasizing “quick fixes” with job-placement-oriented services that had 
no long-term impact on enrollees’ skills, the department formulated a number of 
follow-up measures: the measures based on outcomes three months after termi-
nation, presented in Table 4.3. The USDOL introduced follow-up measures to 
“[promote] effective service to participants and [assist] them to achieve long-term 
economic independence’’ (Division of Employment and Training, New Jersey De-
partment of Labor 1990). 
11. That is, the employment rate at termination and average wage at termination gave 
way to the employment rate, the average weeks worked, and average weekly earn-
ings at follow-up (13 weeks after termination). 
12. Actually, the USDOL’s JTPA Technical Assistance Guide, PY1988, reports that 
the cost standard’s departure point was set “above the 25th percentile. It more 
closely resembles an estimate of average performance.” We interpret this state-
ment to mean the department set the wage standard at the 50th percentile. 
13. State governors had the option to 1) set the performance standard at the national 
departure point; 2) adjust the national departure point for specific economic, geo-
graphic, and demographic factors within the state or local service delivery areas 
using the regression model established by the USDOL; or 3) propose their own 
adjustment method to the USDOL. Between the end of the National JTPA Study 
and the end of JTPA, more states abandoned the USDOL adjustment method for 
their own (option 3). 
14. Barnow (1992) writes that “when estimated coefficients have an unexpected sign, 
the variables are dropped from the models and regressions are re-estimated” (p. 
292). For example, in some regressions, the USDOL dropped an indicator variable 
for Hispanic enrollees because it apparently showed a positive effect on perfor-
mance outcomes. 
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15. For more on the specification of USDOL’s regression model, see Barnow (1992) 
and Trott and Baj (1987). One significant shortcoming they describe is that esti-
mating the Equation with training center–level data, as opposed to enrollee-level 
data, biased the estimates of the model’s coefficients. Using enrollee-level data, 
Trott and Baj demonstrated that the practice of pooling the data by training center 
significantly changes some of the estimates of βm. For a general discussion of the 
theory of adjusting performance measures, what factors should and should not 
be used to adjust performance measures, see Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Schwartz 
(1999). 
16. These states were California, Iowa, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, and Ohio. 
17. These states were Georgia, Iowa, and Ohio. 
18. The first group consisted of the adult employment rate at termination and the adult 
cost per employment. The second group consisted of the youth positive termina-
tion rate and the youth employment rate at termination. The third group consisted 
of the average wage at termination, the welfare employment rate at termination, 
and the youth cost per positive termination. 
19. The USDOL’s performance standard adjustment methodology—to the extent that 
it accounted for external factors that affect performance—produced the same 
effect. 
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5 
Setting the Standards 
Performance Targets and Benchmarks 
Pascal Courty 
Carolyn J. Heinrich 
Gerald Marschke 
A key element in the design of performance measurement and ac-
countability systems is the establishment of appropriate benchmark 
levels (or standards) of performance to guide the evaluation of program 
outcomes. Performance benchmarks shape system incentives and influ-
ence the responses of public managers and staff operating programs. In 
systems with rewards and sanctions linked to results, performing above 
or below the standards can have important short-term consequences 
(e.g., budgetary rewards or revisions, positive or negative recognition), 
as well as long-term ones (e.g., promotion, structural reorganization). 
In this chapter, we review the literature in information economics, 
contract theory (see, for example, Dixit [2002] and Prendergast [1999]), 
and public administration to draw out theoretical implications for the 
construction of performance standards in public organizations.1 We 
then assess alternative methods that are commonly used to construct 
performance standards and consider the relevance of these lessons for 
the design of performance measurement systems in public programs. 
An important premise of our work is that the method used to construct 
performance standards can change the way employees behave and in-
fluence the internal efficiency of organizations. Focusing in particular 
on performance benchmarking in U.S. workforce training programs 
(i.e., JTPA and WIA programs), we assess whether the design of perfor-
mance standards in these programs is efficient and consistent with basic 
principles derived from theory. 
The exercise of performance assessment clearly serves impor-
tant functions in public organizations other than promoting efficiency.
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Marshall et al. (2000) describes three primary functions: 1) account-
ability for public expenditures, 2) the production of comparative 
information to inform customer choices in public services, and 3) 
improvement of professional practice and program management. For 
example, public managers may use performance information to identify 
best practices and to communicate to outside constituencies legitimate 
information about organizational achievements. We acknowledge the 
possibility that the introduction of performance measurement may 
transform organizations through channels other than those we discuss 
in our literature review. We likewise recognize that political and ethical 
concerns also influence the construction of performance standards and 
the use of performance data. We discuss these issues to a greater extent 
in our case study analysis of performance benchmarking in public train-
ing programs. 
ThEORy-BASED FRAMEwORK FOR
PERFORMAnCE BEnChMARKInG 
We frame our discussion in terms of the principal-agent model, a 
theoretical framework commonly applied in the economics and public 
administration literatures. There are critics of this model who argue that 
it overemphasizes the self-seeking behavior of agents and neglects so-
cial interactions and motivators. In his classic study of organizations, 
Thompson (1967), for example, describes the importance of cliques, 
social controls based on informal norms and status that influence the 
performance of organizations. Similarly, stewardship theory empha-
sizes collective goals and public managers “whose motives are aligned 
with the objectives of their principals,” or who highly value coop-
erative behavior even when their interests and those of the principal 
diverge (Davis, Donaldson, and Schoorman 1997, p. 21). Although we 
acknowledge the roles of social and cultural norms and the influence 
of political and personal power relationships as described in these al-
ternative theoretical frameworks, we rely primarily on principal-agent 
theory in modeling behavior and relationships in this study. 
In our application of principal-agent theory to the study of per-
formance standards systems, we call the party who designs the 
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measurement system the principal and the party whose performance is 
measured the agent. We denote the measured performance P, and the 
benchmark level of performance, or the performance standard, P0. The 
difference between the performance outcome (P) and the performance 
standard (P0) is denoted ∆P, that is, ∆P = P − P0. 
We are interested in the methods that are used to construct the 
performance benchmark P
0 
and in the kind of information that these 
methods incorporate in the benchmark. Although we recognize that 
there may not exist a single method of construction that could be ef-
fectively applied in all situations, we still believe that some methods are 
largely more effective than others. We say that a standard is poorly con-
structed or “ineffective” if it is missing key pieces of information and/ 
or if it is likely to send the wrong signals and to stimulate behavioral 
responses with negative implications. In addition, we recognize that, 
in practice, organizations will often use multidimensional measure-
ment systems with multiple measures and performance benchmarks. 
Although we explicitly discuss these issues, for the sake of conciseness, 
we focus in our literature review on the simplest case with a single 
performance measure, as this is sufficient to highlight the main lessons 
from the literature without loss of generality. 
We assume that the agent has some control over the performance 
outcome, and following the economics literature, effort constitutes the 
agent’s choices and exertions that influence the performance outcome. 
We denote the effort choice e and assume that higher effort levels in-
crease the performance outcome, that is, P(e) increases with e. We 
model effort as a one-dimensional choice by the agent. It is useful, 
however, to think of e as a vector of activities; the agent chooses not 
only how hard to work, but also how to allocate her time and effort 
across different activities. For example, in job training centers, case-
workers allocate their efforts toward recruiting participants, assessing 
their training “needs,” networking with other social service organiza-
tions and managing contracts with external vendors, and bookkeeping, 
to name a few of their activities. The lessons we draw from our model 
based on a simple formulation—assuming that e is a scalar—are robust 
to this more realistic assumption. 
In the simplest formulation, performance is equal to effort P = e, 
and value added is equal to DP = e − P0. We think of value added here 
as the agent’s contribution to the principal’s welfare, net of costs. In 
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the case of a job training program, assuming its objective is to raise the 
earnings and employability of the poor, value added is the value of the 
labor market skills enrollees acquire due to the exertions of training 
center workers, net of training costs. 
As discussed above, setting the absolute level of the performance 
standard is a critical task in performance measurement systems. In 
the federal programs we study—JTPA and WIA—and others since 
the U.S. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, 
government officials are required to undertake this task annually. We 
assume (consistent with practice in these programs) that the perfor-
mance standard determines the level of acceptable performance below 
which sanctions are imposed and above which rewards are given. By 
increasing the standard, the principal boosts incentives to improve 
performance, because the agent has to supply more effort to meet the 
standard and avoid sanctions. 
Large or incessant increases in the standard, however, also dimin-
ish the credibility of the measurement system, with the consequence 
that the agent may simply give up or search for alternative, possibly 
unproductive ways to increase measured performance. In our model, 
we assume that the agent receives a level of compensation that is in-
dependent of performance, and we define the level of effort that one 
would expect for that base compensation as e
0
. In an efficiently func-
tioning system, prevailing competitive forces determine this level of 
effort. In other words, it is the amount of effort a representative agent 
would expect to exert for the base level of compensation. In this case, 
the performance standard is set at the level of performance that occurs 
when the agent provides the competitive level of effort, P0 = P(e0). 
The rationale behind setting the performance standard at this level
is that if the performance standard were set above P(e
0
), then the prin-
cipal would be unable to attract and retain the agent. Agents would 
not apply or compete for the job or contract. On the other hand, if the 
performance standard were set below P(e
0
), the principal would be 
overcompensating the agent. 
To illustrate this definition of the performance standard, consider 
a simple manufacturing production example. We use this example 
because manual work constitutes the occupational class where perfor-
mance benchmarking was first used in a systematic way (and is still 
common practice). Taylor (1911) was perhaps its most famous early 
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proponent. His ideas arose from his experience as a machinist in a steel 
plant. Miller (1992, p. 102) also used a piece-rate production setting 
to analyze “managerial dilemmas” and to consider how an incentive 
system could “harness individual self-interest in pursuit of organiza-
tional goals,” “transforming an organizational social dilemma into an 
organizational ‘invisible hand.’” This choice of example is without loss 
of generality, as we will argue that the problems that arise with the 
construction of performance standards in public organizations do not 
fundamentally differ from those arising in production manufacturing. 
Suppose a manual worker in a factory is paid a wage (w) per hour. 
The wage is paid independently of the level of worker performance. 
In addition to the fixed wage, the principal may wish to reward the 
worker for superior performance and impose sanctions for inferior 
performance. The number of pieces the worker produces per hour is 
by itself insufficient to assess whether to reward or sanction the agent. 
One way to address this question is to conduct time-and-motion stud-
ies to establish a benchmark level of performance, or an hourly rate,
P0 = e0(w), which a representative worker earning w would achieve, and 
then use this benchmark to evaluate actual performance. In other words, 
the principal actually assesses the level of performance that occurs un-
der competitive effort and uses this information to set the performance 
standard. The difference between the worker’s performance and the 
performance standard is used as a measure of value added. Under that 
interpretation, value added corresponds to what the agent adds, because 
of superior effort, to what we would expect to prevail in the market. 
This method of establishing the performance standard requires es-
timating the production technology available to the agent, that is, the 
relation between effort and outcomes. Once this relationship is un-
derstood, it is possible to infer the agent’s excess effort relative to the 
competitive level of effort. Counterfactual experiments such as time-
and-motion studies, however, are practical only in a few occupations 
that typically involve manual work. Many public and private sector 
work situations involve nonmanual work, complex group interactions, 
and nonstandardized outputs, making experimental studies to construct 
counterfactual performance benchmarks very costly. 
These complications mean that the methods typically used to 
construct performance standards are imperfect. Real world methods 
necessarily balance the cost of establishing fair and appropriate stan-
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dards and the expected return to the organization from assessing value 
added more precisely; and of course, in the “real world,” non-economic 
factors—e.g., political goals, legislative requirements, etc.—may also 
influence standard setting processes. These challenges and trade-offs 
will become evident in the case study analysis of the JTPA and WIA
performance standards that follow. First, however, we review a set of 
generic problems that any method of setting performance targets must 
address. 
Leveling the Playing Field 
Thus far, we have considered the case of a principal who manages 
a single agent working in a single environment. It often happens, how-
ever, that the agent works in multiple environments or that the principal 
manages multiple agents who face different work conditions. To illus-
trate, we return to the time-and-motion study example presented above 
and assume that there are multiple workers assigned to different ma-
chines. We also assume that the machines vary in their productivity in 
the sense that the amount of effort required to produce a unit of output 
varies by machine. (One might model this idea formally by defining 
the performance outcome from machine k when effort is e as P(e) = 
ke, where k > 0 and k is different from machine to machine.) Assume 
that each machine’s productivity is known to both the principal and the 
agent. 
If the agent is allowed to refuse to work on a machine, the principal 
must factor the difference in marginal products of effort across agents 
into the determination of the performance standard. In fact, if the prin-
cipal sets the same performance standard for all machines, say, P
0
= e
0
, 
then the agent will only agree to work with machines that exhibit high 
marginal productivities. An important point is that time-and-motion 
studies would have to be conducted in each work environment to con-
trol for the special circumstances of the environment that are commonly 
observed by the principal and the agent. 
Consider, for example, the job-training caseworker with the respon-
sibility to assess clients and place them into jobs at a rate required by 
the performance standard. The caseworker will prefer to work with the 
most motivated and capable clients and direct them into the most effec-
tive employment preparation activities. Consequently, in the absence of 
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adjustments to the standard, the caseworker would respond by discrimi-
nating against low-ability enrollees and directing only the higher-ability 
trainees into services with the highest measured performance outcomes 
(e.g., job-placement activities). 
Insurance and Uncontrollable Risk 
The time-and-motion study example assumed no uncertainty about 
the worker’s performance outcome. Consider a more realistic example 
where the worker produces a number of pieces that depend on his or 
her effort and also on some external shock or influence, for example, 
a power outage that slows production (or in the job-training example, 
an economic recession that dampens job placement success). The per-
formance outcome is now equal to P + ∆ and the worker’s value added 
is ∆P = (P + ε) − P
0 
, where e is a mean zero random variable that is 
realized only after the agent has chosen his or her level of effort. Setting 
the standard at a level that does not take into account these circum-
stances or context implies that a worker who supplies the effort level 
that is required to achieve the performance standard will sometimes 
overperform and other times underperform relative to the standard. In 
this situation, value added is equal to ∆P = ∆ when e = e
0 
. Outside 
shocks do not influence the worker’s choice of effort because additional
effort still increases expected performance. They do, however, change 
the realized level of performance and value added, and therefore, the 
worker’s compensation. 
Although a risk-neutral worker will not suffer any disutility from 
this variation in compensation, a risk-averse worker will, and this es-
tablishes a first rationale to construct as fair a performance standard as 
possible. The merit of performance standards will depend in part on 
their ability to control for outside risk (i.e., circumstances beyond the 
control of public managers or staff). The logic of agency theory is that 
standards that properly account for external influences reduce compen-
sation risk, thereby increasing the agents’ welfare. Lowering the risk 
faced by the agent is also desirable for the principal, as it means that he 
does not have to offer the agent a higher wage to compensate for risk 
bearing. 
The key challenge for performance standards system designers is 
to identify the sources of controllable versus uncontrollable factors that 
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influence the performance outcome. In other words, it is important to 
hold the worker responsible for effort, e, but not for external influences, 
e. At the same time, the principal does not want to discount factors 
that are within the agent’s control. For example, the principal does not 
want to lower the performance standard in the event that the worker’s 
machine breaks down if the agent might have anticipated and prevented 
the breakdown. In the context of the job-training example, the prin-
cipal does want to hold the caseworker responsible for (and reward) 
efforts made to appropriately assess clients and facilitate better worker-
employer matches. But it would be unfair and inefficient to penalize 
the caseworker (or job-training center) for a lower rate of worker-
employer matches if it is due to a declining number of labor market 
(job) opportunities. 
As suggested above, though, risk aversion is not the only reason the 
agent may experience disutility from performance standards that fail 
to control for outside risks. Another closely related concern is fairness. 
The issue of income variability drives the concern under risk aversion, 
while other considerations, such as interpersonal comparisons, may 
foster concerns about fairness. For example, the agent may experience 
more disutility from an idiosyncratic shock that lowers only her per-
formance and not the performance of her coworkers, compared to a 
group shock that lowers all workers’ performance. The former shock 
generates different treatments amongst individuals who have essen-
tially behaved identically. As under risk aversion, if workers value 
fairness, the principal benefits from discounting factors that are outside 
the worker’s control. 
hidden Information, Adverse Selection, and Distortions 
We show in the previous section that in setting performance stan-
dards, the principal may want to take into account information about 
shocks that influence the performance outcome and that are outside the 
agent’s control. These shocks are observed only after the agent has cho-
sen a level of effort, implying that they do not influence this choice. We 
now consider a different kind of information that plays an important 
role in the construction of performance standards. This information is 
observed only by the agent, and not by the principal, and it is observed 
before the agent chooses his/her level of effort. For example, assume 
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that when the agent is assigned to a new machine, she alone knows the 
productivity of that machine and can use this information to make her 
effort choice. We say that the information is privately known by the 
agent, and consistent with the literature, we characterize such situations 
as hidden information (Holmstrom 1982; Miller 1992). 
Hidden information further complicates the problem of setting 
standards. To illustrate, we return to the job training program example 
and again assume that the training efforts of caseworkers in this pro-
gram are evaluated in part according to the rate at which their clients 
secure jobs. Caseworkers observe relevant information about applicants 
on the likely success of training investments, (e.g., personal motivation 
and employment barriers). Based on this information, the caseworkers 
can predict how likely the applicant is to obtain employment by the end 
of training. Assume furthermore that those applicants who are more 
likely to perform well on the performance measure are not necessarily 
those who benefit most from training. Indeed, some applicants to the 
job-training program may be highly likely to obtain employment on 
their own. As a result the caseworkers may overinvest in easy-to-serve 
applicants and underinvest in hard-to-serve ones, and it may be impos-
sible for the principal to correct these investment distortions. 
For example, a given effort level e could produce performance out-
come P = e + h, where h < 0 if a hard-to-serve participant is enrolled, 
and h > 0 if an easy-to-serve participant is enrolled. We denote hidden 
information by h to distinguish this kind of information from infor-
mation that is publicly known, such as the information about varying 
productivities of machines. If the caseworker observes the applicants’
type, he has an incentive to enroll only easy-to-serve applicants because 
they produce better outcomes. 
In fact, the only way the principal could try to correct these distor-
tions would be by controlling for the type of applicants who have been 
served, adjusting upward the performance of those agents who have 
enrolled a larger fraction of hard-to-serve applicants. By assumption, 
however, only the agent knows this information. If the principal were to 
ask the agent what type of participants he has enrolled, the agent would 
have an incentive to report enrolling only hard-to-serve enrollees, and 
the principal would have no way to verify that the agent is telling the 
truth. 
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Practically speaking, the principal could correct these distortions 
by developing a specific measure to target the hard-to-serve groups, 
for example, using observable variables such as welfare recipient or 
limited English proficiency as proxies for “hard-to-serve.” This would 
assume that welfare recipients or nonnative English speakers are harder 
to serve because they require higher investments for equal outcomes. 
The principal could set a lower performance standard for these indi-
viduals, for example, P
0
’ = e
0
− h, where P
0
’ < P
0 
by construction. Of 
course, we know that not all welfare recipients (or nonnative English 
speakers) are identical; some are easier to serve than others, and the 
agent observes this information. Again, the agent will be inclined to 
select a nonrepresentative sample of these groups. This implies that the 
principal has corrected some distortions because the agent’s attention 
is now focused on a needier target population, but the agent will still 
select those applicants who are the easiest to serve within these sub-
populations of applicants. 
Note that a slightly different problem from hidden information, 
known as adverse selection in the literature, occurs when there are mul-
tiple agents who are privately informed. In our example, it could be 
the case that different agents face different costs, observed privately, of 
meeting the standard. In the job training case, this happens when there 
are multiple caseworkers who face different eligible populations, and 
when the caseworkers privately observe this information. The distinc-
tion between adverse selection and hidden information has to do with 
the point in time when the agent becomes privately informed. Under 
hidden information, the agent becomes privately informed after agree-
ing to the contract, while under adverse selection, the agent is informed 
before agreeing to the contract. As a consequence, adverse selection 
introduces the possibility that the agent’s private information will influ-
ence the agent’s decision to accept the contract or not. 
To illustrate, assume that the principal offers all agents the option 
to run special programs that are only for hard-to-serve populations. The 
principal lowers the standards for these special programs, and using our 
terminology, this would constitute a new optional contract. The agent 
agrees or declines to participate. The agents will choose to run such 
programs on the basis of their private information about the population 
they face. Presumably, the agents who face the best chances to meet the 
lower performance standards will decide to run such programs. How-
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ever, these agents may not be those who generate the highest returns 
from the principal’s perspective. The agent’s selection rule poses a 
problem when it does not correspond to the rule that the principal would 
use, had the principal had the same information as the agent. 
Multiple Principals 
Another distinctive feature of performance standards systems in the 
public sector is the greater likelihood that agents will work for more 
than one principal. In the context of public organizations, one should 
think of principals as a widely defined category that includes all con-
stituencies or interest groups that may influence the actions of the agent, 
either directly through explicit rewards or indirectly through more sub-
tle channels. For example, in the context of our application to the JTPA
and WIA programs, Congress, the USDOL, and state governments 
would be the main principals, since these are the actors who directly de-
fine the goals and activities of the organization, both through the design 
of the incentive system, performance standards, and also through other 
organizational features. But local politicians, private industry council 
representatives, and other interest groups should also be viewed as sec-
ondary principals, since these parties likewise have roles in influencing 
training program priorities and agency actions. 
The key implication of the presence of multiple principals is in-
creased complexity in the incentive system, particularly if the interests 
of the different principals are not aligned, e.g., emphasizing different 
priorities or outcomes. The agent has to choose how to allocate his/her 
effort level e across the various goals or objectives of the principals, 
which might be represented in a performance standards system by mul-
tiple standards, P1 , P2 , P3 , etc. 
Dixit (2002) proposes an analysis of multiple principals compet-
ing noncooperatively for the agent’s effort. As expected, the agent will 
allocate more effort toward the objectives of principals who compen-
sate at a higher rate (or provide greater rewards for achievement in 
some form or another). In other words, if w1 > w2 , then e1 > e2 and P1 
= e1(w1) > P2 = e2(w2); performance is higher on the outcome set by the 
principal who calls for P1 and provides greater rewards for its achieve-
ment. Dixit demonstrates that the marginal level of effort applied by the 
agent (e1 , e2 , e3 , etc.) toward the achievement of the various outcomes 
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will be decreasing in the number of principals. The reason is simply 
that each principal will reward the agent for success on the particular 
dimension(s) of effort that concern him or her, but he will also insure 
the agent against failure on dimensions of effort that concern the other 
principals. If principals choose the level of incentive noncooperatively, 
the desire to insure the agent will conflict with the desire to provide 
incentives. 
In investigating how the principals compete for the agent’s effort, 
Dixit also shows that the declines in agents’ marginal level of effort 
(as the number of principals increases) will be exacerbated if the ef-
forts across principals’ objectives are substitutes. In other words, the 
principals undermine one another, and the impact of the incentives is 
diminished. In equilibrium, all principals call for effort, but since ef-
forts are substitutable, the incentive effects on total effort are reduced. 
Dixit’s analysis calls for two recommendations for organizational 
design. First, one should allocate and organize tasks across agents based 
on whether they are complements or substitutes. Complementary ac-
tivities can be grouped together, but the grouping of substitute activities 
should be avoided. In the context of the JTPA program, if there are 
some principals who are more concerned about equity of allocation 
(local government) and others more concerned about efficiency (the 
federal government), then it may be optimal to divide up the functions 
of enrollment and training and to assign each of these activities to two 
separate agencies. 
In addition, the model has implications for how the principals 
should be allowed to compete. In particular, the principal i should not 
be permitted to excuse or cover for the agent’s poor performance toward 
meeting principal j’s objective. This “compartmentalization principle” 
has implications in a public organization. Consider, for example, the 
conflict between enrollment and training in the JTPA program described 
above, and assume that the proposed solution of breaking up these tasks 
is not feasible for administrative or practical reasons. In this situation, 
the principals who are concerned primarily with reaching hard-to-serve 
populations will try to set the performance standard in such a way that 
training agencies are not penalized for achieving low performance out-
comes. Similarly, principals who care mainly about efficiency will try 
to minimize the emphasis placed on enrollment choices. A possible re-
sult would be that agencies would face low performance standards and 
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no constraints on enrollment. To avoid this outcome, one would want 
to minimize principals’ interference with one another in the setting of 
performance standards. 
Although there is considerable discussion of “multidimensional-
ity” or multiple principals in the literature, there is little mention of 
situations in which there may be a hierarchy among the principals. 
The political science literature discusses “political multidimensional-
ity” and the difficulty of identifying an “ultimate principal,” e.g., the 
competing interests of House and Senate chambers, committees, and 
other political actors that have implications for the stability of agents’
behavior (Maltzman and Smith 1994). However, it is also possible that 
in a political hierarchy such as that established in the JTPA system, 
with service providers taking signals from local job-training authorities 
and state and federal policy directives at the same time, agents might 
allocate their efforts toward alternative objectives of these principals 
according to the principals’ position in this hierarchy. 
Dynamic Issues 
Measurement systems are often changed from time to time. There 
are many reasons why the principal may update performance standards. 
First, the principal may want to set low standards when a new perfor-
mance measure is introduced to give the agent time to adjust to the 
change. Second, the principal may correct performance measurement 
systems as she acquires new information about the effectiveness of dif-
ferent measurement schemes or about the influence of external factors 
on performance. Third, the principal may revise the standard to account 
for changes in the environment or in the production technology. 
The agent will take into account the possibility of future changes, 
and most importantly, the fact that current performance outcomes may 
be used in setting future standards. In both the JTPA and WIA pro-
grams, this has been a central component of the performance standard 
setting process. The WIA legislation explicitly identifies “continuous 
performance improvement,” in which performance targets increase 
each year, as a central tenet of the performance standards system. Such 
a rule also implicitly exists in any organization that uses past agent per-
formance to estimate the production function and set standards for the 
present. Assume the agent systematically outperforms the standard, and 
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the principal consequently increases it. It could be that the agent was 
outperforming the standard because the agent was exerting exceptional 
effort. The agent will then anticipate that current performance influ-
ences future standards. The natural response to such a rule is to stop 
supplying high effort because it increases the standard (and the level of 
effort required to obtain the same reward in the future). Thus, a simple 
static view of incentive systems may fail to capture such behavioral 
responses that arise only when one considers the dynamic nature of 
performance measurement. 
In the economics and management literature, this phenomenon 
is known as the ratchet effect (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987; Miller 
1992). The agent’s belief about the principal’s policies regarding future 
standards will significantly influence his behavior and the success of 
the incentive system. To eliminate the ratchet effect, the agent must 
trust that the principal will not change the standard. Trust is more likely 
to develop under repeated interactions when the principal can create a 
reputation for not reneging on the contract. Miller (1992, p. 157) like-
wise recognizes the importance of trust in these situations, noting that 
“‘trustworthiness’ on the part of managers seems to be a necessary ele-
ment of an effective incentive system.” Another way the principal can 
eliminate the ratchet effect is by committing to never change a standard, 
or more realistically, by committing to strict rules for changing the stan-
dard. Such commitment is likely to eliminate fear of the ratchet effect 
and reinforce incentives for effort. 
OvERvIEw OF PERFORMAnCE STAnDARD–
SETTInG APPROAChES 
We now present a brief overview of alternative methods for con-
structing performance standards (informed by the theoretical discussion 
above) and consider the environments where these methods are likely 
to work well. 
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Estimating the Production Function 
Most basically, the principal (or public agency) can attempt to es-
timate the production function (i.e., the level of productivity expected 
from a given level of effort) to set the standard. It is sometimes possible 
to establish a standard through experimentation or through statistical 
methods. Such an approach will only be valid, however, for produc-
tion processes that are stable over time and across environments. This 
is relatively rare, for example, in public social service provision. The 
use of data on past performance outcomes to construct estimates of the 
production function is a more common application of this method. A
potential problem with this method, as discussed earlier, is the introduc-
tion of a ratchet effect if higher performance outcomes increase future 
standards. This method is also unlikely to work well in nonstationary 
environments where the production technology is subject to transient 
shocks. 
Relative Performance Evaluation 
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is possible when the princi-
pal manages multiple agents. RPE can take many forms. In one form, the 
principal ranks the agent’s performance as in a tournament (e.g., akin to 
the Job Corps Center annual performance rankings). Alternatively, the 
principal could compare the agent’s performance to the average per-
formance among all agents who perform the same work. RPE works 
well for “insurance purposes” because it controls for shocks that are 
common to all agents. In this way, the model provides a rationale for 
benchmarking by comparing performance across similar workers/agen-
cies, as called for by some public administration scholars (Hatry 1999). 
Of course, this method has its limitations, too, in that it may exacerbate 
competition and may also result in wasteful behaviors (e.g., sabotage, 
monitoring others, etc.). 
negotiating the Standard 
With this method, the principal and agent negotiate (agree on) 
the performance standard. If objective information on the production 
function is absent and relative performance evaluation is not a viable al-
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ternative, this may be the only solution available. This approach requires 
an environment of mutual trust between the agent and principal(s), i.e., 
one in which the agent does not withhold important information about 
her effort and capabilities, and where the principal can be trusted to use 
performance information fairly, e.g., not to increase the standard in the 
event of performance outcomes above the standard. The resulting per-
formance standard (and the corresponding distribution of risk between 
the principal and agent) may be more a function of the relative bargain-
ing ability of the parties, however, rather than reflecting principles of 
effective performance standard setting processes. 
PERFORMAnCE-STAnDARD SETTInG In FEDERAL
JOB-TRAInInG PROGRAMS 
In the U.S. government’s largest job-training program, individual 
providers of government training have been evaluated by their per-
formance relative to specific, numerical standards. Congress has also 
legislated important changes in the formulation of these numerical 
standards, as described in Chapter 4. A major redesign of the program 
five years ago introduced an entirely different approach to setting 
performance standards, and we will devote considerable attention 
to the implications of these changes for the system’s incentives and 
functioning. 
Under JTPA, Congress, the USDOL, and state authorities shared 
in designing and implementing the program’s incentive policies. The 
Labor Department established expected performance levels using a 
regression-based model with national departure points. States could 
use the optional department adjustment model or develop their own ad-
justment procedures, although the state-developed procedures and any 
adjustments made by the governor had to conform to the USDOL’s pa-
rameters (see Chapter 4 and Social Policy Research Associates [1999]). 
A majority of states adopted these models and used the USDOL-
provided performance standards worksheets to determine performance 
targets (some with modifications). 
The WIA program that replaced JTPA in 2000 introduced a new 
approach to setting performance standards that involves the negotia-
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tion of performance targets. States negotiate with the USDOL and local 
workforce investment areas to establish performance standards, us-
ing estimates based on historical data (or past performance) that are 
intended to take into account differences in economic conditions, par-
ticipant characteristics, and services delivered. The pretext for making 
this change to a system of negotiated standards was to promote “shared 
accountability,” described as one of the “guiding principles” of WIA
(USDOL 2001, p. 8). 
In our case analysis of the JTPA and WIA performance measure-
ment systems, the USDOL, Congress, and the states constitute multiple 
principals in the organizational structure, while local implementing 
authorities (in government entities or training centers) function as the 
agents, undertaking the business of enrolling, training, and finding em-
ployment for the program clients. Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 (p. 22) shows 
the performance measures currently in effect in the WIA program and 
also indicates which of these are new to WIA (i.e., that were not used in 
the JTPA program). 
Determining the Base Level of Performance 
The first challenge in setting performance standards is to establish 
the “counterfactual” level of performance, i.e., the level of performance 
that would occur under a competitive level of effort. Consider for ex-
ample the entered employment rate measure. What employment rate 
outcome would an agent who supplies a competitive level of effort 
achieve? 
In general, the USDOL has attempted to address this question 
through the use of data on past performance. For example, prior to the 
start of JTPA, the Labor Department collected performance data on out-
comes during the final years of the training program that preceded JTPA
and used these data to determine the performance standards in the first 
year of JTPA. Now assume that past performance in a representative 
training environment gives a distribution of performance, and that dif-
ferences in performance outcomes are due only to differences in effort. 
Then if the department believes that only 50 percent of the training 
centers have supplied at least the competitive level of effort, the perfor-
mance standard should be set at the 50th percentile of the distribution 
of past performance. 
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In the JTPA measurement system, the performance standard was set 
at the outcome produced by the training center at the 25th percentile of 
performance among all training centers nationwide. Thus, the USDOL
evaluated a training center’s effort, e, against an effort level e’, that cor-
responded to the effort level of the training center at the 25th percentile 
of systemwide performance. An interpretation of this choice is that 25 
percent of the training centers in the previous program were not supplying 
a competitive level of effort. 
Under WIA, the more systematic approach for setting standards 
described above was abandoned. With discretion for setting perfor-
mance standards transferred to the negotiation process between states 
and localities, the use of past performance information varied widely. 
The USDOL did provide some guidance for negotiated targets un-
der WIA using data on the performance of seven early implementing 
states. However, among the majority of states that used baseline per-
formance measures in determining appropriate levels for the standards, 
the sources of these data differed considerably. The various types of 
data used included the projected national averages for the negotiated 
standards provided by the Labor Department; federal baseline numbers 
(available in the federal performance tracking system, i.e., Standard-
ized Program Information Reporting [SPIR] data); unemployment 
insurance (UI) data; and states’ own performance baselines from pre-
vious program years. Georgia, for example, used program year (PY) 
1998 state performance records combined with the projected national 
averages in negotiations with regional office representatives and local-
level officials to determine the performance targets for the first three 
years of WIA. Some states, such as New Hampshire and Ohio, used 
UI data from earlier periods (PY 1994–1997) combined with USDOL
performance data available in the SPIR to set performance levels. These 
considerable differences across states in the performance standard set-
ting process have important implications for the ability of the principal 
to create a level playing field for all agents. 
Is the Playing Field Level? 
Although our discussion thus far has centered on a representative 
training center, there are important differences across centers in the 
populations from which they draw their enrollees and in their labor mar-
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kets. For example, training centers located in relatively depressed labor 
markets should reasonably expect lower performance outcomes than 
those located in relatively tight labor markets. The USDOL recognized 
this problem and provided states with a method to adjust standards that 
took into account features of the training center’s population and envi-
ronment that may have been correlated with the performance outcome. 
Under JTPA, this method established the 25th percentile only as a 
starting or departure point. For each training center, the departure point 
was adjusted using a regression model, taking into account the extent 
that the training center’s characteristics differed from the average train-
ing center’s characteristics. Thus, continuing the above example, the 
adjustment approach would lower the entered employment rate stan-
dard for training centers in depressed job markets relative to those in 
robust ones. 
In the WIA program, the formal performance standards adjustment 
models were discarded by nearly all of the states (the exceptions being 
Texas, Maryland, and the District of Columbia). At the same time, the 
USDOL instructed states to take into account differences in economic
conditions, participant characteristics, and services provided. For a 
majority, these adjustments to standards were made informally during 
the review of past performance data and in negotiations. For example, 
Wisconsin reported using PY 1997 data and the projected averages in 
negotiations with local officials to set the standards. A comparison of 
these data shows that when Wisconsin’s PY 1997 baseline was above 
the projected national averages, the projected averages were established 
as the targets. When Wisconsin’s baseline numbers were below the pro-
jected national averages, the baseline values were typically set as the 
targets. Other states (e.g., Washington, Nebraska, South Carolina, and 
others) followed a similar process. 
Adjusting for Uncontrollable Risks 
In addition to accounting for factors (demographic, economic, or 
others) known at the time that performance standards are established, it 
is important to allow for adjustments to standards that will offset future 
or unknown risks of poor performance due to conditions or circum-
stances beyond the control of agents. In other words, the adjustment 
methodology should also correct for the risk generated by a random 
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shock (ε) in the model. While exceptional performance is still an unbi-
ased estimator of excess effort even in the presence of a random shock, 
such a shock introduces noise in the measure of value added, and there-
fore in the training center’s award. Because of risk-averse training staff 
and uncertain budgets, it is in the principal’s interest to formulate per-
formance standards that control both for persistent differences across 
training centers and transitory or idiosyncratic shocks. 
As described above, many states used past performance data to set 
performance standards for the first year of the WIA program. In addi-
tion, most states also built in anticipated performance improvements 
for the two subsequent years. However, economic conditions changed 
significantly between the pre-WIA period and first three years of the 
program’s implementation. Between 1998 and 1999, unemployment 
rates were declining on average, with 75 percent of all states experienc-
ing a decline. Then between 2000 and 2001, this trend reversed. More 
than 75 percent of the states experienced an increase in unemployment 
rates, and the increases were even greater between 2001 and 2002, fol-
lowing the September 2001 World Trade Center terrorist attacks.2 As 
unemployment rates were increasing in the first three years of WIA
(from 3.94 percent to 5.35 percent, on average) and creating adverse 
labor market conditions for trainees, the standards for performance 
achievement in the program were also increasing (from 66.44 percent 
to 70.94 percent, on average). 
Year-to-year variations in job availability typically cannot be antici-
pated by training centers, much less an economic shock of the magnitude 
precipitated by the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, by adjust-
ing a training center’s standards for the local unemployment rate each 
year, the variance in performance due to unpredictable changes in the 
environment is reduced. And although these types of adjustments were 
made in the JTPA system, they were not standard practice under WIA. 
A 2002 GAO report confirmed that WIA program administrators were 
seriously concerned about their ability to meet performance targets. All 
state program administrators reported that some of the performance 
targets were set too high for them and that the performance standards 
negotiation processes did not allow for adequate adjustments to varying 
economic conditions and participant demographics. In fact, the propor-
tion of states meeting or exceeding their performance standards dropped 
between PY 2001 and PY 2002 for nearly all measures, some dramati-
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Table 5.1  Percent of States Meeting or Exceeding Their negotiated
Performance Standards in Pys 2000–2002 
Performance measure/standard PY 2000 PY 2001 PY 2002 
Adult entered employment rate 56.7 66.5 61.5 
Adult employment retention rate 54.0 60.7 57.7 
Adult earnings change 49.3 64.6 48.1 
Adult credential rate 36.7 45.6 46.2 
Dislocated worker entered employment rate 52.7 65.5 55.8 
Dislocated worker employment retention rate 42.0 58.7 51.9 
Dislocated worker earning replacement rate 54.7 74.8 61.5 
Dislocated worker credential rate 36.7 58.7 55.8 
Older youth entered employment rate 58.7 63.6 42.3 
Older youth employment retention rate 52.0 61.2 48.1 
Older youth earnings change 52.7 64.6 59.6 
Older youth credential rate 29.3 31.6 23.1 
Younger youth retention rate 38.0 59.2 57.7 
Younger youth skill attainment rate 72.0 69.4 53.9 
Younger youth diploma rate 25.3 45.6 50.0 
Employer satisfaction 45.3 75.7 69.2 
Participant satisfaction 51.3 78.6 76.9 
SOURCE: Heinrich (2004). 
cally, such as the 21 percent decrease in the proportion of states meeting 
their older youth entered employment rates (see Table 5.1). 
Cream Skimming and quick Fixes 
The pressures generated by a high-stakes performance measure-
ment system can lead to undesirable behavioral responses on the part of 
agents. The performance standards under both JTPA and WIA were not 
only “noisy,” but they were also vulnerable to manipulation by agents. 
One way to increase P − P0 (and the corresponding performance award) 
was to increase effort. Another way to increase P − P0 that required no 
additional effort, however, was to select among the eligible applicants 
only the high-h types. That is, training centers might enroll persons who 
would produce high employment rates and earnings, even in the absence 
of training. This behavior has been called cream skimming (in addition 
to Chapter 6, see, e.g., Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond [1993]; 
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Cragg [1997]; Heckman and Smith [2003]; and Heckman, Smith, and 
Taber [1996]). 
To prevent cream skimming, the USDOL adjusted the JTPA
standards for the effects of the characteristics of enrollees on P. As il-
lustrated in Chapter 4, the adjustment method compensated training 
centers for enrolling persons such as the handicapped who tended to 
lower posttraining employment rates and earnings outcomes. Training 
centers that enrolled lower than average numbers of welfare recipients 
and handicapped were required to achieve higher standards. That is, the 
USDOL adjusted performance standards for the effect of the training 
center’s enrollment policies on P. 
These adjustments under JTPA, which apparently did not fully ac-
count for all low-h characteristics, may have reduced cream-skimming 
behavior, but they did not eliminate it (Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith 
[2002]). In addition, the adjustment method did not account for train-
ing centers’ choices about the training services made available. Thus, 
the performance measures generated incentives to emphasize short-run, 
“quick fix”–type job placement activities in lieu of longer-term activi-
ties with more training content (Courty and Marschke 2003). Courty 
and Marschke (1997, 2004a) also showed how program managers 
strategically managed their “trainee inventories” and timed participant 
program exits to maximize end of the year performance levels. For a 
more detailed overview of the findings described in this subsection, see 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
Implications of Multiple Principals 
The federal government’s efforts to encourage service delivery to the 
hard-to-serve and the provision of more intensive training activities were 
also frustrated by the presence of multiple principals with differing priori-
ties. Although state authorities followed suit in placing more emphasis on 
these same goals, some local job-training authorities continued to demand 
low-cost placements from their service providers (Heinrich 1999). Heinrich 
found that service providers were aware of the new federal and state 
policy directives but focused primarily on job placement rates and costs 
per placement in their efforts, largely because these were the outcomes 
directly rewarded with contract renewals and other forms of recognition 
at the local level. 
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The change under WIA to a system in which regional USDOL
representatives, state authorities, and local representatives engage in 
negotiations to determine performance standards might have presented 
an opportunity for greater coordination in aligning these principals’
interests and reducing problems associated with divided agent efforts. 
In practice, however, the lack of formal adjustment mechanisms for 
standards under the new system only exacerbated these problems. After 
interviewing WIA program administrators in 50 states and visiting five 
sites, the GAO (2002) concluded that “the need to meet performance 
levels may be the driving factor in deciding who receives WIA-funded 
services at the local level” (p. 14). The GAO report and a subsequent 
study (Heinrich 2004) describe how some local areas have limited ac-
cess to services for individuals who they perceive are less likely to get 
and retain a job. For example, some have responded to these pressures 
by augmenting the screening process for determining registrations or 
by limiting registrations of harder-to-serve job seekers, including dislo-
cated workers whose preprogram earnings were more difficult to replace. 
A Texas official indicated that even with Texas’s relatively sophisti-
cated statistical model for setting and adjusting performance standards, 
adequate adjustments had not been made for economic conditions. 
In her empirical analysis of WIA program performance across the 
states, Heinrich (2004) estimates OLS regressions using as dependent 
variables states’ actual performance levels, and in separate regressions, 
the differentials between their actual performance and the negotiated 
standards. The objective of these analyses is to assess the relationship of 
local participant characteristics and economic conditions to measured 
performance and to determine if “adjustments” made in the negotiation 
process (i.e., to establish fair standards) were effective in accounting for 
these factors. For example, states with a comparatively high number of 
high school dropouts participating in their programs could have negoti-
ated a lower employment retention rate or earnings change standard 
in anticipation that their less educated populations would have fewer 
or less attractive employment opportunities. If the states’ initial pro-
cesses for adjusting performance standards through such negotiations 
had worked as intended, one would expect to see fewer or weaker re-
lationships between the performance differentials and these baseline 
characteristics (compared to their relationships with actual performance 
levels). In other words, only state and local program efforts—not char-
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acteristics of their populations or economic conditions that were beyond 
program managers’ control—should explain why they met, exceeded, 
or fell below their negotiated performance standards. 
Heinrich estimates separate regressions for each of the 17 per-
formance standards for these two dependent variables. In both sets of 
models, characteristics such as race, education, and work history were 
statistically significant predictors of performance relative to some stan-
dards, suggesting that adjustments for participant characteristics were 
inadequate. In fact, the most consistent, negative predictors of perfor-
mance levels and differentials were unemployment rates. These findings 
confirm that states were not prepared to adjust for what turned out to 
be significant risks of failure to meet performance standards due to the 
economic downturn and aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
Dynamics 
Under JTPA, the practice of pegging the performance standard to 
the performance of the training center at the 25th percentile in the prior 
period likely contributed to unsustainable changes in the level of effort 
exerted by training centers over time. If training centers responded to 
incentives and strived to exceed the performance standard, the distribu-
tion of training centers’ performances would shift to the right, implying 
that the new 25th percentile (which would become the basis of the stan-
dard in the next year) would exceed the old 25th percentile. As long as 
training centers can keep up with effort, the standard grows ever higher, 
and the amount of effort necessary to meet the standard also increases, 
leading to higher outcomes and future increases in the standard. More 
realistically, at least if performance improvement or inflation goes on 
for long enough, such a system implies that some training centers will 
eventually fall behind and fail to meet the standard. If such a system 
would be used for long enough, performance inflation should eventu-
ally stop and about 25 percent of training centers would perform below 
the standard: an unsatisfactory outcome. 
Table 5.2 reports the departure points for a number of the original 
JTPA performance measures (i.e., the adult employment rate at ter-
mination, the adult welfare employment rate at termination, and the 
youth employment rate at termination). These departure points were 
consistently set at the 25th percentile of a previous year’s distribution of 
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Table 5.2  Departure Points for First-Generation JTPA Standards 
Adult welfare Youth employment 
Adult employment employment rate at rate at
Program year rate at termination (%) termination (%) termination (%) 
1984 47.0 — 21.4 
1985 57.1 — 36.4 
1986, 1987 62.4 51.3 43.3 
1988, 1989 68.0 56.0 45.0 
NOTE: — = data not available. 
SOURCE: Courty and Marschke (2004b). 
outcomes. As predicted, Table 5.2 shows a general increase in departure 
points over this period of the early JTPA years. The departure points in 
1986–1987 were much higher than those in 1984–1985, which is not 
unexpected given that they were based on performance under JTPA’s 
predecessor program and the initial nine months of JTPA (during which 
training centers were not subject to incentive policies). 
Under WIA, the USDOL strongly encouraged states and localities 
to set standards that would motivate improved performance from year 
to year. In fact, in the effort to promote “continuous performance im-
provement,” the states set standards that not only required that they 
improve over time, but also that the magnitude of the improvements in-
crease from year to year. This approach gave states an implicit incentive 
to negotiate lower standards in the early years, and some of the states, 
in fact, attempted to do this. North Carolina, for example, was asked by 
the USDOL to increase the level of its negotiated standards before the 
start of the WIA program, as they were judged to be too low relative 
to other states and North Carolina’s past performance (Heinrich 2004). 
For the most part, though, states and localities complied with WIA re-
quirements by building yearly increases into the standards. 
As the analysis by Heinrich shows, however, this approach failed 
due to the lack of adjustments for changing economic conditions in 
the early years of WIA. Two years into the program’s operation, 38 
states were identified as having failed to achieve at least 80 percent 
of their performance goals for two consecutive years and were at risk 
for sanctions. More generally, these findings suggest that the types of 
formal performance standards adjustments made in the JTPA system 
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to control for factors outside program managers’ control are critical to 
the success of a system intended to promote continuous performance 
improvements. The presence of conditions that drive ratchet effects in 
WIA also suggests that the design of performance incentives may not 
always follow a strictly economic logic. 
COnCLUSIOnS 
In this chapter, we have drawn from the information economics, 
contract theory, and public administration literatures to discern basic 
lessons for the construction of performance standards. We demonstrate 
the relevance of these lessons in the context of two public programs, 
the U.S. JTPA and WIA federal job training programs. We find evi-
dence that performance measurement system designers have attempted 
to “level the playing field” over time to provide equivalent performance 
incentives across states and localities. Performance standard adjustment 
methods were established to account for “shocks” that are outside an 
agent’s control and to reduce the risk faced by the agent. Policymakers 
have also tried to reduce the potential negative distortions due to hidden 
information. 
At the same time, it is not surprising that in a public sector program 
with multiple principals and political relationships influencing ad-
ministration, the evidence suggests that these problems were not fully 
resolved. We identified some negative dynamic properties of the perfor-
mance measurement system that threaten its sustainability. In both JTPA
and WIA, the dynamics of performance benchmarking and the chal-
lenges of effectively adjusting performance expectations for external 
influences beyond program managers’ control likely contributed to in-
efficiencies and generated incentives to influence performance in ways 
other than increasing effort. Selecting trainees according to observed 
characteristics associated with their labor market success, limiting the 
availability of more intensive training services, and demonstrating lower
performance early on to allow for performance improvements over 
time are some examples of strategic behaviors that were unintended 
by system designers and potentially harmful to the system and pro-
gram outcomes. In the WIA system, where rewards (up to $3 million in 
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grants) and sanctions (up to a 5 percent reduction in grants) had poten-
tially important implications for program functioning, the performance 
standards should have provided appropriate incentives and feedback to 
operators about the effectiveness of their activities in improving service 
quality and participant outcomes. 
Politicians, along with economists and private sector representa-
tives, have been calling for a more businesslike administration of 
government for more than a century, most recently in the “reinventing 
government” and New Public Management reform initiatives. The use 
of performance measurement systems and bonuses in public sector pro-
grams has been a key component of these recent initiatives, although 
both policymakers and scholars have begun to uncover evidence of their 
“dark side,” including some of the negative or unintended consequences
described in this study (Radin 2000). Our research confirms both the 
potential of these systems to be effectively managed to promote per-
formance improvements, and the limitations of these systems’ design, 
which are guided not only by economic theory, but also by political 
demands and the complexities of representative governance. Although 
our research doesn’t point to cogent solutions for all of the problems 
that public sector performance measurement system designers face, we 
do suggest some specific actions public managers can take to improve 
these systems, such as the proper incorporation of different types of 
information into the standard, coordination among multiple principals 
with conflicting interests, and more careful attention to the dynamic im-
plications of performance measurement. More generally, we also hope 
that the framework for analysis of these issues that we present might 
better guide policymakers’ or other scholars’ understanding and consid-
eration of how these systems and public program performance might 
be improved. 
notes 
1. Both Dixit and Burgess and Ratto (2003) evaluate this literature in the context of 
incentive provision inside government organizations. 
2. In New York City alone, it is estimated that about 430,000 job-months and $2.8 
billion in wages were lost in the three months following the September 11 attacks 
(Makinen 2002). 
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6 
Do the Determinants of Program 
Participation Data Provide 
Evidence of Cream Skimming? 
James J. Heckman 
Jeffrey Smith 
This chapter considers the extent to which detailed data on the 
process of participation in a social program can provide researchers 
and policymakers with meaningful evidence on the nature and extent 
of cream skimming caused by a performance-management system. We 
illustrate our discussion with an empirical analysis of data collected as 
part of the National JTPA Study (NJS). These data allow us to empiri-
cally decompose the process of participation in the JTPA program into 
a series of stages: eligibility for the program, awareness of the program, 
application to the program, acceptance into the program, and enrollment 
into the program. This chapter reframes and reinterprets the analysis in 
Heckman and Smith (2004) for this volume.1 
Conceptually, this chapter contributes to the literature by clarifying 
how and when data on multiple stages of the program participation pro-
cess provide credible evidence on the effect of performance standards 
on program participation. Decomposing the process into stages allows 
researchers to compare the determinants of participation across stages. 
Dividing the stages into those on which program staff (and thus perfor-
mance standards) have an important influence and those on which they 
do not provides suggestive evidence on the importance of performance 
standards for program participation. 
Empirically, we make two major contributions. First, we document 
the importance of factors other than cream skimming induced by per-
formance standards in accounting for differences in JTPA participation 
among subgroups. In particular, the eligibility rules for JTPA play a 
major role in driving subgroup differences. Conditional on eligibility, 
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further subgroup differences emerge at the stage of program aware-
ness, something over which program staff have at most limited control. 
These findings suggest caution regarding the conclusions from existing 
analyses that presume strong effects of cream skimming based solely 
on comparisons of the characteristics of program eligibles and program 
participants. 
Second, our analysis of the determinants of program enrollment 
conditional on application and acceptance into the program (the stage 
where we expect program staff to have the most control over the pro-
cess) yields some suggestive evidence consistent with cream skimming. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First we put 
this chapter into the context of the broader literature. We then present
a framework for analyzing data on multiple stages of the program par-
ticipation process and discuss what such data can reveal regarding the 
empirical importance of cream skimming induced by performance 
standards in determining who gets served. The next section documents 
aspects of the JTPA program relevant for our analysis but not covered 
in Chapter 2. We then describe the data we use and the four training 
centers from the National JTPA Study at which much of the data were 
collected, followed by a detailed examination of four stages in the JTPA
participation process: eligibility, program awareness, application and 
acceptance into the program, and formal enrollment. We decompose the 
program participation process in order to focus on how overall differ-
ences in participation probabilities across subgroups break down into 
effects at each stage of the participation process. The last section re-
views our conclusions and places them in the context of the volume as 
a whole. 
COnTExT 
Our analysis fits into two broader literatures, one on the determi-
nants of participation in social programs and the other on the effects of 
performance management systems in social programs in general and in 
active labor market programs in particular. Currie (1996) surveys the 
literature on the determinants of participation in social programs; see 
also the long list of references in Heckman and Smith (2004).2 
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The majority of this literature focuses on participation in U.S. en-
titlement programs such as Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), 
Food Stamps, and Unemployment Insurance. Persons eligible for such 
programs are legally entitled to their benefits. In addition to the de-
cisions of potential participants, bureaucratic discretion plays a role 
even in entitlement programs as program staff can affect eligibility 
decisions—see, e.g., Parsons (1991) for the case of disability insur-
ance—and can affect the information available to potential participants 
as well as the hassle costs of participation in other program contexts. 
Empirical analyses of participation in entitlement programs typically 
focus on the demand side and analyze the effects of variation in the 
costs and benefits of participation among eligibles. 
A smaller literature considers U.S. nonentitlement programs, such 
as many employment and training programs, where participation con-
ditional on eligibility depends explicitly on both decisions by potential 
participants and decisions by program gatekeepers; we call such pro-
grams mutually voluntary programs. The JTPA program that we study 
represents such a program, as do National Science Foundation grants 
and admission to (selective) state colleges and universities (and many 
other programs). As noted in Chapter 2, under WIA (JTPA’s succes-
sor), so-called core services, such as job search assistance, represent 
an entitlement while more expensive services, such as classroom train-
ing, require participant interest, program staff approval, and meeting 
eligibility requirements. Analyses of the determinants of participation 
in mutually voluntary programs have many purposes, including inform-
ing, developing, and implementing econometric evaluation estimators; 
documenting or explaining differences in participation rates across 
groups; and examining the role of performance standards (and, in our 
case, the cream skimming they encourage) on participation patterns. 
Recent analyses in the context of active labor market programs include 
Mitnik (2009), Skedinger and Widerstedt (2007), and Weber (2008); 
see also the earlier references in Heckman and Smith (2004).3 
A vast general literature on the effects of performance management 
systems in government has arisen in the past two decades. Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992) and Osborne and Plastrik (1997) provide important 
popular treatments, while Heinrich and Lynn (2000), Forsythe (2001), 
and Radin (2006), among others, offer more scholarly overviews. In 
the narrower context of active labor market programs, the chapters in 
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this volume touch on many of the major strands of the literature, in-
cluding analyses of participation and service assignment patterns (as in 
this chapter), analyses of the effects of cross-sectional and time-series 
variation in the nature or presence of performance incentives on out-
comes (as in Chapter 7), studies of performance-based contracting (as 
in Chapter 8), and the correlation of performance measures with experi-
mental or econometric estimates of the causal effects of programs (as 
in Chapter 9). Chapters 7, 8, and 9 review the corresponding literatures 
in depth. 
Our analysis in this chapter takes its inspiration from both of these 
literatures. The literature on participation in employment and training 
programs influences our choice of variables, including our examination 
of recent labor force status patterns. It also influences our interpretation 
of the results. The broader literature on program participation motivates 
our emphasis on variation across individuals in the expected costs and 
benefits of participation and our concern with program awareness. As 
discussed in more detail in the next section, the literature on the effects 
of performance management systems influences our thoughts on the 
evidentiary value of our analysis. 
A FRAMEwORK FOR AnALyzInG PARTICIPATIOn
In SOCIAL PROGRAMS 
This section outlines a descriptive framework for analyzing the 
determinants of participation in a social program using data on the char-
acteristics of random samples of individuals observed at each stage of 
the process and considers its analytic value. The framework follows 
individuals through multiple stages of a linear participation process, in 
which participation requires passing through a sequence of stages in a 
specific order. The particular stages in our framework spring from the 
data available to us and the (not unrelated) institutional details of the 
JTPA program examined in our empirical application. Generalizing our 
framework to allow for a nonlinear participation process (say, by ex-
plicitly accounting for the small fraction of JTPA participants sentenced 
to participate in the program by a judge or for individuals who reach 
JTPA via a referral from a service provider) or for a larger number or 
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smaller number of stages is straightforward. Moreover, our framework, 
and our discussion of the evidence it provides, both generalize well be-
yond JTPA and well beyond the context of active labor market policies. 
In order for a person to participate in JTPA, he or she must be eli-
gible for it, must be aware of it, must apply for it, must be accepted 
into it, and must be formally enrolled in it. Figure 6.1 depicts the pro-
cess of selection into the program. Different factors govern each stage 
of the process. Legislators define the eligibility criteria that program 
staff members apply to each applicant. Program awareness depends on 
outreach efforts by program operators, on other aspects of the informa-
tional environment surrounding potential participants, such as friends 
who have participated or interaction with staff from other programs, 
and on potential participants’ prior beliefs about the costs and benefits 
of learning about employment and training programs. 
Potential participants make application decisions based on the ex-
pected benefits and perceived costs of participation. Acceptance into 
a program depends on bureaucratic preferences over applicant types, 
which in many programs are determined in part by formal performance 
standards systems. Acceptance also depends on the willingness of the 
applicant to pursue the application process to its conclusion and on fur-
ther changes in opportunity costs, such as sudden illnesses or the arrival 
of job offers, during the application process. 
Formal enrollment depends on both bureaucratic and personal pref-
erences. For example, as noted in Chapter 4, the JTPA performance 
Figure 6.1  The JTPA Selection Process 
Eligibility for JTPA
↓ 
Awareness of JTPA
↓ 
Application to JTPA
↓ 
Acceptance into JTPA
↓ 
Enrollment into JTPA
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standards system counted only the employment and wages of enrollees 
in a specified period following termination from the program. As a re-
sult, local JTPA offices had an incentive to gain additional information 
about the potential employability of persons accepted into the program 
and to use it to guide their enrollment decisions. At the same time, the 
passage of time between acceptance and enrollment (as when waiting 
for a particular course to begin or looking for an employer willing to 
offer an OJT position) leads to changes in opportunity costs that may 
cause accepted applicants to decline enrollment when offered. 
To more formally describe the participation process, consider the 
following conditional probabilities for a person with characteristics x: 
1) the probability of eligibility, 2) the probability of program awareness 
given eligibility, 3) the probability of application given eligibility and 
awareness, 4) the probability of acceptance given application, and 5) the
probability of formal enrollment conditional on acceptance into a pro-
gram. In formal terms, we have 
(6.1) Pr(el = 1| x) , 
(6.2) Pr(aw = 1| el = 1, x) , 
(6.3) Pr(ap = 1| aw = 1,el = 1, x) 
(6.4) Pr(ac = 1| ap = 1, aw = 1,el = 1, x) , 
(6.5) Pr(en = 1| ac = 1, ap = 1, aw = 1,el = 1, x) , 
where el = 1 if a person is eligible for a program and zero otherwise,
aw = 1 if a person is aware of a program and zero otherwise, ap = 1 if a 
person applies to a program and zero otherwise, ac = 1 if a person ap-
plies to and is accepted into a program and zero otherwise, and en = 1 if 
a person is formally enrolled in a program and zero otherwise. 
As persons only participate in the program if they are eligible el = 1, 
are aware aw = 1, apply ap = 1, are accepted ac = 1, and formally enroll 
en = 1, we can decompose the probability of participation given X = x, 
Pr( par = 1| x) , into the five components on the right-hand side of Equa-
tion (6.2): 
(6.6) Pr( par = 1| x) = 
Pr(en = 1| ac = 1, ap = 1, aw = 1,el = 1, x) Pr(ac = 1| ap = 1, aw = 1,el = 1, x) 
Pr(ap = 1| aw = 1,el = 1, x) Pr(aw = 1| el = 1, x) Pr(el = 1| x) , 
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where par = 1 if a person participates in a program and zero other-
wise. By estimating each of the five component probabilities, we can 
determine the effect of each variable in x on the overall probability of 
participation and where and how it influences program participation. 
A variable that has no effect on the overall probability of participation 
may have strong, but offsetting, effects on the component probabilities. 
In the sections that follow, we apply this framework to analyze par-
ticipation in the JTPA program. Data limitations force us to combine 
application and acceptance into a single step, which we call “applica-
tion/acceptance.” We equate acceptance into the program with reaching 
the stage of random assignment during the experimental evaluation of 
JTPA. Only eligible applicants who completed the aptitude and achieve-
ment tests required at most JTPA training sites and who received a 
written JTPA service plan were subject to random assignment. These 
conditions required a substantial commitment by JTPA training cen-
ters to continued interaction with the applicant, but fall short of formal 
enrollment into JTPA. The section titled “The Determinants of Enroll-
ment in JTPA” presents two sets of decompositions based on Equation 
(6.6). The first set includes four stages: eligibility, awareness, appli-
cation/acceptance, and enrollment. In the second set, we decompose 
Pr(ac = 1| el = 1, x) , the probability of application and acceptance con-
ditional on eligibility, into separate stages of awareness given eligibility 
and acceptance given awareness. Focusing solely on these two stages 
allows us to examine the effects of explanatory variables not included 
in the full decomposition due to data limitations or because they are 
perfect predictors of eligibility. 
What can we learn from the analyses undertaken in the remainder 
of the chapter regarding the empirical importance of cream skimming 
induced by the JTPA performance standards system for the overall pat-
terns of participation in JTPA among various groups? To begin with, we 
can use institutional knowledge to divide the stages of the participation 
process into those affected and not affected by program staff. Subgroup 
differences in the determinants of passing through stages not affected 
by program staff, such as eligibility and (in the main) awareness clearly 
cannot result from cream skimming. The full decompositions presented
in the section “The Determinants of Application/Acceptance into 
JTPA” reveal the relative importance of these stages for overall group 
differences. 
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For stages of the participation process potentially affected by both 
the decisions of potential participants and the decisions of caseworkers, 
our framework yields at best suggestive evidence. Consider a particular 
characteristic Z that positively affects employment and earnings out-
comes in the absence of participation and that both the caseworker and 
the researcher observe. Now consider a stage of the participation pro-
cess over which caseworkers have some control. A positive effect of Z
on the probability of passing through this stage is consistent with cream 
skimming by caseworkers and so provides some suggestive evidence 
in that regard. At the same time, high-Z individuals might participate 
at higher rates even without cream skimming, perhaps because of a 
correlation between observed Z and unobserved motivation or because 
high-Z individuals expect to benefit more from program participation. 
By contrast, a negative effect of Z indicates that cream skimming is not 
the dominant influence on whether or not high-Z individuals transit this 
stage of the participation process. It does not, however, demonstrate the 
absence of cream skimming, because a negative estimated effect might 
simply result from other factors working in the opposite direction over-
powering caseworker efforts. 
Our empirical analysis is deliberately descriptive. We seek to es-
tablish empirical regularities about the participation process in the 
JTPA program as it existed at the time our data were generated. These 
regularities suggest interesting behavioral relationships governing the 
process of program participation. They are not causal (or “structural” 
in the sense that economists use that term). For example, we would 
expect substantive changes in the eligibility rules to change not only 
the determinants of eligibility, but the conditional determinants at the 
other stages as well. We do not require causal effects to make the in-
ferences we do. The analyses in this chapter complement, rather than 
substitute for, related analyses in the literature that aim to estimate the 
causal effects of performance standards on program behavior by mak-
ing use of plausibly exogenous variation in the presence or details of 
such standards. Examples of such analyses include Chapters 7 and 8 in 
this volume, as well as Cragg (1997), Courty and Marschke (2008), and 
Courty, Kim, and Marschke (forthcoming). 
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ThE JTPA PROGRAM 
JTPA was the primary U.S. federal employment and training pro-
gram for the disadvantaged until replaced by the programs financed 
under WIA in 1998. JTPA provided classroom training in occupational 
skills, remedial education, job search assistance, work experience, and 
subsidized on-the-job training (essentially a temporary wage subsidy) at 
private firms for approximately one million persons each year. Chapter 
2 gives an overall picture of the program, compares it to its predeces-
sors and to WIA and, along with Chapter 4, details its performance 
management system. This discussion focuses on the details of JTPA
eligibility determination, which have special relevance to the analysis 
in this chapter. 
There were two primary avenues to eligibility for JTPA. The first 
and most important avenue was economic disadvantage, which oc-
curred if one of two criteria were met: 1) low family income in the six 
months prior to application to the program, or 2) being in a family re-
ceiving cash public assistance such as Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), general assistance, or Food Stamps.4 The short win-
dow for income eligibility allowed highly skilled and normally highly 
paid workers to become eligible for JTPA after being out of work only 
a few months. According to the USDOL (1993), in program year 1991 
around 93 percent of JTPA participants qualified because they were ec-
onomically disadvantaged. A second avenue to eligibility was an “audit 
window’’ that allowed up to 10 percent of participants at each JTPA
training center to be noneconomically disadvantaged persons with
other barriers to employment such as limited ability in English.5 Due 
to the subjective nature of these barriers, and the resulting difficulty in 
determining who is affected by them, at some stages in the participa-
tion process (described in more detail below) we consider only persons 
eligible by virtue of being economically disadvantaged. Devine and 
Heckman (1996) discuss the eligibility rules for JTPA and their impli-
cations for the composition of the eligible population.6 
There are some differences between the eligibility criteria and ser-
vices offered in JTPA compared to its predecessors, the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (CETA) and the Manpower Develop-
ment and Training Act (MDTA), and its successor, the WIA program. 
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Barnow (1993) suggests that these differences are modest in regard to 
CETA and MDTA. USDOL (1998), O’Shea and King (2001), and Social 
Policy Research Associates (2004; see especially Exhibit 1) document 
the details of the WIA program. Universal eligibility for low-intensity 
core services under WIA represents the largest difference between WIA
and JTPA. By law, local programs must give priority to transfer pro-
gram participants and other low income individuals when allocating 
intensive and training services. For these more expensive services, but 
not for the core job finding services, the WIA participation process re-
mains broadly similar to that under JTPA. 
DATA 
The primary source of our data is the NJS, an experimental evalu-
ation of the JTPA program conducted from 1987 to 1989.7 We use data 
on JTPA, even though the program no longer exists, because similar 
data do not exist for the WIA program. As argued in Chapter 3, the pro-
grams have enough in common in terms of the populations they serve, 
the services they provide, and the institutions that provide them that, at 
a general level, the inferences we make regarding the relative impor-
tance of cream skimming and other factors in determining participation 
patterns likely carry over to WIA. 
In the NJS, persons accepted into JTPA at a nonrandom sample of 
16 JTPA training centers were randomly assigned into either a control 
group excluded from JTPA (for 18 months) or a treatment group given 
access to JTPA services. In order to learn more about the JTPA-eligible 
population, and to facilitate the development of better nonexperimental 
evaluation methods, data were collected on JTPA-eligible nonpartici-
pants (ENPs) at 4 of the 16 centers. We describe these 4 centers in 
detail in the next section. The ENP sample includes only individuals eli-
gible via the economic disadvantage criterion as determined by a short 
household screening instrument. 
Detailed information on demographic characteristics, labor market 
histories, transfer program participation, and family composition and 
income was collected on the ENPs and on experimental control group 
members at the same four sites. We use this information for our analy-
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ses of awareness of JTPA and of application/acceptance into JTPA. For 
the experimental treatment group, we have only the limited information 
on characteristics collected shortly before random assignment. We use 
these data to study enrollment into JTPA at the four sites. 
The NJS did not collect data on persons ineligible for JTPA. In or-
der to analyze the determinants of eligibility we use a national sample 
drawn from the 1986 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation (SIPP). Devine and Heckman (1996) use the SIPP for their 
detailed study of JTPA eligibility; our dataset is a close cousin of theirs. 
The SIPP data are well suited to this purpose because they contain suf-
ficient information to precisely determine JTPA eligibility via economic 
disadvantage. We treat the SIPP panel as a series of repeated cross-
sections, and create a dataset consisting of person-months.8 
The data we use have, not surprisingly, both advantages and disad-
vantages. In terms of advantages, both the SIPP and ENP data measure 
eligibility via economic disadvantage relatively precisely. All of the 
surveys from the NJS obtained relatively high response rates; the SIPP
does less well on this dimension. Measurement of both acceptance 
and enrollment in JTPA relies on administrative data, and so avoids 
the problems of systematic measurement error in survey measures of 
program participation documented by Smith and Whalley (2009) for 
JTPA and by Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009) for a wide variety of 
other programs. The key disadvantages associated with our data include 
the lack of separate information on program application and our reli-
ance on only four nonrandomly selected sites for the ENP and JTPA
participant data. The latter becomes problematic when combined with 
national-level data from the SIPP and when attempting to generalize to 
the overall JTPA eligible and participant populations. 
ThE FOUR SITES FROM ThE nATIOnAL JTPA STUDy 
Detailed data on ENPs were collected from the geographic areas 
served by four training centers: Corpus Christi, Texas; Fort Wayne, In-
diana; Jersey City, New Jersey; and Providence, Rhode Island. Table 
6.1 provides descriptive information about these centers in order to pro-
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vide some context for our analysis. The table notes provide details on 
the sources and definitions of the variables. 
The first three columns of Table 6.1 present the race/ethnicity of the 
eligible adult population at each site, constructed using the data on the 
ENPs and the experimental control group. The sites vary widely on this 
dimension, with a strong Hispanic majority in Corpus Christi, a strong 
African American majority in Jersey City, almost exclusively whites in 
Fort Wayne, and a broad mix in Providence. The fourth column presents 
mean years of schooling among adult eligibles at each site. Here we find 
less variation, though Providence stands out as an outlier on the low 
side, with a mean below 11 years. 
The fifth and sixth columns provide economic context in the form 
of the unemployment and the poverty rates, respectively. Corpus Christi 
and Jersey City have relatively weak economic situations at this time, 
while Providence and (especially) Fort Wayne were experiencing rela-
tively low unemployment and poverty rates. 
The final three columns summarize the service recommendations 
that the JTPA participants in the experimental samples at these training 
centers received prior to random assignment. In the jargon of the Na-
tional JTPA Study, the “CT-OS treatment stream” denotes individuals 
recommended for classroom training in occupation skills (and possibly 
other services, but not on-the-job training), the “OJT treatment stream” 
denotes individuals recommended for on-the-job training (and possibly 
other services, but not classroom training in occupational skills), and 
the “other treatment stream” is a residual category. Most of those rec-
ommended for CT-OS either receive it or do not enroll at all (and thus 
receive at most very minimal services), but many of those recommended
for OJT end up enrolling but receiving only job search assistance be-
cause no employer can be found who will offer them an on-the-job 
training slot. The sites differ in their service mix for a number of rea-
sons, including the availability of local training providers of sufficient 
size and quality, the state of the local economy, and whether the center 
leadership has a “work first” or “learn first” orientation. Among the 
four sites in our study, Jersey City emphasizes classroom training, Fort 
Wayne and Corpus Christi emphasize on-the-job training, and Provi-
dence emphasizes other services. 
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Table 6.1  Characteristics of the Four Sites from the national JTPA Study 
Eligibles Fraction Fraction Fraction 
Average CT-OS OJT other 
Fraction Fraction Fraction years of Unemploy- Poverty treatment treatment treatment 
Name white black Hispanic schooling ment rate rate stream stream stream 
Corpus Christi 0.25 0.08 0.66 11.33 10.2 13.4 34.3 51.5 14.1 
Fort Wayne 0.74 0.23 0.02 11.28 4.7 5.9 6.4 66.2 27.3 
Jersey City 0.05 0.68 0.24 11.51 7.3 18.9 46.0 35.7 18.3 
Providence 0.32 0.28 0.31 10.72 3.8 12.1 32.3 13.0 54.7 
SOURCE: Characteristics of the adult eligible population at each site come from the authors’ calculations using the National JTPA Study 
data on the ENPs and the experimental control group. Following Heckman and Smith (1999), we assign the ENPs a weight of 0.97 and 
the controls a weight of 0.03 in calculating these averages. The numbers for race/ethnicity do not add up to 1.00 because other race/ 
ethnicity individuals are omitted. The unemployment rates (unweighted annual averages for 1987–1989) are from Exhibit 3.3 of Orr et 
al. (1996). Poverty rates (for 1979) are from Exhibit 3.2 of Orr et al. (1996). The treatment stream recommendation fractions come from 
Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993, Table 7.1). As noted in the text, these refer to the services for which individuals in the National 
JTPA Study were recommended prior to random assignment. The CT-OS treatment stream corresponds to individuals recommended for 
classroom training in occupational skills and possibly other services not including on-the-job training. The OJT treatment stream refers 
to individuals recommended for subsidized on-the-job training at private firms plus possibly other services not including CT-OS. The 
other treatment stream is a residual category. 
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Overall, these four sites vary on geographic (two in the North-
east, one in the Southwest, and one in the Midwest), demographic, 
economic, and programmatic dimensions. Although neither the 4 sites 
nor the 16 sites represent random samples of all JTPA training centers, 
the sites examined in this chapter nonetheless do a good job of captur-
ing the diversity present in the population of sites. In addition, the site 
characteristics presented here provide a context for, and aid in the inter-
pretation of, the results that follow.9 
ThE DETERMInAnTS OF ELIGIBILITy
FOR ThE JTPA PROGRAM 
This section examines the determinants of eligibility for JTPA. Ta-
ble 6.2 defines the explanatory variables used in this chapter. Tables 6.3 
and 6.4 present the results of logit analyses of the determinants of eligi-
bility. Table 6.3 presents results for adult (aged 22 and above) men and 
women, and Table 6.4 presents the results for male and female out-of-
school youth (aged 16–21). We focus on these four demographic groups 
throughout our empirical analysis for three reasons. First, they are the 
groups employed in the experimental impact reports, in our other work 
utilizing these data, and in some of the other chapters in this volume. 
Second, because of differences around family responsibilities and ed-
ucation, we would expect men and women, and youth and adults, to 
behave differently. Third, we have no NJS data on in-school youth, as 
this group was excluded from the experimental analysis. 
The first column for each demographic group in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 
displays estimated coefficients and associated standard errors (in pa-
rentheses) from logit models of the probability of eligibility derived 
from the SIPP data. The second column displays estimates of the mean 
derivative of the probability of eligibility with respect to each charac-
teristic (in square brackets) along with p-values from tests of the null 
hypotheses that each population coefficient equals zero.10 
A number of interesting findings emerge from this analysis. 
First, even after controlling for family income and productivity char-
acteristics, race and ethnicity are very important determinants of the 
probability of eligibility. For example, for adult females, the difference 
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Table 6.2  Definitions of variables 
Site indicators
Fort Wayne, Jersey City, and Providence indicate the site of residence. Corpus 
Christi is the omitted site.
Race and ethnicity
Black, Hispanic, and other race/ethnicity indicate race or ethnicity. Whites are 
the omitted group. 
Age
Age categories indicate age at the time of eligibility determination or of the 
participation decision. The omitted category is 16–18 years for youth and 
22–29 years for adults. 
Highest grade completed
Schooling categories indicate the highest grade of formal schooling com-
pleted. The omitted category is exactly 12 years. 
Low English ability
This variable indicates low ability in English. For the ENPs, this means that 
the person completed the baseline interview in a language other than English. 
For the controls, it means that the person indicated a language other than 
English in response to a survey question on language preference. 
Marital histories
These categories indicate the respondent’s marital status history. The omit-
ted category is single, never married. In Tables 6.16 and 6.17, the divorced, 
widowed, and separated category is broken up into two categories, one for 
persons who were last married from 1–24 months ago and one for persons 
who were last married more than 24 months ago. 
Presence of young children
Children younger than six years old indicates an own child less than six years 
old in the household. 
Current AFDC receipt
This variable indicates that the respondent was receiving benefits under the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, either as a case head or as 
part of someone else’s case. 
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Table 6.2  (continued) 
Current Food Stamp receipt
This variable indicates that the respondent was in a household receiving Food 
Stamps. 
Current labor force status
These variables indicate whether the respondent was employed, unemployed 
(not working but looking for work), or out of the labor force (not employed 
and not looking for work). The omitted category is currently employed. 
Labor force status transitions
These categories in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 and Tables 6.16–6.19 indicate the two 
most recent labor force statuses in the seven months up to and including the 
month of the participation decision. The second status in each pattern indi-
cates the labor force status at the time of the participation decision. The first 
status indicates the status of the most recent prior spell during the preceding 
six months. Thus, the pattern “employed → unemployed” indicates someone 
who was unemployed at the time of the participation decision but whose most 
recent prior labor force status within the preceding six months was employed. 
Persons in the same labor force status for all seven months have repeated 
patterns of the form “OLF → OLF.” The omitted pattern is “employed → 
employed,” indicating persistent employment. In some cases, the “employed 
→ OLF” and “unemployed → OLF” categories are collapsed due to small 
sample sizes. 
Time since most recent employment
These categories indicate the number of months since the person was last 
employed. The omitted category is currently employed. 
Family income in the last year
These categories indicate total family earnings in the past year. The omitted 
category is less than $3,000. For some tables, the original six categories are 
combined into four due to small sample sizes. 
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Table 6.3  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Eligibility: Adults 
Adult males Adult females 
Black 1.315 [0.060] 2.172 [0.129] 
(0.034) 0.000 (0.032) 0.000 
Hispanic 1.070 [0.048] 2.270 [0.136] 
(0.036) 0.000 (0.030) 0.000 
Other race/ethnicity 1.352 [0.062] 1.551 [0.090] 
(0.087) 0.000 (0.051) 0.000 
Aged 30–39 −0.860 [−0.038] 0.018 [0.001] 
(0.030) 0.000 (0.026) 0.489 
Aged 40–49 −0.939 [−0.042] 0.144 [0.007] 
(0.040) 0.000 (0.030) 0.000 
Aged 50–54 −1.586 [−0.064] 0.047 [0.002] 
(0.049) 0.000 (0.035) 0.176 
Highest grade < 10 0.737 [0.033] 0.974 [0.060] 
(0.034) 0.000 (0.029) 0.000 
Highest grade 10–11 0.292 [0.012] 0.514 [0.031] 
(0.033) 0.000 (0.028) 0.000 
Highest grade 13–15 −0.231 [−0.009] −0.408 [−0.022] 
(0.031) 0.000 (0.025) 0.000 
Highest grade > 15 −0.064 [−0.003] −1.652 [−0.075] 
(0.036) 0.074 (0.032) 0.000 
Currently married 0.157 [0.006] 1.366 [−0.074] 
(0.035) 0.000 (0.029) 0.000 
Div.-wid.-sep. 0.177 [0.007] 0.043 [0.003] 
(0.042) 0.000 (0.031) 0.162 
Child age < 6 years −0.205 [−0.008] 0.646 [0.035] 
(0.036) 0.000 (0.027) 0.000 
Family income $3,000–$6,000 0.113 [0.019] −0.367 [−0.039] 
(0.050) 0.024 (0.044) 0.000 
Family income $6,000–$9,000 −1.814 [−0.206] −1.737 [−0.154] 
(0.048) 0.000 (0.043) 0.000 
Family income $9,000–$12,000 −3.103 [−0.268] −2.671 [−0.214] 
(0.056) 0.000 (0.043) 0.000 
Family income $12,000–$15,000 −3.857 [−0.295] −3.318 [−0.249] 
(0.056) 0.000 (0.044) 0.000 
  
142 Heckman and Smith 
Table 6.3  (continued) 
Adult males Adult females 
Family income > $15,000 
Constant 
Number of observations 
−4.966 [−0.331] 
(0.048) 0.000 
−0.474 [0.000] 
(0.033) 0.000 
80,598 
−4.461 [−0.301] 
(0.037) 0.000 
4.714 [0.000] 
(0.043) 0.000 
89,196 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, 
and p-values are below the mean derivatives. Person-month data from the 1986 SIPP
full panel. Omitted categories in the logit are white, aged 22–29, highest grade equals 
12, never married, no young children, and family income less then $3,000. Using the 
sample proportion eligible as the cutoff value, the within-sample prediction rates for 
adult males are 72.48 percent for eligibles and 91.10 percent for noneligibles. The 
corresponding rates for adult females are 79.82 percent for eligibles and 88.32 percent 
for noneligibles. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
in the average probability of eligibility for blacks and Hispanics relative 
to whites exceeds 0.12 holding the resource variables constant. 
Being married has a large negative estimated effect on the eligibil-
ity probabilities for all groups except adult males. The eligibility status 
of adult males is driven primarily by their own income, while for adult 
females and for youth, eligibility status depends in large part on the 
earnings of other family members. For all demographic groups except 
adult males, the presence of an own child under the age of six living in 
the home substantially increases the probability of eligibility for JTPA. 
Children raise the income cutoff for eligibility by increasing household 
size but do not add to the family income. In addition, years of schooling 
have an important impact on eligibility for all groups. 
Not surprisingly, the probability of eligibility decreases mono-
tonically with family income for all four demographic groups. The 
magnitude of the estimated average derivatives is very large for family 
income categories corresponding to incomes above $6,000. For adult 
males, raising family income from less than $3,000 to between $9,000 
and $12,000 produces a decrease in the average probability of JTPA
eligibility of 0.268. For male and female youth, the estimated average 
derivatives are larger still, reflecting the differential importance of fam-
ily resources in determining eligibility for these groups. 
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Table 6.4  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Eligibility: youth 
Male youth Female youth 
Black 1.111 [0.056] 2.446 [0.155] 
(0.164) 0.000 (0.092) 0.000 
Hispanic 2.255 [0.121] 1.114 [0.068] 
(0.103) 0.000 (0.076) 0.000 
Other race/ethnicity 1.514 [0.078] 2.065 [0.129] 
(0.195) 0.000 (0.408) 0.000 
Aged 19–21 −0.434 [−0.021] 0.124 [0.007] 
(0.082) 0.000 (0.070) 0.079 
Highest grade < 10 1.959 [0.100] 0.915 [0.057] 
(0.105) 0.000 (0.107) 0.000 
Highest grade 10–11 1.469 [0.074] 0.134 [0.008] 
(0.109) 0.000 (0.086) 0.118 
Highest grade > 12 −0.150 [−0.007] −0.617 [−0.036] 
(0.107) 0.160 (0.072) 0.000 
Currently married −1.657 [−0.068] 0.609 [0.036] 
(0.168) 0.000 (0.082) 0.000 
Div.-wid.-sep.        −3.041 [−0.106] 1.511 [0.094] 
(0.380) 0.000 (0.242) 0.000 
Child age < 6 years 1.161 [0.061] 1.468 [0.090] 
(0.168) 0.000 (0.081) 0.000 
Family income $3,000– −2.582 [−0.387] −1.306 [−0.201] 
$6,000 (0.153) 0.000 (0.102) 0.000 
Family income $6,000– −4.370 [−0.547] −3.008 [−0.436] 
$9,000 (0.165) 0.000 (0.126) 0.000 
Family income $9,000– −4.595 [−0.561] −4.237 [−0.552] 
$12,000 (0.157) 0.000 (0.144) 0.000 
Family income $12,000– −5.935 [−0.631] −5.057 [−0.610] 
$15,000 (0.204) 0.000 (0.142) 0.000 
Family income > $15,000 −6.628 [−0.660] −6.585 [−0.695] 
(0.153) 0.000 (0.103) 0.000 
Constant 6.246 [0.000] 6.164 [0.000] 
(0.170) 0.000 (0.117) 0.000 
Number of observations 10,280 11,165 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and 
p-values are below the mean derivatives. Person-month data from 1986 SIPP full panel. 
Omitted categories in the logit are white, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never 
married, no young children, and family income less than $3,000. Using the sample pro-
portion eligible as the cutoff value, the within-sample prediction rates for male youth 
are 71.95 percent for eligibles and 90.67 percent for noneligibles. The corresponding 
rates for female youth are 72.72 percent for eligibles and 91.32 percent for noneligibles. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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As we detail in the table notes, the small set of characteristics in-
cluded in the specifications reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 do well at 
predicting within-sample eligibility status. For all four groups, over 70 
percent of the eligibles and almost 90 percent of the noneligibles are 
correctly predicted when we use the overall eligibility rate within each 
group to define the cutoff for predicting eligibility. Taken together, our 
results demonstrate that the eligibility rules for JTPA produced sub-
stantial group differences in access to subsidized government training. 
These differences have no link to the presence of a performance man-
agement system within JTPA. 
ThE DETERMInAnTS OF AwAREnESS
OF ThE JTPA PROGRAM 
This section investigates the determinants of awareness of the JTPA
program using data on the controls and ENPs at the four JTPA sites 
described earlier. The concept of program awareness is an elusive but 
important one. Differential access to information about the program can 
affect awareness and thereby influence participation. Language barriers 
are an obvious case in point. However, awareness also depends on the 
incentives a person has to participate in the program. In some cases 
the desire to participate may influence awareness rather than awareness 
independently influencing participation. 
As we lack evidence on individuals’ information-gathering activi-
ties, we cannot determine the extent to which information costs, and 
therefore program awareness, play a causal role in determining pro-
gram participation choices. However, the evidence presented in this 
section indicates that awareness of JTPA among those eligible for it 
is by no means universal, and that program awareness appears to be 
related to the likelihood of participation in the program, to education, 
and to language skills. We also present evidence that a sizeable fraction 
of persons who are eligible for the program do not believe that they are 
eligible for it. Taken together, this evidence suggests that barriers to in-
formation represent an important determinant of program participation. 
Each member of the ENP sample was asked whether or not he or 
she had heard of the JTPA program. In keeping with the decentral-
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ized nature of the program, local training sites often selected operating 
names other than JTPA. To overcome this problem, ENPs were asked 
about their awareness of JTPA using the program’s primary name in 
their locality. This measure does not capture general awareness of the 
existence of programs like JTPA among individuals not aware of JTPA
by its local name. Persons who indicated that they were aware of the 
program were then asked whether or not they believed themselves to 
be presently eligible for it. Control group members are assumed to be 
aware of JTPA and of their own eligibility for it. 
Table 6.5 presents rates of awareness and self-reported eligibility 
for ENPs in each major demographic group. The first column presents 
the fraction of the ENPs who have heard of JTPA. These fractions are 
surprisingly low. For all four groups, the awareness rate is below 50 
percent. The rate is higher for youth than for adults, which may indi-
rectly reflect requirements that sites expend 40 percent of their training 
resources on youth, who constitute much less than 40 percent of the eli-
gible population. The second column gives the fraction of those persons 
aware of the program who think that they are eligible for it. Note that all 
Table 6.5  Awareness of and Self-Reported Eligibility for the JTPA 
Program: JTPA-Eligible nonparticipants 
Self-reported Self-reported 
eligibility for JTPA eligibility for JTPA 
Self-reported conditional on unconditional on 
awareness of JTPA awareness awareness 
Adult males 0.3539 0.3598 0.1274 
(0.0167) (0.0311) (0.0116) 
Adult females 0.4165 0.4594 0.1913 
(0.0124) (0.0214) (0.0099) 
Male youth 0.4722 0.5672 0.2678 
(0.0373) (0.0610) (0.0330) 
Female youth 0.4667 0.5410 0.2525 
(0.0289) (0.0453) (0.0251) 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. National JTPA Study data. Respondents are 
coded as aware of JTPA if they report having heard of JTPA by its most common local 
name. Respondents are coded as self-reported eligibles if they are aware of JTPA and 
report that they believe themselves to be presently eligible for it. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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of the ENPs are determined to be eligible at the time of their screening 
interviews and that nearly all are still eligible at the time the awareness 
question was asked in the baseline interview. Conditional on awareness, 
only 36 percent of adult males, 46 percent of adult females, and around 
55 percent of youth realize that they qualify for JTPA services. Taking 
the product of these two probabilities yields the unconditional prob-
ability of awareness and self-reported eligibility appearing in the third 
column. Barely 12 percent of adult male eligibles can identify both the 
program and their own eligibility for it. Even among youth, only about 
25 percent of eligibles are both aware of the program and of their own 
eligibility for it. These figures suggest that there are substantial costs 
associated with finding out about social programs such as JTPA and 
about the rules governing access to their services, and that information 
costs play an important role in producing demographic differentials in 
program participation. 
The results from a logit analysis of the determinants of awareness 
of the JTPA program appear in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. These tables have 
the same basic structure as Tables 6.3 and 6.4. These estimates result 
from the pooled sample of ENPs and experimental controls at the four 
sites in the NJS that collected ENP data. Following Heckman and Smith 
(1999), we weight the data such that the ENPs and controls represent 
0.97 and 0.03 of the overall eligible population, respectively. 
For all four demographic groups, black eligibles are relatively more 
likely than white eligibles to know about JTPA. Adult Hispanic eligi-
bles are relatively less likely than whites to know about JTPA, with 
the difference being statistically significant in both cases. The negative 
and statistically significant coefficient estimates for Hispanic adult eli-
gibles arise even after controlling for facility with the English language 
and for level of education.11 Language skills and educational deficits 
play a role in explaining this phenomenon but more than just language 
deficits are involved. Tienda and Jensen (1988) find that Hispanics par-
ticipate less in government programs compared to non-Hispanics with 
the same basic economic characteristics; this suggests that they may 
obtain less information about programs such as JTPA from their social 
environment. 
Consistent with the standard human capital model (see, e.g., Becker 
[1964]), older adults have statistically significantly lower probabilities 
of awareness of the program than persons age 22 to 29. This may reflect 
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the reduced demand for skill enhancement programs with age docu-
mented in, e.g., Leigh (1995). The pattern with respect to education is 
hump-shaped. Persons with the lowest levels of schooling have lower 
conditional probabilities of awareness than those who have completed 
high school. This evidence supports the notion of substantial informa-
tion processing costs among those with very low levels of schooling. A
lower likelihood of participating in JTPA, and hence a lower value to 
information about the program, accounts for the evidence that the most 
educated persons are less aware of the program. More specifically, indi-
viduals with high levels of education have low incentives to know about 
poverty reduction programs, as they are not typically eligible for them. 
Among adults, divorced, widowed, or separated eligibles have 
a higher probability of awareness than do those who are single. The 
difference is both statistically and substantively significant for adult 
males. For three of the four groups, living in a family that receives 
Food Stamps has a positive effect on the probability of being aware of 
JTPA, while living in a family that receives AFDC has a positive effect 
only for adult males and for female youth. The estimated effect of liv-
ing in a family receiving Food Stamps is large, with mean derivatives 
of 0.164 and 0.133, and it is statistically significant for both adult males 
and females. As nearly all of the adult female AFDC recipients also 
receive Food Stamps, the negative (essentially zero) coefficient on the 
AFDC variable indicates the additional effect of receiving both AFDC 
and Food Stamps, rather than just Food Stamps. Interpreted in this way, 
the absence of any AFDC effect becomes less surprising. The strong 
effects observed for Food Stamp receipt are consistent with the practice 
in that program of providing recipients with information about training 
opportunities. 
Unemployed (i.e., out of work but actively looking for work) 
eligibles have a higher probability of program awareness for all four 
demographic groups. This difference between the unemployed and the 
employed is statistically significant for both male and female adults. 
In contrast, eligible individuals who are out of the labor force (i.e., not 
working and not actively looking for work) have lower probabilities of 
awareness than employed eligibles for all four demographic groups. 
These results are consistent with the relative value of information about 
JTPA for the two groups. 
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Table 6.6  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Awareness 
among JTPA-Eligible nonparticipants: Adults 
Adult males Adult females 
Fort Wayne 0.261 [0.055] −0.187 [−0.039] 
(0.233) 0.264 (0.203) 0.356 
Jersey City 0.071 [0.015] −0.174 [−0.036] 
(0.210) 0.736 (0.191) 0.364 
Providence −0.268 [−0.054] −0.683 [−0.142] 
(0.231) 0.245 (0.197) 0.001 
Black 0.414 [0.094] 0.288 [0.063] 
(0.272) 0.128 (0.194) 0.138 
Hispanic −0.486 [−0.102] −0.360 [−0.077] 
(0.210) 0.021 (0.185) 0.051 
Other race/ethnicity −0.290 [−0.063] −0.348 [−0.074] 
(0.279) 0.298 (0.255) 0.174 
Low English ability −0.763 [−0.147] −1.334 [−0.254] 
(0.180) 0.000 (0.144) 0.000 
Aged 30–39 −0.345 [−0.073] −0.114 [−0.024] 
(0.165) 0.037 (0.137) 0.405 
Aged 40–49 −0.372 [−0.078] −0.235 [−0.050] 
(0.201) 0.064 (0.174) 0.177 
Aged 50–54 0.010 [0.002] −0.126 [−0.027] 
(0.349) 0.977 (0.253) 0.619 
Highest grade < 10 −0.476 [−0.100] −0.836 [−0.180] 
(0.179) 0.008 (0.135) 0.000 
Highest grade 10–11 −0.144 [−0.031] −0.126 [−0.028] 
(0.210) 0.494 (0.173) 0.468 
Highest grade 13–15 0.102 [0.022] −0.263 [−0.058] 
(0.239) 0.671 (0.201) 0.190 
Highest grade > 15 −0.387 [−0.082] −0.646 [−0.141] 
(0.279) 0.166 (0.292) 0.027 
Currently married 0.019 [0.004] −0.239 [−0.051] 
(0.181) 0.918 (0.162) 0.142 
Div.-wid.-sep.        0.718 [0.156] 0.112 [0.024] 
(0.273) 0.009 (0.164) 0.494 
Child age < 6 years −0.079 [−0.016] −0.062 [−0.013] 
(0.161) 0.623 (0.130) 0.635 
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Table 6.6  (continued) 
Adult males Adult females 
Current AFDC receipt 0.088 [0.019] −0.086 [−0.018] 
(0.499) 0.859 (0.218) 0.694 
Current Food Stamp receipt 0.756 [0.164] 0.625 [0.133] 
(0.251) 0.003 (0.187) 0.001 
Currently unemployed 0.805 [0.176] 0.628 [0.136] 
(0.289) 0.005 (0.250) 0.012 
Currently out of the labor −0.182 [−0.037] −0.221 [−0.047] 
force (0.258) 0.481 (0.140) 0.115 
Family income $3,000– −0.152 [−0.030] 0.604 [0.129] 
$9,000 (0.347) 0.662 (0.239) 0.012 
Family income $9,000– −0.070 [−0.014] 0.389 [0.083] 
$15,000 (0.343) 0.838 (0.239) 0.104 
Family income > $15,000 0.377 [0.080] 0.156 [0.033] 
(0.340) 0.267 (0.215) 0.469 
Constant −0.359 [0.000] 0.238 [0.000] 
(0.393) 0.361 (0.287) 0.407 
Number of observations 1,551 2,436 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and 
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Omitted catego-
ries in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, aged 22–29, highest grade equals 12, never 
married, no young children, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving 
Food Stamps, currently employed, and family income less than $3,000. Using the 
sample proportion aware of JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for 
adult males are 63.29 percent for aware eligibles and 62.95 percent for unaware eli-
gibles. The corresponding rates for adult females are 69.44 percent for aware eligibles 
and 61.82 percent for unaware eligibles. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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Table 6.7  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Awareness 
among JTPA-Eligible nonparticipants: youth 
Male youth Female youth 
Fort Wayne 0.054 [0.011] 0.150 [0.033] 
(0.661) 0.935 (0.490) 0.759 
Jersey City −0.147 [−0.031] −0.509 [−0.111] 
(0.727) 0.839 (0.461) 0.270 
Providence −0.412 [−0.087] −0.686 [−0.153] 
(0.666) 0.536 (0.438) 0.117 
Black 1.183 [0.242] 0.902 [0.204] 
(0.739) 0.109 (0.464) 0.052 
Hispanic 0.189 [0.040] 0.298 [0.068] 
(0.652) 0.772 (0.416) 0.475 
Other race/ethnicity 1.348 [0.277] −0.813 [−0.167] 
(1.370) 0.325 (0.610) 0.183 
Low English ability −2.972 [−0.439] −2.373 [−0.393] 
(0.751) 0.000 (0.664) 0.000 
Aged 19–21 −0.891 [−0.187] −0.212 [−0.048] 
(0.528) 0.091 (0.300) 0.478 
Highest grade < 10 −0.025 [−0.005] −0.672 [−0.153] 
(0.630) 0.968 (0.368) 0.068 
Highest grade 10–11 0.280 [0.059] −0.077 [−0.018] 
(0.592) 0.636 (0.405) 0.849 
Highest grade > 12 −0.254 [−0.053] 0.063 [0.014] 
(0.729) 0.728 (0.496) 0.898 
Currently married 1.323 [0.266] 0.136 [0.031] 
(0.819) 0.106 (0.370) 0.713 
Div.-wid.-sep.          −0.584 [−0.119] −0.951 [−0.203] 
(0.830) 0.482 (0.444) 0.032 
Child age < 6 years −0.242 [−0.050] −0.164 [−0.037] 
(0.758) 0.750 (0.323) 0.613 
Current AFDC receipt −0.838 [−0.170] 0.329 [0.073] 
(1.087) 0.441 (0.420) 0.433 
Current Food Stamp 0.494 [0.103] −0.026 [−0.006] 
receipt (0.813) 0.543 (0.410) 0.950 
Currently unemployed 0.522 [0.110] 0.362 [0.081] 
(0.575) 0.363 (0.471) 0.442 
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Table 6.7  (continued) 
Male youth Female youth 
Currently out of the labor −0.990 [−0.203] 0.000 [0.000] 
force (0.594) 0.095 (0.342) 1.000 
Family income $3,000– −0.907 [−0.188] 0.040 [0.009] 
$9,000 (0.915) 0.321 (0.441) 0.928 
Family income $9,000– −0.395 [−0.082] −0.321 [−0.072] 
$15,000 (0.938) 0.673 (0.555) 0.563 
Family income > $15,000 −0.703 [−0.146] −0.410 [−0.092] 
(1.031) 0.495 (0.534) 0.442 
Constant 0.613 [0.000] 0.272 [0.000] 
(1.019) 0.547 (0.633) 0.668 
Number of observations 530 700 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and 
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Omitted catego-
ries in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never 
married, no young children, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving 
Food Stamps, currently employed, and family income less than $3,000. Using the 
sample proportion aware of JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for 
male youth are 72.31 percent for aware eligibles and 64.86 percent for unaware eli-
gibles. The corresponding rates for female youth are 67.43 percent for aware eligibles 
and 53.64 percent for unaware eligibles. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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While the concept of program awareness is a conceptually prob-
lematic one, the evidence presented here indicates that learning about 
the JTPA program and its eligibility requirements is not costless, and 
that the likelihood of becoming aware of the program varies in predict-
able ways. In particular, we find that differences in information costs, 
information processing and language skills, and the expected value of 
information about the JTPA program (which is itself a function of the 
probability of participation in the program and its expected benefit) can 
account for the patterns we observe in the data. Both the institutional 
structure of JTPA and our empirical findings suggest little if any link 
between awareness and JTPA’s performance standards system. While 
local JTPA offices could in principle influence awareness by targeting 
specific groups or locations in their (quite limited) marketing efforts 
or by choosing contractors with links to specific subgroups among the 
eligible population, the indirect nature of these strategies suggests that 
even a program that wanted to cream-skim would likely devote its ef-
forts primarily to other margins. Moreover, findings such as the positive 
effect of Food Stamp receipt on awareness argue against a major role 
for attempts to cream-skim at this stage in the participation process. Our 
analysis also suggests, however, that one way to boost program partici-
pation is to increase awareness among those eligible. 
ThE DETERMInAnTS OF APPLICATIOn/
ACCEPTAnCE InTO JTPA
This section presents a logit analysis of the determinants of applica-
tion/acceptance (defined as reaching random assignment) conditional 
on program awareness using data on controls and ENPs from the NJS. 
We combine the application and acceptance stages here because we 
lack the data to examine them separately. Combining these two stages 
in the program participation process means that the patterns we ob-
serve reflect the influence of individual decisions to apply and to persist 
through the (sometimes lengthy) application process, as well as JTPA
staff decisions regarding referrals to other programs, the number of re-
quired visits to the JTPA office and other hassle costs, what services to 
offer, and so on. 
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Tables 6.8 and 6.9 report estimates of logit models of application/ 
acceptance into the JTPA program as a function of observed charac-
teristics for the four demographic groups. Coefficient estimates and 
estimated standard errors take account of the choice-based nature of 
the sample. The training site indicators included in the model have no 
behavioral interpretation, as the relative numbers of ENPs and controls 
at each site is an artifact of the study design. The notes to Tables 6.8 and 
6.9 summarize the within-sample predictive success of the models.12 
The most dramatic result in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 is the powerful ef-
fect of recent labor force status dynamics on application/acceptance 
into JTPA.13 For both adult males and adult females, all of the labor 
force status pattern indicators have coefficients statistically different 
from zero, though many of the coefficients cannot be statistically dis-
tinguished from one another. In general, unemployed persons are the 
most likely to apply and be accepted into the JTPA program. For adult 
men, individuals who recently became unemployed, either by leaving 
employment or by reentering the labor force, have higher application/ 
acceptance probabilities than the long term (over six months) unem-
ployed. This difference does not appear for adult women. 
Older adults have a lower conditional probability of application/ 
acceptance, consistent with conventional arguments that the return to 
training declines with age. The effect of years of completed schooling 
on acceptance into the program shows a hill-shaped pattern for adults, 
with individuals with fewer than 10 or more than 15 years of schooling 
having differentially low estimated application/acceptance probabili-
ties. This pattern reveals that it is more than just low rates of awareness 
that cause those with less than a high school education to have low rates 
of participation in JTPA conditional on eligibility. For youth, the prob-
ability of application/acceptance increases monotonically with years of 
schooling. 
Relative to single, never married persons, currently married per-
sons have a statistically significantly lower probability of application/ 
acceptance for three of the four demographic groups. Among adult 
men, but not the other three demographic groups, divorced, widowed, 
and separated persons also have lower probabilities of application/ac-
ceptance into JTPA. 
The effect of living in a family receiving AFDC is negative for all 
four groups, and statistically significant for three. In contrast, family 
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Table 6.8  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Acceptance into JTPA-
Aware EnP and Control Samples: Adults 
Adult males Adult females 
Fort Wayne 2.334 [0.117] 1.878 [0.118] 
(0.450) 0.000 (0.256) 0.000 
Jersey City 1.120 [0.040] 1.228 [0.060] 
(0.482) 0.020 (0.238) 0.000 
Providence 1.547 [0.054] 1.720 [0.084] 
(0.507) 0.002 (0.280) 0.000 
Black 0.159 [0.008] −0.060 [−0.003] 
(0.304) 0.600 (0.199) 0.763 
Hispanic −0.170 [−0.007] 0.964 [0.067] 
(0.442) 0.701 (0.240) 0.000 
Other race/ethnicity 1.228 [0.079] −0.169 [−0.008] 
(0.455) 0.007 (0.494) 0.732 
Aged 30–39 −0.564 [−0.028] −0.291 [−0.016] 
(0.263) 0.032 (0.160) 0.069 
Aged 40–49 −0.836 [−0.038] −0.226 [−0.013] 
(0.396) 0.035 (0.224) 0.313 
Aged 50–54 −0.766 [−0.036] −0.276 [−0.016] 
(0.518) 0.139 (0.334) 0.408 
Highest grade < 10 −0.950 [−0.040] −0.194 [−0.010] 
(0.341) 0.005 (0.172) 0.258 
Highest grade 10–11 −0.103 [−0.006] −0.112 [−0.006] 
(0.331) 0.755 (0.184) 0.543 
Highest grade 13–15 0.327 [0.020] 0.413 [0.027] 
(0.332) 0.325 (0.208) 0.047 
Highest grade > 15 −1.420 [−0.053] −0.500 [−0.024] 
(0.550) 0.010 (0.767) 0.515 
Currently married −0.875 [−0.043] −0.909 [−0.042] 
(0.314) 0.005 (0.214) 0.000 
Div.-wid.-sep.        −0.571 [−0.031] 0.142 [0.010] 
(0.316) 0.071 (0.167) 0.398 
Child age < 6 years −0.166 [−0.007] −0.185 [−0.010] 
(0.349) 0.634 (0.159) 0.245 
Current AFDC receipt −1.545 [−0.047] −0.975 [−0.050] 
(0.691) 0.025 (0.232) 0.000 
Current Food Stamp receipt 0.189 [0.009] 0.205 [0.012] 
(0.323) 0.558 (0.191) 0.282 
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Table 6.8  (continued) 
Adult males Adult females 
Unemployed → employed 1.752 [0.068] 1.722 [0.080] 
(0.390) 0.000 (0.325) 0.000 
OLF → employed 2.372 [0.120] 1.122 [0.039] 
(0.447) 0.000 (0.370) 0.002 
Employed → unemployed 3.861 [0.328] 2.782 [0.210] 
(0.430) 0.000 (0.277) 0.000 
Unemployed → unemployed 2.615 [0.146] 2.862 [0.223] 
(0.536) 0.000 (0.320) 0.000 
OLF → unemployed 4.048 [0.360] 2.326 [0.144] 
(0.566) 0.000 (0.324) 0.000 
Employed or unemployed → 5.421 [0.610] 
OLF (0.937) 0.000 
Employed → OLF 1.400 [0.055] 
(0.314) 0.000 
Unemployed → OLF 2.242 [0.134] 
(0.452) 0.000 
OLF → OLF 1.550 [0.055] 1.093 [0.037] 
(0.556) 0.005 (0.260) 0.000 
Family income $3,000– −1.196 [−0.075] 0.269 [0.016] 
$9,000 (0.531) 0.024 (0.232) 0.246 
Family income $9,000– −0.448 [−0.034] −0.023 [−0.001] 
$15,000 (0.480) 0.351 (0.339) 0.946 
Family income > $15,000 −1.895 [−0.098] 0.034 [0.002] 
(0.507) 0.000 (0.313) 0.914 
Constant −3.385 [0.000] −4.857 [0.000] 
(0.564) 0.000 (0.385) 0.000 
Number of observations 1,024 1,520 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and 
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimates reflect 
weighting to account for choice-based sampling. Omitted categories in the logit are Cor-
pus Christi, white, aged 22–29, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young chil-
dren, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, “Employed → 
employed,” and family income less than $3,000. The categories “Employed → OLF” and 
“Unemployed → OLF” are combined due to small sample sizes. Using the population pro-
portion of persons accepted into JTPA (assumed to be 3 percent overall) to determine the 
cutoff, the within sample prediction rates for adult males are 81.06 for controls (applied 
and accepted into JTPA) and 81.38 for ENPs (did not apply or not accepted into JTPA). 
The corresponding rates for adult females are 65.94 for controls and 71.43 for ENPs. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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Table 6.9  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Acceptance into JTPA-
Aware EnP and Control Samples: youth 
Male youth Female youth 
Fort Wayne 2.268 [0.127] 0.750 [0.040] 
(0.647) 0.000 (0.506) 0.139 
Jersey City 1.445 [0.060] 0.462 [0.022] 
(0.649) 0.026 (0.545) 0.396 
Providence 3.627 [0.246] 1.218 [0.067] 
(0.632) 0.000 (0.471) 0.010 
Black −0.793 [−0.030] 0.227 [0.011] 
(0.515) 0.124 (0.434) 0.601 
Hispanic 0.717 [0.046] 0.097 [0.005] 
(0.628) 0.254 (0.439) 0.825 
Other race/ethnicity −4.207 [−0.080] 0.971 [0.064] 
(1.252) 0.001 (0.798) 0.223 
Aged 19–21 0.285 [0.013] −0.451 [−0.024] 
(0.460) 0.536 (0.328) 0.169 
Highest grade < 10 −0.104 [−0.005] −0.028 [−0.001] 
(0.508) 0.838 (0.421) 0.947 
Highest grade 10–11 −0.187 [−0.009] −0.392 [−0.018] 
(0.475) 0.693 (0.440) 0.373 
Highest grade > 12 0.472 [0.028] 0.236 [0.014] 
(0.845) 0.576 (0.441) 0.592 
Currently married −1.225 [−0.042] −0.527 [−0.022] 
(0.637) 0.055 (0.436) 0.227 
Div.-wid.-sep.       0.155 [0.009] 0.316 [0.018] 
(1.226) 0.899 (0.662) 0.633 
Current AFDC receipt −1.455 [−0.043] −0.934 [−0.007] 
(0.980) 0.137 (0.399) 0.019 
Current Food Stamp 0.555 [−0.043] 1.311 [−0.042] 
receipt (0.580) 0.339 (0.370) 0.000 
Child age < 6 years −1.294 [0.030] −0.139 [0.083] 
(0.676) 0.056 (0.339) 0.681 
Unemployed → 2.110 [0.120] 1.776 [0.059] 
employed (0.629) 0.001 (0.564) 0.002 
OLF → employed −1.331 [−0.021] 2.243 [0.095] 
(0.890) 0.135 (0.597) 0.000 
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Table 6.9  (continued) 
Male youth Female youth 
Employed → 2.087 [0.118] 3.648 [0.293] 
unemployed (0.537) 0.000 (0.664) 0.000 
Unemployed → 2.211 [0.130] 2.638 [0.137] 
unemployed (0.706) 0.002 (0.591) 0.000 
OLF → unemployed 1.285 [0.054] 3.292 [0.229] 
(0.764) 0.093 (0.614) 0.000 
Employed or 1.959 [0.106] 
unemployed → OLF (0.806) 0.015 
Employed → OLF 1.462 [0.041] 
(0.498) 0.003 
Unemployed → OLF 0.845 [0.017] 
(0.886) 0.340 
OLF → OLF 2.387 [0.150] 1.201 [0.030] 
(0.699) 0.001 (0.549) 0.029 
Family income $3,000– 3.867 [0.309] −0.386 [−0.015] 
$9,000 (0.748) 0.000 (0.536) 0.472 
Family income $9,000– 1.552 [0.055] 0.261 [0.013] 
$15,000 (0.746) 0.038 (0.691) 0.706 
Family income > 1.011 [0.028] 1.765 [0.149] 
$15,000 (0.764) 0.186 (0.535) 0.001 
Constant −6.787 [0.000] −4.732 [0.000] 
(0.976) 0.000 (0.753) 0.000 
Number of observations 436 540 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and 
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimates reflect 
weighting to account for choice-based sampling. Omitted categories in the logit are 
Corpus Christi, white, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young 
children, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, “Em-
ployed → employed,” and family income less than $3,000. The categories “Employed 
→ OLF” and “Unemployed → OLF” are combined due to small sample sizes. Using 
the population proportion of persons accepted into JTPA (assumed to be three percent 
overall) as the cutoff, the within sample prediction rates for male youth are 68.66 for 
controls (applied and accepted into JTPA) and 76.47 for ENPs (did not apply or not 
accepted into JTPA). The corresponding rates for female youth are 67.91 for controls 
and 69.57 for ENPs. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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Food Stamp receipt has a positive influence in all cases. Interpreting 
the AFDC coefficient as the marginal effect of family AFDC receipt in 
addition to Food Stamps, it appears that among aware eligibles, AFDC 
recipients have much lower probabilities of application/acceptance into 
JTPA than do those receiving only Food Stamps. As the effect of young 
children in the home is being controlled for, this difference does not re-
sult from young children acting as a barrier to work or training outside 
the home. 
The effects of family income differ across groups. High levels of 
family income reduce the probability of application/acceptance among 
adult males, have little effect for adult females, and raise the probability 
of participation for both youth groups. The availability of income from 
other family members to provide support during training appears to en-
courage youth to apply to JTPA. 
We do not include measures of the state of the local economy at 
the four sites during the time that the ENP and control samples were 
collected in the specifications reported here. In other work, we estimate 
models including both county-level monthly unemployment rates aver-
aged over the counties constituting each of the sites, and interactions 
between these unemployment rates and the site indicators. Surprisingly, 
given the strong effects of individual unemployment found here, these 
variables never attain statistical significance and never have a notice-
able impact on the proportion of correct predictions. One reason for this 
is that the number of ENPs whose month of measured (via the screen-
ing interview) eligibility occurs in a given calendar month depends not 
only on the size of the eligible population in that month, but also on 
the administrative schedule of the consulting firm doing the screening. 
A second reason is that the flow into the program, as measured by the 
number of persons randomly assigned in each calendar month, depends 
strongly on factors besides the local economy, including the academic 
schedule of the community colleges that provide much of the JTPA
classroom training at these sites. 
Our analysis of application/acceptance into JTPA conditional on 
eligibility reveals the fundamental importance of labor force status dy-
namics in determining who applies and is accepted into the program 
conditional on program awareness. A number of other factors includ-
ing age, schooling, marital status, and family income play important 
supporting roles. In terms of cream skimming, the institutions appear 
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to drive some measurable effects here, as caseworkers can affect the 
process once a potential participant applies to JTPA. For example, 
caseworkers sometimes required extra visits as a way of weeding out 
potential participants not seriously interested in services and/or employ-
ment. The overrepresentation of unemployed individuals who recently 
lost a job or reentered the labor market is consistent with a cream-
skimming story, though it is also consistent with the use of JTPA as a 
form of job search by such persons. The age, education, marital status, 
welfare, and family income patterns we estimate do not suggest a domi-
nant role for cream skimming, but they do not rule out a modest one, 
either. 
ThE DETERMInAnTS OF EnROLLMEnT In JTPA 
Formal enrollment constitutes the final stage in the JTPA partici-
pation process. In this section we examine the determinants of the 
transition from acceptance into the program (defined as reaching ran-
dom assignment) to formal enrollment.14 A key difference between 
acceptance and enrollment is that, as noted in Chapters 3 and 4, only 
the outcomes of persons formally enrolled in JTPA influenced the re-
wards (or punishments) that a site received under the JTPA performance 
standards system. Training centers in JTPA had considerable (but not 
unlimited) discretion regarding whether (and when) to enroll persons 
accepted into the program. The performance standards system provided 
an incentive for training centers to delay enrollment until accepted ap-
plicants provided evidence that they were likely to obtain a job or to 
otherwise count favorably toward center performance. In practice, this 
sometimes meant that individuals receiving job search assistance were 
not enrolled until they found a job and that persons assigned to receive 
subsidized on-the-job training at private firms were not enrolled until a 
firm willing to provide them with such training had been located. For 
persons assigned to receive classroom training, training centers would 
often wait until trainees successfully attended class before enrolling 
them in the program. 
Another factor influencing enrollment decisions for persons recom-
mended for classroom training is their ability to maintain themselves 
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during the time they are enrolled in training. Classroom training typi-
cally lasts longer than employment-related services such as job search 
assistance. At the same time, unlike earlier programs such as CETA, 
JTPA provided no stipends to trainees except in unusual circumstances. 
Thus, the willingness of a person to pursue classroom training could 
depend on the availability of a stable income from outside sources. Two 
important sources of such income are transfer programs such as AFDC 
and family income. Thus, we would expect AFDC receipt and family 
income to have positive effects on the probability of enrollment. 
At the same time, the lag between acceptance into the program 
and enrollment may lead to changes in the opportunity costs of par-
ticipation. Accepted applicants may receive job offers that dominate 
the training offered by JTPA, or they may experience illness or family 
problems that make it impossible for them to enroll. Alternatively, they 
may not care for the particular services offered by their caseworkers, or 
may not expect them to provide sufficient benefits to justify their time, 
hassle, and opportunity costs. Thus, even though enrollment represents 
the stage in the participation process where JTPA staff members have 
both the greatest incentive to cream-skim and the most leverage to do 
so, the patterns we observe still represent the combined influence of 
their efforts and of individual decisions to continue in or drop out of 
the program. 
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 present the results of logit analyses of enroll-
ment for the four demographic groups using data on the experimental 
treatment group. The notes to the tables discuss the within-sample pre-
dictive performance of the model, which is quite good. We find that the 
four training centers have very different overall enrollment rates, even 
controlling for the observable characteristics of their accepted appli-
cants. For all four demographic groups, accepted applicants at the Fort 
Wayne and Jersey City centers have enrollment probabilities substan-
tially lower than similar persons at Corpus Christi, which is the omitted 
training center in our analysis. These differences reflect in part the dif-
fering mix of services offered at the various sites. As documented in 
Table 6.1, Corpus Christi offered mainly classroom training. This form 
of service leads to a higher enrollment rate than other JTPA services; 
see Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993). In contrast, Fort Wayne 
and, to a lesser extent, Jersey City, primarily offered on-the-job train-
ing and job search assistance. Centers offering these services will have 
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lower enrollment rates among accepted applicants because those who 
fail to locate a job or for whom no firm is willing to provide on-the-job 
training often do not ever get enrolled in the program. 
Conditional on acceptance into JTPA, older adults are less likely 
to enroll than younger adults. This finding is consistent with the lower 
expected returns to training for older persons, which would make them 
relatively more likely to drop out of the program in response to a given 
outside opportunity. Family participation in the Food Stamp Program 
has a negative effect for three of the four demographic groups, with 
the effect both large and statistically significant for adult females. To 
the extent that Food Stamp recipients are less likely to find employ-
ment than other accepted applicants, this is consistent with creaming 
induced by the operation of JTPA performance standards. Also consis-
tent with these incentives is our finding that for women and male youth, 
having no employment experience strongly reduces the probability of 
enrollment. 
Finally, we estimate a large positive effect of family income on 
the enrollment probability for adults. Family income may allow an ac-
cepted applicant to undertake training even in the absence of a stipend. 
Thus, even though higher family income lowers eligibility, it raises the 
probability of enrollment among accepted applicants. 
Taken together, our findings on the determinants of enrollment pro-
vide some suggestive, but not definitive, evidence of cream skimming. 
The strongest evidence comes from the systematic relationship between 
enrollment probabilities and service types across sites. Sites emphasiz-
ing subsidized on-the-job training, which provides greater enrollment 
flexibility than classroom training, appear to make strategic use of that 
flexibility. In terms of the covariates, explanations other than cream 
skimming can account for the age and family income effects. The rest 
lack any consistent pattern of precisely estimated coefficients across 
demographic groups. As such, we conclude only that, based primarily 
on site effects, our analysis of enrollment offers suggestive evidence in 
favor of cream skimming. 
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Table 6.10  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Enrollment into JTPA
Experimental Treatment Group: Adults 
Adult males Adult females 
Fort Wayne −0.692 [−0.163] −1.030 [−0.232] 
(0.177) 0.000 (0.177) 0.000 
Jersey City −1.157 [−0.274] −1.280 [−0.292] 
(0.204) 0.000 (0.195) 0.000 
Providence 0.447 [0.090] −0.563 [−0.121] 
(0.198) 0.024 (0.199) 0.005 
Black −0.180 [−0.041] −0.240 [−0.056] 
(0.129) 0.165 (0.132) 0.069 
Hispanic 0.271 [0.060] 0.196 [0.045] 
(0.181) 0.135 (0.176) 0.265 
Other race/ethnicity −0.024 [−0.005] 0.637 [0.141] 
(0.283) 0.933 (0.350) 0.068 
Low English ability 0.288 [0.065] −0.082 [−0.019] 
(0.241) 0.231 (0.210) 0.697 
Aged 30–39 −0.105 [−0.023] 0.056 [0.013] 
(0.114) 0.358 (0.115) 0.629 
Aged 40–49 −0.483 [−0.109] −0.324 [−0.075] 
(0.165) 0.003 (0.160) 0.042 
Aged 50–54 −0.370 [−0.083] 0.055 [0.013] 
(0.285) 0.195 (0.305) 0.856 
Highest grade < 10 −0.129 [−0.029] −0.168 [−0.038] 
(0.140) 0.357 (0.132) 0.203 
Highest grade 10–11 −0.210 [−0.047] −0.041 [−0.009] 
(0.130) 0.105 (0.124) 0.738 
Highest grade 13–15 0.001 [0.000] −0.035 [−0.008] 
(0.156) 0.993 (0.151) 0.817 
Highest grade > 15 −0.204 [−0.046] −0.216 [−0.049] 
(0.260) 0.432 (0.302) 0.475 
Currently married 0.325 [0.073] 0.106 [0.024] 
(0.154) 0.034 (0.167) 0.525 
Div.-wid.-sep.        0.273 [0.061] 0.203 [0.046] 
(0.135) 0.044 (0.121) 0.093 
Child age < 6 years 0.109 [0.024] 0.336 [0.077] 
(0.154) 0.480 (0.115) 0.004 
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Table 6.10  (continued) 
Adult males Adult females 
Current AFDC receipt 0.132 [0.029] 0.158 [0.036] 
(0.353) 0.709 (0.138) 0.253 
Current Food Stamp receipt −0.070 [−0.016] −0.237 [−0.054] 
(0.132) 0.595 (0.117) 0.044 
Employed 1–6 months ago −0.060 [−0.013] 0.308 [0.071] 
(0.164) 0.715 (0.150) 0.040 
Employed 7–12 months ago −0.058 [−0.013] 0.216 [0.050] 
(0.210) 0.781 (0.198) 0.276 
Employed > 12 months ago 0.032 [0.007] 0.287 [0.066] 
(0.211) 0.880 (0.177) 0.106 
Never employed −0.085 [−0.019] 0.061 [0.014] 
(0.227) 0.709 (0.192) 0.750 
Family income $3,000– −0.108 [−0.024] 0.211 [0.049] 
$9,000 (0.122) 0.378 (0.118) 0.073 
Family income $9,000– 0.057 [0.013] 0.441 [0.100] 
$15,000 (0.165) 0.728 (0.166) 0.008 
Family income 0.483 [0.105] 0.599 [0.135] 
> $15,000 (0.204) 0.018 (0.256) 0.019 
Constant 0.498 [0.000] 0.596 [0.000] 
(0.365) 0.172 (0.350) 0.088 
Number of observations 1,886 2,012 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, 
and p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimation 
includes observations with imputed covariates due to relative high levels of item non-
response. Omitted categories in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, normal English 
ability, aged 22–29, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young children, not 
currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, currently employed, 
and family income less than $3,000. Using the sample proportion of accepted ap-
plicants enrolled into JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for adult 
males are 62.48 percent for enrollees and 67.94 percent for nonenrollees. The cor-
responding rates for adult females are 57.64 percent for enrollees and 66.41 percent 
for nonenrollees. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Table 6.11  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Enrollment into JTPA
Experimental Treatment Group: youth 
Male youth Female youth 
Fort Wayne −1.213 [−0.241] −1.266 [−0.253] 
(0.273) 0.000 (0.271) 0.000 
Jersey City −1.350 [−0.274] −1.557 [−0.324] 
(0.297) 0.000 (0.266) 0.000 
Providence −0.554 [−0.096] −0.597 [−0.103] 
(0.276) 0.045 (0.276) 0.031 
Black −0.291 [−0.061] −0.223 [−0.048] 
(0.191) 0.127 (0.210) 0.287 
Hispanic −0.044 [−0.009] 0.212 [0.043] 
(0.241) 0.854 (0.250) 0.396 
Other race/ethnicity 0.531 [0.102] 
(0.533) 0.319 
Low English ability −0.360 [−0.070] 0.113 [0.023] 
(0.392) 0.358 (0.391) 0.773 
Aged 19–21 −0.429 [−0.087] 0.036 [0.007] 
(0.175) 0.014 (0.167) 0.830 
Highest grade < 10 0.060 [0.012] 0.084 [0.017] 
(0.213) 0.779 (0.204) 0.680 
Highest grade 10–11 0.000 [0.000] 0.131 [0.027] 
(0.192) 0.999 (0.183) 0.476 
Highest grade > 12 0.064 [0.013] −0.111 [−0.023] 
(0.405) 0.874 (0.355) 0.755 
Currently married 0.138 [0.028] −0.052 [−0.011] 
(0.335) 0.680 (0.302) 0.864 
Div.-wid.-sep.    0.338 [0.066] 0.424 [0.083] 
(0.729) 0.643 (0.381) 0.267 
Child age < 6 years 0.279 [0.055] 0.092 [0.019] 
(0.313) 0.373 (0.193) 0.632 
Current AFDC receipt −0.699 [−0.151] 0.135 [0.028] 
(0.336) 0.038 (0.241) 0.576 
Current Food Stamp receipt 0.157 [0.032] −0.060 [−0.012] 
(0.219) 0.474 (0.195) 0.757 
Employed 1–6 months ago −0.228 [−0.044] −0.220 [−0.044] 
(0.254) 0.370 (0.239) 0.357 
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Table 6.11  (continued) 
Male youth Female youth 
Employed 7–12 months ago −0.467 [−0.093] −0.415 [−0.085] 
(0.341) 0.170 (0.332) 0.211 
Employed > 12 months ago −0.413 [−0.082] −0.353 [−0.072] 
(0.409) 0.312 (0.328) 0.282 
Never employed −0.657 [−0.134] −0.276 [−0.055] 
(0.302) 0.030 (0.280) 0.324 
Family income $3,000– −0.057 [−0.012] 0.086 [0.018] 
$9,000 (0.185) 0.758 (0.176) 0.627 
Family income $9,000– −0.463 [−0.099] 0.207 [0.042] 
$15,000 (0.234) 0.048 (0.272) 0.446 
Family income > $15,000 0.301 [0.058] 0.116 [0.024] 
(0.278) 0.279 (0.280) 0.680 
Constant 2.505 [0.000] 1.453 [0.000] 
(0.586) 0.000 (0.557) 0.009 
Number of observations 923 962 
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, 
and p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimation 
includes observations with imputed covariates due to relative high levels of item non-
response. Omitted categories in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, normal English 
ability, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young children, not 
currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, currently employed, 
and family income less than $3,000. Using the sample proportion of accepted ap-
plicants enrolled into JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for male 
youth are 60.20 percent for enrollees and 65.08 percent for nonenrollees. The cor-
responding rates for female youth are 57.51 percent for enrollees and 68.75 percent 
for nonenrollees. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
  
 
            
  
 
 
 
 
 
=
166 Heckman and Smith 
DECOMPOSInG ThE PROCESS OF SELECTIOn InTO JTPA 
In order to determine at what stage—enrollment (en), awareness 
(aw), acceptance (ac), or eligibility (el)—and in which direction par-
ticular observed characteristics operate to determine participation in the 
program, we use the chain rule to decompose the probability of partici-
pation in the following way: 
(6.7) ∂ Pr(en = 1 | x) 
= 
∂x 
∂cond (en)  ⋅ cond (ac) ⋅ cond (aw) ⋅ cond (el)  ∂x  
∂cond (ac )+cond (en) ⋅ ⋅ cond (aw) ⋅ cond (el)  ∂x  
∂cond (aw) +cond (en) ⋅ cond (ac) ⋅ ⋅ cond (el)  ∂x  
∂cond (el) +cond (en) ⋅ cond (ac) ⋅ cond (aw) ⋅  ∂x  
where cond (en) = Pr(en = 1 | ac = 1, aw = 1,el = 1, x) 
cond (ac) = Pr(ac = 1 | aw = 1,el  1, x) 
cond (aw) = Pr(aw = 1 | el = 1, x) 
cond (el) = Pr(el = 1 | x) . 
This equation decomposes the effect of a change in x on the prob-
ability of participation in the program into its effect on each constituent 
probability weighted by the remaining probabilities. In each term, the 
component in square brackets is the effect of a change in x on one of 
the conditional probabilities leading to participation in the program. For 
dichotomous variables, we replace derivatives with finite changes. 
Using Equation (6.7), we can assess through which channels, if any, 
variation in x operates to affect the probability of participation in JTPA. 
In this section, we present results for two different decompositions. The 
two decompositions differ in terms of the number of steps included, the 
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set of variables included, and the data used to perform the decomposi-
tion. These criteria are interrelated because the probability estimates 
are derived from different datasets and not all of the datasets contain all 
of the variables used to estimate the conditional probabilities discussed 
in the preceding sections. Reducing the number of stages enables us 
to estimate the effects of more explanatory variables. In addition, for 
certain variables some of the stages in Equation (6.7) are effectively 
eliminated. For example, belonging to a family that receives AFDC or 
Food Stamps makes the probability of eligibility equal to one. It is only 
informative to examine the effects of AFDC and Food Stamp receipt on 
the remaining components of the decomposition. 
The first decompositions we present appear in Tables 6.12–6.15. 
The format of each table corresponds directly to Equation (6.7). The es-
timates of the probability of eligibility are based on the SIPP data. The 
estimates for the conditional probabilities of awareness, of application/ 
acceptance, and of enrollment all draw on data from the four sites in the 
National JTPA Study, with the first two constructed using the pooled 
ENP and control group data and the last obtained from the experimental 
treatment group. The stark difference in geographic coverage between 
the samples for the first stage and the later stages of the decomposition 
weakens our analysis, but this is unavoidable given the lack of compa-
rable data on the ineligible population at the four ENP sites. As in the 
earlier tables, the reported derivatives consist of sample averages of in-
dividual derivatives (or finite differences). They are not the derivatives 
evaluated at the sample means of the characteristics.15 
The first column in the table presents the overall effect of a change 
in the indicated characteristic x on the probability of enrollment; this 
is the term on the left-hand side of Equation (6.7). These values are 
expressed in terms of the expected change in the probability of partici-
pation resulting from the indicated change in characteristics, multiplied 
by 100 for ease of presentation. To put the terms in context, note that 
the unconditional probability of participation is around 0.03, so that an 
overall effect of −0.867, which is the effect for adult males of switching 
from a family income of $0–$3,000 to one over $15,000, translates into 
a change in the probability of −0.00867, or a reduction of nearly one-
third relative to the unconditional probability. 
The second, fourth, sixth, and eighth columns of the first panel 
present the four chain rule terms that compose the overall effect. Thus, 
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Table 6.12  JTPA Participation Simulation Results—weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics 
on the Probability of Participation in JTPA 1986 SIPP Panel Sample of JTPA Eligibles: Adult Males 
(80,598 observations) 
Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted 
Overall eligibility Percent awareness Percent acceptance Percent enrollment Percent 
Change from: effect term of overall term of overall term of overall term of overall 
White to 
Black 0.15813 0.17989 113.76 0.06623 41.88 −0.05204 −32.91 −0.03595 −22.74 
(0.00174) (0.00194) (0.21) (0.00068) (0.20) (0.00054) (0.21) (0.00041) (0.15) 
Hispanic −0.09954 0.12535 −125.93 −0.08245 82.83 −0.18921 190.08 0.04676 −46.98 
(0.00121) (0.00137) (1.30) (0.00086) (0.54) (0.00198) (1.03) (0.00053) (0.30) 
Other race/ethnicity 0.19616 0.17773 90.61 −0.07631 −38.90 0.08834 45.03 0.00643 3.28 
(0.00202) (0.00193) (0.16) (0.00081) (0.19) (0.00084) (0.19) (0.00007) (0.02) 
Aged 22–29 to 
30–39 −0.20738 −0.07229 34.86 −0.04524 21.81 −0.08232 39.69 −0.00752 3.63 
(0.00213) (0.00078) (0.05) (0.00046) (0.05) (0.00083) (0.06) (0.00009) (0.01) 
40–49 −0.23873 −0.08673 36.33 −0.04657 19.51 −0.05507 23.07 −0.05034 21.09 
(0.00252) (0.00095) (0.06) (0.00048) (0.04) (0.00056) (0.04) (0.00058) (0.05) 
50–54 −0.31125 −0.12920 41.51 −0.00039 0.012 −0.12280 39.45 −0.05886 18.91 
(0.00330) (0.00139) (0.05) (0.00000) (0.00) (0.00127) (0.05) (0.00067) (0.04) 
Single, never married to 
Married −0.05544 0.01257 −22.68 0.01334 −24.07 −0.12037 217.11 0.03899 −70.33 
(0.00052) (0.00014) (0.15) (0.00014) (0.14) (0.00117) (0.69) (0.00044) (0.45) 
Div.-wid.-sep. 0.09699 0.02779 28.66 0.10393 107.16 −0.06582 −67.86 0.03110 32.06 
(0.00106) (0.00030) (0.10) (0.00106) (0.18) (0.00068) (0.37) (0.00035) (0.16) 
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Highest grade = 12 to 
< 10 −0.07920 0.08490 −107.19 −0.06366 80.37 −0.01038 126.74 −0.00008 0.10 
(0.00091) (0.00093) (0.93) (0.00067) (0.44) (0.00105) (0.53) (0.00000) (0.00) 
10–11 0.02426 0.03716 153.13 −0.01861 −76.70 0.02108 86.89 −0.01537 −63.33 
(0.00027) (0.00041) (0.52) (0.00019) (0.46) (0.00021) (0.44) (0.00018) (0.44) 
13–15 0.01822 −0.02288 −125.56 0.00813 44.64 0.01885 103.44 0.01412 77.48 
(0.00019) (0.00026) (0.88) (0.00008) (0.25) (0.00019) (0.41) (0.00016) (0.31) 
> 15 −0.24466 −0.00939 3.84 −0.05869 23.99 −0.17448 71.32 −0.00210 0.86 
(0.00245) (0.00010) (0.01) (0.00060) (0.04) (0.00174) (0.05) (0.00002) (0.00) 
No child < 6 years of 
age to child
 < 6 years of age −0.09757 −0.02979 30.53 −0.00915 9.38 −0.07291 74.72 0.01429 −14.64 
(0.00097) (0.00032) (0.07) (0.00009) (0.02) (0.00072) (0.10) (0.00016) (0.05) 
Family income < $3,000 
to 
$3,000–$9,000 −0.32777 −0.10544 32.17 −0.02445 7.46 −0.15696 47.89 −0.04095 12.49 
(0.00344) (0.00116) (0.04) (0.00025) (0.02) (0.00161) (0.06) (0.00047) (0.03) 
$9,000–$15,000 −0.47674 −0.25404 53.29 −0.03367 7.06 −0.15563 32.64 −0.03338 7.00 
(0.00484) (0.00259) (0.05) (0.00035) (0.02) (0.00158) (0.04) (0.00038) (0.02) 
> $15,000 −0.86666 −0.32102 37.04 0.01048 −1.21 −0.56750 65.48 0.01143 −1.32 
(0.00493) (0.00250) (0.09) (0.00011) (0.01) (0.00274) (0.07) (0.00013) (0.01) 
(continued) 
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Table 6.12  (continued) 
Unweighted Unweighted Unweighted 
eligibility awareness Unweighted enrollment 
Change from: term term acceptance term term 
White to 
Black 0.06693 0.11697 −0.00968 −0.07041 
(0.00018) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005) 
Hispanic 0.04687 −0.14448 −0.03352 0.08792 
(0.00013) (0.00011) (0.00020) (0.00000) 
Other race/ethnicity 0.06753 −0.13250 0.01774 0.01230 
(0.00020) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00000) 
Aged 22–29 to 
30–39 −0.02757 −0.08029 −0.01583 −0.01445 
(0.00007) (0.00004) (0.00009) (0.00000) 
40–49 −0.03277 −0.08247 −0.01053 −0.09820 
(0.00009) (0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00003) 
50–54 −0.04864 −0.00068 −0.02274 −0.11663 
(0.00014) (0.00000) (0.00013) (0.00008) 
Single, never married to 
Married 0.00468 0.02359 −0.02424 0.07681 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00012) (0.00006) 
Div.-wid.-sep.        0.01056 0.18502 −0.01223 0.05862 
(0.00003) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00002) 
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Highest grade = 12 to 
< 10 0.03184 −0.11108 −0.01834 −0.00016 
(0.00008) (0.00007) (0.00010) (0.00000) 
10–11 0.01406 −0.03287 0.00410 −0.02980 
(0.00004) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00000) 
13–15 −0.00856 0.01443 0.00364 0.02700 
(0.00002) (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00000) 
> 15 −0.00355 −0.10503 −0.03325 −0.00404 
(0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00017) (0.00000) 
No child < 6 years of age to 
child < 6 years of age −0.01129 −0.01621 −0.01379 0.02742 
(0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00007) (0.00001) 
Family income < $3,000 to 
$3,000–$9,000 −0.03797 −0.04304 −0.02817 −0.08075 
(0.00013) (0.00000) (0.00017) (0.00006) 
$9,000–$15,000 −0.08709 −0.05927 −0.03101 −0.06552 
(0.00035) (0.00000) (0.00019) (0.00000) 
> $15,000 −0.27189 0.01851 −0.22959 0.02226 
(0.00040) (0.00001) (0.00043) (0.00000) 
NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors reflect variation 
due to the sample used to perform the simulations. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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Table 6.13  JTPA Participation Simulation Results—weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in
Characteristics on the Probability of Participation in JTPA 1986 SIPP Panel Sample of JTPA
Eligibles: Adult Females (89,196 observations) 
Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted 
Overall eligibility Percent awareness Percent acceptance Percent enrollment Percent 
Change from: effect term of overall term of overall term of overall term of overall 
White to 
Black 0.18225 0.17694 97.09 0.04858 26.66 −0.01011 −5.55 −0.03316 −18.20 
(0.00074) (0.00074) (0.08) (0.00024) (0.09) (0.00005) (0.01) (0.00016) (0.05) 
Hispanic 0.05725 0.06722 117.41 −0.03759 −65.65 −0.03785 −66.11 0.06547 114.36 
(0.00027) (0.00028) (0.26) (0.00018) (0.28) (0.00018) (0.25) (0.00033) (0.36) 
Other race/ethnicity 0.08121 0.06315 77.76 −0.05323 −65.54 0.00495 6.10 0.06633 81.68 
(0.00037) (0.00026) (0.15) (0.00025) (0.22) (0.00002) (0.02) (0.00033) (0.18) 
Aged 22–29 to 
30–39 −0.06881 0.00439 −6.38 −0.00849 12.34 −0.07057 102.56 0.00587 −8.53 
(0.00031) (0.00002) (0.01) (0.00004) (0.02) (0.00032) (0.00) (0.00003) (0.02) 
40–49 −0.13415 0.00954 −7.11 −0.02645 19.72 −0.08264 61.60 −0.03461 25.80 
(0.00064) (0.00004) (0.02) (0.00013) (0.03) (0.00039) (0.00) (0.00017) (0.03) 
50–54 −0.17226 −0.02104 12.21 −0.02611 15.16 −0.13052 75.77 0.00540 −3.13 
(0.00078) (0.00008) (0.02) (0.00013) (0.02) (0.00061) (0.05) (0.00003) (0.01) 
Single, never married to 
Married −0.25809 −0.11003 42.63 −0.03753 14.54 −0.13273 51.43 0.02221 −8.61 
(0.00096) (0.00037) (0.03) (0.00018) (0.02) (0.00054) (0.03) (0.00011) (0.02) 
Div.-wid.-sep. 0.05775 −0.00537 −9.30 0.00975 16.88 0.02610 45.20 0.02727 47.21 
(0.00028) (0.00002) (0.02) (0.00005) (0.03) (0.00012) (0.03) (0.00014) (0.04) 
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Highest grade = 12 to 
< 10 −0.00028 0.12478 −45004.11 −0.09553 34456.05 −0.01200 4329.50 −0.01752 6320.56 
(0.00039) (0.00050) (61725.88) (0.00048) (47143.37) (0.00006) (5926.98) (0.00009) (8658.46) 
10–11 −0.02252 0.00440 −19.54 −0.00229 10.17 −0.01690 75.04 −0.00773 34.34 
(0.00011) (0.00002) (0.05) (0.00001) (0.02) (0.00008) (0.06) (0.00004) (0.03) 
13–15 0.00983 −0.02878 −292.81 −0.02655 −270.11 0.06390 650.14 0.00125 12.70 
(0.00010) (0.00012) (2.80) (0.00013) (2.40) (0.00030) (5.07) (0.00001) (0.10) 
> 15 −0.17329 −0.11342 65.45 −0.08481 48.94 0.04682 −27.02 −0.02190 12.64 
(0.00072) (0.00045) (0.07) (0.00039) (0.04) (0.00022) (0.03) (0.00011) (0.02) 
No child < 6 years of 
age to child 
< 6 years 0.00212 0.03731 1763.02 −0.00557 −263.19 −0.06759 −3193.65 0.03797 1794.02 
(0.00012) (0.00015) (103.67) (0.00003) (15.97) (0.00033) (194.88) (0.00019) (107.23) 
Family income 
< $3,000 to 
$3,000–$9,000 0.00364 −0.08450 −2322.85 0.06882 1891.74 0.01681 462.23 0.00250 68.81 
(0.00022) (0.00037) (139.38) (0.00034) (108.34) (0.00008) (27.00) (0.00001) (4.04) 
$9,000–$15,000 −0.14105 −0.18756 132.98 0.03819 −27.08 −0.02034 14.42 0.02862 −20.29 
(0.00068) (0.00084) (0.13) (0.00019) (0.11) (0.00009) (0.04) (0.00014) (0.08) 
> $15,000 −0.37947 −0.33806 89.09 0.00612 −1.61 −0.08725 22.99 0.03971 −10.46 
(0.00114) (0.00098) (0.00) (0.00003) (0.01) (0.00036) (0.05) (0.00020) (0.04) 
(continued) 
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Table 6.13  (continued) 
Unweighted Unweighted Unweighted Unweighted 
eligibility awareness acceptance enrollment 
Change from: term term term term 
White to 
Black 0.11936 0.10254 −0.00213 −0.07239 
(0.00025) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00003) 
Hispanic 0.04523 −0.07589 −0.00796 0.13711 
(0.00010) (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00006) 
Other race/ethnicity 0.04237 −0.10664 0.00105 0.13905 
(0.00009) (0.00004) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Aged 22–29 to 
30–39 0.00292 −0.01759 −0.01495 0.01270 
(0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00003) (0.00000) 
40–49 0.00633 −0.05442 −0.01792 −0.07575 
(0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00003) 
50–54 −0.01395 −0.05343 −0.02759 0.01166 
(0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00000) 
Single, never married to 
Married −0.08046 −0.07888 −0.03365 0.04852 
(0.00017) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00002) 
Div.-wid.-sep.        −0.00355 0.02033 0.00566 0.05814 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000) 
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Highest grade = 12 to 
< 10 0.08384 −0.18277 −0.00254 −0.03823 
(0.00017) (0.00014) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
10–11 0.00292 −0.00474 −0.00356 −0.01680 
(0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00000) 
13–15 −0.01898 −0.05459 0.01348 0.00270 
(0.00005) (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00000) 
> 15 −0.07569 −0.17394 0.00970 −0.04777 
(0.00020) (0.00009) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
No child < 6 years of age to 
child < 6 years 0.02473 −0.01154 −0.01397 0.08169 
(0.00006) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00004) 
Family income < $3,000 to 
$3,000–$9,000 −0.05266 0.14643 0.00361 0.00541 
(0.00015) (0.00006) (0.00001) (0.00000) 
$9,000–$15,000 −0.11255 0.08099 −0.00431 0.06103 
(0.00035) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00000) 
> $15,000 −0.26155 0.01266 −0.02135 0.08726 
(0.00039) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00000) 
NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors reflect variation 
due to the sample used to perform the simulations. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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Table 6.14  JTPA Participation Simulation Results—weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics 
on the Probability of Participation in JTPA 1986 SIPP Panel Sample of JTPA Eligibles: Male youth
(10,280 observations) 
Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted 
Overall eligibility Percent awareness Percent acceptance Percent enrollment Percent 
Change from: effect term of overall term of overall term of overall term of overall 
White to 
Black 0.18985 0.13157 69.30 0.19817 104.38 −0.08387 −44.18 −0.05602 −29.51 
(0.00359) (0.00251) (0.59) (0.00360) (1.21) (0.00185) (0.94) (0.00127) (0.59) 
Hispanic 0.16202 0.27921 172.33 0.00435 2.68 −0.16337 −100.84 0.04183 25.82 
(0.00461) (0.00559) (2.31) (0.00008) (0.07) (0.00334) (3.13) (0.00098) (0.80) 
Other race/ethnicity 0.11554 0.21151 183.06 0.19799 171.37 −.35420 −306.57 0.06022 52.12 
(0.00528) (0.00417) (6.88) (0.00348) (7.34) (0.00742) (16.67) (0.00144) (2.69) 
Aged 16–18 to 
19–21 −0.04099 −0.05230 127.60 −0.12499 304.94 0.17496 −426.86 −0.03866 94.32 
(0.00217) (0.00098) (5.88) (0.00224) (15.65) (0.00386) (26.88) (0.00091) (5.52) 
Single, never married to 
Married −0.09644 −0.14673 152.14 0.22705 −235.42 −0.20505 212.61 0.02827 −29.31 
(0.00327) (0.00262) (3.74) (0.00400) (7.59) (0.00430) (4.65) (0.00067) (0.66) 
Div.-wid.-sep. −0.45773 −0.18594 40.62 −0.16515 36.08 −0.12806 27.98 0.02142 −4.68 
(0.00827) (0.00319) (0.18) (0.00311) (0.10) (0.00267) (0.16) (0.00051) (0.04) 
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Highest grade = 12 to 
< 10 0.27423 0.19428 70.85 0.00450 1.64 0.05394 19.67 0.02152 7.85 
(0.00480) (0.00358) (0.36) (0.00008) (0.01) (0.00110) (0.25) (0.00051) (0.10) 
10–11 0.31709 0.15118 47.68 0.06286 19.82 0.09853 31.07 0.00451 1.42 
(0.00559) (0.00287) (0.35) (0.00112) (0.13) (0.00200) (0.27) (0.00011) (0.02) 
> 12 −0.15662 −0.00644 4.11 −0.08392 53.58 −0.06819 43.54 0.00192 −1.23 
(0.00291) (0.00012) (0.05) (0.00152) (0.17) (0.00140) (0.20) (0.00005) (0.01) 
No child < 6 years of 
age to child 
< 6 years −0.06653 0.13831 −207.91 −0.02807 42.20 −0.20069 301.67 0.02392 −35.95 
(0.00296) (0.00276) (9.74) (0.00051) (1.50) (0.00411) (9.40) (0.00057) (1.18) 
Family income < 
$3,000 to 
$3,000–$9,000 −0.02934 −0.38646 1317.34 −0.09657 329.20 0.47009 −1602.39 −0.01638 55.82 
(0.00890) (0.00892) (577.07) (0.00178) (147.80) (0.00977) (750.37) (0.00038) (25.52) 
$9,000–$15,000 −0.62620 −0.36139 57.71 0.00376 −0.60 −0.18625 29.74 −0.08230 13.14 
(0.01208) (0.00660) (0.13) (0.00007) (0.01) (0.00378) (0.08) (0.00188) (0.08) 
> $15,000 −1.13101 −0.85797 75.86 −0.07077 6.26 −0.22640 20.02 0.02411 −2.13 
(0.00927) (0.00564) (0.21) (0.00126) (0.07) (0.00358) (0.18) (0.00056) (0.04) 
(continued) 
 
Table 6.14  (continued) 
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Unweighted Unweighted Unweighted 
eligibility Unweighted acceptance enrollment 
Change from: term awareness term term term 
White to 
Black 0.06224 0.23652 −0.01464 −0.10033 
(0.00033) (0.00027) (0.00011) (0.00009) 
Hispanic 0.12856 0.00515 −0.02811 0.07099 
(0.00071) (0.00001) (0.00023) (0.00011) 
Other race/ethnicity 0.09938 0.24597 −0.05971 0.10316 
(0.00059) (0.00029) (0.00051) (0.00017) 
Aged 16–18 to 
19–21 −0.02447 −0.14922 0.02848 −0.06538 
(0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00020) (0.00006) 
Single, never married to 
Married −0.06715 0.28561 −0.03700 0.04882 
(0.00043) (0.00023) (0.00032) (0.00007) 
Div.-wid.-sep.        −0.08370 −0.18808 −0.02320 0.03693 
(0.00060) (0.00048) (0.00018) (0.00006) 
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Highest grade = 12 to 
< 10 0.09339 0.00533 0.01010 0.03660 
(0.00051) (0.00001) (0.00007) (0.00005) 
10–11 0.07254 0.07497 0.01866 0.00780 
(0.00039) (0.00009) (0.00013) (0.00001) 
> 12 −0.00299 −0.09993 −0.01283 0.00333 
(0.00002) (0.00013) (0.00009) (0.00000) 
No child < 6 years of age to 
child < 6 years 0.06409 −0.03296 −0.03545 0.04130 
(0.00038) (0.00006) (0.00029) (0.00006) 
Family income < $3,000 to 
$3,000–$9,000 −0.13607 −0.10801 0.09427 −0.02889 
(0.00150) (0.00018) (0.00035) (0.00003) 
$9,000–$15,000 −0.17195 0.00445 −0.03412 −0.14599 
(0.00229) (0.00001) (0.00027) (0.00013) 
> $15,000 −0.57966 −0.08677 −0.05300 0.04362 
(0.00228) (0.00010) (0.00026) (0.00006) 
NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors reflect variations 
due to the sample used to perform the simulation. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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Table 6.15 JTPA Participation Simulation Results—weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics 
on the Probability of Participation in JTPA 1986 SIPP Panel Sample of JTPA Eligibles: Female youth 
(11,165 observations) 
Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted 
Overall eligibility Percent awareness Percent acceptance Percent enrollment Percent 
Change from: effect term of overall term of overall term of overall term of overall 
White to 
Black 0.60673 0.25958 42.78 0.15867 26.15 0.23113 38.09 −0.04265 −7.03 
(0.00343) (0.00170) (0.17) (0.00122) (0.08) (0.00153) (0.13) (0.00043) (0.04) 
Hispanic 0.33973 0.13234 38.95 0.07296 21.48 0.03803 11.19 0.09640 28.38 
(0.00237) (0.00086) (0.18) (0.00055) (0.07) (0.00031) (0.04) (0.00103) (0.14) 
Other race/ 0.52914 0.21732 41.07 −0.15091 −28.52 0.39674 74.98 0.06597 12.47 
ethnicity (0.00323) (0.00135) (0.24) (0.00124) (0.12) (0.00309) (0.24) (0.00071) (0.07) 
Aged 16–18 to 
19–21 −0.13182 0.00600 −4.55 −0.04413 33.48 −0.09964 75.58 0.00594 −4.51 
(0.00103) (0.00004) (0.04) (0.00033) (0.09) (0.00080) (0.09) (0.00006) (0.02) 
Single, never 
married to 
Married −0.11438 0.04948 −43.26 0.02279 −19.93 −0.21716 189.86 0.03049 −26.66 
(0.00122) (0.00031) (0.52) (0.00017) (0.15) (0.00170) (0.81) (0.00032) (0.20) 
Div.-wid.-sep. 0.43598 0.16794 38.52 −0.13812 −31.68 0.34108 78.23 0.06509 14.93 
(0.00272) (0.00102) (0.22) (0.00113) (0.13) (0.00267) (0.23) (0.00070) (0.08) 
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Highest grade = 12 to 
< 10 0.02402 0.10392 432.68 −0.13596 −566.07 0.03667 152.69 0.01939 80.72 
(0.00062) (0.00064) (10.15) (0.00105) (17.22) (0.00030) (4.69) (0.00020) (2.47) 
10–11 −0.04111 0.00763 −18.55 −0.03043 74.01 −0.03857 93.82 0.02026 −49.28 
(0.00034) (0.00005) (0.16) (0.00023) (0.21) (0.00032) (0.27) (0.00021) (0.33) 
> 12 −0.23797 −0.08057 33.86 −0.00592 2.49 −0.15552 65.35 0.00405 −1.70 
(0.00153) (0.00052) (0.16) (0.00004) (0.01) (0.00120) (0.16) (0.00004) (0.01) 
No child < 6 years of 
age to child 
< 6 years 0.04561 0.16064 352.24 −0.01929 −42.29 −0.11019 −241.62 0.01445 31.68 
(0.00111) (0.00095) (7.62) (0.00015) (1.20) (0.00094) (7.36) (0.00015) (0.95) 
Family income
< $3,000 to 
$3,000–$9,000 −0.21200 −0.20549 96.93 0.04033 −19.02 −0.02672 12.60 −0.02013 9.49 
(0.00173) (0.00166) (0.09) (0.00030) (0.10) (0.00022) (0.08) (0.00021) (0.06) 
$9,000–$15,000 −0.26501 −0.31212 117.78 −0.01785 6.73 0.05881 −22.19 0.00615 −2.32 
(0.00243) (0.00277) (0.12) (0.00014) (0.03) (0.00049) (0.11) (0.00006) (0.01) 
> $15,000 −0.29814 −0.64432 216.11 −0.06660 22.34 0.43046 −144.38 −0.01767 5.93 
(0.00588) (0.00390) (3.51) (0.00050) (0.46) (0.00460) (4.09) (0.00018) (0.13) 
(continued) 
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Unweighted Unweighted Unweighted Unweighted 
eligibility awareness acceptance enrollment 
Change from: term term term term 
White to 
Black 0.07514 0.18894 0.08124 −0.06723 
(0.00020) (0.00012) (0.00038) (0.00006) 
Hispanic 0.03805 0.08826 0.01283 0.14839 
(0.00010) (0.00004) (0.00007) (0.00011) 
Other race/ethnicity 0.06344 −0.17801 0.13083 0.10252 
(0.00017) (0.00019) (0.00058) (0.00011) 
Aged 16–18 to 
19–21 0.00172 −0.05334 −0.03352 0.00931 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00016) (0.00001) 
Single, never married to 
Married 0.01431 0.02747 −0.07153 0.04781 
(0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00036) (0.00003) 
Div.-wid.-sep.        0.04896 −0.16342 0.11298 0.10116 
(0.00013) (0.00015) (0.00052) (0.00011) 
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Highest grade = 12 to 
< 10 0.03018 −0.16072 0.01233 0.03028 
(0.00008) (0.00015) (0.00006) (0.00003) 
10–11 0.00219 −0.03662 −0.01290 0.03163 
(0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00007) (0.00003) 
> 12 −0.02355 −0.00714 −0.05464 0.00635 
(0.00005) (0.00000) (0.00028) (0.00001) 
No child < 6 years of age to 
child < 6 years 0.04769 −0.02320 −0.03586 0.02259 
(0.00012) (0.00002) (0.00019) (0.00002) 
Family income < $3,000 to 
$3,000–$9,000 −0.05959 0.04868 −0.00894 −0.03154 
(0.00019) (0.00002) (0.00005) (0.00002) 
$9,000–$15,000 −0.09455 −0.02149 0.01981 0.00962 
(0.00035) (0.00001) (0.00010) (0.00001) 
> $15,000 −0.19203 −0.08038 0.11196 −0.02763 
(0.00017) (0.00002) (0.00045) (0.00002) 
NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors reflect variations 
due to the sample used to perform the simulation. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
   
 
 
 
 
 
184 Heckman and Smith 
for the decomposition in Tables 6.12–6.15, the weighted eligibility term 
is given by the first term on the right-hand side of Equation (6.7), the 
weighted acceptance term by the second term, the weighted awareness 
term by the third term, and the weighted enrollment term by the fourth 
term. The third, fifth, seventh, and ninth columns present the percent-
age of the overall effect attributable to each of the four components. 
Thus, the third column indicates the percentage of the overall effect that 
results from the effect of the indicated change in x on the conditional 
probability of eligibility, which is given by the ratio of the weighted eli-
gibility term to the overall effect multiplied by 100. The second panel of 
each table presents the unweighted effect of the indicated change in x on 
each of the conditional probabilities. This unweighted effect is just the 
average partial derivative (or finite difference) of the probability with 
respect to the characteristic. 
The results for race and ethnicity are especially striking. Blacks 
consistently have an overall probability of participation higher than that 
of whites. For three of the four demographic groups, this higher overall 
probability decomposes into higher conditional probabilities of eligi-
bility and awareness, but lower conditional probabilities of acceptance 
and enrollment. Decomposing the overall effect in this way makes it 
clear where blacks fall out of the participation process, and suggests 
that policy measures designed to increase their participation should 
likely focus relatively more attention on the stages of application, ac-
ceptance, and enrollment, rather than on changes in eligibility rules or 
on outreach efforts to increase awareness, although such measures may 
still bear fruit. This evidence indicates that the concerns expressed in 
GAO (1991) regarding minority participation may not have been mis-
placed. Administrative discretion may have played a role in reducing 
black participation in JTPA, and may continue to do so under WIA. 
A different pattern emerges for the categorical age variables. For 
adults, older persons nearly always have lower conditional probabili-
ties at every stage in the participation process relative to persons aged 
22–29. The same is true of youth, where a modest overall negative ef-
fect for 19–21-year-olds relative to 16–18-year-olds is mirrored at each 
stage in the process except for the application/acceptance stage for male 
youth and the eligibility and enrollment stages for female youth. 
Overall, being married rather than being single decreases the prob-
ability of participation in JTPA for all four demographic groups. The 
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dominant factor lowering enrollment among married persons is a strong 
negative effect of marriage on the conditional probability of application/ 
acceptance. For adult males, this negative term outweighs a positive 
effect of marriage on the conditional probabilities of eligibility, aware-
ness, and enrollment. The probability of participation for divorced, 
widowed, or separated persons exceeds that for single persons in three 
of the four groups. For adult males, positive effects of having once been 
married on eligibility, awareness, and enrollment dominate the negative 
acceptance term, while all but the eligibility term are positive for adult 
females. 
For adults, the relationship between the overall probability of 
participation in JTPA and years of completed schooling is roughly hill-
shaped, with its peak occurring at 10–11 years of completed schooling 
for men and 13–15 years for women. The decompositions reveal that 
the overall relationship results from combining a negative relationship 
between years of schooling and eligibility, and generally hill-shaped re-
lationships between schooling and awareness, application/acceptance, 
and enrollment. For youth, the overall relationship between participa-
tion and years of completed schooling peaks at 10–11 years for males 
and at less than 10 years for females. 
For three of the four demographic groups, the overall effect of 
having an own child under six years of age in the home breaks down 
into a positive component due to increased conditional probabilities of 
eligibility and enrollment, and negative components due to decreased 
probabilities of awareness and acceptance. The overall effect is nega-
tive for men and positive for women. 
The overall probability of participation in JTPA decreases mono-
tonically in family income for adult males and male and female youth, 
and peaks in the $3,000–$9,000 category for adult females. The strong 
negative relationship between family income and the probability of 
eligibility described earlier in the chapter dominates the overall ef-
fect in almost every case. The exception is the peak for adult females, 
which results from the influence of a similarly peaked pattern in the 
relationship between family income and the conditional probabilities of 
awareness and of application/acceptance for that group. 
Tables 6.16–6.19 present a second set of decompositions. In these 
tables, we decompose the probability of application/acceptance con-
ditional on eligibility into components due to awareness and due to 
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Table 6.16  JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition 
weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA
national JTPA Study Eligible nonparticipant Sample: Adult Males (1,552 observations) 
Weighted Weighted 
Overall awareness Percent acceptance Percent 
Change from: effect term of overall term of overall 
White to 
Black 2.5149 (0.0675) 1.5521 (0.0495) 61.72 (0.66) 0.9628 (0.0257) 38.28 (0.66) 
Hispanic −2.9536 (0.0902) −2.6335 (0.0844) 89.16 (0.25) −0.3201 (0.0087) 10.84 (0.25) 
Other race/ethnicity 5.8446 (0.1485) −1.4193 (0.0457) −24.28 (0.85) 7.2639 (0.1668) 124.28 (0.85) 
Aged 22–29 to 
30–39 −3.7082 (0.0993) −1.3499 (0.0433) 36.40 (0.62) −2.3583 (0.0664) 63.60 (0.62) 
40–49 −4.2680 (0.1146) −1.2858 (0.0412) 30.13 (0.55) −2.9822 (0.0838) 69.87 (0.55) 
50–54 −2.5991 (0.0765) 0.1994 (0.0064) −7.67 (0.22) −2.7985 (0.0803) 107.67 (0.22) 
Highest grade 12 to 
< 10 −6.5763 (0.1825) −2.1992 (0.0693) 33.44 (0.54) −4.3771 (0.1279) 66.56 (0.54) 
10–11 −1.4067 (0.0380) −0.7153 (0.0233) 50.85 (0.70) −0.6914 (0.0193) 49.15 (0.70) 
13–15 2.1957 (0.0557) 0.5977 (0.0192) 27.22 (0.57) 1.5980 (0.0430) 72.78 (0.58) 
> 15 −7.3700 (0.2089) −1.6050 (0.0516) 21.78 (0.40) −5.7650 (0.1688) 78.22 (0.40) 
Not receiving AFDC to 
Current AFDC receipt −5.5477 (0.1714) 0.4306 (0.0138) −7.76 (0.22) −5.9783 (0.1800) 107.76 (0.23) 
Not receiving Food Stamps to 
Current Food Stamp receipt 4.4612 (0.1165) 2.8726 (0.0897) 64.39 (0.68) 1.5886 (0.0424) 35.61 (0.68) 
Two most recent labor force 
statuses from employed → 
employed to 
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Unemployed → employed 11.1319 (0.2484) 2.8784 (0.0920) 25.86 (0.60) 8.2535 (0.1969) 74.14 (0.60) 
OLF → employed 15.2249 (0.3061) 2.6670 (0.0845) 17.52 (0.45) 12.5578 (0.2646) 82.48 (0.44) 
Employed → unemployed 23.9905 (0.4532) 2.8125 (0.0946) 11.72 (0.31) 21.1780 (0.3998) 88.28 (0.31) 
Unemployed → unemployed 15.9797 (0.3196) 3.6041 (0.1122) 22.55 (0.55) 12.3756 (0.2652) 77.45 (0.55) 
OLF → unemployed 28.6514 (0.4525) 6.4026 (0.2087) 22.35 (0.59) 22.2488 (0.3654) 77.65 (0.59) 
Employed → OLF 25.9317 (0.3865) −1.6591 (0.0530) −6.40 (0.22) 27.5908 (0.3904) 106.40 (0.22) 
Unemployed → OLF 30.8787 (0.4021) −4.9403 (0.1627) −16.00 (0.67) 35.8191 (0.3365) 116.00 (0.67) 
OLF → OLF 6.8828 (0.1859) −0.0298 (0.0009) −0.43 (0.01) 6.9126 (0.1864) 100.43 (0.03) 
No child < 6 years of age to 
child < 6 years −0.9468 (0.0270) −0.5962 (0.0190) 62.97 (0.71) −0.3506 (0.0114) 37.03 (0.71) 
Family income < $3,000 to 
$3,000–$9,000 −5.2227 (0.1744) −0.1078 (0.0034) 2.06 (0.06) −5.1149 (0.1725) 97.94 (0.04) 
$9,000–$15,000 −2.4054 (0.0750) −0.1520 (0.0048) 6.32 (0.18) −2.2535 (0.0722) 93.68 (0.19) 
> $15,000 −6.8375 (0.2571) 1.6230 (0.0511) −23.74 (0.94) −8.4605 (0.2804) 123.74 (0.94) 
Corpus Christi site to 
Fort Wayne site 12.6473 (0.3162) 1.0828 (0.0346) 8.56 (0.22) 11.5644 (0.2958) 91.44 (0.23) 
Jersey City site 6.3780 (0.1534) 0.3288 (0.0105) 5.16 (0.15) 6.0492 (0.1490) 94.84 (0.16) 
Providence site 6.4292 (0.1691) −1.5965 (0.0509) −24.83 (0.95) 8.0257 (0.1824) 124.83 (0.95) 
Never married to 
Currently married −4.9098 (0.1401) 0.4562 (0.0145) −9.29 (0.31) −5.3660 (0.1467) 109.29 (0.31) 
Married 1–24 months ago 4.3002 (0.1261) 4.2079 (0.1252) 97.85 (0.04) 0.0923 (0.0025) 2.15 (0.07) 
Married > 24 months ago 5.3340 (0.1391) 3.6192 (0.1166) 67.85 (0.73) 1.7147 (0.0441) 32.15 (0.73) 
NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors reflect variation 
in the samples used to do the simulations. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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Table 6.17  JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition 
weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA
national JTPA Study Eligible nonparticipant Sample: Adult Females (2,438 observations) 
Weighted Weighted 
Overall awareness Percent acceptance Percent 
Change from: effect term of overall term of overall 
White to 
Black 0.3406 (0.0082) 0.5807 (0.0110) 170.49 (1.57) −0.2401 (0.0044) −70.49 (1.57) 
Hispanic 2.5843 (0.0514) −1.5509 (0.0312) −60.01 (1.29) 4.1352 (0.0709) 160.01 (1.29) 
Other race/ethnicity −0.5642 (0.0140) −0.9772 (0.0192) 173.22 (1.55) 0.4130 (0.0074) −73.22 (1.55) 
Aged 22–29 to 
30–39 −1.5293 (0.0272) −0.2304 (0.0044) 15.07 (0.18) −1.2989 (0.0238) 84.93 (0.17) 
40–49 −1.0421 (0.0184) −0.3973 (0.0075) 38.12 (0.30) −0.6449 (0.0120) 61.88 (0.30) 
50–54 −0.9142 (0.0163) −0.3667 (0.0071) 40.12 (0.30) −0.5474 (0.0102) 59.88 (0.30) 
Highest grade 12 to 
< 10 −2.6424 (0.0495) −2.0099 (0.0393) 76.06 (0.21) −0.6325 (0.0119) 23.94 (0.21) 
10–11 −0.8521 (0.0151) −0.2605 (0.0050) 30.57 (0.27) −0.5916 (0.0109) 69.43 (0.27) 
13–15 1.4035 (0.0265) −0.5493 (0.0103) −39.14 (0.72) 1.9527 (0.0332) 139.14 (0.72) 
> 15 −3.5102 (0.0668) −1.4343 (0.0283) 40.86 (0.26) −2.0760 (0.0410) 59.14 (0.26) 
Not receiving AFDC to 
Current AFDC receipt −3.9558 (0.0809) −0.0051 (0.0001) 0.13 (0.00) −3.9507 (0.0808) 99.87 (0.00) 
Not receiving Food Stamps to 
Current Food Stamp receipt 2.4674 (0.0416) 1.3765 (0.0242) 55.79 (0.30) 1.0908 (0.0201) 44.21 (0.30) 
Two most recent labor force 
statuses from employed → 
employed to 
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Unemployed → employed 10.1978 (0.1374) 0.2336 (0.0044) 2.29 (0.04) 9.9642 (0.1353) 97.71 (0.00) 
OLF → employed 6.0237 (0.0963) −0.6424 (0.0123) −10.66 (0.17) 6.6660 (0.1040) 110.66 (0.18) 
Employed → unemployed 20.0536 (0.2370) 1.9825 (0.0363) 9.89 (0.15) 18.0711 (0.2195) 90.11 (0.15) 
Unemployed → unemployed 19.1886 (0.2369) 1.1889 (0.0234) 6.20 (0.12) 17.9997 (0.2287) 93.80 (0.11) 
OLF → unemployed 13.1690 (0.1825) 0.8147 (0.0151) 6.19 (0.09) 12.3543 (0.1737) 93.81 (0.09) 
Employed → OLF 7.3442 (0.1160) 0.2988 (0.0056) 4.07 (0.06) 7.0454 (0.1125) 95.93 (0.04) 
Unemployed → OLF 13.9890 (0.1926) −0.6109 (0.0118) −4.37 (0.08) 14.5999 (0.1989) 104.37 (0.05) 
OLF → OLF 4.2671 (0.0845) −0.9764 (0.0188) −22.88 (0.45) 5.2435 (0.0952) 122.88 (0.46) 
No child < 6 years of age to 
child < 6 years −0.8987 (0.0173) −0.1516 (0.0029) 16.87 (0.21) −0.7471 (0.0151) 83.13 (0.20) 
Family income < $,3000 to 
$3,000–$9,000 2.1865 (0.0390) 1.1198 (0.0208) 51.22 (0.38) 1.0667 (0.0215) 48.78 (0.38) 
$9,000–$15,000 1.0367 (0.0183) 0.6227 (0.0117) 60.07 (0.38) 0.4140 (0.0083) 39.93 (0.37) 
> $15,000 0.5172 (0.0107) −0.0683 (0.0013) −13.20 (0.22) 0.5855 (0.0116) 113.20 (0.23) 
Corpus Christi site to 
Fort Wayne site 7.6811 (0.1556) −0.6637 (0.0124) −8.64 (0.19) 8.3448 (0.1608) 108.64 (0.18) 
Jersey City site 5.4065 (0.0990) −0.7513 (0.0147) −13.90 (0.24) 6.1578 (0.1084) 113.90 (0.23) 
Providence site 7.3382 (0.1506) −2.0068 (0.0412) −27.35 (0.62) 9.3450 (0.1711) 127.35 (0.62) 
Never married to 
Currently married −3.7900 (0.0758) −0.3984 (0.0077) 10.51 (0.13) −3.3915 (0.0697) 89.49 (0.12) 
Married 1–24 months ago 3.1004 (0.0569) −0.0496 (0.0009) −1.60 (0.02) 3.1499 (0.0576) 101.60 (0.00) 
Married > 24 months ago 6.3540 (0.1107) 0.5205 (0.0100) 8.19 (0.11) 5.8335 (0.1038) 91.81 (0.12) 
NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors reflect variation 
in the samples used to do the simulations. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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Table 6.18  JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition 
weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA
national JTPA Study Eligible nonparticipant Sample: Male youth (530 observations) 
Weighted Weighted 
Overall awareness Percent acceptance Percent 
Change from: effect term of overall term of overall 
White to 
Black 4.8041 (0.2699) 6.6041 (0.2893) 137.47 (2.52) −1.7999 (0.0720) −37.47 (2.52) 
Hispanic 5.9390 (0.2145) 0.2688 (0.0123) 4.53 (0.22) 5.6701 (0.2112) 95.47 (0.22) 
Other race/ethnicity −3.1888 (0.3835) 6.6837 (0.3157) −209.60 (28.11) −9.8724 (0.4783) 309.60 (28.11) 
Aged 16–18 to 
19–21 −1.1238 (0.2264) −5.3078 (0.2366) 472.32 (109.67) 4.1840 (0.1576) −372.32 (109.67) 
Never married to 
Currently married 2.1384 (0.3343) 7.4097 (0.3489) 346.50 (54.91) −5.2712 (0.2273) −246.50 (54.91) 
Div.-wid.-sep. −3.4641 (0.1330) −2.0780 (0.0950) 59.99 (1.04) −1.3862 (0.0561) 40.01 (1.04) 
Highest grade 12 to 
< 10 −0.3731 (0.0267) −0.6401 (0.0292) 171.56 (6.06) 0.2670 (0.0103) −71.56 (6.06) 
10–11 1.9636 (0.0810) 1.6799 (0.0760) 85.55 (0.59) 0.2837 (0.0110) 14.45 (0.59) 
> 12 −1.8382 (0.0667) −0.6697 (0.0305) 36.43 (1.04) −1.1685 (0.0468) 63.57 (1.04) 
Not receiving AFDC to 
Current AFDC receipt −11.1117 (0.4965) −4.2387 (0.1942) 38.15 (0.74) −6.8730 (0.3298) 61.85 (0.74) 
Not receiving Food Stamps to 
Current Food Stamp receipt 3.7423 (0.1253) 1.8386 (0.0835) 49.13 (1.20) 1.9037 (0.0692) 50.87 (1.20) 
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Two most recent labor force 
statuses from employed → 
employed to 
Unemployed → employed 14.4300 (0.3934) 1.1809 (0.0536) 8.18 (0.40) 13.2491 (0.3886) 91.82 (0.40) 
OLF → employed −4.5935 (0.2030) 0.5569 (0.0255) −12.12 (0.57) −5.1505 (0.2159) 112.12 (0.57) 
Employed → unemployed 16.6120 (0.4569) 3.5322 (0.1670) 21.26 (0.93) 13.0798 (0.4174) 78.74 (0.93) 
Unemployed → unemployed 10.3782 (0.2823) 3.2308 (0.1478) 31.13 (1.11) 7.1474 (0.2211) 68.87 (1.11) 
OLF → unemployed 0.3517 (0.0666) −1.2450 (0.0573) −354.01 (72.52) 1.5967 (0.0634) 454.01 (72.52) 
Employed → OLF 26.9129 (1.1099) −8.8298 (0.4202) −32.81 (2.70) 35.7427 (0.8344) 132.81 (2.70) 
Unemployed → OLF 5.5548 (0.3447) 7.5616 (0.3597) 136.13 (2.89) −2.0068 (0.0916) −36.13 (2.89) 
OLF → OLF 6.9113 (0.5004) −6.8417 (0.3147) −98.99 (10.08) 13.7529 (0.4157) 198.99 (10.08) 
No child < 6 years of age to 
child < 6 years −9.2754 (0.4498) −1.9897 (0.0911) 21.45 (0.67) −7.2856 (0.3823) 78.55 (0.67) 
Family income < $,3000 to 
$3,000–$9,000 9.3512 (0.4811) −4.6211 (0.2073) −49.42 (3.64) 13.9722 (0.4734) 149.42 (3.64) 
$9,000–$15,000 −2.6233 (0.1288) −3.1610 (0.1402) 120.50 (1.17) 0.5377 (0.0256) −20.50 (1.17) 
> $15,000 −4.7303 (0.1979) −3.8578 (0.1714) 81.56 (0.69) −0.8725 (0.0425) 18.44 (0.69) 
Corpus Christi site to 
Fort Wayne site 10.3470 (0.3620) 0.3657 (0.0169) 3.53 (0.17) 9.9813 (0.3578) 96.47 (0.17) 
Jersey City site 3.0515 (0.1968) −1.4890 (0.0675) −48.80 (3.80) 4.5406 (0.2061) 148.80 (3.80) 
Providence site 18.4090 (0.6361) −2.3738 (0.1081) −12.89 (0.76) 20.7827 (0.6359) 112.89 (0.75) 
NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors reflect variation 
in the samples used to do the simulations. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
  
 
192   
Table 6.19  JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition 
weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA
national JTPA Study Eligible nonparticipant Sample: Female youth (701 observations) 
Weighted Weighted 
Overall awareness Percent acceptance Percent 
Change from: effect term of overall term of overall 
White to 
Black 3.9275 (0.1724) 3.0290 (0.1451) 77.12 (0.49) 0.8985 (0.0322) 22.88 (0.49) 
Hispanic 1.0273 (0.0415) 0.5037 (0.0249) 49.03 (0.75) 0.5236 (0.0189) 50.97 (0.75) 
Other race/ethnicity 2.8539 (0.1085) −2.4043 (0.1197) −84.25 (5.34) 5.2582 (0.1592) 184.25 (5.34) 
Aged 16–18 to 
19–21 −2.3024 (0.0867) −0.5579 (0.0272) 24.23 (0.54) −1.7445 (0.0634) 75.77 (0.54) 
Never married to 
Currently married −1.5024 (0.0587) 0.6539 (0.0321) −43.52 (1.63) −2.1563 (0.0833) 143.52 (1.63) 
Div.-wid.-sep. −1.1802 (0.0922) −2.5635 (0.1267) 217.21 (7.55) 1.3833 (0.0481) −117.21 (7.55) 
Highest grade 12 to 
< 10 −2.0172 (0.0973) −2.0554 (0.0984) 101.89 (0.00) 0.0381 (0.0014) −1.89 (0.05) 
10–11 −1.7373 (0.0661) −0.4037 (0.0200) 23.24 (0.50) −1.3336 (0.0487) 76.76 (0.51) 
> 12 1.0272 (0.0355) −0.0518 (0.0025) −5.04 (0.16) 1.0790 (0.0375) 105.04 (0.15) 
Not receiving AFDC to 
Current AFDC receipt −2.3463 (0.0926) 1.2829 (0.0633) −54.68 (2.33) −3.6292 (0.1378) 154.68 (2.33) 
Not receiving Food Stamps to 
Current Food Stamp receipt 6.5595 (0.2010) 0.1105 (0.0054) 1.68 (0.06) 6.4490 (0.1971) 98.32 (0.07) 
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Two most recent labor force 
statuses from employed → 
employed to 
Unemployed → employed 9.5744 (0.2550) −0.4118 (0.0203) −4.30 (0.18) 9.9862 (0.2662) 104.30 (0.18) 
OLF → employed 11.3506 (0.2832) −1.8182 (0.0898) −16.02 (0.81) 13.1688 (0.3136) 116.02 (0.81) 
Employed → unemployed 24.0502 (0.4336) −1.4540 (0.0712) −6.05 (0.31) 25.5041 (0.4422) 106.05 (0.32) 
Unemployed → unemployed 17.0906 (0.4181) 1.2007 (0.0580) 7.03 (0.29) 15.8899 (0.3908) 92.97 (0.29) 
OLF → unemployed 21.6456 (0.4132) 0.3991 (0.0197) 1.84 (0.09) 21.2465 (0.4105) 98.16 (0.08) 
Employed → OLF 8.6803 (0.2773) 1.4078 (0.0686) 16.22 (0.52) 7.2725 (0.2306) 83.78 (0.53) 
Unemployed → OLF 7.1564 (0.2625) 3.3152 (0.1614) 46.32 (0.97) 3.8412 (0.1313) 53.68 (0.97) 
OLF → OLF 4.6998 (0.1774) −1.0262 (0.0503) −21.84 (0.98) 5.7260 (0.2065) 121.84 (0.99) 
No child < 6 years of age to 
child < 6 years −1.3768 (0.0594) −0.8447 (0.0417) 61.36 (0.74) −0.5320 (0.0210) 38.64 (0.74) 
Family income < $3,000 to 
$3,000–$9,000 −0.8170 (0.0328) 0.1014 (0.0050) −12.41 (0.43) −0.9184 (0.0366) 112.41 (0.43) 
$9,000–$15,000 −0.7310 (0.0416) −0.9901 (0.0490) 135.45 (1.50) 0.2591 (0.0101) −35.45 (1.50) 
> $15,000 8.3821 (0.2512) −1.1948 (0.0593) −14.25 (0.59) 9.5768 (0.2877) 114.25 (0.59) 
Corpus Christi site to 
Fort Wayne site 3.5282 (0.1269) 0.3522 (0.0173) 9.98 (0.30) 3.1761 (0.1138) 90.02 (0.30) 
Jersey City site 0.3881 (0.0532) −1.5274 (0.0769) −393.62 (69.52) 1.9155 (0.0728) 493.62 (69.53) 
Providence site 3.5378 (0.1675) −2.1585 (0.1040) −61.01 (3.86) 5.6963 (0.2075) 161.01 (3.86) 
NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors reflect variation 
in the samples used to do the simulations. 
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004). 
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application/acceptance given awareness. Omitting the stages of eligi-
bility and enrollment allows us to simulate using the same ENP and 
control data from the National JTPA Study that we use to estimate the 
conditional probabilities of awareness and of application/acceptance. 
Omitting the enrollment stage allows us to include variables represent-
ing recent labor force status transitions, which are not available in the 
treatment group data we use to estimate the probability of enrollment. 
Otherwise, the format of the tables and the construction of the indi-
vidual terms parallels that for the decompositions already discussed. 
The basic patterns for those variables, such as age and schooling, 
included in the earlier decompositions remain essentially the same as 
for the decompositions previously discussed, so we do not dwell on 
them here. Of great interest are the decompositions of the overall ef-
fects of family receipt of AFDC and Food Stamps on the application/ 
acceptance probabilities. The overall effect of AFDC receipt is nega-
tive for all four groups. For both groups of adults, the overall effect 
decomposes into a small effect due to awareness, combined with a large 
negative effect of living in a family receiving AFDC on the probability 
of application/acceptance conditional on awareness. For male youth, 
living in a family receiving AFDC has negative effects of equal size on 
awareness and on application/acceptance given awareness. For female 
youth positive awareness and negative application and acceptance ef-
fects cancel to yield a small overall effect. 
All four demographic groups show a positive impact of living in a 
family receiving Food Stamps on the probability of application/accep-
tance. For all the groups except female youth, this effect decomposes 
into roughly equal positive effects of Food Stamp receipt on the prob-
abilities of awareness and of application/acceptance conditional on 
awareness. For female youth, the contribution of the awareness term 
is negligible, leaving the impact of living in a family receiving Food 
Stamps on application/acceptance to dominate the overall effect. Inter-
preting the effect of AFDC receipt as measuring the difference between 
receiving both AFDC and Food Stamps and just Food Stamps, we find 
that AFDC receipt primarily discourages application/acceptance. 
Finally, examination of the decompositions for the variables repre-
senting the two most recent labor force statuses at the time of random 
assignment or eligibility screening shows that in all cases it is the effect 
of these statuses on the probability of application/acceptance condi-
  
 
Program Participation Data and Cream Skimming 195 
tional on awareness that accounts for their large positive effects on the 
unconditional probability of application/acceptance. The estimated ef-
fects of labor force status transitions on awareness are small and are 
of mixed sign, with negative estimated effects usually associated with 
transitions out of the labor force. 
These decompositions offer unique insights regarding the effects 
of characteristics such as race, age, education, transfer program par-
ticipation, labor force status, and family income on the various stages 
of the process by which individuals select and are selected into the 
JTPA program. For many characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, 
the same characteristic has competing effects at different stages of the 
process. Other characteristics, such as age among adults, operate in the 
same direction on the conditional probabilities of program eligibility, 
awareness, application/acceptance, and formal enrollment. Sorting out 
the effects of particular characteristics at each step enriches our un-
derstanding of the overall participation process and demonstrates quite 
clearly that much of the action in terms of subgroup differences arises 
at stages in the participation process over which JTPA staff have little 
or no control. 
SUMMARy AnD COnCLUSIOnS 
This chapter lays out a framework for studying the determinants 
of participation in social programs using data on random samples of 
individuals at each stage in the participation process. We outline the 
evidence our framework can provide regarding cream skimming by 
program staff, perhaps motivated by the incentives resulting from 
administrative performance standards, in the context of what we call 
mutually voluntary programs. In such programs, participation depends 
on the choices of both potential participants and program staff. In that 
context, our framework can provide only suggestive evidence for or 
against cream skimming based on characteristics observed by both the 
researcher and the program staff, except in the special case where pro-
gram staff completely control certain stages of the process. Except in 
that special case, our framework cannot provide the sort of definitive 
positive evidence of caseworker responses to performance incentives 
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obtained by studies that rely on exogenous variation in the existence or 
nature of those incentives, such as Courty, Kim, and Marschke (forth-
coming). When caseworkers (or other program staff) have little or no 
control over specific stages of the process, our framework also reveals 
the importance of factors other than cream skimming in generating dif-
ferences in participation among groups. 
We apply our framework to data from the JTPA program, which 
allows us to decompose participation into the stages of eligibility, 
awareness, application/acceptance, and enrollment. From the perspec-
tive of this volume, two major empirical findings emerge from this 
analysis. Although they arise from data on JTPA, the similarity between 
JTPA and other programs (including its successor WIA) documented in 
Chapter 2 suggests that they likely apply more broadly. 
The first major finding is that much of the action in terms of dif-
ferences in participation rates across groups occurs at stages in the 
participation process over which program staff have little or no control. 
This finding highlights the dangers of inferring cream skimming from 
simple comparisons of program participants and program eligibles. 
The second major finding is that we find only modest evidence of 
cream skimming at the stages of the participation process where JTPA
caseworkers arguably do have some influence, namely enrollment, and 
to a lesser extent, application and acceptance. Several factors may ac-
count for this lack of strong evidence, particularly relative to the amount 
of attention cream skimming receives in discussions of performance 
management systems for employment and training programs. 
First, caseworkers may have goals that conflict with those of the 
performance management system. Given the relatively indirect and 
low-powered incentives offered by the system, they may choose to in-
dulge those goals. Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) use data from 
Corpus Christi, the only site in the NJS to collect good data on appli-
cants, to study the transition from application to enrollment. They find 
evidence that caseworkers prefer applicants with relatively weak, rather 
than relatively strong, expected labor market outcomes in the absence 
of the program. This suggests that caseworker preferences for serving 
the most disadvantaged may overcome the incentives provided by the 
performance standards system in some contexts. 
Second, JTPA caseworkers faced many constraints other than the 
performance standards system. Local JTPA offices faced political con-
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straints emanating from politicians, businesspeople, community groups, 
and service providers. For example, Smith (1992) shows that three of 
the four sites analyzed here underserve (relative to its representation in 
the eligible population) the race/ethnic group locally in the majority, 
even when that group is black. This may reflect political pressures to 
cater to marginal voting blocks. Some or all of these other pressures 
may weigh against the incentives for cream skimming provided by the 
performance measures. They may also lead program staff to focus on 
alternative forms of strategic behavior aimed at improving their mea-
sured performance, such as those discussed in Chapter 7. 
Third, Courty, Kim, and Marschke (forthcoming) suggest a role 
for the regression model developed by the USDOL and used to adjust 
the performance standards faced by local JTPA offices for differences 
in participants’ observed characteristics. Although optional for states 
at the time, all of the states with sites in the NJS used the regression 
adjustment model. The model relied on data from prior years on the 
relationship between participants’ characteristics and their postprogram 
labor market outcomes. If the model worked as intended, it should have 
diminished or even eliminated the incentive sites faced to cream-skim 
based on the observed characteristics included in the adjustment model. 
Many of those same characteristics appear in our model, with the result 
that if the regression adjustment did its job, we should not expect to find 
much evidence of cream skimming in our analysis. Of course, program 
staff may still have tried very hard to select participants based on char-
acteristics not included in the adjustment model. 
Fourth, the empirical patterns generated by participant choices may 
simply overshadow the efforts of the caseworkers, even at the stages of 
the participation process where caseworkers have the most influence. 
Overall, the results of our empirical analysis provide valuable in-
sights into the importance of cream skimming under JTPA and suggest 
the value of a similar but richer analysis using data from the current 
WIA program. 
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notes 
1. In addition to issues related to the effects of performance standards, Heckman and 
Smith (2004) focus on how decomposing the participation process illuminates the 
causes of differences in program participation across groups more generally and 
how it contributes to the selection and specification of econometric evaluation 
estimators. 
2. More recent work in this area includes Aizer (2007); Bitler, Currie, and Scholz 
(2003); Burton, Macher, and Mayo (2007); Dahan and Nisan (2009); and Kleven 
and Kopczuk (2008). 
3. A related literature considers how participants get allocated to services within pro-
grams that provide more than one service. See Plesca and Smith (2007) and Mitnik 
(2009) and the references therein. 
4. The act also specifies additional eligibility criteria for several small groups. In the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data used in our analysis, we 
are not able to accurately measure foster child status, disability, or homelessness 
on a monthly basis, and so are unable to implement the special eligibility rules 
applicable to these groups in selecting our sample of eligibles. However, these 
groups represent a very small portion of the overall eligible population, and many 
of those eligible under the special provisions will also be eligible under the basic 
family income and program participation criteria described in the text. 
5. Program year 1991 covers the period from July 1991 to June 1992. 
6. Two other details regarding JTPA eligibility deserve note. First, the implementa-
tion of the rules varied somewhat across localities, as states and training centers 
had some discretion over exactly what did and did not constitute family income 
and what did and did not constitute a family for the purposes of the program. 
Devine and Heckman (1996) find these differences too small to affect the patterns 
discussed here. Second, the eligibility rules described here are those in place at 
the time our data were collected. Some small changes in rules took place after that 
time; see Devine and Heckman (1996) or USDOL (1993). 
7. See Doolittle and Traeger (1990) for a discussion of the implementation of the 
NJS and Bloom et al. (1997) and Orr et al. (1996) for summaries of the impact 
estimates. 
8. Appendices A and B in Heckman and Smith (2003) provide additional detail re-
garding the NJS and SIPP samples used in our analyses. 
9. Doolittle and Traeger (1990), Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993), and Orr et 
al. (1996) all provide even more detail about the sites in the National JTPA Study. 
10. We present mean derivatives and not derivatives evaluated at the mean of the x. 
That is, we calculate the derivative (or finite difference for binary variables) for 
each observation and report the (weighted) sample mean. The literature sometimes 
refers to these as mean marginal effects. The standard errors take account of the 
use of multiple observations on the same individuals. 
11. The English language ability variable should be interpreted with caution as it 
arises from different underlying measures in the ENP and control group samples. 
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For the ENPs, lack of English ability is measured by the language in which the 
respondent chose to complete the baseline survey, while for the controls it is ob-
tained from a question on language preference administered around the time of 
random assignment. 
12. Appendix C of Heckman and Smith (2003) provides additional details regarding 
the methods used to obtain the reported results. 
13. Heckman and Smith (1999) discuss the importance of these variables at greater 
length. See also Card and Sullivan (1988) and Dolton and Smith (2010). 
14. Heckman, Smith and Taber (1998) discuss nonenrollment within the experimen-
tal treatment group and its implications for the evaluation of JTPA. See also the 
general discussions of treatment group dropout and control group substitution in 
Heckman et al. (2000) and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999). 
15. Appendix C of Heckman and Smith (2003) contains a detailed discussion of the 
simulations. 
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Measuring Government Performance 
An Overview of Dysfunctional Responses 
Pascal Courty 
Gerald Marschke 
Explicit performance measurement systems may elicit unintended 
and dysfunctional responses, also known as gaming responses. Under-
standing when such responses take place, their extent and their nature, 
is essential for improving the design of measurement systems and the 
overall effectiveness of performance incentives. This concern is reflected 
in the recent growth in empirical studies focusing on unintended behav-
ioral responses to explicit incentives. We review this literature and try 
to provide a unifying framework to put into perspective the various 
classes of dysfunctional responses that have been identified in practice. 
We use this framework to discuss implications for the design of perfor-
mance measurement systems. 
The performance measure is the rule used to collect and aggregate 
the data generated by the agent’s actions. The performance outcome 
is the value generated when that rule is applied to specific data. The 
next section proposes a formal classification of dysfunctional responses 
based on the terminology of the multitasking literature. Dysfunctional 
responses occur when the performance measure does not communicate 
correctly the marginal impact of decision making on the true objec-
tive of the organization. We distinguish three kinds of dysfunctional 
responses: 1) accounting manipulations, which are responses that boost 
the performance outcome but have no other impact on the organization; 
2) gaming responses, which boost the performance outcome and have 
a negative impact on the organization; and 3) marginal misallocations, 
which have a positive impact on the organization but are suboptimal in 
the sense that alternative allocations would have a higher impact. 
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This classification is useful because it can help guide the organi-
zation’s response to different dysfunctional behaviors. In the case of 
accounting manipulation, for example, the organization only has to 
invert the performance inflation relation and appropriately discount the 
rewards to performance achievement. If this cannot be done satisfacto-
rily, however, accounting manipulations will have an indirect negative 
impact on the organization because the information contained in per-
formance outcomes may be misinterpreted. Gaming responses should 
unambiguously be eliminated as they have both a direct negative impact 
on the organization (misallocation of resources) and an indirect one 
(misinterpretation of outcomes). Marginal misallocations often origi-
nate from the fact that the performance measure is too coarse and does 
not capture some dimensions of value added. The typical remedy is to 
complement the performance measure with finer measures or with alter-
native evaluation methods (i.e., subjective performance evaluation).1 
After that we summarize the empirical literature on dysfunctional 
responses to performance measurement systems in public and pri-
vate sector organizations, with an emphasis on the former. We then 
review the evidence on dysfunctional responses in the JTPA organiza-
tion. Our point of departure is the earlier discussion of the weaknesses 
of the JTPA incentive system presented in Chapter 4. We exploit the 
analytical framework introduced there to understand the sources and 
consequences of dysfunctional responses. We conclude that section 
with some thoughts on the implications of the JTPA experience for WIA
and its new performance incentive system. 
The chapter ends with an assessment of the extent to which dys-
functional responses may impede the performance of measurement 
systems and draws lessons for policymakers. An important lesson of 
this review is that much progress has been made in identifying dys-
functional responses. A growing literature has produced studies that go 
beyond anecdotal reports and impressionistic evidence and try to iden-
tify dysfunctional behavior and measure performance inflation. Still, we 
find that this literature typically focuses on a narrow set of responses. In 
addition, the evidence reviewed rarely addresses the fundamental effi-
ciency question of measuring the welfare impact of the dysfunctional 
responses identified. These conclusions suggest that much work is still 
necessary to further our understanding of dysfunctional behavior. 
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Before proceeding, we should acknowledge that others have dis-
cussed the existence of problems with performance measurement in 
both private and public organizations. See in particular Prendergast 
(1999), Propper and Wilson (2003), and Smith (1995). Other chapters 
in this book also discuss problems with performance measurement 
in JTPA and WIA. The main contribution of this chapter is to focus 
exclusively on the issue of dysfunctional responses, leaving aside more 
general problems associated with performance measurement, and to try 
to provide a comprehensive overview of such responses. To achieve 
this goal, we provide a theoretical framework to develop a formal 
classification of dysfunctional responses. This classification is useful 
to understand the practical challenges of identifying dysfunctional 
responses, to evaluate the negative impact of such responses, and to 
formulate appropriate remedies. We hope that this formal framework 
will be helpful in understanding the difficulties organizations face to 
correctly measure and reward productivity, and ultimately that it will 
support the design of more effective models of performance measure-
ment and incentive systems. 
DEFInITIOnS OF DySFUnCTIOnAL RESPOnSES 
A central assumption of the incentive literature is that performance 
measurement influences behavior, and most importantly, that it may be 
sometimes difficult to anticipate how it does so. Performance measures 
encourage the right kind of behavioral responses only if they suc-
cessfully communicate the organization’s true objectives. In an early 
discussion of the subject, Blau (1955) warns that if performance mea-
sures are not perfectly aligned with the organization’s objective, they 
may generate, in addition to intended responses, what could be called 
unintended or dysfunctional responses. 
A dysfunctional response is an action that increases the perfor-
mance measure but is unsupported by the designer because it does 
not efficiently further the true objective of the organization (see, for 
example, Kerr [1975] and Jensen and Meckling [1992]). The multi-
tasking framework captures the notion that the investment allocation 
that maximizes performance outcomes does not necessarily correspond 
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to the allocation that maximizes value added (Baker 1992; Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1991).2 
Although all dysfunctional responses share the general property 
that they were not intended by the incentive designer, there are types 
of dysfunctional responses that correspond to different ways in which 
the measurement technology may be imperfect. To provide a more pre-
cise classification of dysfunctional responses, we borrow the language 
of the multitasking literature. The starting point of this literature is to 
assume that the agent invests in tasks. One could think of a task as a 
project. In the context of JTPA, for example, a task could be a single 
enrollee or a group of enrollees. The agent has to allocate resources 
across tasks and the issue is how the performance measure guides, or 
misguides, the agent’s resource allocation. Each task is characterized by 
its type a. The agent privately observes the task’s type a and invests in 
effort, e. The performance outcome for task a is 
Ma(e,g) = mae. 
We assume without loss of generality that ma ≥ 0. Our specification 
ignores additive performance measurement noise.3 This assumption is 
not restrictive for the analysis, which focuses on defining dysfunctional 
responses.4 The principal’s objective or social value added on task a is 
Va(e) = vae. 
Finally, we assume that investment in effort is costly: 
Ca(e,g) = (½)cae
2, 
where c a ≥ 0. The performance outcome is 
M = Sa Ma(e). 
The fundamental assumption of the multitasking literature is that 
the principal can observe only M. The performance measure, how-
ever, is an imperfect measure of the agent’s effectiveness because it 
aggregates the outcome of multiple tasks. As a result, the performance 
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measure may not be aligned with the true objective of the principal. 
Stated formally, this will be the case when the marginal return of effort 
on the measure is not the same as the marginal return of effort on the 
principal’s objective, ma ≠ va. 
Several comments are in order. First, this setup focuses exclusively 
on problems that are associated with the inadequacy of the measure 
to convey the true objective. It omits problems relating to the princi-
pal’s ability to select the right measure and implement it properly and 
to the agent’s willingness or capacity to respond to performance mea-
surement. Although we briefly discuss the limitations imposed by these 
assumptions next, see Smith (1995) and Kravchuk and Schack (1996) 
for a more complete discussion of the problems that emerge when these 
assumptions do not hold. Some of these additional concerns regarding 
the implementation of performance measurement are also discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
Second, the multitasking framework assumes that the principal’s 
objective, V a(e), is well defined. In practice, performance measurement 
sometimes fails because the principal’s objective is poorly defined or 
because the principal must strike a compromise between potentially 
conflicting goals. Our analysis does not address these problems. Con-
sider next our assumption that the agent chooses the resource allocation 
that achieves the highest outcome on the performance measures. This 
assumption rules out the possibility that the agent has his/her own 
preferences over resource allocation that conflict with performance 
measurement. It also rules out the possibility that the agent is actu-
ally an organizational unit composed of multiple decision makers with 
conflicting objectives, as is frequently the case in the real world. In 
addition, we assume that the agent understands the technology of pro-
duction of the performance measure, M a(e). Finally, our model abstracts 
from issues related to the dynamics of performance measurement. Here 
we consider a static model, ignoring the possibility that the principal 
may change the performance measure and the potential dysfunctional 
responses associated with such a possibility (Courty and Marschke 
2003a). 
Keeping these qualifications in mind, our setup suggests a formal 
definition of dysfunctional responses. A dysfunctional response is an 
investment choice that is different from the investment choice that max-
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imizes the organizational goal. Formally, an agent who maximizes the 
performance outcome invests 
e a = m a/ca 
in task a, while the investment that maximizes the organizational objec-
tive is 
* ea= va/ca. 
*A dysfunctional response occurs when ea ≠ ea. We distinguish three 
types of dysfunctional responses: 
1) Marginal misallocation: actions that enter the principal’s objec-
tive but are distorted in the performance measure. Formally,
m ≠ v > 0 and c > 0. To illustrate, consider the case of perfor-a a a 
mance measurement in schools (Jacob 2005; Hannaway 1992). 
In recent years some policy analysts and public officials have 
advocated setting up performance measures for local school 
districts, possibly backed by educational subsidies as incentives 
(e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2002). Such performance 
measures are based on scores from standardized tests of reading, 
writing, and arithmetic. These tests do not measure the results 
of teaching citizenship, conflict resolution, and interpersonal 
skills—skills that are an important aim of primary schools. 
Because the tests do not measure citizenship, for example, the 
theory predicts that teachers will invest less, or possibly neglect 
altogether, this skill. Instituting performance measurement can 
produce distortions by causing agents to spend little time on 
activities that are productive but not fully taken into account in 
the performance measure. 
2) Accounting manipulation: actions that increase the perfor-
mance measure but do not enter the principal’s objective and 
do not enter the cost function. Formally, m > 0 and v = c = a a a 
0. Accounting manipulations are activities that boost the per-
formance measure and do not waste resources. Such responses 
are informally known as “cooking the books” or “window 
dressing.” Accounting manipulation increases the agent’s 
chances of earning the rewards associated with higher perfor-
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mance outcomes. They may not create welfare loss since the 
organization could, in principle, neutralize this behavior by 
appropriately discounting the rewards to higher performance 
outcomes (Courty and Marschke 2004). If such adjustment in 
rewards is possible, this class of dysfunctional responses does 
not have direct inefficiency implications (since ea = ea on all 
tasks that actually enter the organization’s objective). Often, 
however, the principal may not be aware of such responses. 
When this is the case, the informative power of the perfor-
mance measure decreases and the principal may overreward 
those agents who invest more in accounting manipulation. 
Such dysfunctional manipulation would have indirect negative 
efficiency impacts on the organization. 
3) Gaming: actions that increase the performance outcome neg-
atively enhance the principal’s objective and/or positively 
increase the cost function. Formally, m > 0, v ≤ 0, and c ≥ 0, a a a 
with at least one of the last two inequalities strict. The distinc-
tion between accounting manipulation and gaming is that the 
latter imposes a cost to the organization because the agent ends 
up wasting resources to boost performance. For example, if 
the activities involved in “cooking the books” waste resources, 
then they fall within the category of gaming. Gaming implies 
not only some kind of accounting manipulation but also a costly 
misallocation of resources. 
This classification is useful because the organization’s optimal 
response depends on the type of dysfunctional behavior under con-
sideration. As mentioned earlier, the organization does not care 
about accounting manipulation if it can invert the performance infla-
tion relation and appropriately discount the rewards to performance 
achievement. If this cannot be done satisfactorily, then accounting 
manipulations will have an indirect negative impact on the organiza-
tion. Gaming responses should unambiguously be eliminated as they 
have both a direct negative impact (ea ≠ ea) and an indirect impact on 
the organization. Marginal misallocations often originate from the fact 
that the performance measure is too coarse and does not capture some 
dimensions of value added. The typical remedy is to complement the 
performance measure with additional measures or with alternative eval-
uation methods (i.e., subjective performance evaluation). 
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REvIEw OF EvIDEnCE OF DySFUnCTIOnAL RESPOnSES
In PUBLIC AnD PRIvATE SECTORS
Casual reports of dysfunctional responses to performance incen-
tives abound. Although sometimes insightful, such accounts only give 
a very impressionistic view of the actual extent and impact of such 
responses. It is typically not possible to establish on the basis of such 
reports the amount of performance inflation that actually goes on, or to 
determine the existence of welfare loss. To draw relevant lessons for the 
design of performance measurement systems, one must develop system-
atic methods to identify and measure distortions. We start by discussing 
why it is difficult to systematically measure dysfunctional responses in 
practice. Next, we review different methods that have been successful 
at producing hard empirical evidence on dysfunctional responses. 
Challenges in Identifying Dysfunctional Responses 
Several difficulties arise when one tries to assess the extent of 
dysfunctional behavior. To start, demonstrating the existence of dys-
functional responses involves estimating relationships that are typically 
hidden from the researcher. One needs to identify actions that are not 
perfectly aligned with the principal’s objective. Using the notation of 
the model, one needs to show that ma ≠ va, and also possibly that ca > 0, 
depending on the type of dysfunctional responses considered. But the 
researcher does not typically observe the marginal impacts of decision 
making on the production and cost functions. 
To illustrate, consider the case of marginal misallocation. 
Researchers who study agent responses to performance measures often 
find evidence of actions that raise performance outcomes, but then 
find it difficult to demonstrate that these actions are suboptimal (i.e., 
to show that these responses are not the ones that maximize the stated 
objective of the organization). The difficulty lies in establishing the 
counterfactual of what the agent’s value added would have been absent 
the agent’s actions. Consider the cream skimming literature in job 
training programs that has studied enrollment responses to performance 
measurement in the JTPA organization (Chapters 6 and 9). Critics of 
JTPA’s performance incentive system feared that the measures used, 
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which focus on labor market success (e.g., employment status) at the 
end of training, would encourage managers to enroll only those par-
ticipants likely to perform well on employment measures—the most 
“job ready”—irrespective of how much they might gain from the pro-
gram (that is, increase their human capital). Some studies have found 
evidence that program managers prefer the job ready, but this alone is 
not evidence of dysfunctional responses. To demonstrate dysfunctional 
response, one must show that the job-ready applicants are also those 
who do not benefit the most from the program (see Chapters 5 and 8, and 
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith [2002]). Using our notation, although it 
seems intuitive that ma /ca is high for the job ready, one needs to prove 
that va /ca is low for this target population to establish the existence of 
marginal misallocation. 
The literature has circumvented this challenge by focusing on incen-
tive schemes where dysfunctional responses can be unambiguously 
identified from the specifics of the contract. A substantial fraction of 
the literature focuses on accounting manipulation responses where the 
agent uses its discretion over the timing and reporting of performance 
outcomes to meet performance thresholds (Asch 1990; Courty and 
Marschke 2004; Healy 1985; Jacob and Levitt 2003; Oettinger 2002; 
and Oyer 1998). The advantage of focusing on such timing and mis-
reporting strategies is that the observed responses can only be consistent 
with the specifics of the contract. Using the notation introduced earlier, 
these actions are unambiguously dysfunctional since ma > 0 while va = 0. 
The main shortcomings of this approach, however, are that it can be 
applied only to a narrow set of dysfunctional responses and requires 
detailed information on the contracts and behavior that is often hidden 
from the researcher. Another shortcoming of this approach is that it will 
work only to identify accounting manipulations, to the extent that ca = 0, 
and such responses are likely to have lower direct efficiency impact 
than the other two types of dysfunctional responses. 
A final approach to identify dysfunctional responses focuses on 
changes in performance outcomes that follow the introduction of a new 
performance measure. We discuss this approach in more detail in the 
next section. 
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Evidence of Dysfunctional Responses 
Propper and Wilson (2003) present some evidence of dysfunctional 
responses in their review of the empirical literature on the use and use-
fulness of performance measures in the public sector. In this section, 
we review some of this evidence, as well as new evidence, using the 
classification presented above. 
health sector 
Dranove et al. (2003) study whether the introduction of report cards 
changes how health care providers select patients. Report cards pro-
vide information about the performance of hospitals. Skeptics argue 
that health report cards may encourage providers to game the system 
by cream skimming, that is, by avoiding sick and/or seeking healthy 
patients. Their evidence shows that report cards led to substantial selec-
tion by providers, with a decline in the illness severity of patients, a 
finding consistent with a cream skimming hypothesis. They conclude 
that the overall impact of the report card was to reduce welfare. This 
evidence is consistent with marginal misallocation, since perfor-
mance measurement generates a reallocation of resources that reduces 
efficiency. 
Goddard et al. (2000) present a general discussion of the difficulties 
in implementing performance measurement. They consider the impact 
of the “Performance Framework,” an initiative by the UK National 
Health Service to increase the importance attached to formal perfor-
mance indicators in the health sector. They present qualitative interview 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that performance measurement 
may generate a wide range of unintended responses. 
School and training program 
Jacob and Levitt (2003) investigate teacher cheating, a behavioral 
response consistent with accounting manipulation. Some school dis-
tricts allocate school budgets on the basis of schools’ performance. A
number of highly publicized incidents of teacher cheating have fueled 
the suspicion that teachers have responded by “teaching the test” and 
manipulating students’ grade-to-grade promotions to boost scores. 
However, most of this evidence is anecdotal. Jacob and Levitt propose 
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an innovative way to measure the extent of teacher cheating that com-
bines measures on unexpected test score fluctuations and suspicious 
patterns of answers for students. They show that the joint distribution 
of these two variables should demonstrate systematic patterns if some 
teachers cheat and others do not. 
Jacob (2005) presents some evidence of marginal misallocation. 
He examines the impact of an accountability policy implemented in 
the Chicago Public Schools in 1996–1997. He finds that math and 
reading achievement increased sharply following the introduction of 
the accountability policy. He also finds that teachers responded strate-
gically to the incentives along a variety of dimensions—by increasing 
special education placements, preemptively retaining students, and sub-
stituting away from low-stakes subjects like science and social studies.
Oettinger (2002) presents a study of academic performance evalu-
ations and shows that undergraduate students respond to nonlinear 
incentives. Due to the threshold effects implied by a discrete grade 
system, students tend to cluster slightly above grade boundaries. Using 
our terminology, this evidence is consistent with marginal misallo-
cation because students strategically change effort decisions to meet 
performance thresholds, a behavior that is unlikely to be efficient. In 
fact, Oettinger’s evidence suggests that the performance incentive gen-
erates allocations of effort over the duration of the term that depend on 
the realized grade history. The efficient allocation of effort, however, 
should not depend on grade history.   
Burgess et al. (2003) evaluate the impact of a pilot incentive scheme 
in Jobcentre Plus, a large UK public job training agency, and present 
some evidence of marginal misallocation. The incentive scheme they 
consider gives team bonuses for five different targets that measure with 
varying degrees of precision the bureaucrats’ effectiveness at placing 
the unemployed into jobs. The authors hypothesize that in such a multi-
tasking environment, where different tasks are measured with different 
degrees of precision, workers may choose to exert effort on the tasks 
for which their actions are more easily verifiable. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, they find an impact on job placement (quantity measure) 
but little impact on less precise measures (quality measures). 
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Private sector: managers and salespeople 
Explicit performance measures are commonly used in private 
sector occupations such as firm executives (using both accounting and 
stock market based measures) and salespeople.5 Evidence of accounting 
manipulations from these occupations abounds. In an early contribution 
to the accounting manipulation literature, Healy (1985) documents that 
managers who are compensated for meeting annual income thresholds 
use their discretion over the timing of income reporting to smooth their 
compensation across accounting years. Similarly, Oyer (1998) uses dif-
ferences in the date of the end of the fiscal year for companies that are 
otherwise similar to show that there is more variability in firms’ sales 
at the end of the fiscal years—when salespersons’ bonuses are com-
puted—than in the middle. Oyer’s evidence should be interpreted as 
accounting manipulation, if salespeople only manipulate sales reports. 
Alternatively, if salespeople reallocate effort over the accounting year, 
then the evidence should be interpreted as marginal misallocation.6 
Gibbs et al. (2009) present some evidence that incentive designers 
are aware of marginal misallocations and actually structure measure-
ment systems to address such problems. They use data on incentive 
contracts for auto dealership managers to investigate whether incentive 
designers internalize multitasking concerns. They show that incentive 
designers select pools of incentive measures that complement each 
other, and set the relative weights on the different measures selected to 
address multitasking concerns. For example, the extent to which a mea-
sure distorts incentives (by discouraging cooperation or encouraging 
a short-term focus) reduces the weight it receives. In addition, firms 
use additional performance bonuses, based on subjective performance 
evaluation, to balance multitasking and manipulation incentives. 
EvIDEnCE FROM JTPA
This section reviews the evidence of dysfunctional responses in the 
JTPA organization. Here we draw from our own work but also refer to 
the work of Heckman and Smith presented in Chapter 6 and Heinrich 
in Chapter 8 of this monograph. The evidence presented in this section 
  
 
Measuring Government Performance 215 
builds upon the characteristics of the JTPA incentive system presented 
in Chapter 4 (see also Courty and Marschke [2003b] ). 
We present two kinds of evidence. The first summarizes the econo-
metric evidence of behavioral responses to JTPA’s attempts to evaluate 
organizational performance, as well as estimates of the costs that are 
incurred when performance measures lead to dysfunctional behavior. 
This evidence establishes a clear link between the specifics of the incen-
tive policies faced by bureaucrats and their behavior. The second kind 
of evidence is based on survey data of self-reported behavior. This evi-
dence reviews a wider set of hypotheses regarding the implications of 
the incentive system but because the evidence is based on self-reported 
behavior, the inference is more anecdotal in nature and sometimes sub-
ject to interpretation. 
Timing Strategies 
Using data from the National JTPA Study, we document how in 
the first decade of JTPA, agencies delayed terminating unemployed 
enrollees, even after their training concluded, to maximize the perfor-
mance outcomes (Courty and Marschke 1997, 2004). This strategic 
termination behavior can be of two types. The first type takes advantage 
of the fact that training agencies do not need to report the employment 
status of the enrollees who have completed their training on the date 
training ends but have a 90-day window to do so. Because labor market 
outcomes vary over time naturally on their own, training agencies 
have an incentive to strategically choose the date they report enrollees’
employment outcomes. At the end of an enrollee’s training, training 
agencies face a decision: terminate the enrollee and report her labor 
market outcomes or postpone termination in hopes that the outcome 
improves. The optimal termination strategy leads the training agency 
to terminate enrollees who are employed within the 90-day period fol-
lowing training either on the last day of training or on the first day 
of employment, whichever occurs first, and all others on the 90th day 
following training end. Courty and Marschke (2004) report evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis. They find that this strategic reporting 
increases the overall employment rate at termination, which was the 
most important performance measure at the time, by 11.3 percentage 
points, from 47.0 percent to 58.3 percent. Stated differently, training 
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agencies in their study would produce an employment rate outcome 20 
percent lower if they were required to graduate enrollees (and report 
their performance outcomes) on the date they actually finish training. 
The second type of strategic termination behavior takes place at 
the end of the fiscal year. Consider a stylized two-program-year incen-
tive system where the training agency receives an award if the yearly 
labor market–based performance outcome exceeds a fixed performance 
standard. The training agency does not know its final aggregate per-
formance outcome until the end of the program year because the labor 
market outcomes depend on random factors, such as the state of the 
local economy, which are outside its control. Because of the graduation 
strategy described above, the training agency reaches the end of the 
year with an inventory of enrollees who have finished training within 
the previous 90 days but are unemployed. At the end of the first pro-
gram year, the training agency chooses how many from this inventory 
to graduate in the present program year, with the remainder to be gradu-
ated in the following program year. Assume there are n such persons, 
of whom n1 will be graduated in the first program year and n2 = n – n1 
in the next one. The training agency chooses n1 to maximize the present 
value of the sum of the two awards. 
The optimal graduation strategy on the last day of the first program 
year depends on the difference between the performance outcome and 
the standard as the last day arrives. Let N = Ne + Nu be the number of 
persons who were graduated during the year (excluding the year’s last 
day), where Ne and Nu and are the numbers of such persons graduated 
employed and unemployed, respectively. Let S be the performance 
standard. Three cases can be distinguished (see Figure 7.1). In case 1, on 
the last day of the year, the cumulative performance outcome exceeds 
the standard by so much that the training agency can graduate all unem-
ployed enrollees. This corresponds to the HIGH region in Figure 7.1. 
In case 1, because N /(N+n) ≥ S , n1 = n. In case 2, which corresponds e 
to the MED region in Figure 7.1, the cumulative performance outcome 
exceeds the standard, but not by much. In case 2, because graduating 
all unemployed enrollees would push the outcome below the stan-
dard, it pays the training agency to graduate persons from its inventory 
only until the performance outcome equals the performance stan-
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dard. That is, the training agency chooses n1 such that Ne /(N+n) = S . 
Rearranging yields 
Nen1 = − N. S 
This equation implies that n
1 
lies between zero and n, approaching 
zero when the training agency just meets the standard and n when the 
training agency outperforms the standard by n/N percentage points or 
more. In case 3, corresponding to the LOW region in Figure 7.1, the 
training agency fails to meet the standard at the end of the year (Ne /N ≤ 
S ). In this case, because it cannot win an award this year, the training 
agency “takes a bath,” graduating all n persons from its inventory to 
maximize the probability of an award next year. 
Courty and Marschke (2004) find evidence that training agencies 
pursued such a termination strategy. In particular, they found that JTPA
training agencies delayed graduating idle, unemployed enrollees longer 
than idle, employed ones; graduated idle, unemployed enrollees sooner 
if they finished in the last three months of the program year than if they 
finished within the first nine months of the program year; and graduated 
Figure 7.1  The Graduation Decision 
n1 LOW MED HIGH
n 
NeS  N 
 


 
nS NN 
 218 Courty and Marschke 
unemployed enrollees who finished training in the last three months 
of the program year sooner if the training agencies were doing either 
very well or poorly relative to the employment standard. These findings 
are consistent with the two-period graduation model. Thus the evidence 
suggests that by timing performance measurement in this way, training 
agencies boosted their performance and their awards without providing 
higher-quality services or providing services more efficiently. 
Courty and Marschke (2004) make the important distinction between 
responses that divert resources (e.g., agents’ time) from productive 
activities and responses that simply reflect an accounting phenomenon. 
Using our terminology, the former would be labeled gaming and the 
latter accounting manipulations. Others have documented timing strate-
gies but have not shown any efficiency impact. Courty and Marschke, 
however, provide evidence that the responses they identify, by con-
suming programmatic resources, have a negative impact on the true 
goal of the organization and thus conclude that these responses are more 
than a mere accounting phenomenon. They are evidence of gaming. 
For example, they find that earnings impacts are lower in those training 
agencies that engage more in termination strategies, which is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that graduation timing is inefficient. In addition, 
they find that year-end timing is inefficient on two counts. First, training 
agencies are more likely to suddenly truncate training in June, an input 
distortion that is a direct consequence of the strategic manipulation of 
yearly performance that takes place in the month of June. Second, they 
find that earnings impacts are lower for those enrollees who receive 
training in June. They interpret this finding as evidence that training 
agencies substitute time and effort away from training toward the end of 
the program year. 
Other Dysfunctional Responses 
We review additional evidence also consistent with dysfunctional 
behavior. To start, we show that accounting manipulation behavior is 
not limited to the employment at termination performance measure by 
presenting evidence from other performance measures. Then we present 
evidence that the incentive system may also distort the enrollment deci-
sion and the training allocation decision. 
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Manipulating the wage and earning measures 
The graduation decision was also influenced by the other class 
of JTPA performance measures: the performance measures based on 
wages and earnings. Courty and Marschke (2004) focus on the optimal 
termination strategy for employed enrollees. They show that training 
agencies may choose to terminate employed enrollees who have little 
chance of experiencing a wage increase, but wait on those employed 
enrollees who have a high likelihood of experiencing a wage increase. 
The training agency does not wait on all enrollees because by doing so it 
might lose credit for some employment. This risk is significant because 
approximately one-quarter of the enrolled who were employed on their 
graduation date were not employed at the same job three months later. 
The refined strategy that takes the wage measure into account implies 
that some employed enrollees should be terminated later than is pre-
dicted under the simple strategy presented earlier. Focusing on the 
enrollees who were employed at the end of training and who experi-
enced a second employment spell under a new employer before the close 
of the 90-day window, Courty and Marschke show that those enrollees 
who experience a wage decrease are more likely to be terminated during 
the first employment spell. They also show that those participants who 
are graduated after the start of their secondary employment spell should 
experience higher wage offers. They conclude that the covariation of 
graduation delay and the wages in secondary employment spells appear 
consistent with a graduation strategy that maximizes the wage and 
earnings performance outcomes. This behavior qualifies as accounting 
manipulation or gaming depending on its efficiency impact. 
Manipulating the follow-up measures 
The switch from termination-based follow-up measures may have 
provoked several kinds of responses by local decision makers. First, the 
follow-up measures may have encouraged training centers to emphasize 
intensive training services (as opposed to employment-focused services, 
such as job search) in the hopes of producing larger and longer-lasting 
impacts on earnings and employment. Second, the follow-up measures 
may have induced caseworkers to extend their contact with enrollees 
beyond their termination dates. Courty and Marschke (2007) present 
some evidence suggesting that the follow-up performance measures 
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captured how effective training centers were at offering postprogram 
“quick fixes” (such as transportation allowances) to enable the enrollees 
to stay employed on the follow-up measurement date. These responses 
qualify as marginal misallocation because such quick fixes, although 
potentially productive, divert resources away from other activities that 
would have increased long-term earning and employment. 
Manipulating the cost measure 
In addition to employment and wage/earning measures, in the 
early years JTPA training centers faced a cost-based measure that 
judged the program’s managers by how much they spent to produce 
an employment at termination. The incentives inherent in the cost and 
employment rate at termination measures were very similar (Courty 
and Marschke 2007). Thus, in time, JTPA officials came to believe that 
the cost measure also was encouraging short-run, “quick fix”–type job 
placement activities in lieu of longer-term activities with more training 
content. In 1990, when they replaced the termination-based measures 
with follow-up-based measures, they also phased out the cost measure 
because they believed “that the use of cost standards in the awarding of 
incentives [had] the unintended effect of constraining the provision of 
longer-term training programs” (italics ours) (Federal Register 1990). 
Such responses—if they indeed occurred—belong to the category of 
marginal misallocation. 
Enrollment 
Cream skimming—the use of the training center’s considerable 
discretion to select enrollees on the basis of their expected effect on 
performance outcomes—is the core concern of most empirical anal-
yses of JTPA’s incentive system. The system judged training centers 
on the basis of postprogram employment and earnings levels, whereas 
the objective of training was skill development. Such performance out-
comes induce training centers to choose persons with high levels of 
human capital at the expense of persons who would most benefit from 
training. The nature and evidence of cream skimming is discussed at 
length in Chapters 6 and 9. 
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Training selection 
Researchers have also investigated the effects of JTPA performance 
incentives on training centers’ training strategies. While training choice 
has received less attention than the cream skimming issue, its study is 
motivated by similar concerns—that short-term performance measures 
encourage training centers to emphasize “quick fixes,” services that 
have no long-term impact on enrollee skills. 
Marschke (2002) studies the effects of two performance measure 
reforms on the training strategies of JTPA training centers. In the early 
1990s, the USDOL moved away from termination-based measures 
toward performance measured three months after termination. The 
USDOL also eliminated measures that rewarded training agencies 
that kept low the average cost of training an enrollee. Both reforms 
occurred in response to a growing perception that the training centers 
were relying heavily on job-placement-oriented services at the expense 
of more intensive kinds of training. Many policymakers also felt that 
the typical JTPA training spell was too short to be effective (average 
enrollment in the first decade of JTPA lasted only about five months). 
Marschke (2002) finds that these performance reforms produced 
mixed results. The switch to performance measurement three months 
after training ends appeared to encourage agencies to offer the kinds 
of intensive training that raise the long-term earnings abilities of JTPA
enrollees, but the impacts from this reform were offset by the elimination 
of the cost measure. Apparently the cost measure had been discouraging 
training agencies from offering classroom vocational training because it 
was the longest and most expensive of the major kinds of training. After 
the cost measure was removed, training agencies offered more class-
room vocational training, but earnings impacts fell because classroom 
vocational training produced the smallest earnings impacts of the main 
kinds of training offered.7 
In the context of the multitasking model, rewarding the employment 
rate at termination measure, for example, was leading the center to pre-
scribe training activities that increased the training center’s employment 
rate but reduced the earnings ability of JTPA enrollees. The employment 
rate at termination measure and earnings impacts are misaligned. The 
cost measure, on the other hand, was leading training centers to favor 
training types that increased both earnings impacts and the training cen-
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ter’s award. Thus, the cost measure, insofar as it discouraged the use of 
vocational training, a relatively low-gain and high-cost activity, appears 
to have been aligned. To conclude, this discussion presents some evi-
dence consistent with the hypothesis that the choice of performance 
measure influences the agent’s choice of resource allocation, and that 
different performance measures are imperfect in different ways in the 
sense that each produces different patterns of marginal misallocation. 
General Test of Dysfunctional Responses 
Courty and Marschke (2008) propose a different approach to iden-
tify dysfunctional responses. They look at how the correlation between 
the objective of the organization and the performance measure changes 
after a measure is introduced. The multitasking model predicts that this 
correlation should decrease after a measure is introduced if the agent 
engages in any kind of dysfunctional response. Courty and Marschke 
conclude that one can identify dysfunctional responses by estimating 
the change in correlation between a performance measure and the true 
goal of the organization before and after the measure has been activated. 
Using data from the JTPA incentive system, they test the hypothesis 
for the introduction of the follow-up measures, which corresponds to 
one of the most important changes in the history of JTPA’s incentive 
system. They find some evidence consistent with the hypothesis and 
draw implications for the choice of performance measures. 
wIA 
WIA’s performance incentive system is still relatively new and 
therefore little studied. Nonetheless, the record on JTPA may allow us 
to draw some conclusions about the performance of WIA’s system. As 
Chapters 2 and 5 show, there are many similarities and some differences 
between performance incentives under JTPA and performance incen-
tives under WIA. As in JTPA, most of the performance measures in 
WIA are based on enrollees’ labor market outcomes. All labor market 
outcomes are measured after training ceases (as opposed to on the 
date of termination), as in latter-day JTPA. Moreover, WIA focuses on 
outcomes six months after job placement. In JTPA, performance out-
comes were far more short term. This may be an improvement over 
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JTPA in two ways. First, because labor market outcomes are measured 
six months after an enrollee leaves the program, outcomes are harder 
to manipulate in WIA by the strategic timing of graduation. Second, 
measuring outcomes six months after graduation reduces the return 
to “quick fix”–type training strategies. As the JTPA evidence seems 
to show, longer-term measures lead to greater earnings gains from 
training. WIA also reinstates cost measures, which the evidence seems 
to show also improve earnings gains. 
Interestingly, in its early years WIA includes among the JTPA-style 
performance measures a before-after measure of enrollees’ earnings. 
Conceptually, the difference between an enrollee’s earnings before 
enrollment and after termination is more similar to an earnings or 
employment gain—and thus more similar to the objective of job training 
under JTPA and WIA—than is a posttraining labor outcome. While it is 
more similar to a job training impact, a before-after earnings measure 
also suffers from potential problems. For the average enrollee, earnings 
dip just before entering job training, suggesting that her earnings would 
eventually rise even if the job training program had no value. This 
phenomenon, the so-called Ashenfelter dip, means that before-after 
earnings differences are distorted measures of the true impact of job 
training (see Heckman and Smith [1999] for a discussion of this point.) 
Thus, whether before-after measures lead to less cream skimming is a 
question that must be answered with empirical studies. 
COnCLUSIOnS 
This chapter offers a comprehensive overview of dysfunctional 
responses covering theoretical concepts, empirical evidence from both 
the public and private organizations, and summarizing studies of dys-
functional responses that focus on the JTPA organization. We assess the 
extent to which dysfunctional responses may impede the performance 
of the measurement system, and we draw lessons for policymakers. 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that performance measures 
elicit unanticipated responses because line workers and their managers 
gain a superior understanding of how to influence these measures. Man-
agers and workers acquire through their day-to-day operation of their 
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programs an expert’s knowledge of the levers available to manipulate 
performance outcomes. Because the designers of the performance 
measures are remote from the everyday operations of the agencies 
they oversee, they lack this knowledge. This information asymmetry 
means that the designers of performance measures cannot anticipate 
all behavioral responses ex ante. An implication is that dysfunctional 
responses can present substantial challenges to the design of perfor-
mance measurement systems. At least three lessons can be drawn from 
the evidence. 
1) Designers of performance measures should consider how local 
decision makers respond to the performance measures and 
accept that they cannot anticipate all responses. Most perfor-
mance measures elicit unanticipated responses because agents 
gradually gain a superior understanding of how to influence 
them. Designers should encourage some of these unanticipated 
responses and discourage others. 
2) Designers should respond differently to different types of dys-
functional behavior. In the case of accounting manipulation, for 
example, the organization only has to appropriately discount 
the rewards to performance achievement. Gaming responses 
should unambiguously be eliminated as they have both a 
direct negative impact on the organization (misallocation of 
resources) and an indirect one (misinterpretation of outcomes). 
Marginal misallocations often originate from the fact that the 
performance measure is too coarse and does not capture some 
dimensions of value added. The typical remedy is to comple-
ment the performance measure with finer measures. 
3) The evidence reinforces the conjecture that explicit perfor-
mance measures impose costs—monitoring and improvement 
consume resources (Prendergast 1999). Until performance 
measure designers discover them, the dysfunctional responses 
that imperfectly conceived performance measures engender 
can undermine the organization’s mission. These costs make 
the use of performance measurement systems uneconomical for 
many public sector organizations because they raise more man-
agement problems than they solve. This may explain why such 
organizations rarely implement explicit performance measures. 
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In a separate line of research, we characterize a process by which 
the designers of performance measures learn about and respond to local 
decision maker responses (Courty and Marschke [2003a]; see also 
Heinrich and Marschke [2010]). This feedback loop suggests that per-
formance measurement systems must be continuously monitored and 
improved. We conclude that implementation is not a static, one-time 
challenge but a dynamic one. 
An important lesson of this review is that much progress has been 
made in identifying dysfunctional responses. A growing literature has 
produced studies that go beyond casual reports and anecdotal evidence 
and try to measure performance inflation and assess the impact of these 
responses on the organization. Still, we find that this literature typically 
focuses on a narrow set of responses. In addition, the evidence reviewed 
rarely compellingly addresses the fundamental efficiency question of 
measuring the welfare impact of the dysfunctional responses identified. 
This suggests that there is still much work to be done to further our 
understanding of dysfunctional behavior. 
notes 
We would like to thank James Heckman and Carolyn Heinrich. 
1. Subjective performance evaluation is based on judgment and is more qualitative 
and flexible than explicit performance incentives. Unlike explicit performance mea-
sures, subjective performance measures cannot be verified by outside parties and 
therefore organizations cannot contract upon them. 
2. The theoretical literature on incentive provision is reviewed in Gibbons (1997) and 
Prendergast (1999). Marschke (2001), Courty and Marschke (2003a), and Propper and 
Wilson (2003) also review this literature and draw implications specific to govern-
ment organizations. Dixit (2002) and Burgess and Ratto (2003) review the broader 
literature on organizational design and focus on issues that are specific to the public 
sector. Interestingly, this framework was introduced to explain why high-powered 
explicit incentives, whose canonical illustration is a piece rate system, appeared far 
less frequently in practice than is predicted by standard principal-agent models. The 
point of the theoretical literature on multitasking was to extend the principal-agent 
model to accommodate the possibility that high-powered explicit incentives may 
not be optimal when the principal cannot perfectly measure the objective she wants 
the agent to pursue. 
3. Our specification is very similar to the specification in Baker (2002), who assumes 
that V = f.a + e and P = g.a + f, where f and g are vectors of marginal products 
  
 
 
 
  
	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	
	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	  
	
	
226 Courty and Marschke 
of actions, a, in the principal’s objective and performance outcome equations. We 
ignore the error terms e and f as they do not influence the agent’s action choice (see 
the following note). 
4. In the standard principal-agent model, measurement noise plays a role in the de-
termination of the optimal contract, but it does not directly influence the agent’s 
investment decisions. 
5. When output can be measured, manual work is another occupation where explicit 
performance measurement is common. In an unusual study, Lazear (2000), for ex-
ample, discusses how an installer of automobile glass minimized the impact of po-
tential dysfunctional responses to the introduction of piece rate rewards. 
6. Asch (1990) also presents some evidence of reporting timing. She shows that navy 
recruiters who receive awards for meeting year-end recruitment quotas respond by 
reallocating their work efforts over the year. 
7. This finding is consistent with the results of the National JTPA Study, which found 
that compared with job search assistance and on-the-job training, vocational class-
room training produced the weakest earnings and employment gains (see Orr et al. 
1994). One interpretation of Marschke’s finding is that the deactivation of the cost 
measure in the early 1990s was misguided. The finding does not rule out, however, 
that at the same time it discouraged the use of vocational classroom training, the 
cost measure encouraged training centers to cut corners in the delivery of services, 
or to dilute or prematurely shorten training activities for enrollees. 
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Local Responses to Performance 
Incentives and Implications 
for Program Outcomes 
Carolyn J. Heinrich 
In his classic piece on “street-level” bureaucracy, Lipsky (1980) 
describes the critical position occupied by public employees engaged 
in social service delivery. These employees, he argues, constitute the 
scope and function of government services, and the individual deci-
sions of these workers become agency policy. Street-level bureaucrats 
shape citizens’ expectations of government services, determine who 
qualifies for services, and implement service delivery. 
This chapter presents research that explores how local (street-level)
bureaucrats in the JTPA program shaped or moderated the role and 
effects of performance standards in program administration and service 
delivery. A case-study approach is used to investigate these effects in a 
county-level agency (located in the Chicago metropolitan area), using 
data on subunits (contractors) and their staff and individual participants. 
The local JTPA participant selection and service assignment processes 
are modeled using quantitative and qualitative data to facilitate a more 
precise understanding of how and the extent to which performance stan-
dards and related administrative policies influence participant access to 
training and the types of services provided to participants. 
Although WIA superseded the JTPA program, the WIA program 
preserves major elements of the JTPA performance standards system 
and extends its role in managing local program processes and service 
delivery. WIA requires states to institute a performance-based certi-
fication system for training service providers that establishes a mini-
mum performance level for all providers receiving individual training 
account (voucher) dollars. Local workforce investment boards and ser-
vice providers continue to be responsible for guiding service and fund-
231 
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ing allocations, performance data collection, and the management and 
use of this information at the local level. 
In this research, unique access to information from and about the 
job training agency’s program administration, service providers, and the 
terms of their contracts with the agency facilitated the in-depth study of 
local JTPA program processes. Detailed information on individual par-
ticipants from management information system (MIS) records (1984– 
1994) and detailed case management records maintained by staff also 
make possible the analysis of factors that are sometimes overlooked or 
obscured in aggregate (e.g., state-level) studies of program operations. 
The findings of this research show that program administrators 
and service provider staff in this agency were highly conscious of the 
agency’s performance goals. A contractual and administrative focus on 
specific levels of (or standards for) performance outcomes had direct 
and indirect effects on participant selection and training service assign-
ment decisions of program staff. Both deliberate screening on applicant 
characteristics to advance performance goals and indirect cream skim-
ming grounded in contractual arrangements and program administra-
tive decisions appeared to occur in this agency, with possible negative 
implications for the participants and net value added of the program. 
The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows. 
First, local-level administrative and service delivery processes and con-
cerns about the role and influence of performance standards in these 
processes are described. The goals of the case study of participant 
selection and service assignments and hypotheses that were tested in 
a simulation of these processes are then explained. The next section 
presents the findings of the simulation and other multivariate analyses, 
as well as a discussion of these findings. The final section summarizes 
the findings and their implications for current employment and training 
programs and policies. 
Role of Performance Standards in Local-Level Program 
Administration and Service Delivery 
The substantial discretion accorded to local-level program adminis-
trators in deciding how performance standards are used and the extent 
to which they are used has confounded efforts to fully understand their 
influence and implications. The design and institution of performance 
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standards systems varies not only across states but also at the local 
level, where the main responsibility for making these systems func-
tion effectively lies. Along with their own target population and ser-
vice goals, job training agencies transmit federal- and state-level goals 
and requirements to training professionals who serve clients and man-
age job training programs on a daily basis. As both Lipsky (1980) and 
Brodkin (1987) have pointed out, bureaucratic discretion of this type 
provides the means for administrative agencies and program managers 
to make policy by shaping it as they implement it. 
The county job training agency in this study relied primarily on 
contracts with other public and private sector organizations to deliver 
program services.1 Service providers acted, in effect, as agents of the 
administrative entity and entered into a competitive bidding process 
to obtain contracts with the agency for service provision. Through the 
contract awards and negotiation processes, job training agency offi-
cials attempted to exert control over who received services, the types of 
training services made available, and program outcomes. 
Federal and state governments generally specified few guidelines or 
requirements for contracts between agencies and their service provid-
ers. Yet one would expect job training agencies to design contracts that 
facilitate satisfactory job training program outcomes as measured by 
state performance evaluation models. Contracts between this agency 
and its service providers contained detailed information about target 
population demographic characteristics; the types of training to be 
made available and anticipated wages-at-placement, estimated service 
costs, including tuition, wage subsidies, and supportive service costs; 
and performance-based payment benchmarks for reimbursement of pro-
gram costs. Service providers were also required to establish detailed 
program budgets and service plans before contracts were finalized, and 
any subsequent modifications to the contracts had to be approved and 
documented by agency officials. 
In the contract awards process, the largest weights were accorded to 
service providers’ proposed placement rates, costs per placement, and 
average wage rates at placement. Secondary criteria used in this process 
included service provider experience with targeted population(s), labor 
market need for proposed services, private sector linkages and coordi-
nation with other agencies, and service provider in-kind contributions. 
Service providers’ performance in the previous year also factored into 
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the decision process. Service providers who attained at least 90 percent 
of their planned goals for enrollment, job placements, and expenditures 
were eligible for exemplary service points that increased their competi-
tive point totals. 
If, in fact, service providers who satisfied or exceeded contract 
requirements—ostensibly furthering the performance and target pop-
ulation goals of the job training agency—were more likely to secure 
future contracts, the system would likely establish strong incentives for 
service providers to achieve high placement rates and wages at place-
ment. Some research, discussed below, suggests that this type of per-
formance evaluation system is also likely to contribute to unintended, 
negative program effects. 
Arguments and Evidence on the Role and Influence of 
Performance Standards in JTPA Programs
Two fundamental issues underlie concerns about the influence of 
performance standards on employment and training programs: 1) who 
should have access to these services, and 2) what types of program 
services should be provided to achieve program goals. JTPA program 
eligibility guidelines required 90 percent of all enrollees to be disadvan-
taged; an equitable distribution of services among substantial segments 
of the eligible population; and minimum levels of service to youth, high 
school dropouts, and welfare recipients. WIA, however, has introduced 
a new universal access approach to service delivery in which all adults 
are eligible for core workforce development services, although local 
workforce investment boards are still encouraged to give priority for 
skills training services to public aid recipients and other low-income 
persons when program funds are sparse. A universal access approach to 
service does not eliminate the possibility that access to varying levels of 
service might still be constrained locally. 
A primary concern expressed by JTPA program administrators was 
that performance standards might encourage cream skimming, or the 
selection of participants who are expected to have good postprogram 
outcomes, regardless of what the program contributes. In cases where 
participants would do nearly as well or equally well in the labor mar-
ket without receiving program services, the program’s measured per-
formance would be high, but its net impact would be small or zero. (In 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Local Responses to Performance Incentives 235 
Chapter 6, Heckman and Smith define and discuss the cream skimming 
problem more extensively.) 
Research on JTPA operations has generated mixed findings on the 
influence of performance standards, depending on the types of perfor-
mance standards used and the local-level practices adopted. In a review 
of this research, Heinrich (1999) notes the general finding that state and 
local agencies with policies that emphasized exceeding performance 
standards while minimizing training costs tended to discourage services 
to hard-to-serve eligible applicants and reduced the intensity and aver-
age length of services for adults. Changes in the legislated performance 
standards requirements in 1988 were designed to deemphasize the role 
of performance standards in federal and state JTPA program evaluations 
and to encourage agencies to focus more on providing higher-quality 
training as measured by earnings and employment retention rather than 
job placement rates.2 
From the program administrator’s point of view, there was little 
effect of these legislated changes on service provider performance 
incentives. The system still focused on employment and earnings levels
rather than gains or net value added of training programs. In the case-
study agency, cost-per-placement standards were still included in 
contracts and were one of the primary criteria for evaluating service 
provider performance in contract award decisions. The 1988 legisla-
tive amendments that changed the evaluation of placement and earn-
ings outcomes to three months after termination did not affect retention 
measures in this agency’s contracts until the 1992 program year. Even 
then, the changes affected less than one-fourth of the contracts. This 
suggests that it is important to know what incentives went into contracts 
between job training agencies and their services providers and were 
used to guide competition among service providers. The findings also 
suggest that despite legislative changes, incentives to “cream-skim” 
may still have been present at the local level. 
Because one does not observe participant outcomes in the counter-
factual state (in the absence of program services), it is difficult to deter-
mine if intake staff participant selection decisions are unduly influenced 
by applicants’ probable labor market success. Most research focuses 
on direct cream skimming by intake staff, or cream skimming based 
on their observations of applicant characteristics during the participant 
selection process. For example, one intake worker observed in this study 
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described an applicant who was laid off from a high-wage, high-skilled 
job and was hoping to be called back to this position. Anticipating an 
easy job placement, the worker enrolled the applicant and assigned him 
to job search assistance activities. When the participant was called back 
to his previous job, the service provider received credit for this place-
ment. This is a relatively obvious case of cream skimming. 
Cream skimming may also operate indirectly, however, through 
practices that may be more difficult to identify. Program managers may 
influence participant mix indirectly by offering certain types of training 
services that may or may not appeal to specific applicant groups. They 
may also establish intake and assessment procedures that favor one 
type of applicant over another. JTPA’s restrictions on stipends and sup-
portive services and the capabilities or willingness of service providers 
to make supportive services available, for example, may have influ-
enced who applied and the level of motivation they needed to secure 
an opportunity to participate. In addition, the location of service offices 
and focus of outreach activities may also affect program awareness and 
the resulting applicant pool. 
In this research, I distinguish between indirect cream skimming, 
which typically influences who is likely to apply for services and who 
is likely to follow through the application process (i.e., decisions made 
by the eligible persons), and direct cream skimming, which, alterna-
tively, results from decisions made by intake staff based on their obser-
vations of and interactions with applicants during the selection process. 
I hypothesize that incentives created by JTPA performance standards 
(and continuing under WIA) likely encouraged a combination of direct 
cream skimming on participant characteristics and indirect cream skim-
ming that was grounded in program administrative decisions and con-
tractual arrangements at the local level. 
CASE STUDy AnD SIMULATIOn OF JTPA PARTICIPAnT
SELECTIOn AnD SERvICE ASSIGnMEnT PROCESSES 
While JTPA legislation, state- and local-level program priorities, 
and terms of contracts between job training agencies and service pro-
viders all provided guidelines for participant selection and service 
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assignment, these decisions were typically made by the agency’s job 
training professionals or service provider staff under contract with the 
agency. A goal of this case study was to uncover the underlying struc-
ture of these judgments, model the participant selection and service 
assignment processes, and evaluate their implications for employment 
and training outcomes. 
A number of different factors might influence the judgments of 
agency and service provider staff in participant selection and service 
assignment decisions, including external influences such as agency 
or contract target population goals, training service and expenditures 
plans, eligibility requirements, and application procedures. Judgments 
of intake staff would also be based on their own knowledge, experi-
ence, and preferences, and the observed or measured characteristics 
of the applicants. Controls for these factors are necessary to evaluate 
their relative influences in participant selection and service assignment 
processes. 
This study makes use of detailed information from applicants to a 
job training program at all stages of the participant selection process. 
Participant selection and service assignment decision-making processes 
were observed, intake staff were interviewed about these decision pro-
cesses, and final outcomes (i.e., intake staff judgments) were recorded. 
These observations aided the formulation of hypotheses about these 
processes. Next, an empirical strategy was developed to assess how dif-
ferent factors interact to produce the final decision outcomes. 
Case-Study and Simulation Goals, Methodology, and hypotheses 
In studying the structural components of human judgments,
Rossi and Nock (1982) note that there are a relatively small number of 
characteristics to which decision makers pay attention when making 
judgments about persons. In other words, only a small number of char-
acteristics of the seemingly infinite number of ways in which job train-
ing program applicants may differ are actually important to the judg-
ments at hand. Second, they argue that, for the most part, judgments are 
“socially structured,” i.e., there is general agreement among persons 
on how much weight should be given to relevant characteristics and on 
how these characteristics should be combined to arrive at judgments. 
A third structural component of human judgments is that each decision 
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maker tends toward consistency in his or her own judgments, departing 
in a regular way from the socially defined consensus on how such judg-
ments should be made. If these structural components exist for a spe-
cific set of judgments, then the judgments can be modeled to determine 
what variables or characteristics are most relevant to the judgment, as 
well as the nature of their influence. 
Using detailed data on intake staff decisions, I formulate an 
approach to evaluate the influences of external factors and applicant 
characteristics that used both “constructed” and actual program data. 
First, based on observations of participant selection and service assign-
ment decisions and discussions with intake staff, I generate a list of fac-
tors examined by intake staff in these decision-making processes. Using 
actual data collected by program staff on these factors, I construct a 
simulation exercise of these processes. The exercise consisted of four 
main parts: 1) the selection of job training program participants from a 
pool of applicants constructed using actual program data; 2) the assign-
ment of the selected “participants” to training activities; 3) the consid-
eration of alternative scenarios of constraints on participant selection 
decisions, including different levels of performance standards and cost 
constraints; and 4) a review and open group discussion of the casework-
ers’ selection decisions, which included case comparisons chosen to 
probe the influences of external factors and applicant characteristics on 
their decisions. (See Heinrich [1995] for a detailed description of the 
simulation exercise design as well as a transcription of the postsimula-
tion discussion.) 
I subsequently analyze a number of hypotheses using these data. 
First, are there a relatively small number of observed applicant charac-
teristics which emerge as important in intake staff selection decisions? 
What are these characteristics? The relative importance of character-
istics associated with applicants’ employability or their probability of 
placement was of particular interest, as they relate to analyses of cream 
skimming. Using information known about the actual placement out-
comes of program applicants, I also evaluate the influence of appli-
cants’ probability of placement on intake staff selection decisions. 
A second set of hypotheses posed the following questions: Do 
intake staff use the same decision function in selecting participants (as 
other staff members), and do they make the same participant selections? 
Another hypothesis pertains to the third structural component of human 
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judgments: Are intake staff selection decisions consistent, i.e., do they 
depart in a regular way from the socially defined consensus? The intake 
staff’s actual selections of participants for the job training program 
were compared to their simulation selections to evaluate consistency. 
The simulation was designed to hold constant or eliminate con-
straints on decision making that may influence intake staff’s actual 
selection decisions. For example, in the simulation, intake staff were 
given explicit verbal and written instructions that they should assume 
no restrictions on the availability of training service activities. After 
making participant selections, intake staff assigned the selected cases 
to training service activities based on applicant characteristics. I subse-
quently analyzed the relationship of observed applicant characteristics 
to their assignment to different training service activities. 
Intake staff were also provided with a target job placement rate and 
approximate cost per participant that reflected job training center con-
tract averages of these performance standards for optional use in the 
simulation. I use responses of intake staff to a questionnaire admin-
istered during the exercise and postsimulation discussion to uncover 
information about the influence of these performance standards during 
the simulation and in practice and their interaction with training ser-
vices constraints in actual job training programs. 
Two professional job training program caseworkers who were 
employees of a job training service provider under contract with the 
agency participated in the simulation.3 These caseworkers were exclu-
sively responsible for selecting program participants and assigning 
them to program activities for the job training program studied. Agency 
officials and program caseworkers provided copies of all records of 
applicants to the program, including caseworkers’ comments written 
during case reviews and following meetings with program applicants. 
Caseworkers’ participant selection and service assignment procedures 
were also observed. While it might have been useful to conduct the 
simulation with many intake staff across the job training center, com-
plete access to other applicant records and observations of intake staff 
were not possible, so that similar hypothesis testing and data analyses 
would not have been feasible. 
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Description of JTPA Participant Selection and Service 
Assignment Processes 
Similar to many job training agencies under JTPA, the number of 
applicants eligible for program services in this service delivery area 
tended to substantially exceed the number of program openings. There 
were 221 applicants to the specific job training program studied, and 50 
of these persons were eventually selected to participate. In screening 
applicants for the program, intake staff met with them an average of 
four times before they made a decision to either enroll them or to refer 
them to another organization for services. 
All intake staff in Illinois were required to screen applicants for 
employment barriers, including basic skills deficiencies, limited work 
histories, single head of household with dependent children, displaced 
homemaker, child care needs, limited English proficiency, handicapped, 
veteran, ex-offender, and substance abuse. Caseworkers conveyed the 
importance of identifying applicants’ employment barriers and deter-
mining whether they could be overcome with the commitment of the 
applicant and the resources of the program. 
Caseworkers indicated that they viewed the presence of employment 
barriers as an opportunity to serve persons who have a greater need for 
program services. Employment barriers that emerged as positive selec-
tion criteria included basic skills deficiencies, minimal work histories, 
single head of household, and the presence of children in a household. 
Persons with employment barriers that could not be addressed with pro-
gram resources, such as serious medical or mental health conditions, 
were referred to other agencies for assistance. In addition, caseworkers 
did not view the receipt of public assistance as an employment barrier, 
noting that since the stipend provided under CETA was eliminated in 
JTPA, the receipt of public aid may have provided an essential source 
of income for some participants during their enrollment. 
Caseworkers also evaluated applicants’ levels of motivation and 
commitment to making the program work. While the average number 
of times applicants met with caseworkers was four, case records of pro-
gram applicants showed a range of as few as one meeting to as many as 
eight scheduled appointments over four to six weeks. Applicants were 
typically required to come back for at least one additional meeting; 
those who did not return again were assumed to be less serious about 
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participating. If the applicants kept their appointments, were punctual, 
and came prepared, caseworkers interpreted these as signs that they 
were capable and willing to make a serious program commitment. In 
effect, caseworkers attempted to distinguish between those people who 
were only interested in a “quick fix” (i.e., looking for the shortest way 
to get money in their hands) and those who had a serious interest in 
increasing their skills and finding employment. 
The types of information caseworkers sought from applicants also 
aided their efforts to assess the applicants’ ability or willingness to com-
mit to the program. In evaluating employment histories, caseworkers 
not only sought basic information about employment status, job posi-
tions, and recent wages, but they also wanted to know how long appli-
cants stayed with their jobs, the reasons they were no longer at the jobs, 
and whether absenteeism was ever a problem. They wanted to know 
the types of occupational or job training activities received in order 
to avoid duplication or to build upon previously acquired skills. They 
asked whether the training was completed, if the applicant obtained a 
job after training, and how long the individual then stayed with the 
job. If there were gaps in an applicant’s employment history, the case-
workers wanted to find out if there were reasonable explanations for 
them, such as pregnancy, health problems, or family responsibilities. As 
with employment barriers, their concern was not necessarily how many 
problems there were, but rather how much effort the applicant was will-
ing to put forth to overcome these difficulties. 
Caseworkers claimed that they were less likely to select individu-
als with post–high school educations, since they believed they could 
do more to serve persons with relatively less education. Their ability 
to effectively serve the less educated, however, was also contingent on 
contract specifications for training service availability. Caseworkers 
indicated in the simulation questionnaire that the types of training ser-
vices and available training “slots” were determined long before their 
initial screening sessions with applicants. In fact, the types of train-
ing services and corresponding number of training opportunities were 
typically set before the final approval of program funding in the JTPA
program. The program director then told the caseworkers how many 
vocational training, on-the-job training (OJT), and other positions could 
be made available to participants. “[The program director] will tell us 
something like ‘we have five slots for OJT, and we want to fill them 
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with $8.00 per hour positions,” explained one caseworker. Casework-
ers could make a request to modify the original training service plan, 
but this was usually not done. The service assignment process actu-
ally began, therefore, when the caseworkers commenced the applicant 
screening process. 
Caseworkers also frequently arranged specific training opportuni-
ties (e.g., a particular apprenticeship position in a manufacturing plant), 
and then looked for applicants who met the position requirements. In 
effect, they would first “fill the training slots” with appropriate posi-
tions to satisfy the service provider contract and then screen for appli-
cants who were suitable to these positions. The responses of 110 JTPA
applicants to follow-up survey questions about their screening sessions 
with intake staff also provided evidence of this practice. About 20 per-
cent of the applicants discussed specific training opportunities and jobs 
with intake staff. Several were even set up for interviews and offered 
jobs before they began intake procedures or before they were notified 
of the staff’s decision to either accept them into the program or refer 
them elsewhere. One respondent indicated that she was offered a job 
during the application process and was worried that if that particular job 
closed, she might not be accepted into the program. 
Performance standards in service providers’ contracts with the 
agency may also have influenced the training opportunities made avail-
able and final participant selections. In the simulation, caseworkers 
were given a target job placement rate and an approximate cost per 
placement to guide their decisions if they chose to use this information. 
The caseworkers indicated in the postsimulation questionnaire, how-
ever, that this information did not have any influence on their partici-
pant selection and service assignment decisions. They pointed out that 
their objective was to “place” the participants, not to worry about costs. 
“I work with the person, not the money,” wrote one caseworker. 
During a meeting with agency officials prior to the start of the pro-
gram, one of the caseworkers had made the comment that it was dif-
ficult to get “numbers” out of his mind, that he was thinking “numbers, 
numbers, numbers.” When asked about his comment in the open dis-
cussion, this caseworker indicated that it was the job placement rate 
number that concerned him. He clarified that the placement rate affects 
whether or not his organization will get comparable funding in the next 
program year. The director who supervises the caseworkers’ work also 
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indicated that the job placement rate achieved by the program would 
be a key factor in agency’s evaluation of the service provider’s perfor-
mance. On the other hand, caseworkers also emphasized the separation 
of day-to-day operations “in the field” and issues of the budget that are 
the director’s concern: “ . . . we’re not dealing directly with the budget. 
We are the implementers of the program.” 
The findings of an interview conducted with the agency’s intake 
supervisor supported the caseworkers’ assertion about the role and 
influence of performance standards (see Heinrich [1995] for the inter-
view transcription). The intake supervisor indicated that participants 
were selected on the basis of the professional judgment of intake staff, 
and that the performance standards played no direct role in their deci-
sions. Yet the intake supervisor also indicated that intake staff had little 
discretion in deciding what types of training services they could make 
available to clients. She said they were given strict, detailed guidelines 
to which they were expected to closely adhere in assigning participants 
to activities. This finding is consistent with the caseworkers’ responses 
indicating they did not have a role in determining the availability and 
number of training service openings. These decisions were made by the 
program director in consideration of contract requirements and budget 
specifications negotiated with agency officials. Together, these findings 
suggest that the influence of performance standards in the participant 
selection and service assignment processes may have been more likely 
to operate indirectly, at the administrative or executive level, through 
decisions made about service availability by program directors and 
agency executives. The reported separation of performance standards 
considerations from intake staff duties appears to refute contentions 
that performance standards lead to direct cream skimming based on 
applicant characteristics at the caseworker level. 
SIMULATIOn FInDInGS: JTPA PARTICIPAnT SELECTIOn 
AnD SERvICE ASSIGnMEnTS 
Figure 8.1 shows how simulated data were analyzed to evaluate 
the influence of various factors on participant selection and service 
assignment decisions. The columns show the decision of caseworker 
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Figure 8.1  Analysis of Counselors’ Simulated Selection Decisions 
Counselor 1 selections 
Choose applicant Do not choose 
Counselor 2 
selections 
Choose 
applicant 
Do not 
choose 
Both select applicant 
Only counselor 1 
chooses 
Only counselor 2 
chooses 
Neither select 
applicant 
1 (e.g., choose or do not choose applicant), and the rows reflect the 
same decision of caseworker 2. Also shown are the four possible out-
comes of caseworkers’ decisions for a given applicant: both select the 
applicant, neither selects the applicant, caseworker 1 selects the appli-
cant but caseworker 2 does not, and caseworker 2 chooses the applicant 
but caseworker 1 does not. The simulation data for all applicants were 
aggregated to form the following variables for analyses: 1) applicants 
selected by caseworker 1 (column 1 in the box); 2) applicants selected 
by caseworker 2 (row 1 in the box); 3) applicants selected by either 
caseworker 1 or caseworker 2 (upper right-hand cell, upper left-hand 
cell and lower left-hand cell); and 4) the selection decisions of case-
worker 1 plus those of caseworker 2 (all four cells in the box), which 
factors in their decisions not to choose applicants as well. The fourth 
decision variable is used only in logit analyses of the simulation data. 
Comparison of Simulation Selections and Actual 
Program Selections 
Simple comparisons of the caseworkers’ simulation and actual pro-
gram selections (e.g., chi-square tests) suggested that the two casework-
ers selected similar groups of participants and that they were generally 
consistent in their decision-making procedures. Twelve of the 25 cases 
selected by the caseworkers in the simulation (48 percent) were the 
same. However, these comparisons do not provide information about 
which applicant characteristics they emphasized in their selection deci-
sions, how much weight was given to these characteristics, or how dif-
ferent characteristics might have interacted to influence their selection 
decisions. To learn more about caseworkers’ decision functions and 
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how they arrived at final selections, maximum likelihood logit models 
of their participant selections were estimated. 
Logit models were used to estimate factors influencing participant 
selections.4 Four of the dependent variables employed in the logit analy-
ses were described in Figure 8.1: 1) the simulated participant selections 
of caseworker 1; 2) the simulated participant selections of caseworker 2; 
3) the simulated selections of either caseworker 1 or caseworker 2; and 
4) selections of caseworker 1 plus caseworker 2, where cases selected by 
neither caseworker have zero “weight.” Cases selected by one but not the 
other are “weighted” by one, and cases selected by both are “weighted”
by two. Errors in these simulated selection models may represent indi-
vidual errors (e.g., deviations from the caseworkers’ usual judgment 
processes), intrinsic uncertainty (e.g., reflecting that the caseworkers’
judgments may naturally vary or not always be 100 percent consistent), 
and other possible decision errors. 
The fifth dependent variable indicates which of the 50 applicant 
cases included in the simulation were actual program participants and 
was used to model the influence of applicant characteristics on case-
workers’ actual participant selections. The error term in this model may 
reflect the influence of omitted variables (e.g., factors which casework-
ers considered but were not incorporated in the simulation), such as the 
reasons applicants left their previous jobs. This type of information was 
not available for all applicants and therefore was not provided to case-
workers in the simulation. 
A large number of possible explanatory variables was reduced 
through the modeling process to a core set of independent variables, 
including age, sex (male), single head of household, highest grade 
completed, previous training services, never married, welfare recipi-
ent, number of children, basic skills deficiency, limited work history, 
unemployed all of preprogram year, and most recent wage. All of the 
dependent and independent variables employed in the logit analyses are 
described in Appendix 8A. 
The logistic regression model results for the five dependent vari-
ables are summarized in Table 8.1. The findings suggest that casework-
ers emphasize different factors in their selection decisions, and the 
coefficient sizes and signs on many variables suggest that they weighed 
these factors differently as well. Four of the explanatory variables in 
the model of caseworker 2’s selections attained statistical significance, 
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Table 8.1  Findings from Simulation and Actual Participant Selection Logit Models 
Dependent variables 
Selections of Actual 
Caseworker 1 Caseworker 2 Selections of caseworker 1 participant 
selections selections caseworker 1 + caseworker 2 selections 
Independent variables (N=46) (N=46) or 2 (N=46) (N=96) (N=46) 
Constant 
Age 
Sex (male) 
Single head of household 
Highest grade completed 
Previous training services 
Never married 
Welfare recipient 
Children 
45.473*** −13.098** 12.439 10.537** 
(16.854) (6.596)  (13.355) (4.841) 
−0.088 0.260*** 0.472 −0.021 
(0.086) (0.099) (0.291) (0.038) 
1.332 −0.796 0.152 −0.012 
(1.512) (1.161) (0.865) (0.698) 
−0.220 −1.297 −6.275 −0.213 
(1.496) (1.472) (4.392) (0.744) 
−3.503*** 0.100 −2.887* −0.910*** 
(1.341) (0.469) (1.551) (0.374) 
−0.156 −0.129 6.190 −0.100 
(1.016) (1.034) (4.256) (0.603) 
0.918 4.303*** 10.909 2.013 
(1.129) (1.631) (6.784) (1.461) 
2.200 1.559 1.978 0.456 
(1.493) (1.156) (1.325) (0.633) 
−0.412 0.635** 2.347* −0.157 
(0.274) (0.324) (1.349) (0.167) 
−2.639 
(5.203) 
0.044 
(0.069) 
0.979 
(1.103) 
3.403*** 
(1.383) 
−0.111 
(0.370) 
0.501 
(0.855) 
−1.272 
(0.949) 
−1.472 
(0.996) 
−0.027 
(0.210) 
    247
 
Basic skills deficiency 2.840** 
(1.337) 
8.054* 
(4.835) 
−0.586 
(0.654) 
−1.591 
(1.202) 
0.246 
(0.938) 
Limited work history −1.102 
(1.245) 
1.198 
(2.173) 
0.567 
(0.679) 
1.814 
(1.454) 
0.901 
(0.973) 
Unemployed all of 
preprogram year 
−0.661 
(0.995) 
−4.269 
(3.111) 
2.603*** 
(0.682) 
−1.320 
(1.326) 
1.528* 
(0.919) 
Most recent hourly wage 0.014 
(0.246) 
0.026 
(0.115) 
0.023 
(0.142) 
−0.163 
(0.308) 
0.098 
(0.191) 
Log likelihood 
Pseudo R2 (%) 
−18.493 
37.2 
−8.464 
15.6 
−46.783 
84.5 
−16.963 
36.9 
−25.079 
48.2 
NOTE: * significant at α = 0.100; ** significant at α = 0.050; *** significant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below 
the coefficient values. 
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compared to only one independent variable in the model of caseworker 
1’s selections. Caseworker 2 was the older and more experienced intake 
staff member. It is possible that as intake staff gain more experience 
in this profession, they become more certain about which applicant 
characteristics are important and/or more consistent in their decision-
making procedures. 
A formal test of the hypothesis that the caseworkers employed the 
same decision function, a test for equality of the coefficients in the 
selection models, was performed.5 The results of the likelihood ratio 
test rejected the null hypothesis (at α < 0.005) that the caseworkers’
decision functions were the same.6 This finding suggests that there 
may not be a strong “social structure” or consensus as to how applicant 
characteristics should be evaluated in participant selection processes, 
at least for the characteristics measured and included in these mod-
els. I also calculated pseudo-R2 values for the models (see Amemiya 
1981) and found that when modeled separately, there is considerably 
more unexplained variance in the caseworkers’ simulated selections. 
This seems to suggest that when combining the decisions made by both 
caseworkers and giving more weight to cases in which both agreed to 
either admit or reject applicants, we gain a better understanding of their 
decision-making processes. 
The most consistent finding across the models in Table 8.1 was 
the negative coefficient on the highest grade completed variable, sta-
tistically significant in three of the five models. This finding implies 
that applicants with more education were less likely to be selected into 
the program and is consistent with caseworkers’ indications that they 
favored applicants with lower education levels. 
The two employment barriers mentioned most frequently in case 
reviews and in the postsimulation discussion were basic skills deficien-
cies and limited work histories. Being the most closely related (of the 
observed characteristics) to applicants’employability, one would expect 
that if intake staff were cream skimming based on these characteristics, 
they would be negatively related to the probability of selection. The 
coefficient for basic skills deficiency is positive in three models and 
is large and statistically significant in two of these. The limited work 
history variable also has a positive coefficient in four models but is not 
statistically significant in any model. These findings provide tentative 
evidence against the theory that intake staff cream-skim on observed 
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characteristics related to employability. Long-term unemployment was 
also a statistically significant, positive selection factor in two models. 
The variable coefficients in the model of the caseworkers’ actual 
program participant selections, however, differed from those in the 
caseworkers’ simulation models. These differences might be attributed 
to a number of factors, including unobserved and unmeasured factors 
(such as applicant motivation or constraints on training service assign-
ments) and decision errors (including random deviations from their 
usual judgment processes or inconsistencies in their judgments). 
With information about the caseworkers’ actual program partici-
pant selections and the employment outcomes of program applicants, 
I further analyze the influence of applicants’ probability of placement 
on participant selection decisions using a two-stage model. In the first-
stage regression (shown in Table 8.2), a variable indicating whether 
or not employment was obtained following program application was 
regressed against applicants’ demographic and employment and train-
ing history characteristics to obtain predicted probabilities of placement 
for the applicants. These predicted placement probabilities formed a 
new variable (the probability of placement) that was used as an explan-
atory variable in a second-stage regression with caseworkers’ actual 
participant selections as the dependent variable (also shown in Table 
8.2).
A striking finding of this second-stage regression is the relatively 
large, positive, and statistically significant coefficient on the probability 
of placement variable, more precisely estimated than any other explan-
atory variable in the regression. This finding suggests that in the actual 
participant selection process, caseworkers were likely influenced by 
factors related to applicants’ probability of placement (or employment). 
It also indicates that direct cream skimming on applicant characteristics 
might have been occurring. 
To further evaluate this argument, I also added the probability of 
placement variable to the caseworkers’ simulated selection models 
and reestimated these logistic regressions (see Table 8.3). In estimat-
ing these models, I sought to test whether the probability of placement 
was some function of the observed applicant characteristics provided 
to caseworkers in the simulation, or a function of additional informa-
tion the caseworkers acquire during the selection process, i.e., infor-
mation not captured in the variables made available in the simulation. 
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Table 8.2  Two-Stage Logistic Regression Estimation of the Influence
of Applicants’ Probability of Placement on Participant 
Selection Decisions 
First-stage Second-stage 
logistic regression logistic regression 
Dependent variable: 
Placed in employment 
(or employed) following Dependent variable: 
program participation Actual participant 
Independent variables (or application) selections 
Constant 
Age 
Sex (male) 
Single head of household 
Highest grade completed 
Previous training 
services 
Never married 
Welfare recipient 
Children 
Basic skills deficiency 
Limited work history 
Unemployed all of 
preprogram year 
Most recent hourly wage 
Probability of placement 
Model log likelihood 
Pseudo R2 (%) 
−34.547* 
(19.327) 
0.360** 
(0.161) 
5.715 
(3.650) 
2.835 
(3.026) 
1.171 
(0.942) 
0.576 
(0.898) 
4.046* 
(2.398) 
3.500 
(2.365) 
0.206 
(0.669) 
4.597 
(3.027) 
7.146* 
(3.983) 
−4.095* 
(2.227) 
−0.472 
(0.354) 
n/a 
−9.150 
17.1 
1.482 
(6.884) 
−0.087 
(0.106) 
0.638 
(1.397) 
3.960** 
(1.750) 
−0.232 
(0.487) 
0.615 
(1.092) 
−2.896** 
(1.375) 
−2.358* 
(1.352) 
−0.148 
(0.284) 
−0.297 
(1.316) 
0.070 
(1.217) 
2.365** 
(1.191) 
−0.126 
(0.260) 
6.392*** 
(2.114)  
−18.360 
37.1 
NOTE: * significant at α = 0.100; ** significant at α = 0.050; *** significant at α = 0.010. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the coefficient values. 
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The results presented in Table 8.3 indicate that the probability of place-
ment was not a significant factor in the caseworkers’ simulation selec-
tion decisions. There are several possible interpretations of these find-
ings. One is that the caseworkers did evaluate and weigh applicants’
observed characteristics to estimate their probability of placement, but 
that in the simulation (free of performance pressures and constraints), 
they did not use this information. A more plausible explanation, how-
ever, is that the probability of placement was judged mainly using 
information not made available in the simulation. For example, some 
of these unmeasured variables might include information that provides 
clues about the applicants’ motivation (from details of employment his-
tory to physical appearance). Although this type of information is not 
systematically collected by employment and training program staff, in 
their actual participant selection decisions, caseworkers seemed to pre-
dict placement probabilities very well and to use this information to 
guide their decisions. 
In his classic study on bureaucracy, Blau (1955) finds similar par-
ticipant screening philosophies and practices among state employment 
agency staff. Like the JTPA intake workers, employment agency staff 
who exercised discretion in client selection indicated they derived sat-
isfaction from helping those most in need and “welcomed the opportu-
nity to assist them.” However, in actual client selections, Blau finds the 
majority of agency staff favored “strivers,” or persons who were most 
likely to be successful in society. He concluded that personal prefer-
ences for helping the most disadvantaged were set aside as a result of 
the orientation toward maximizing placements and in the interest of 
efficient performance. Forty years later, Blau’s conclusions seem to gar-
ner support from this case study as well. 
Multinomial Logit Analyses of Factors Influencing Participant 
Assignment to Training Activities 
During the simulation, the caseworkers assigned each person they 
selected to a training service activity. They were given no guidelines as 
to the number of “participants” they could assign to each of four avail-
able program activities (vocational training, on-the-job training, reme-
dial education, and job search assistance). In making these assignments, 
caseworkers were asked to consider only applicant characteristics. 
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Table 8.3  Logistic Regressions of Simulated Participant Selections from 
Caseworker 1 and Caseworker 2, Including Probability of 
Placement variable 
Dependent variables 
Caseworker 1’s Caseworker 2’s 
simulated participant simulated 
Independent variables selections participant selections 
Constant 
Age 
Sex (male) 
Single head of household 
Highest grade completed 
Previous training services 
Never married 
Welfare recipient 
Number of children 
Basic skills deficiency 
Limited work history 
Unemployed all of 
preprogram year 
Most recent hourly wage 
Probability of placement 
Model log likelihood 
Pseudo R2 (%) 
45.367*** 
(16.987) 
−0.105 
(0.096) 
1.180 
(1.545) 
−0.432 
(1.591) 
−3.458*** 
(1.347) 
−0.136 
(1.014) 
0.753 
(1.172) 
2.125 
(1.484) 
−0.422 
(0.274) 
−1.610 
(1.207) 
1.557 
(1.557) 
−1.223 
(1.334) 
−0.191 
(0.321) 
0.806 
(1.886) 
−16.726
 36.8 
−18.037** 
(8.503) 
0.362*** 
(0.140) 
−0.860 
(1.220) 
−1.643 
(1.518) 
0.239 
(0.500) 
−0.220 
(1.089) 
5.884*** 
(2.192) 
1.806 
(1.191) 
0.824** 
(0.375) 
4.045** 
(1.748) 
−0.920 
(1.256) 
−1.081 
(1.075) 
0.064 
(0.259) 
−2.816 
(2.224) 
−18.493
 37.2 
NOTE: ** significant at α = 0.050; *** significant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses below the coefficient values. 
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The multinomial logit analyses examine the factors that influenced 
intake staff service assignment decisions. The dependent variables are 
categorical variables for four main types of program activities made 
available in JTPA programs: vocational training, on-the-job training, 
basic or remedial education, and job search assistance. The independent 
variables in these models were the characteristics of the selected par-
ticipants, i.e., the same core set of variables employed in the models of 
participant selection. Table 8.4 shows the multinomial logit estimation 
of participant service assignments using the simulation data. Despite 
the small sample of 38 simulation assignees (only those cases selected 
were assigned to services), there are a number of statistically significant 
findings among these results. 
A multinomial logit regression of service assignment was also esti-
mated for adult JTPA Title IIA program participants in the job training 
agency. The management information system (MIS) data provided by 
the agency for all JTPA program years was used, yielding a total of 
18,120 observations. The dependent variable employed in the job train-
ing center multinomial logit model included assignment to the same 
four categories of training as the simulation model. The independent 
variables were also the same as those available for the simulation mod-
els, with a few exceptions.7 The job training center multinomial logit 
model is shown in Table 8.5. 
One of the more important findings of the multinomial logit mod-
els suggests that access to training opportunities for persons with basic 
skills deficiencies and low education levels may have been relatively 
limited. High school dropouts and persons with basic skills deficien-
cies were significantly more likely to be assigned to receive remedial 
education, while persons with more education were significantly less 
likely to receive these services. Persons with basic skills deficiencies 
were significantly less likely to be assigned to vocational training, on-
the-job training, or job search assistance, while persons with post–high 
school educations were significantly more likely to receive job search 
assistance. These findings support the theory that individuals assigned 
to on-the-job training and job search assistance require basic educa-
tion and skill levels that make them more “job-ready.” Discussions 
with the program caseworkers and findings of the National JTPA Study 
also revealed that vocational training providers often have enrollment 
requirements that preclude the entry of persons with basic skills defi-
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Table 8.4  Multinomial Logit Model of Training Activity Assignments Using Simulation Data 
Categorical dependent variable 
Basic or remedial 
Independent variables Vocational training On-the-job training education Job search assistance 
Constant 
Age 
Sex (male) 
Single head of household 
Highest grade completed 
Welfare recipient 
Number of children 
Basic skills deficiency 
Limited work history 
Unemployed all of 
preprogram year 
−9.800 110.385 8.676 −4.052 
(13.93) (258.1) (5.799) (15.53) 
0.121 −0.307* −0.006 −0.579 
(0.114) (0.179) (0.060) (0.460) 
0.427 0.324 0.301 −1.605 
(1.867) (2.920) (0.852) (4.188) 
3.618* −3.555 0.725 −34.639 
(2.222) (2.639) (0.900) (46.71) 
−0.584 −8.869 −1.094** 0.724 
(0.887) (20.93) (0.483) (1.991) 
0.305 −1.049 0.562 7.679* 
(1.527) (1.767) (0.721) (4.465) 
0.344 −0.571 −0.008 −1.801* 
(0.352) (0.660) (0.206) (0.919) 
1.169 −42.929** 1.828** −1.203 
(1.664) (20.15) (0.926) (3.050) 
3.601** 0.571 0.539 −39.705** 
(1.782) (3.122) (1.045) (16.40) 
0.500 10.278** 2.183*** 20.488 
(1.288) (4.167) (0.761) (14.47) 
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Never married  0.624 4.391 −0.514 0.117 
(1.386) (2.768) (0.753) (0.116) 
Most recent hourly wage 0.850** 0.546 0.114 0.010 
(0.431) (0.322) (0.182) (0.008) 
Model log likelihood −61.396 
NOTE: * significant at α = 0.100; ** significant at α = 0.050; *** significant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below 
the coefficient values. 
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Table 8.5  Multinomial Logit Model of Training Activity Assignments Using Service Records of 18,120 Adult JTPA
Title IIA Participants, Program years 1984–1993 
Categorical dependent variable 
Basic or remedial 
Independent variables Vocational training On-the-job training education Job search assistance 
Constant 
Age 
Sex (male) 
Single head of household 
High school dropout 
Post–high school education 
Welfare recipient 
Household size 
Basic skills deficiency 
Limited work history 
−0.297* −0.303** −4.899*** −2.951*** 
(0.153) (0.138) (0.357) (0.142) 
−0.016*** −0.029*** −0.033*** 0.026*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) 
−0.107* 0.571*** 0.202 −0.007 
(0.064) (0.058) (0.130) (0.054) 
0.171** 0.155** −0.120 0.188*** 
(0.075) (0.065) (0.148) (0.064) 
0.098 −0.039 1.233*** 0.169 
(0.076) (0.068) (0.129) (0.704) 
0.016 −0.197*** −0.519*** 0.152*** 
(0.063) (0.058) (0.168) (0.055) 
0.147** −0.573*** −0.466*** −0.023 
(0.069) (0.067) (0.123) (0.061) 
−0.013 0.029*** 0.033* −0.011 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.019) (0.036) 
−0.148*** −0.097* 0.593*** −0.087* 
(0.058) (0.051) (0.110) (0.051) 
0.067 −0.282*** 0.346*** 0.029 
(0.059) (0.054) (0.113) (0.053) 
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Unemployed at application −0.321 
(0.338) 
−0.135** 
(0.060) 
−0.029 
(0.138) 
0.027 
(0.063) 
Unemployed all of 
preprogram year 
−0.060 
(0.076) 
−0.293*** 
(0.069) 
0.688*** 
(0.151) 
0.234 
(0.157) 
Employed–unemployed −0.088 
(0.074) 
0.044 
(0.060) 
−0.160 
(0.148) 
0.031 
(0.065) 
Unemployed–employed 
African American 
−0.047 
(0.700) 
0.064 
−0.092 
(0.058) 
−0.340*** 
0.145 
(0.144) 
0.963*** 
0.249*** 
(0.061) 
−0.176*** 
Program year 1989 
Program year 1990 
Program year 1991 
Program year 1992 
Model log likelihood
(0.061) 
0.806*** 
(0.096) 
0.993*** 
(0.082) 
0.930*** 
(0.093) 
−0.228** 
(0.097) 
−20,586.83 
(0.052) 
0.970*** 
(0.078) 
0.670*** 
(0.077) 
0.698*** 
(0.079) 
−0.244*** 
(0.079) 
(0.145) 
2.177*** 
(0.205) 
2.496*** 
(0.184) 
2.030*** 
(0.093) 
0.308 
(0.252) 
(0.054) 
1.072*** 
(0.090) 
0.830*** 
(0.089) 
0.613*** 
(0.099) 
0.354*** 
(0.060) 
NOTE: * significant at α = 0.100; ** significant at α = 0.050; *** significant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below 
the coefficient values. 
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ciencies, e.g., requirements such as a high school diploma or minimum 
scores on tests of adult basic education. 
Another noteworthy finding was that males were more likely to be 
assigned to on-the-job training, which has consistently been shown to 
be the most effective employment and training service (Barnow and 
Gubits 2002). During case reviews and the postsimulation discussion, 
the caseworkers pointed out that men tended to be more eager to get 
into training activities that generated a faster monetary payoff. Since 
on-the-job training participants received wages during the training
period, males found these training opportunities more lucrative. In 
addition, male applicants were more likely to have had previous job 
experience that was expected to aid a successful outcome in on-the-
job training activities. In general, women and welfare recipients were 
more likely to be assigned to vocational training activities, and welfare 
recipients were also significantly less likely to be assigned to on-the-job 
training activities. Also consistent with the above findings, persons with 
limited work histories (i.e., minimal job experience) were significantly 
less likely to be assigned to on-the-job training and job search assis-
tance; they were significantly more likely to receive remedial education 
or vocational training services. 
The coefficients for the program year indicators (Table 8.5) show 
a pattern of declining assignment probabilities in the 1990s, most
likely reflecting the decline in JTPA program funding and reduced
number of training opportunities during these years. Studies suggest 
that with fewer resources, job training agencies are more likely to allo-
cate funds to less expensive, shorter-term training activities and to avoid 
serving those who require more intensive services to become job-ready 
(Dickinson and West 1988; Zornitsky et al. 1988; Orfield and Slessarev 
1986). Table 8.6 shows that corresponding to funding declines in the 
1990s, there was a noticeable shift in this agency toward less expensive 
services (e.g., job search assistance and job club activities). There was 
also a less definitive trend away from the provision of more expensive 
training such as remedial education services, on-the-job training and 
vocational training (with costs per placement ranging from $2,917.90 
to $2,834.10). Job search assistance and job club activities (a less inten-
sive form of job search) were much less expensive services (approxi-
mately $1700). (See Table 8.7 for job placement rates, wages at place-
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Table 8.6  number of Training Services Received by JTPA Title 2A Adult Participants, Program years 1986–1993 
PY 1986 PY 1987 PY 1988 PY 1989 PY 1990 PY 1991 PY 1992 PY 1993 
JTPA training service activitya N=2,732 N=2,302 N=1,811 N=1,633 N=1,314 N=1,010 N=1,101 N=1,065 
Vocational training n 1,145 947 730 733 654 527 544 409 
% (41.9) (41.1) (40.3) (44.9) (49.8) (52.2) (49.4) (38.4) 
On-the-job training n 815 609 530 473 340 288 325 281 
% (29.8) (26.5) (29.3) (29.0) (25.9) (28.5) (29.5) (26.4) 
Remedial education n n/ab n/a n/a 186 96 51 38 50 
% (11.4) (7.3) (5.0) (3.5) (4.7) 
Job search assistance n n/a n/a 216 204 157 84 197 184 
% (9.1) (12.5) (11.9) (8.3) (17.9) (17.3) 
Job club n n/a n/a 135 189 127 51 170 151 
% (7.5) (11.6) (9.7) (5.0) (15.4) (14.2) 
Counseling and n 1,149 1,040 653 419 300 195 0 9 
assessment % (42.1) (45.2) (36.1) (25.7) (22.8) (19.3) (0.0) (0.8) 
Case management n n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 950 1,036 
% (86.3) (97.3) 
a Supportive services were not shown in this table since the identifier codes were used inconsistently in the JTPA MIS system. 
b For some of the early program years, these data were either not available or were coded inconsistently. 
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ment, and estimated service costs for adult JTPA Title IIA participants 
by program activity.) 
In addition, Table 8.6 shows that counseling and assessment activi-
ties were replaced by case management services beginning in program 
year 1992. To generate an official record of the provision of case man-
agement services, program staff had to make contact with a participant 
at least once per month. This minimal case-management requirement 
made these services very inexpensive to provide. In program year 1993, 
23.8 percent of JTPA Title IIA program participants received only case 
management services while enrolled. It is possible that as program 
resources continued to decline, job training agencies found that provid-
ing only case-management services was an inexpensive way to main-
tain participant numbers despite squeezed budgets. 
It is also possible that agency officials were struggling to manage 
trade-offs among the costs of services, the benefits to participants as 
measured by performance standards, and the number of training oppor-
tunities they could make available. The job placement rate was accorded 
the highest weight in this agency’s performance evaluation process. The 
provision of on-the-job training services, which were more costly to 
provide but generated higher average job placement rates (by a margin 
of 21–38 percent) than other training activities, was not declining over 
time. Vocational training, however, had a substantially lower average 
Table 8.7  Job Placement Rates, wages at Placement, and Estimated 
Costs of Service for Adult JTPA Title IIA Participants by 
Program Activity 
Mean job Mean Estimated cost 
placement rate wage at per placement 
Program activity (%) placement ($) ($) 
Vocational training 58.3 5.87 2,834.10 
On-the-job training 81.2 6.72 2,844.13 
Remedial education services 43.0 5.73 2,917.90 
Job search assistance 47.7 6.82 1,789.06 
Job club 51.2 6.90 1,642.90 
Counseling and assessment 59.9 6.17 2,541.46 
Case management 58.4 7.03 n/aa 
a For most service provider contracts and participant records, the costs of case manage-
ment activities are not specified separately from other service costs. 
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job placement rate (58.3 percent) that is about the same as the place-
ment rate for counseling/case management activities, but is consider-
ably more expensive to provide than counseling and case management. 
In a 1992 review of job training program evaluations, LaLonde finds 
that less expensive services provided to a larger segment of the eligible 
population yielded higher returns for each training dollar invested. It 
is also important to remember that costs per placement continued to 
be a primary factor in this agency’s performance reviews and contract 
award decisions long after the federal government eliminated cost-per-
placement standards. 
Synthesis of Findings on Participant Selection, Service 
Assignment, and Program Management 
The analyses of participant selection and service assignment 
decisions, in conjunction with the implications of declining program 
resources in this job training agency, suggest that declining program 
funds may have compelled the provision of cheaper training services. 
This, in turn, may have required the recruitment of more job-ready per-
sons to attain successful outcomes (i.e., job placements). For example, 
given budgetary pressures due to declining federal program resources, 
service providers may have been led in competitive bidding and con-
tract negotiations to increase the number of job search assistance (i.e., 
less expensive) positions budgeted for their programs. As intake staff 
typically worked with fixed numbers of available training positions 
when they began the applicant screening process, they may have been 
required to recruit more individuals suitable to job search assistance 
activities. 
One of the most consistent findings in the simulated and actual 
participant selection models was the negative relationship of years of 
schooling completed to the probability of selection. On the other hand, 
Tables 8.4 and 8.5 showed that the number of years of schooling com-
pleted was positively related to assignment to job search assistance 
activities. Therefore, given a specific and growing number of job search 
assistance positions they were required to fill, intake staff may have 
been induced to select more applicants with higher education levels. 
The participant selection models also indicated that applicants with 
basic skills deficiencies were more likely to be selected, and the ser-
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vice assignment models showed these persons were significantly more
likely to receive remedial education services. However, remedial edu-
cation was one of the more expensive training activities, and provision 
of these services declined over time under JTPA. Nonprofit agencies 
(independent of the JTPA program) were likewise under increasing 
performance accountability pressures and less likely to offer remedial 
education on their “menu” of services. As fewer remedial education 
opportunities were made available, it is possible that caseworkers were 
less likely to enroll persons with basic skill deficiencies. In addition, 
the findings also showed that participants with basic skills deficiencies 
were significantly less likely to be assigned to vocational training, on-
the-job training, and job search assistance, suggesting that more dis-
advantaged participants might not have had access to the full range of 
training services if remedial education services were not made available 
to them. 
Other case study findings generally supported these assertions 
about the effects of budgetary constraints on the availability of training 
opportunities and the selection of program participants. Service pro-
vider managers indicated that contract cost-per-placement standards 
discouraged the provision of multiple services (e.g., remedial education 
followed by vocational training), since these services raised average 
cost per placement figures and could negatively affect future contract 
awards. Even though intake staff asserted that they are not influenced by 
performance standards, the continued emphasis on placement rates and 
costs per placement in local-level service provider contracts seemed to 
be a pervasive force. A separate study (Heinrich 1999) of this agency’s 
administrative and service provider contracting practices showed that 
service providers’ performance relative to cost standards established in 
their contracts with the local JTPA agency was the most important factor 
influencing the agency’s contract renewal and funding level decisions. 
In conclusion, the strong emphasis on placement rates and costs 
per placement in the local-level performance evaluation system seemed 
to inevitably pervade intake staff participant selection and service 
assignment decisions, contributing to both direct and indirect creaming 
practices. Other factors affecting program administration and service 
delivery decisions exacerbated the pressures generated by performance 
standards. These factors included declining program resources (relative 
to a large job-training-eligible population), the absence of performance 
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standard adjustments in service provider contracts for services to more 
disadvantaged applicants, and minimum qualifications required for 
entry to more intensive skill-building program activities. 
COnCLUSIOn 
While the findings of this case study are not generalizable to all 
job training programs, some basic policy conclusions emerge that have 
implications for the administration of current job training programs 
under WIA and other programs (e.g., public welfare). This research pro-
duced evidence that “street-level bureaucrats” engaged in job training 
program service delivery were responsive to incentives generated by the 
performance standards system. The local job training agency designed 
its own performance-based contracting and provider performance eval-
uation system, and program administrators and service provider staff 
demonstrated that they were highly conscious of the agency’s emphasis 
on placement rate and cost-per-placement outcomes. 
The agency’s contractual and administrative focus on placement 
rates and cost-per-placement appeared to have both direct and indirect 
effects on the participant selection and training service assignment deci-
sions of program staff. Both direct cream skimming on applicant char-
acteristics during the participant selection process and indirect cream 
skimming grounded in contractual arrangements and program adminis-
trative decisions were likely occurring in this service delivery area, with 
potentially negative implications for the achievement of basic program 
objectives. 
The research findings also suggest that the main sources of indirect 
cream skimming were contractual and administrative constraints on the 
types of training services that could be made available to program par-
ticipants. The study of the JTPA service assignment processes showed 
that participant selection decisions and service assignment decisions 
were most often made concurrently, and that the numbers and types 
of available training positions were typically fixed before the intake 
process began. Therefore, intake staff were required to find persons 
suitable to the available training positions, rather than selecting partici-
pants based primarily on their relative need for and interest in training 
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services and then assigning them to appropriate activities. This practice 
by itself does not constitute cream skimming. However, as job training 
program funds declined over time, the availability of remedial educa-
tion services decreased substantially, and the provision of relatively 
less-expensive program services, such as job search assistance and job 
club activities, increased. As a result, access to training for persons with 
basic skills deficiencies and low education levels appears to be declin-
ing, while access for more able, job-ready applicants (better suited to 
job search activities) was likely increasing.
In the WIA program, concerns have again been raised about the 
influence of performance standards on individuals’ access to program 
services. The WIA performance standards, like those in JTPA, still 
focus on shorter-term outcome levels, and budgetary constraints like-
wise limit the types of services that are made available to participants. 
In addition, WIA introduced a sequential process of service access, 
from core (basic and self-directed job search services) to intensive (job 
readiness and job search seminars) to substantive job skills training 
services. While local programs have adapted different approaches to 
sequencing, early studies show that few clients are receiving the more 
expensive intensive or training services (D’Amico et al. 2001). Barnow 
and Gubits (2002) note that in one site, the level of training provided 
under WIA was reduced by 75 percent. 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, a 2002 GAO report sug-
gests that history may be repeating itself. The GAO interviewed WIA
program administrators in 50 states and visited five sites to assess the 
effectiveness of the WIA performance management system and reported
that many states have indicated that the need to meet performance stan-
dards is a driving factor in who receives WIA-funded services at the 
local level. It also described how some local areas were limiting access 
to services for individuals who they perceive are less likely to get and 
retain a job. Observing the serious challenges that states and locali-
ties have faced in implementing the system, the GAO suggested that 
“even when fully implemented, WIA performance measures may still 
not provide a true picture of WIA-funded program performance” (GAO 
2002, p. 3). In a summary report to the USDOL on the implementation 
of WIA, Barnow and Gubits (2002, Note 12) also find, based on meet-
ings with officials from about 20 states, that “the greatest dissatisfaction 
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in every instance has been with the way the performance management 
system has been implemented.” 
This study presents evidence of strong links between the types 
of services made available in public training programs and who gets 
access to these services, and the role and effects of performance stan-
dards on key decisions made by program administrators and street-level 
bureaucrats in implementing the program. More generally, the collec-
tive empirical findings of this book demonstrate the responsiveness of 
public organizations and their employees to performance standards, and 
suggest that in designing or refining performance standards systems for 
public programs, careful consideration should be given to both direct 
and indirect potential consequences of these systems for those served 
or seeking services. 
notes 
1. While this administrative structure was common to many JTPA service delivery 
areas, WIA now prohibits these local agencies from directly providing training 
services, and the only contract or agreement for service provision that may be 
established (with few exceptions) is between the workforce investment boards and 
One-Stop center operators. The local workforce investment boards are required 
to select One-Stop operators through a competitive process or designation of a 
consortium that includes at least three of the federal programs providing services 
at the One-Stop. 
2. The principal 1988 changes included an end to mandatory use of cost-per-
placement standards and a shift toward the evaluation of placement and earnings 
outcomes three months after participant termination rather than at the time of 
termination. 
3. The job training program service provider I closely studied has been operating 
in this job training center since the CETA years (i.e., before JTPA). It is one of 
the primary vendors and has accounted for approximately 7 percent of all service 
provider contracts since the start of JTPA. One of the two program caseworkers 
had approximately 5 years of experience working in this profession, and the other 
was employed as a caseworker for 16 years. Both had worked for this particular 
service provider for about 5 years. 
4. The logit model estimated was: Pi = E(Y=1 | Xi) = 1 / 1 + e−(b1 + b2Xi1 +. . . + bk Xik), 
where Pi is the probability an applicant is selected, Y is the program caseworker’s 
decision, taking on the value “1” if a given applicant is selected, and the Xik are 
characteristics of the program applicants. The betas (bk) measure the influence of 
applicant characteristics on caseworkers’ judgments. 
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5. First, an unrestricted model of the caseworkers’ simulation selections was esti-
mated. This model included two sets of explanatory variables (i.e., the demo-
graphic characteristics and employment and training history variables included 
in the logit models)—one set interacted with caseworker 1’s simulation selections 
and the other interacted with caseworker 2’s selections. This model allowed differ-
ent estimates of the variable coefficients for each caseworker. The restricted model 
used the dependent variable “caseworker 1 plus caseworker 2 selections.” 
6. Likelihood ratio statistic = −2 ln λ, where ln λ = ln L(Ω
r
) − ln L(Ω) = −56.376 − 
−33.492 = −22.884. The observed value of −2 ln λ is very large (45.768). With 11 
degrees of freedom, it is much greater than χ20.005, which leads me to strongly reject 
Ho. 
7. In the job training center multinomial logit model: 1) education is represented by 
indicator variables (high school dropout, post–high school education, and college 
graduate, where the omitted category is high school graduate); 2) household size 
is used as a proxy for the number of children; 3) employment status and history 
are represented by an indicator variable for employment status at application 
(unemployed at application) and variables indicating employment history in the 
year prior to application (no preprogram year earnings, employed–unemployed 
transition, unemployed–employed transition); 4) an indicator variable for race 
(African American) is included in the model; 5) there were no variable measures 
available in the MIS data for marital status or previous training activities, and 6) 
program year indicators are included to capture the influence of changes in the 
availability of different training activities across program years. 
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Appendix 8A 
variable Descriptions 
DEPEnDEnT vARIABLES 
Actual participant selections = 1 if actual program participant, 0 if applicant, 
nonparticipant. 
Counselor 1 selections = 1 if selected by counselor 1 during the simulation, 0 
if not selected by counselor 1. 
Counselor 2 selections = 1 if selected by counselor 2 during the simulation, 0 
if not selected by counselor 2. 
Counselor 1 or counselor 2 selections = 1 if selected by either counselor 1 or 
counselor 2 during the simulation, 0 if not selected by either counselor 1 or 
counselor 2. 
Counselor 1 plus counselor 2 selections: based on 100 evaluated exercise cases 
(50 by counselor 1 and 50 by counselor 2) = 1 if selected by either counselor 
1 or counselor 2 during the simulation, 0 if not selected by either counselor 
1 or counselor 2. 
Service category = 0 if not selected nor assigned to a training activity, 1 if 
selected case was assigned to vocational training, 2 if selected case was 
assigned to on-the-job training, 3 if selected case was assigned to remedial 
education, and 4 if selected case was assigned to job search assistance. 
Wage at placement = JTPA program participants’ wage at placement (i.e., at the 
time of their termination from the program, if placed in a job), in dollars. 
InDEPEnDEnT vARIABLES 
Sex = 1 if male, 0 if female. 
Age variables 
Age: (continuous, range 19–51). 
Age less than 30 years = 1 if under 30 years old, 0 otherwise. 
Age 30 to 39 years = 1 if 30 to 39 years old, 0 otherwise. 
Age over 39 years = 1 if over 39 years old, 0 otherwise. 
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Ethnicity 
White = 1 if white (Caucasian), 0 otherwise. 
African American = 1 if African American, 0 otherwise. 
Hispanic = 1 if of Hispanic origin (including South or Central Americans, 
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and others), 0 otherwise. 
Other race = 1 if American Indian, Asian, or any other race excluded in other 
categories, 0 otherwise. 
Education variables 
Highest grade completed: (continuous, range 10–16). 
Dropout = 1 if high school dropout, 0 otherwise. 
Graduated high school = 1 if high school graduate with no post–high school 
education, 0 otherwise. 
Post–high school education = 1 if has post–high school education, 0 otherwise. 
Any training = 1 if previously received vocational, on-the-job, or other training 
services, 0 otherwise. 
GED = 1 if has GED, 0 otherwise. 
Labor Force Status and Employment history variables 
Employed at application = 1 if employed at application, 0 otherwise. 
Unemployed at application = 1 if unemployed at application, 0 otherwise. 
Not in labor force at application = 1 if not in labor force, 0 otherwise. 
Employed–unemployed transition = 1 if employed in 7–12 months prior to 
application and unemployed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise. 
Employed–not in labor force transition = 1 if employed in 7–12 months prior 
to application and not in labor force in 6 months prior to application, 0 
otherwise. 
Employed all of preprogram year = 1 if employed in 7–12 months prior to 
application and employed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise. 
Unemployed–employed transition = 1 if unemployed in 7–12 months prior 
to application and employed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise. 
Unemployed–not in labor force transition = 1 if unemployed in 7–12 months 
prior to application and not in labor force in 6 months prior to application, 
0 otherwise. 
Unemployed all of preprogram year = 1 if unemployed in 7–12 months prior to 
application and unemployed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise. 
Not in labor force–employed transition = 1 if not in labor force in 7–12 months 
prior to application and employed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise. 
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Not in labor force–unemployed transition = 1 if not in labor force in 7–12 
months prior to application and unemployed in 6 months prior to applica-
tion, 0 otherwise. 
Not in labor force all of preprogram year = 1 if not in labor force in 7–12 
months prior to application and not in labor force in 6 months prior to appli-
cation, 0 otherwise. 
Ever worked full time = 1 if ever worked full time, 0 otherwise. 
Most recent wage: (continuous, range $4.25– $10.40). 
Zero earnings in year prior to enrollment = 1 if no earnings in employment 
security records in the four quarters prior to the individual’s enrollment in 
JTPA, 0 otherwise. 
Employment Barriers 
Single head of household = 1 if single head of household, 0 otherwise. 
Displaced homemaker = 1 if displaced homemaker, 0 otherwise. 
Veteran = 1 if veteran of any war, 0 otherwise. 
Vietnam veteran = 1 if veteran of Vietnam War, 0 otherwise. 
Limited work history = 1 if limited work history, 0 otherwise. 
Transportation = 1 if transportation is a barrier, 0 otherwise. 
Basic skills deficiency = 1 if basic skills deficiency, 0 otherwise. 
Child care = 1 if child care is a barrier, 0 otherwise. 
Medical problem = 1 if medical problem, 0 otherwise. 
Welfare recipient = 1 if receiving any public assistance (AFDC, food stamps, 
or general assistance), 0 otherwise. 
Handicapped = 1 if physically handicapped, 0 otherwise. 
Limited English proficiency = 1 if tested and found to have limited ability to 
speak English, 0 otherwise. 
Ex-offender = 1 if convicted of criminal offense prior to time of application, 
0 otherwise. 
Substance abuse problem = 1 if determined by intake staff or medical doctor to 
be chemically dependent (i.e., a substance abuser), 0 otherwise. 
Marital Status variables 
Never married = 1 if never married, 0 otherwise. 
Married = 1 if married, 0 otherwise. 
Married, not living with spouse = 1 if married, not living with spouse, 0 
otherwise. 
Divorced = 1 if separated, divorced, or widowed, 0 otherwise. 
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Family Composition 
Number of children: (continuous, range 0–7). 
Household size: (continuous variable). 
Training history variable 
Previous training services = 1 if any vocational, occupational, or on-the-job 
training services were received by program applicant prior to his/her appli-
cation to JTPA, 0 otherwise. 
Program year Indicator variables 
Program year 1985 through Program year 1993: Each of these indicators takes 
on the value 1 if the JTPA participant was enrolled during that program year 
(beginning July 1, ending June 30), 0 otherwise. 
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Do Short-Run 
Performance Measures 
Predict Long-Run Impacts? 
James J. Heckman 
Carolyn J. Heinrich 
Jeffrey Smith 
This chapter culminates the analysis in this volume by examining 
two closely related questions.1 The first of these is posed in the title: Do 
performance measures based on short-run outcomes predict long-run 
program impacts? If they do, then performance management systems 
like those in JTPA and WIA will provide incentives that enhance the 
economic efficiency of program operations. Put differently, if existing 
performance measures predict long-term impacts, then their use pro-
vides some benefits to weigh against the costs documented in earlier 
chapters. The second question concerns the efficiency costs of cream 
skimming induced by the performance standards. As noted in Chapter 
3, depending on the relationship between the performance measures 
and net program impacts, cream skimming may be efficiency increas-
ing (a positive relationship), efficiency decreasing (a negative relation-
ship), or neutral (no relationship). 
We address these questions in two different ways. The two analyses 
build on different identifying assumptions but both utilize the experi-
mental data from the National JTPA Study (NJS) introduced in Chapter 
6. The two analyses represent different ways of dealing with the fact 
that, absent additional assumptions, experimental data do not provide 
impacts for individuals, only average impacts for groups. Both strate-
gies have important limitations, which we discuss in detail later on in 
the chapter. 
Both methods yield the same basic findings. First, the short-run 
labor market outcomes commonly used as performance measures do 
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not predict long-run impacts. Indeed, in some cases we find a perverse 
relationship, indicating that the performance measures actually provide 
an incentive for program staff to move away from, rather than toward, 
economic efficiency. Second, we find little evidence of an efficiency 
cost associated with cream skimming; if anything, it may provide a 
small efficiency gain. 
nJS DATA 
We use data gathered as part of the NJS, an experimental evaluation 
of the JTPA program described in Chapters 2 and 4, for the analyses in 
this chapter. The experiment was conducted at 16 of the more than 600 
JTPA training centers (which we will also refer to as sites). Table 9.1 
lists the sites that volunteered to participate in the experiment and pro-
vides some descriptive statistics. Columns one through three indicate 
the racial/ethnic composition of the adult participant population during 
the study, while the fourth column indicates adult participants’ average 
years of schooling. The fifth and sixth columns display unemployment 
and poverty rates. 
The final three columns indicate the fraction of participants 
assigned to each of the three experimental treatment streams, based on 
the services recommended for them prior to random assignment. The 
classroom training in occupational skills (CT-OS) stream includes indi-
viduals who were recommended to receive CT-OS and possibly other 
services not including subsidized on-the-job training (OJT) at private 
firms. The OJT treatment stream includes individuals recommended to 
receive OJT and possibly other services not including CT-OS. The other 
services stream is a residual category that, with only a few exceptions, 
includes individuals not recommended to receive either CT-OS or OJT. 
As illustrated in Exhibit 3.17 of Orr et al. (1996), individuals in the 
CT-OS stream usually received classroom training whether in the form 
of basic education or CT-OS or both. Those in the OJT stream often did 
not enroll; when they did enroll they tended to receive OJT or, some-
what less often, job search assistance. Individuals in the “other” treat-
ment stream received a wide variety of services. 
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Table 9.1  Descriptive Statistics for the 16 Sites in the national JTPA Study 
Fraction of participants that are: Avg. yrs. of Fraction of participants assigned to: 
schooling for Unemp. Poverty CT-OS OJT Other services 
Site White Black Hispanic participants rate rate stream stream stream 
Corpus Christi, TX 23.3 10.4 65.5 11.2 10.2 13.4 34.3 51.5 14.1 
Cedar Rapids, IA 87.8 7.6 1.3 11.6 3.6 6.0 60.0 35.4 4.6 
Coosa Valley, GA 82.1 17.1 0.6 10.7 6.5 10.7 36.1 38.1 25.7 
Heartland of FL 50.2 45.7 2.8 11.4 8.5 11.3 28.9 27.1 44.0 
Fort Wayne, IN 72.3 23.7 2.8 11.5 4.7 5.9 6.4 66.2 27.3 
Jersey City, NJ 6.3 68.6 20.3 11.5 7.3 18.9 46.0 35.7 18.3 
Jackson, MS 13.9 85.5 0.3 12.2 6.1 12.8 57.9 35.5 6.6 
Larimer County, CO 77.9 1.8 17.0 12.2 6.5 5.9 29.6 7.1 63.3 
Decatur, IL 68.1 31.9 0.0 11.8 9.2 7.8 14.4 79.1 6.5 
Northwest MN 81.3 1.8 10.9 11.4 8.0 11.1 25.6 74.0 0.4 
Butte, MT 86.6 0.3 5.0 11.7 6.8 7.5 26.6 40.1 33.3 
Omaha, NE 38.6 53.4 4.2 11.7 4.3 6.7 77.4 18.9 3.7 
Marion, OH 95.6 2.3 0.9 11.3 7.0 7.2 48.8 41.8 9.4 
Oakland, CA 8.0 68.3 6.8 12.4 6.8 16.0 49.6 7.9 42.6 
Providence, RI 33.6 33.9 24.6 11.3 3.8 12.1 32.3 13.0 54.7 
Springfield, MO 96.1 1.8 0.0 11.9 5.5 10.1 17.7 74.6 7.7 
SOURCE: Race/ethnicity and years of schooling for adult participants come from calculations by the authors using the National JTPA
Study data. Race/ethnicity categories do not necessarily sum to one due to the omission of “other.” Unemployment rates are from Orr et 
al. (1996, Exhibit 3.3) and are unweighted annual averages for 1987–1989. Poverty rates come from Orr et al. (1996, Exhibit 3.2) and 
are for 1979. The treatment stream recommendation fractions for adults come from Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993, Table 7.1). 
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The site selection strategy for the evaluation excluded sites with 
small enrollments for cost reasons. Attempts to gain external validity 
among larger sites by selecting sites at random failed due to high refusal 
rates, as described by Doolittle and Traeger (1990) and Hotz (1992). 
Without random site selection, external validity in the strict sense 
clearly fails. At the same time, Table 9.1 makes clear that the 16 sites 
represent a diverse mix in terms of participant demographics, local eco-
nomic conditions, and service mix. Doolittle and Traeger (1990, Section 
5) compare the 16 experimental sites to the population of all JTPA sites 
and find that, on average, the two groups look much alike. In our view, 
these patterns make our results suggestive, rather than either definitive 
or irrelevant, when generalized to the JTPA program more broadly. 
At the experimental centers, persons who applied to and were 
accepted into the program were randomly assigned to either a treatment 
group allowed access to JTPA services or to a control group denied 
access to JTPA services for the next 18 months. A short survey at the 
time of random assignment collected background information on demo-
graphic characteristics, educational attainment, work history, past train-
ing receipt, current and past transfer program participation, and fam-
ily income and composition. This survey was self-administered with 
assistance from program staff; it achieved a response rate well over 90 
percent as well as only modest item nonresponse conditional on survey 
response. We use variables from this baseline survey to define our sub-
groups (and for the participant descriptive statistics in Table 9.1). 
In addition, follow-up surveys collected information on employ-
ment and earnings around 18 months after random assignment and, for a 
random subsample, at around 30 months after random assignment. The 
response rates for the two surveys were 83 and 77 percent, respectively, 
with little difference between the experimental treatment and control 
groups (see Appendix A of Orr et al. [1994]). Both the program and the 
experimental analysis divided participants into four groups based on 
age and sex: adult males and females aged 22 and above and male and 
female out-of-school youth aged 16–21 (the NJS did not examine the 
component of JTPA serving in-school youth). We examine only adult 
males and females in this chapter due to the small samples available for 
the two youth groups. 
We use the data on wages, earnings, and employment from the follow-
up surveys to construct the performance measures and outcome vari-
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ables. Our outcome variables consist of earnings and employment for 
18 or 30 months after random assignment. For our analyses using per-
centiles, we use all observations with valid values of earnings over the 
18 months after random assignment. For the analyses using subgroup 
variation in experimental impacts, we trim the top 1 percent of the earn-
ings values. The employment variables measure the fraction of months 
employed, where we code an individual as employed in a month if they 
have positive earnings in that month. 
The JTPA performance measures we analyze are hourly wage and 
employment at termination from the program and weekly earnings and 
employment 13 weeks after termination. In most states at this time, pro-
gram staff members obtained these outcomes via telephone surveys of 
participants. We do not have access to the telephone survey data for our 
sample and instead use program termination dates from JTPA admin-
istrative data combined with data from the follow-up surveys on job 
spells to construct the performance measures. Because program admin-
istrators did not necessarily contact participants on the exact date of 
termination or follow-up (and to allow for some measurement error in 
the timing of the self-reported job spells), we count all job spells within 
30 days on either side of the termination date (or 13 weeks after termi-
nation, as appropriate) in constructing the performance measures. We 
measure employment based on the presence or absence of a job spell 
within this window. For the wage measure, we use the highest hourly 
wage within the window for persons holding more than one job. For 
the earnings measure, we take the average weekly earnings on all jobs 
over the 61-day window. Following the definition of the corresponding 
official performance measures, we calculate hourly wages and weekly 
earnings for employed persons only. 
For more information on the NJS experimental data, see the official 
impact reports in Bloom et al. (1997) and Orr et al. (1996), the official 
implementation reports in Doolittle and Traeger (1990) and Kemple, 
Doolittle, and Wallace (1993), and related papers on the design and the 
data by Hotz (1992), Smith (1997), Kornfeld and Bloom (1999), and 
Heckman and Smith (2000). For discussions of interpretational issues 
see Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), Heckman, Smith, and Taber 
(1998) and Heckman et al. (2000). 
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ECOnOMETRIC AnALySIS STRATEGIES: 
nOTATIOn AnD MOTIvATIOn 
Ideally, we would like to relate individual program impacts to indi-
vidual values of the performance measures. Unfortunately, as discussed 
in, e.g., Heckman (1992); Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997); 
Heckman and Smith (1998); and Djebbari and Smith (2008), without 
additional assumptions, even experimental data do not allow us to gen-
erate individual-level impact estimates. 
To consider this issue more carefully, we return to the notation 
defined in Chapter 3. Recall that Ya 
1
,i denotes a labor market outcome 
for person i in some period a given treatment, where the 1 superscript 
denotes treatment. Similarly, Ya 
0
,i denotes a labor market outcome in 
the same period given no treatment, implying that the impact for indi-
vidual i in period a equals Y 1 −Y 0 = D . In this chapter, we distin-a,i a,i a,i 
guish between two periods: the short run, denoted by s, and the long 
run, denoted by l. Both periods begin at the time the individual decides 
to participate or not. In terms of this notation, we would ideally like to 
relate Ys 
1
,i and Dl i, . Finally, recall that S denotes the set of individuals 
treated. 
Experimental data consist of the marginal distributions of out-
comes in the treated and untreated states, that is, f (Ya 
0 ) and f (Ya 
1). 
Experimental data to not identify the joint distribution of outcomes, 
f (Ya 
0 ,Ya 
1) , and therefore do not identify individual impacts. Experi-
mental data do identify mean impacts for subgroups of individuals 
defined by characteristics not affected by the treatment (which usually 
means those observed prior to random assignment). Letting g denote 
some particular subgroup (such as those with exactly 12 years of 
schooling) out of a set G, we can construct the impact estimate for the 
subgroup by taking a mean difference between the treated and untreated 
units in subgroup g. More formally, we estimate the subgroup impact 
D = E Y( 1 | G = g) − E Y( 0 | G = g) by replacing the conditional ex-a,g a a 
pectations with the corresponding sample means.2 
The next two sections describe the strategies we employ to deal 
with the lack of individual impact estimates. The first strategy imposes 
additional, nonexperimental, assumptions on the data that allow us to 
construct individual impact estimates. The second strategy relies solely 
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on subgroup variation in the experimental impacts and, as such, requires 
no additional assumptions. 
ECOnOMETRIC AnALySIS STRATEGIES: 
RAnK PRESERvATIOn 
Our first econometric strategy builds on the assumption of rank 
preservation outlined in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997).3 We 
assume that the joint distribution of treated and untreated outcomes 
takes a very simple form: the counterfactual for each quantile of the 
treated outcome distribution consists of the corresponding quantile of 
the untreated outcome distribution. Thus, for example, the counterfac-
tual outcome for the median treated person consists of the outcome of 
the median untreated person. Note that under this assumption, cream 
skimming on Ya 
0 implies the same choices as cream skimming on Ya 
1. We 
can think of the simple world defined by the rank preservation assump-
tion as a “one factor” world in which those who do well in the treated 
state also do well in the untreated state and those who do poorly in the 
treated state also do poorly in the untreated state. 
This assumption may seem quite unusual, but in fact it nests the 
widely (though often implicitly) used common effect model in which 
Da,i = Da . In the common effect world, the treatment has the same 
effect on all participants. In this world, the treated outcome distribution 
has the same shape as the untreated outcome distribution but its location 
differs by the common treatment effect. For example, if the untreated 
outcomes have a normal distribution with mean 100 and variance 20, 
and the common treatment effect equals 10, then the treated outcomes 
have a normal distribution with mean 110 and variance 20. Moreover, 
in the common effect world, quantiles of the treated and untreated out-
come distributions again form counterfactuals for one another. The rank 
preservation assumption relaxes the assumption of an equal treatment 
effect for all participants while keeping the link between the quantiles 
of the two outcome distributions. It therefore nests the common effect 
model as a special case. 
More formally, following Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), 
if each individual has the same rank in the distributions of Ya 
0 and Ya 
1, 
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then we can associate a Ya 
0 with each Ya 
1; continuity of the two distribu-
tions implies a unique association. The assumptions of rank preserva-
tion plus continuity allow us to construct Da as a function of Ya 
0 (or, 
what is the same thing, of Ya 
1). We operationalize this idea by taking 
percentile differences across the treated and untreated outcome distri-
0, j 0butions.4 Let Ya denote the jth percentile of the Ya distribution, with 
1, j 1Ya the corresponding percentile in the Ya distribution. Thus, we esti-
0, j ) 1, j 0, jmate D (Y = Y −Y . Our data include mass points at zero earn-a a a a 
ings in both the treated and untreated distributions. For the correspond-
ing percentiles we simply assign an impact of zero; because all of the 
outcomes equal zero in the lower percentiles of the two distributions, 
order does not matter. Thus, the lack of a unique association in this part 
of the distribution poses no problems in our application. 
ECOnOMETRIC AnALySIS STRATEGIES: SUBGROUP
vARIATIOn In ExPERIMEnTAL IMPACTS 
Our second identification strategy relies solely on the exogenous 
variation in treatment status induced by the experiment. As noted 
above, as a result of random assignment, we can construct unbiased 
mean impact estimates for subgroups defined by variables observed 
prior to random assignment. 
To implement this strategy, we form 43 subgroups based on the 
following characteristics measured at the time of random assignment: 
race, age, education, marital status, time since most recent employment, 
receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC—the pre-
decessor to the current Temporary Aid to Needy Families program), 
receipt of Food Stamps, and training center. Individuals with complete 
data belong to eight subgroups, while we include those with incomplete 
data in as many subgroups as their data allow. Using a regression frame-
work, we construct mean-difference experimental impact estimates for 
each subgroup.5 We adjust these estimates by dividing through by the 
fraction enrolled in each subgroup to reflect the fact that a substantial 
fraction of persons (41 percent of adult males and 37 percent of adult 
females) in the treatment group dropped out and did not participate in 
JTPA.6 We construct the subgroup average performance measures by 
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simply averaging the individual performance measures over the mem-
bers in each subgroup. 
RESULTS BASED On ThE RAnK PRESERvATIOn 
ASSUMPTIOn 
Figures 9.1 and 9.2 present estimates of Da (Ya 
0, j ) constructed under 
the rank preservation assumption. Self-reported earnings in the 18 
months after random assignment constitute the outcome variable. The 
horizontal axis in each figure indicates percentiles of the treated and 
untreated (i.e., control) outcome distributions. The vertical axis indi-
cates the difference in outcomes at each percentile. 
We begin with the estimates for adult women in Figure 9.1, for 
whom the sample size is the largest. First, we observe zero impacts 
through the 20th percentile. This region corresponds to persons with 
zero earnings in the 18 months after random assignment in both the 
treated and untreated states under the rank preservation assumption. 
Second, we observe a relatively constant positive treatment effect of 
around $800 over the interval from the 20th to the 90th percentile. 
Third, we note a discernible increase in the estimated impact in the 
final decile. Assuming roughly equal costs among participants at dif-
ferent percentiles, the pattern in Figure 9.1 suggests that cream skim-
ming beyond the 20th percentile has little effect on the economic effi-
ciency of JTPA. However, a policy of targeting services at the bottom 
two deciles entails clear costs. To the extent that the untreated outcome 
proxies for the performance measures, Figure 9.1 suggests only a very 
modest (and very nonlinear) positive relationship between the perfor-
mance measures and the impacts. 
Figure 9.2 for adult men tells a similar tale. We observe a relatively 
flat relationship over the range from the 10th to the 50th percentile, after 
which it dips and then rises again. Given the wide standard errors (and 
the smaller region of zero impacts at the lowest percentiles) we can say 
with some (but not overwhelming) confidence that cream skimming, 
in regard to adult males, also likely has little effect, either positive or 
negative, on efficiency. And, to the extent that the untreated outcomes 
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Figure 9.1  quantile Treatment Effects, Adult Males 
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Figure 9.2  quantile Treatment Effects, Adult Females 
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proxy for the performance measures, we see little relationship between 
the two for adult males under the rank preservation assumption. 
RESULTS BASED On SUBGROUP vARIATIOn: UnIvARIATE
In this section we examine the experimental impact estimates for 
subgroups defined by individual baseline characteristics. Put differ-
ently, we examine the correlation between predictors of Ya 
1 and impacts 
conditional on values of those predictors. Caseworkers may use specific 
variables, such as labor force status, to help them forecast short-run 
outcomes as part of a strategy to select as participants individuals likely 
to do well on the performance measures. Moreover, the relationship 
between such characteristics and Da is of interest in its own right. 
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 summarize subgroup estimates of the impact of 
JTPA on the earnings and employment of adult females and adult males 
in the JTPA experiment, respectively. The first column in each table lists 
the values of each subgroup variable. Columns two through five pre-
sent impacts on earnings in the 18 and 30 months after random assign-
ment and on the fraction of months employed in the 18 and 30 months 
after random assignment. Note that the samples differ for the 18 and 
30 month outcomes due to survey nonresponse in the second follow-up 
survey. We also present p-values from tests of the null of equal impacts 
among the subgroups defined by each variable. We present subgroup 
impacts conditional on labor force status (employed, unemployed, and 
out of the labor force), highest grade completed, AFDC receipt and 
month of last employment (if any), all measured at the time of random 
assignment. All of these variables predict the level of the 18-month and 
30-month outcomes for participants. 
For adult females, we reject the null of equal impacts among sub-
groups in 4 of the 16 possible cases. Two of the rejections (at the 5 per-
cent level) occur for employment over 18 months and earnings over 30 
months conditional on AFDC receipt, with larger impacts in each case 
for women receiving AFDC. As AFDC receipt is negatively related to 
Ya 
1, this finding suggests that cream skimming may be somewhat inef-
ficient for adult women. The other two rejections occur for earnings and 
employment over 30 months conditional on month of last employment. 
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Table 9.2  Experimental Impact Estimates by Subgroup, Adult Females 
Subgroup Earnings impacts ($) Employment impacts 
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months 
Labor force status 
P-value for equal impacts 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Out of the labor force 
P-value for equal impacts 
Highest grade completed 
< 10 
Highest grade completed 
10–11 
Highest grade completed 
12 
Highest grade completed 
> 12 
0.3919 
1,223.78 
(651.64) 
507.42 
(507.92) 
1,543.72 
(601.48) 
0.6890 
1,029.22 
(643.40) 
1,341.37 
(592.06) 
460.29 
(469.73) 
971.20 
(816.54) 
0.5745 
1,487.38 
(2,461.08) 
428.84 
(1,715.10) 
3,274.29 
(2,089.21) 
Educ
0.4641 
−2227.56 
(2,577.38) 
3,088.46 
(2,179.51) 
1503.23 
(1,711.16) 
795.14 
(2,997.34) 
AFDC receipt 
0.4715 
0.0017 
(0.0135) 
0.0112 
(0.0112) 
0.0274 
(0.0160) 
ation 
0.8149 
0.0135 
(0.0164) 
0.0289 
(0.0147) 
0.0129 
(0.0109) 
0.0115 
(0.0172) 
0.2286 
−0.0158 
(0.0168) 
0.0184 
(0.0128) 
0.0184 
(0.0188) 
0.4646 
0.0175 
(0.0182) 
0.0246 
(0.0171) 
−0.0053 
(0.0129) 
0.0209 
(0.0211) 
P-value for equal impacts 
Not receiving AFDC 
Receiving AFDC 
P-value for equal impacts 
Currently employed 
Last employed 0–2 
months ago 
Last employed 3–5 
months ago 
Last employed 6–8 
months ago 
0.7224 
712.26 
(392.05) 
924.57 
(451.07) 
0.8614 
1,104.08 
(721.42) 
594.01 
(713.69) 
171.44 
(953.91) 
1,874.38 
(1,175.53) 
0.0371 
−947.01 
(1,462.17) 
3,624.35 
(1,631.02) 
Recent employment 
0.0492 
396.24 
(2,851.27) 
979.22 
(2,485.38) 
−7,677.17 
(3,485.31) 
975.22 
(3,721.12) 
0.0277 
0.0028 
(0.0087) 
0.0343 
(0.0113) 
0.5708 
0.0138 
(0.0151) 
0.0099 
(0.0161) 
−0.0063 
(0.0199) 
0.0451 
(0.0263) 
0.2607 
0.0026 
(0.0105) 
0.0211 
(0.0127) 
0.0139 
0.0056 
(0.0197) 
0.0060 
(0.0181) 
−0.0589 
(0.0220) 
0.0502 
(0.0305) 
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Table 9.2  (continued) 
Subgroup Earnings impacts ($) Employment impacts 
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months 
Recent employment 
Last employed 9–11 1,679.73 5,244.59 0.0310 0.0636 
months ago (1,311.91) (4,437.63) (0.0305) (0.0382) 
Last employed ≥ 12 1,304.36 4,919.73 0.0341 0.0347 
months ago (587.15) (2,020.46) (0.0155) (0.0180) 
Never employed 610.59 −2,490.44 0.0335 −0.0059 
(609.42) (2,736.46) (0.0168) (0.0191) 
NOTE: Monthly earnings are based on self-reports with top 1 percent trimming. Esti-
mates are adjusted for program dropouts in the treatment group. Earnings impacts 
are calculated using all sample members with valid observations for self-reported 
monthly earnings during each period. The sample includes 4,886 valid observations 
for the 18-month period after random assignment and 1,147 valid observations for 
the 30-month period after random assignment. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors appear in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002). 
We have trouble interpreting these estimates, which do not reveal any 
obvious systematic pattern. 
Considering the estimates in Table 9.2 more broadly, we see three 
patterns. First, we lack the data to precisely estimate most of the sub-
group impacts. Second, the point estimates often suggest very differ-
ent impacts by subgroup. Third, the subgroup impact estimates often 
change substantially between 18 and 30 months. Taken together, these 
findings leave us with a lot of uncertainty about the efficiency effects of 
cream skimming. At the same time, it seems unlikely that caseworkers, 
who receive little feedback about the long-run labor market outcomes 
of participants at either the individual or aggregate level, have more 
information about these patterns than we do. Thus, any efforts to select 
participants based on these observed variables will likely have little 
systematic relationship to impacts, a conclusion quite consistent with 
the finding in Bell and Orr (2002) and Lechner and Smith (2007) that 
caseworkers cannot predict impacts. 
For adult males, statistically significant differences in impacts 
among subgroups defined by our set of characteristics emerge only 
once, for impacts on 18-month earnings conditional on labor force sta-
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Table 9.3  Experimental Impact Estimates by Subgroup, Adult Males 
Subgroup Earnings impacts ($) Employment impacts 
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months 
Labor force status 
P-value for equal impacts 0.0407 0.3469 0.2679 0.6517 
Employed 2,839.24 6,328.20 0.0300 0.0005 
(1,145.51) (4,143.22) (0.0166) (0.0194) 
Unemployed 718.84 3,021.68 0.0056 0.0180 
(710.16) (2,339.51) (0.0105) (0.0125) 
Out of the labor force −2,193.85 −2,725.72 −0.0163 0.0289 
(1,658.81) (4,693.28) (0.0262) (0.0281) 
Education 
P-value for equal impacts 
Highest grade completed 
< 10 
Highest grade completed 
10–11 
Highest grade completed 
12 
Highest grade completed 
> 12 
0.6077 
680.26 
(1,193.62) 
−64.77 
(1,020.79) 
1,438.13 
(793.68) 
−92.00 
(1,238.21) 
0.7939 0.9587 0.7206 
1,713.46 0.0114 0.0403 
(3,935.62) (0.0203) (0.0225) 
−270.18 0.0120 0.0134 
(3,516.67) (0.0163) (0.0188) 
552.70 0.0030 0.0105 
(2,729.26) (0.0119) (0.0141) 
4,886.81 0.0116 0.0201 
(4,155.34) (0.0172) (0.0221) 
AFDC receipt 
P-value for equal impacts 0.5948 0.5794 0.3813 0.6678 
Not receiving AFDC 722.73 2,933.22 0.0122 0.0161 
(556.43) (1,810.58) (0.0085) (0.0099) 
Receiving AFDC −232.18 −274.82 −0.0132 0.0306 
(1,706.56) (5,495.50) (0.0278) (0.0322) 
Recent employment 
P-value for equal impacts 
Currently employed 
Last employed 0–2 
months ago 
Last employed 3–5 
months ago 
Last employed 6–8 
months ago 
0.5995 
2,668.20 
(1,230.61) 
816.36 
(1,091.14) 
−425.61 
(1,162.99) 
−5.65 
(1,824.51) 
0.6193 
3,053.96 
(4,174.11) 
6,126.54 
(3,637.23) 
1,248.64 
(3,794.83) 
−790.27 
(5,453.91) 
0.9112 0.7010 
0.0176 −0.0134 
(0.0178) (0.0212) 
0.0168 0.0205 
(0.0152) (0.0180) 
0.0037 0.0119 
(0.0176) (0.0209) 
−0.0135 0.0312 
(0.0256) (0.0296) 
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Table 9.3  (continued) 
Subgroup Earnings impacts ($) Employment impacts 
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months 
Recent employment 
Last employed 9–11 1,191.58 −4,914.81 0.0163 0.0098 
months ago (2,328.58) (7,657.02) (0.0384) (0.0478) 
Last employed ≥ 12 525.44 3,885.63 0.0284 0.0475 
months ago (1,333.79) (4,722.38) (0.0224) (0.0257) 
Never employed −799.52 −6,377.68 0.0017 0.0145 
(1,606.04) (6,242.27) (0.0295) (0.0319) 
NOTE: Monthly earnings are based on self-reports with top 1 percent trimming. Esti-
mates are adjusted for program dropouts in the treatment group. Earnings impacts 
are calculated using all sample members with valid observations for self-reported 
monthly earnings during each period. The sample includes 4,886 valid observations 
for the 18-month period after random assignment and 1,147 valid observations for 
the 30-month period after random assignment. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors appear in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002). 
tus. In this case, the largest impacts appear for men employed at the time 
of random assignment. Employment at random assignment correlates 
positively with Ya 
1. As for adult women, the insignificant coefficients 
vary substantially among subgroups, and exhibit patterns that are diffi-
cult to interpret, such as nonmonotonicity as a function of months since 
last employment or years of schooling, as well as substantial changes 
from 18 to 30 months. Combined with the general lack of statistically 
significant subgroup impacts, the pattern of estimates represents weak 
evidence of at most a modest efficiency gain to cream skimming for 
adult males. For both men and women, of course, the costs of service 
provision may vary among subgroups as well, so that the net impacts 
may differ in either direction from the gross impacts reported here. 
Other results in the literature that make use of the experimental data 
from the NJS echo the findings in Tables 9.2 and 9.3. Bloom et al. (1993, 
Exhibits 4.15 and 5.14) present subgroup impact estimates on earnings 
in the 18 months after random assignment. Orr et al. (1996, Exhibits 
5.8 and 5.9) present similar estimates for 30-month earnings using a 
somewhat different earnings measure than we use here.7 Both consider 
a different set of subgroups than we do. Only a couple of significant 
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subgroup impacts appear at 18 months. At 30 months, the only signifi-
cant subgroup differences found by Orr et al. (1996) among adults are 
for adult men, where men with a spouse present have higher impacts.8 
Overall, the absence of many statistically significant subgroup differ-
ences, combined with the pattern of point estimates, makes the findings 
in Bloom et al. (1993) and Orr et al. (1996) consistent with our own 
findings. There exists little evidence of substantial efficiency gains or 
losses from picking participants on the basis of X and, even if such 
potential gains or losses exist, neither we nor, in all probability, the 
caseworkers, have any real knowledge of them. 
RESULTS BASED On SUBGROUP vARIATIOn In 
ExPERIMEnTAL IMPACTS: REGRESSIOn 
We now turn to our multivariate regression analysis of the relation-
ship between subgroup impacts and subgroup average performance 
measures. Table 9.4 presents estimates of the relationship between 
experimental impacts on earnings and on employment and various per-
formance measures based on short-term labor market outcomes. We 
estimate separate regressions for each outcome (earnings and employ-
ment for 18 and 30 months) and for each performance measure.9 
The four columns of estimates in Table 9.4 correspond to cumulated 
earnings and employment impacts for 18 and 30 months after random 
assignment. Each cell in the table presents the regression coefficient 
associated with the column’s dependent variable and the row’s inde-
pendent variable, the estimated (robust) standard error of the coeffi-
cient, the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the population 
coefficient equals zero and the R2 for the regression. We do not report 
the estimated constant terms from the regressions to reduce clutter. For 
example, the first row of the first column reveals that a regression of 
subgroup earnings impacts for the 18 months after random assignment 
on the subgroup average hourly wage at termination from the JTPA pro-
gram yields an estimated coefficient of −$577.61 on the hourly wage, 
with a standard error of $304.00, a p-value of 0.0645, and an overall R2 
of 0.0809. 
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Four striking findings emerge from Table 9.4. First, and most 
important, we find many negative relationships between short-run per-
formance indicators and experimental impact estimates at the subgroup 
level. In many cases the short-run outcome measures utilized in the 
JTPA performance standards system have a perverse relationship with 
the longer-run earnings and employment impacts that constitute the 
program’s goals. The only evidence supporting the efficacy of short-
run outcome measures comes from the employment-based performance 
measures for adult men, which are positive and statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level in three cases. These same performance measures 
have negative coefficients in seven out of eight cases for adult women. 
Second, we find low R2 values throughout. The short-term perfor-
mance measures have only a very weak relationship with impacts on 
earnings and employment for 18 or 30 months. Third, moving from 
performance measures based on outcomes at termination from the pro-
gram to longer-term measures based on outcomes three months after 
termination usually weakens the relationship between the performance 
measure and program impacts. In particular, the R2 values nearly always 
decline and the estimated coefficients sometimes become less positive 
or more negative. Fourth, the performance measures often do worse (in 
terms of the fraction of variance explained) at predicting impacts for 
30 months after random assignment than at predicting impacts for 18 
months after random assignment. This indicates that the low predictive 
power of the performance measures in our analysis does not result from 
reductions in work activity during the periods of program participation 
(the so-called lock-in effect), which for some participants constitutes a 
nontrivial chunk of the 18 months after random assignment. 
In sum, the regression analysis yields three clear conclusions. First, 
short-run performance measures do a very poor job of predicting long-
run impacts, in terms of explained variation. In general, performance 
measures only weakly related to program goals accomplish little as 
rewards and punishments often get assigned based on noise. In terms 
of the discussion in Chapter 3, the JTPA performance measures do not 
solve the principal-agent problem by providing incentives for impact 
maximization. Moreover, they clearly fail to provide cheap, quick prox-
ies for econometric impact evaluations. Second, the point estimates 
often suggest a negative relationship, indicating that the JTPA perfor-
mance standards system may have provided an incentive for reduced 
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Table 9.4  Relationship between ∆ and Y1
1  in JTPA: Earnings and Employment Impacts 
Earnings impact ($) measured over: Employment impact measured over: 
18 months after 30 months after 18 months after 30 months after 
Performance standard measure random assignment random assignment random assignment random assignment 
Adult females 
Hourly wage at time of termination −577.61 
(304.00) 
p = 0.0645 
R2 = 0.0809 
−1,729.66 
(1,280.64) 
p = 0.1842 
R2 = 0.0426 
−0.018 
(0.008) 
p = 0.0202 
R2 = 0.1246 
−0.010 
(0.011) 
p = 0.3559 
R2 = 0.0208 
Weekly earnings at time of follow-up −3.74 
(8.78) 
p = 0.6726 
R2 = 0.0044 
−12.05 
(36.54) 
p = 0.7432 
R2 = 0.0026 
−0.000 
(0.000) 
p = 0.2728 
R2 = 0.0293 
−0.000 
(0.000) 
p = 0.3277 
R2 = 0.0234 
Employment at time of termination −117.72 
(941.92) 
p = 0.9012 
R2 = 0.0004 
−2,065.61 
(3,928.63) 
p = 0.6019 
R2 = 0.0069 
−0.023 
(0.023) 
p = 0.3213 
R2 = 0.0246 
−0.029 
(0.033) 
p = 0.3767 
R2 = 0.0196 
Employment at time of follow-up 1,513.28 
(1,482.04) 
p = 0.3132 
R2 = 0.0248 
−1,873.03 
(6,236.83) 
p = 0.7655 
R2 = 0.0022 
−0.067 
(0.037) 
p = 0.0767 
R2 = 0.0745 
−0.024 
(0.053) 
p = 0.6521 
R2 = 0.0050 
  
Adult males 
Hourly wage at time of termination 465.41 
(394.76) 
p = 0.2452 
R2 = 0.0328 
−1,405.68 
(1,653.30) 
p = 0.4001 
R2 = 0.0173 
0.003 
(0.005) 
p = 0.4914 
R2 = 0.0116 
−0.005 
(0.010) 
p = 0.6230 
R2 = 0.0059 
Weekly earnings at time of follow-up 6.74 
(7.42) 
p = 0.3690 
R2 = 0.0197 
−20.76 
(31.79) 
p = 0.5174 
R2 = 0.0103 
0.000 
(0.000) 
p = 0.9921 
R2 = 0.0000 
−0.000 
(0.000) 
p = 0.3274 
R2 = 0.0234 
Employment at time of termination 2,542.99 
(1,384.72) 
p = 0.0737 
R2 = 0.0778 
3,673.71 
(5,869.08) 
p = 0.5349 
R2 = 0.0097 
0.005 
(0.017) 
p = 0.7559 
R2 = 0.0024 
−0.059 
(0.034) 
p = 0.0850 
R2 = 0.0723 
Employment at time of follow-up 2,579.24 
(2,486.91) 
p = 0.3058 
R2 = 0.0256 
18,716.00 
(9,842.28) 
p = 0.0643 
R2 = 0.0810 
0.050 
(0.028) 
p = 0.0848 
R2 = 0.0707 
0.021 
(0.061) 
p = 0.7338 
R2 = 0.0029 
NOTE: The actual JTPA performance measures are defined as follows: “Hourly wage at placement” is the average wage at program 
termination for employed adults. “Weekly earnings at follow-up” are the average weekly wage of adults employed 13 weeks after pro-
gram termination. “Employment rate at termination” is the fraction of adults employed at program termination. “Employment rate at 
follow-up” is the fraction of adults who were employed 13 weeks after program termination. In our analysis, employment rates were 
calculated based on the presence or absence of a job spell within 30 days before or after each reference date (termination or follow-
up). Hourly wages were calculated based on the highest reported hourly wage for all job spells reported within 30 days before or after 
each reference date. Weekly earnings were calculated by averaging the product of hourly wages and hours worked per week across all 
reported job spells within 30 days before or after each reference date weighted by the fraction of the 61-day window spanned by each 
job spell.
SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002). 
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efficiency. Third, we can say little about the efficiency cost to cream 
skimming other than that the data do not make a loud statement in either 
direction given our sample size and subgroups. 
PUTTInG ThE RESULTS In COnTExT 
The findings presented in this chapter do not represent an anomaly 
in the literature, but rather tell much the same story as the other studies 
that perform similar analyses. Table 9.5 summarizes six other studies 
that examine the relationship between performance standards measures 
based on short-run outcome levels and long-run program impacts; these 
six studies include, to the best of our knowledge, all of the published 
studies of this type as well as two that appeared only as government 
reports.10 For each study, the table provides the citation, the particu-
lar employment and training program considered, the data used for the 
analysis, the impact measure used (for example, earnings from 18 to 
36 months after random assignment), the impact estimator used (for 
example, random assignment), the particular performance measures 
considered (for example, employment at termination), and the findings. 
Four studies, Gay and Borus (1980), Cragg (1997), Barnow (1999), 
and Burghardt and Schochet (2001), reach conclusions very similar to 
our own. The other two studies, Friedlander (1988) and Zornitsky et 
al. (1988), obtain more mixed results. The most positive of the studies, 
Zornitsky et al. (1988), examines the AFDC Homemaker/Home Health 
Aide Demonstration, which provided a homogeneous treatment to rela-
tively homogeneous clients. This program represents a very different 
context from multitreatment programs serving heterogeneous popula-
tions such as JTPA and WIA. Moreover, this demonstration program, 
with its focus on the skills for a particular high-demand occupation, 
most likely did not lead to much postprogram human capital investment. 
As noted in Chapter 3, such investments tend to weaken the relationship 
between the short-run performance measures and long-run impacts. 
Taken together, these studies generally support our finding from the 
JTPA data that performance standards based on short-run outcome lev-
els likely do little to encourage the provision of services to those who 
benefit most from them in employment and training programs. 
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LIMITATIOnS OF OUR AnALySIS 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on one particular caseworker 
response to the imposition of a performance management system based 
on short-run outcomes: changes in who gets accepted into the pro-
gram. In a model similar to the one presented in Chapter 3, casework-
ers attempt to forecast both impacts and performance outcomes using 
the information available at the time of the acceptance decisions. In 
the case of the subgroup regression analysis, our interpretation assumes 
that caseworkers use observed characteristics to forecast both impacts 
and performance outcomes and then act on those forecasts. The per-
formance management system causes them to put more weight onto 
the performance outcome forecast in making decisions about whom to 
serve. 
Two important assumptions lurk in the shadows behind this inter-
pretation. First, we must assume that mean impacts and mean perfor-
mance at the subgroup level do not differ between a world with per-
formance standards and a world without them. This assumption could 
easily fail if, for example, service allocations conditional on character-
istics change with the introduction of performance management.11 Sec-
ond, we must also assume that mean impacts and mean performance at 
the subgroup level do not differ between applicants and participants.12 
Caseworkers see and make choices about applicants, while we have 
data only on individuals accepted into the program, as indicated by their 
reaching random assignment. The data from the Corpus Christi site in 
the NJS considered in Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) indicate that 
only about one-third of applicants reach random assignment, which 
leaves plenty of scope for differences between applicants and partici-
pants in the relationship that we estimate. 
A final and very important limitation resides in the inability of our 
analyses in this chapter (or indeed, in this book) to say anything about 
the effect of the performance standards on the technical efficiency (or 
productivity) of the local JTPA training centers. By way of illustration, 
consider the subgroup regression analysis and suppose that having a 
performance standards system increases both the mental and physical 
effort levels (more “working smart” and less on-the-job leisure) of pro-
gram staff. Suppose that this extra effort increases the impact of the 
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Table 9.5  Evidence on the Correlation Between y
1
 and ∆ from 
Several Studies 
Study Program Data Measure of impact 
Gay and 
Borus 
(1980) 
Zornitsky 
et al. (1988) 
Friedlander 
(1988) 
Manpower 
Development 
and Training Act 
(MDTA), Job 
Opportunities 
in the Business 
Sector (JOBS), 
Neighborhood Youth 
Corps Out-of-School 
Program (NYC/OS), 
and the Job Corps 
AFDC Homemaker-
Home Health Aid 
Demonstration 
Mandatory welfare-
to-work programs in 
San Diego, Baltimore, 
Virginia, Arkansas, 
and Cook County 
Randomly selected 
program participants 
entering programs 
from December 1968 
to June 1970 and 
matched (on age, race, 
city, and sometimes 
neighborhood) 
comparison 
sample of eligible 
nonparticipants. 
Volunteers in the 
seven states in which 
the demonstration 
projects were 
conducted. To be 
eligible, volunteers 
had to have been on 
AFDC continuously 
for at least 90 days. 
Applicants and 
recipients of AFDC 
(varies across 
programs). Data 
collected as part of 
MDRC’s experimental 
evaluations of these 
programs. 
Impact on Social 
Security earnings in 
1973 (from 18 to 36 
months after program 
exit). 
Mean monthly 
earnings in the 32 
months after random 
assignment and mean 
monthly combined 
AFDC and food 
stamp benefits in 
the 29 months after 
random assignment. 
Postrandom 
assignment earnings 
(from UI earnings 
records) and welfare 
receipt (from 
administrative data). 
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Impact estimator Performance measures Findings 
Nonexperimental 
“kitchen sink” 
Tobit model 
Experimental impact 
estimates 
Experimental impact 
estimates 
Employment in quarter after 
program, before-after (four 
quarters before to one quarter 
after) changes in weeks 
worked, weeks not in the 
labor force, wage rate, hours 
worked, income, amount of 
unemployment insurance 
received, and amount of 
public assistance received. 
Employment and wages at 
termination. Employment 
and welfare receipt three and 
six months after termination. 
Mean weekly earnings 
and welfare benefits in the 
three and six month periods 
after termination. These 
measures are examined both 
adjusted and not adjusted for 
observable factors including 
trainee demographics and 
welfare and employment 
histories and local labor 
markets. 
Employment (nonzero 
quarterly earnings) in 
quarters 2 and 3 (short term) 
or quarters 4 to 6 (long term) 
after random assignment. 
Welfare receipt in quarter 
3 (short-term) or quarter 6 
(long-term) after random 
assignment. 
No measure has a consistent, 
positive, and statistically 
significant relationship to 
the estimated impacts across 
subgroups and programs. 
The before-after measures, 
particularly weeks worked 
and wages, do much better 
than employment in the 
quarter after the program. 
All measures have the correct 
sign on their correlation 
with earnings impacts, 
whether adjusted or not. The 
employment and earnings 
measures are all statistically 
significant (or close to it). 
The welfare measures are 
correctly correlated with 
welfare impacts but the 
employment measures are 
not unless adjusted. The 
measures at three and six 
months do better than those 
at termination, but there is 
little gain from going from 
three to six. 
Employment measure is 
positively correlated with 
earnings gains but not welfare 
savings for most programs. 
Welfare indicator is always 
positively correlated with 
earnings impacts, but rarely 
significantly so. It is not 
related to welfare savings. 
Long-term performance 
measures do little better (and 
sometimes worse) than short-
term measures. 
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Table 9.5  (continued) 
Study Program Data Measure of impact 
Cragg JTPA (1983–87) NLSY Before-after change in 
(1997) participant earnings. 
Barnow JTPA (1987–89) NJS Earnings and hours 
(1999) worked in month 
10 after random 
assignment. 
Burghardt Job Corps Experimental data The outcome 
and from the National measures include 
Schochet Job Corps Study receipt of education 
(2001) or training, weeks 
of education or 
training, hours per 
week of education or 
training, receipt of a 
high school diploma 
or GED, receipt of a 
vocational certificate, 
earnings, and being 
arrested. All are 
measured over the 
48 months following 
random assignment. 
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Impact estimator Performance measures Findings 
Generalized bivariate 
Tobit model of 
preprogram and 
postprogram annual 
earnings 
Fraction of time spent 
working since leaving school 
in the preprogram period. 
This variable is strongly 
correlated with postprogram 
employment levels. 
Negative relationship 
between work experience 
and before-after earnings 
changes. 
Experimental impact 
estimates 
Regression-adjusted levels 
of earnings and hours worked 
in month 10 after random 
assignment. 
At best a weak relationship 
between performance 
measures and program 
impacts. 
Experimental impact 
estimates 
Job Corps centers divided 
into three groups: high 
performers, medium 
performers, and low 
performers based on their 
overall performance rankings 
in program years 1994, 1995, 
and 1996. High and low 
centers were in the top and 
bottom third nationally in all 
three years, respectively. 
No systematic relationship 
between the performance 
groups and the experimental 
impact estimates. 
SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002); Barnow and Smith (2004). 
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program for all participants by $100 over 18 months. In our regres-
sions of estimated subgroup mean impacts on estimated subgroup mean 
performance levels, this extra $100 shows up in the intercept, not in 
the slope coefficient, with the result that we do not interpret it as the 
effect of the performance standards. To our knowledge, the only evi-
dence of the effect of performance management on technical efficiency 
in the context of an active labor market program comes from the United 
Kingdom, where Burgess et al. (2004) find evidence of such effects for 
small work teams but not for large ones. This lack of evidence comes 
as a real surprise, given that the literature on performance incentives in 
private firms, well summarized in Prendergast (1999), focuses almost 
exclusively on productivity effects. 
SUMMARy AnD COnCLUSIOnS 
This chapter presents several empirical analyses designed to address 
the questions laid out in the introduction: First, do short-run perfor-
mance measures predict long-run impacts? Second, what are the effi-
ciency costs of cream skimming? We describe the identifying assump-
tions underlying our analyses as well as their limitations. 
Taken as a whole, our empirical analysis reaches two important 
conclusions. First, the limited evidence we have suggests that what-
ever cream skimming occurs in JTPA produces only modest efficiency 
gains or losses. In other words, though we must acknowledge the noisi-
ness of the evidence, our results suggest at most a modest efficiency 
cost associated with eschewing cream skimming in favor of a focus on 
the most hard-to-serve among those applying to the program. Second, 
the JTPA performance standards do not promote efficiency because the 
short-run outcomes they rely on have essentially a zero correlation with 
long-run impacts on employment and earnings. This surprising result 
comports with the findings in several other studies that have estimated 
this relationship. 
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notes 
1. This chapter presents results from Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002) and bor-
rows in places from their text. 
2. In addition to simple mean differences, we can also use regression analysis to 
obtain experimental impact estimates. Doing so may generate more precise esti-
mates if the exogenous conditioning variables included in the regression soak up 
a lot of the residual variance. 
3. This concept has a variety of names in the published literature, including “per-
fect positive dependence” and “perfect positive rank correlation.” We use “rank 
preservation” here because it is short and seems to be gaining ground in the most 
recent literature. 
4. See, e.g., Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997); Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes 
(2008); and Djebbari and Smith (2008) for more details on this estimator, includ-
ing the construction of the standard errors. 
5. This correction amounts to using the simple Wald instrumental variables estimator 
with treatment status as an instrument for enrollment. See, e.g., the discussions in 
Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1998) and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999, 
Section 5.2) on the properties and origin of this estimator. 
6. An alternative strategy would generate predicted individual impacts by including 
interaction terms between baseline covariates and the treatment group dummy in 
an impact regression; see Barnow (1999) for an application. 
7. Their earnings measure combines self-report data with data from Unemploy-
ment Insurance earnings records. For more details, see the discussion in Orr et al. 
(1996). 
8. Orr et al. (1996, Exhibits 5.19 and 5.20) also present subgroup impact estimates 
for male and female youth. As expected given the small sample sizes, they find no 
statistically significant differences in estimated impacts among the subgroups. 
9. To improve statistical efficiency, we use the inverse of the robust standard errors 
from the corresponding impact estimation as weights in each regression. Recall 
that the dependent variable here is the impact; its estimated standard error is thus 
an estimate of the variance of the error term for that impact, which represents one 
observation in our regression. Viewed in this way, the procedure amounts to doing 
weighted least squares in the presence of heteroskedasticity, where the extent of 
the heteroskedasticity is indicated by differences among subgroups in the esti-
mated standard errors of the impacts. 
10. We thank Tim Bartik of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research for 
providing us with copies of two of the unpublished papers. 
11. To see this, consider a simple case with two groups, A and B, two services, Class-
room Training (CT) and Job Search Assistance (JSA), and one short-run perfor-
mance measure, P. For group A, CT yields impact 100 and performance 20 while 
JSA yields impact 40 and performance 40. In contrast, for group B, CT yields 
impact 30 and performance 10 while JSA yields impact 40 and performance 40. 
Suppose further that without the performance management system, program staff 
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would maximize impacts by assigning group A to CT and group B to JSA. In 
contrast, with the performance management system, they maximize performance 
by assigning both A and B to JSA. Thus, the introduction of the performance stan-
dards system induces a substantial efficiency loss. Unfortunately, our regression 
analysis applied to data collected from this imaginary program after the introduc-
tion of performance standards would not reveal the efficiency loss. This follows 
from the fact that in the world with the performance standards system, the correla-
tion between subgroup mean impacts and subgroup performance equals zero. 
12. To see the issue, consider a simple example. In this example our program has just 
one service: CT. Among the applicants, some individuals have a (H)igh impact 
of CT because they get along well with the instructor, others would have a (L)ow 
impact because they do not. At the same time, applicants also differ in their job 
search behavior following CT. Some individuals, call them (F)ast, take the first 
job they find after completing CT while other individuals, call them (S)low, search 
longer but find a higher paying job in the end, as standard search theory would 
predict. Together H/L and F/S define four groups. Assume that these four groups 
each constitute one-quarter of the applicants and that the program has sufficient 
resources to serve half of the applicants. To make the example concrete, we assign 
the following values: H-F individuals have impact 100 and performance 50, H-S 
individuals have impact 120 and performance 20, L-F individuals have impact 50 
and performance 50, and L-S applicants have impact 80 and performance 10. In 
a world without performance standards, caseworkers serve only H individuals, 
while in a world with performance standards, caseworkers serve only F individu-
als. In the applicant population, impact and performance outcomes have a negative 
correlation, indicating an efficiency loss from selection into the program based on 
performance rather than impacts. In the participant population, impact and perfor-
mance have a zero correlation because, by construction, performance equals 50 
for all the participants regardless of their impact. This example clearly violates 
the assumption of the same relationship between impacts and performance among 
participants and applicants. It also demonstrates that failure of this assumption can 
lead to a misleading conclusion about the efficiency effects of cream skimming 
and about whether short-term outcomes predict long-term impacts. 
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10 
Lessons for Advancing Future 
Performance Standards Systems 
James J. Heckman 
Carolyn J. Heinrich 
Jeffrey Smith 
The economic recession that started in 2007 led to renewed inter-
est in public employment and training services. At the same time, the 
accompanying financial crises also elevated concern for how dwindling 
government budgets could be spent more efficiently and effectively to 
maximize returns to public investments in training. As discussed in the 
introductory chapter, revamping incentive systems in government is a 
critical step toward improving government performance and our future 
economic outlook. 
The chapters in this volume marshal some of the most detailed evi-
dence available on how performance standards and incentives influence 
the behavior of program administrators and staff and contribute to pro-
gram outcomes or unintended consequences. Since each chapter pres-
ents a self-contained summary of its main findings, we do not review 
the details of each one. Instead, this conclusion presents three main 
lessons learned from these essays and discusses some of their policy 
implications. 
LESSOn 1: AGEnCIES RESPOnD TO InCEnTIvES 
Concerns that performance incentives are disregarded by govern-
ment employees because award levels are low or because benefits are 
diffused are not justified. Low-powered cash incentives may, in fact, be 
high-powered because of the value of the budgetary awards in estab-
lishing the reputation of bureaucrats and the recognition that comes 
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with them. Bonuses and award money create leverage in the social ser-
vices community and are thus frequently highly prized (Heinrich 2007). 
The evidence reported by Courty and Marschke in Chapter 7 demon-
strates that agencies made placement, enrollment, and termination deci-
sions in ways that were consistent with maximizing their performance 
as measured by the JTPA performance standards system. The evidence 
presented by Heinrich in Chapter 8 reveals that although caseworkers 
claimed to discount performance standards in decision making, they 
nevertheless selectively enrolled into JTPA people who were likely to 
contribute to the placement goals rewarded under the performance stan-
dards system. 
Courty and Marschke and Heinrich also present a dark side to the 
behavior elicited by the JTPA performance standards system. Training 
centers showed remarkable ingenuity in manipulating the JTPAaccount-
ing system and reporting requirements in their efforts to boost their 
measured performance. Practices included enrolling persons receiv-
ing job search assistance or on-the-job training only after they found 
a job, using short-term training arrangements in order to maximize the 
probability of counting a successful placement, holding persons who 
did not find jobs in dead-end job clubs, and releasing poorly perform-
ing trainees from the program at strategic accounting dates when it did 
least damage to training center performance records. These all represent 
behaviors that make perfect sense in terms of the performance stan-
dards, but they do nothing to raise participant earnings or increase the 
equity with which program services are distributed. 
The problem of regulating job-training programs—or any govern-
ment agency—is that enforceable regulations cannot be written too 
finely, and simple rules can and will, as shown in this volume, be sub-
verted. Along these lines, performance standards systems designers 
also need to grasp the dynamic properties of performance incentive sys-
tems, as discussed in Chapter 5 and illustrated throughout this volume. 
An incentive system designer’s understanding of how individuals will 
respond to performance standards will inevitably be imperfect prior to 
their introduction, and it is only as performance measures and targets are 
tried, evaluated, modified, and/or discarded that their responses become 
known (Courty and Marschke 2007). Of course, this type of monitor-
ing to assess a measure’s effectiveness and possible distortion requires 
a considerable investment on the part of incentive system designers, 
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one that has probably been underestimated in the past. And as Heinrich 
and Marschke (2010) point out, learning on the part of bureaucrats will 
advance over time as well, as they come to better know the distinct 
weaknesses of performance measures and how they can be exploited 
through their day-to-day experiences. Incentive system designers will 
have to expect to regularly review and revise the rules and incentives 
they create if they want to avoid the inefficient behavior documented in 
the chapters in this volume. 
LESSOn 2: CURREnT PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS DO
nOT PREDICT LOnG-RUn GAInS 
While the chapters by Courty and Marschke and Heinrich indi-
cate that the JTPA performance standards system effectively motivated 
agency staff and service providers to meet short-run performance stan-
dards, they do not indicate whether the measures themselves are appro-
priate to induce the achievement of the primary program goals, i.e., 
increasing the earnings of program participants (or the value added of 
the program). Chapter 9 demonstrates that the short-run performance 
measures featured by the JTPA performance standards system were 
weakly and often perversely related to the long-term effects of the pro-
gram on the earnings and employment of participants. Yet it is these 
long-term effects that constituted the true goal of the program’s services. 
The analysis also reveals that the measurement of wages and employ-
ment at a later point following termination represented no improve-
ment in the performance monitoring system. Neither set of measures 
was strongly positively related to long-run program impacts on earn-
ings and employment, suggesting that the performance standards sys-
tem did not promote the program’s key objectives of long-run gains in 
earnings and employment for participants. We see no reason to expect 
that the relationships between the performance measures and programs 
have changed under WIA and thus no reason to think that this problem 
has gone away. 
From the perspective of policymakers and taxpayers who would 
like to maximize the value from government dollars spent on public 
programs, the goal of incentive system designers should be to choose 
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performance measures so that the effects of bureaucratic actions on mea-
sured performance are aligned with the effects of those same actions on 
value added. However, we frequently lack the information required to 
realize this objective in practice. Empirical research, as Heckman and 
Smith suggest, has focused primarily on estimating measures of statisti-
cal association between performance and value added, where the value 
added of programs has been assessed through the use of randomized 
experiments or through sophisticated statistical modeling. The dynam-
ics of performance standards systems, however, may limit the useful-
ness even of these estimates, as the alignment between a performance 
measure and value added may decrease after a performance measure is 
introduced and bureaucrats respond by exploring all strategies for rais-
ing it, not just those that also increase program value added. Clearly, 
this will continue to be one of the most vexing issues for performance 
standards system designers for some time to come. 
LESSOn 3: ThE CREAM SKIMMInG PROBLEM
IS OvERSTATED 
The charge of cream skimming has arisen frequently in public job 
training programs, including the Workforce Investment Act program. 
In Chapters 3, 6, and 9, we define various uses of this term and pre-
sent evidence that fears about cream skimming are overstated. For most 
demographic groups, experimental estimates of the earnings impacts 
of participation in JTPA are uniform over broad skill levels. Only at 
the lowest skill levels is there any evidence that impacts were smaller 
than at higher levels of the skill distribution. While there is some evi-
dence of a trade-off between serving the most disadvantaged within 
eligible populations and allocating program resources most efficiently, 
it appears to be a modest one given the modest benefits realized by 
program participants. 
Cream skimming is usually defined as arising from purposive 
screening behavior by bureaucrats. Chapters 6 and 8 present informa-
tion about disparities in program participation rates among different 
demographic groups. Even among eligible persons, there are substantial 
differences in program participation rates. It is not enough to compare 
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participation rates among the eligible to determine if cream skimming 
is an important factor. At issue is how much of the difference in par-
ticipation rates conditional on eligibility is due to the voluntary choices 
of individuals, how much is due to their lack of information about the 
program, and how much is due to the decisions of bureaucrats. The 
decompositions of participation rates into components due to eligibil-
ity, awareness, and acceptance that are presented in Chapter 6 reveal 
that personal choices and lack of information play the major role in 
accounting for demographic disparities in participation. Administrative 
discretion also has some role to play in determining the participation 
rates of different groups in public job training programs, but it is not the 
dominant factor. 
The evidence in Chapters 6 and 8 indicates that those whose char-
acteristics make them more employable and more easily placed were 
more likely to be screened into the JTPA system. However, the analysis 
of Chapter 6 reveals that the same characteristics that make a person 
more attractive in terms of achieving objectives within the job place-
ment system also made that person more aware of the program and 
more willing to apply to it. Thus, if resources are going to be used to 
improve equity in access to programs with voluntary enrollment, incen-
tive system designers and program administrators should consider 
investing more in (or providing incentives for) increasing awareness of 
the program among the eligible population. 
We realize that there will be some limits to the generalizability 
of these findings and the lessons of this collection of studies to other 
public program contexts, and that there is inherent variability in the 
potential of performance standards systems for improving government 
performance in the many different contexts in which they have been 
introduced or considered. At the same time, it is clear that there is no 
diminishing of demand on the part of policymakers or the public for 
greater accountability and a results-oriented focus of government. The 
research in this volume suggests that there is considerable work to do 
in addressing the flaws of current public sector performance standards 
systems as well as investing in research that will guide improvements 
and advancements to these systems as their use expands in the public 
sector. 
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program in, 294t 
ARRA. See American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act 
Ashenfelter dip, 223 
Asian workers, adult enrollment rate at 
employment termination of, 79, 80t 
Australia, public bureaucracies and 
performance incentive system 
development in, 2 
Awards. See Contracted services, award 
process for; Incentive awards and 
rewards 
Baltimore, Maryland, mandatory 
welfare-to-work program in, 294t 
Bartik, Tim, 299n10 
Benchmarks as performance standards, 
7–8, 95–108 
base level of performance in setting, 
98, 111–112 
dynamics and, 107–108, 118–120, 
119t 
hidden information and distortions, 
102–105, 223–225 
(see also Cream-skimming 
behaviors; Deadline effects) 
insurance and uncontrollable risk, 
101–102, 109, 113–115, 121n2, 
126 
leveling the playing field with, 100–
101, 112–113, 120 
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Benchmarks as performance standards, 
cont. 
multiple principals, 105–107, 116–
118 
principal-agent model framework for, 
96–100 
Black workers 
as adults and JTPA, 79, 80t, 141t 
as ENPs in Jersey City, 136, 137t 
JTPA participation simulation results 
and, 168t, 170t, 172t, 174t, 176t,
178t, 180t, 182t, 184, 186t, 188t,
190t, 192t 
NJS data on, 139, 142, 274, 275t 
services to, 197, 257t 
Bonuses, performance standards and, 2, 
121, 214, 306 
See also Incentive awards and 
rewards 
Butte, Montana, as NJS data site, 275t 
California, 294t 
enrollment of target groups as 
performance measure in, 83, 91n16 
as NJS participant, 68t, 275t 
Case management, 232 
as JTPA service, 17, 19, 30–31, 259t,
260–261, 260t 
as WIA service, 17, 19, 30–31 
Caseworker as agent, 97–98, 100–105, 
114 
continuous improvement and, 107–
108 
decisions by, as suggestive cream- 
skimming evidence, 132, 195–197 
investment in tasks by, 206–208, 
225–226n3, 226n4 
multiple-agent conditions, 104–105, 
109 
participant selection and service 
assignment by, 58n11, 240–243 
(see also Service delivery case 
study) 
performance measures as data rules 
for action by, 203–204, 219–220 
See also Street-level bureaucrats 
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, as NJS data site, 275t 
CETA. See Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act 
Chicago metropolitan area, case study 
of county-level agency in, 231–
232, 265n3 
Chicago Public Schools, accountability 
policy in, 213 
Children 
effect of, on JTPA participation, 142, 
185, 240 
in support of, 2, 139, 208 
(see also Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children [AFDC]) 
Civil Service Reform Act, merit pay 
system and, 89–90n8 
Classroom training, 127 
assumptions about, 293, 300n12 
as JTPA service, 133, 136, 137t, 158, 
160, 221, 226n7 
NJS data on, 274, 275t 
short-run performance measure for, 
293, 299–300n11 
College and university admissions 
participation in, 35, 127 
post-, and training service 
assignment, 158, 256t 
Colorado, as NJS participant, 68t, 275t 
Community colleges, JTPA classroom 
training at, 158 
Compensation, 98, 101 
staff, in federal-level programs, 67, 
70, 89–90n8, 89n7 
Competition, 82, 265n1 
job training centers and, 85–86, 88, 
109, 112, 261 
Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act (CETA), 15, 240 
differences between, and JTPA, 133–
134, 160 
Continuous improvement, as change 
dynamic, 107–108, 119–120 
Contracted services 
award process for, 233–234, 261, 
262–263 
JTPA vs. WIA and, 265n1 
 
 
 
 
  
 
       
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
      
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
   
   
 
 
  
       
   
   
   
 
   
  
 
   
      
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
	 	 	   
 
 
       
   
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
Index 317 
Cook County, Illinois, mandatory 
welfare-to-work program in, 294t 
Coosa Valley, Georgia, as NJS data site, 
275t 
Corpus Christi, Texas 
ENPs in NJS data from, 135–138, 
137t, 275t, 293 
JTPA enrollment probabilities in, 160,
196 
Counseling and assessment 
as JTPA service, 17, 19, 259t, 260–
261, 260t 
as WIA service, 17, 19 
County-level programs, 231–232, 265n3, 
275t, 294t 
Cream-skimming behaviors, 212 
discouragement of, 88, 116 
equity and efficiency of, 44–46, 48, 
274, 281, 283, 298 
performance incentive system and, 9, 
43–48, 57, 58–59n12, 76 
performance standards systems and, 
30, 115–116, 308–309 
street-level bureaucrats and, 235–236,
248, 262, 263–264 
Cream-skimming behaviors, evidence of, 
125–199 
application/acceptance determinants 
for JTPA program, 129f, 131, 
152–159, 154t–155t, 156t–157t,
243 
awareness determinants for JTPA
program, 129f, 144–152, 145t,
148t–149t, 150t–151t 
context for, 126–128 
decomposing the selection process 
into JTPA program, 126, 130–131,
166–195, 168t–171t, 172t–175t,
176t–179t, 180t–183t, 186t–187t,
188t–189t, 190t–191t, 192t–193t,
198n1 
eligibility determinants for JTPA
program, 129f, 138–144, 
139t–140t, 141t–142t, 143t, 198n4 
enrollment determinants for JTPA
program, 129–130, 129f, 159–165,
162t–163t, 164t–165t, 210–211, 
220 
JTPA program and, 132–134 
NJS data for, 134–135, 198n7 
sites from NJS, 135–138, 137t 
social program participation as 
framework for, 128–132, 195–196 
Customer satisfaction, performance and, 
23t, 41, 115t 
Deadline effects, distortion of 
performance measures as, 87, 88 
Decatur, Illinois, as NJS data site, 275t 
Dislocated workers, 115t, 117 
JTPA Title III for, 22t, 24, 25n3 
WIA performance measures for, 22t,
24 
District of Columbia, WIA performance 
standards in, 113 
Dynamics of Performance Management
(Moynihan), 10–11 
Earnings impacts, 35 
equilibrium effects on, 32, 58n5 
gender differences in, 281–283, 282ff,
283, 287–288, 289, 290t–291t,
299n7 
literature survey of, 294t–297t 
maximizing, as goals of JTPA/WIA, 
29, 58n2, 219, 223, 235, 265n2 
as negotiated performance standard, 
115t, 117 
performance measures for, and JTPA/
WIA, 22t–23t, 25, 41–42, 70, 
74t–75t, 76, 86, 90n11 
vocational training and, 221–222, 
226n7 
Economically disadvantaged persons 
federal funding to, allocated through 
states, 17, 25n5, 87 
handicapped, and adult enrollment 
rate at employment termination, 
79, 80t, 240 
JTPA program for, 16, 19, 25–26n7, 
133–135, 198n8 
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Educational attainment, 253 
as case study variable, 245, 252t,
254t, 256t, 261 
ENPs in NJS and, 136, 137t, 139, 
141t, 275t 
JTPA and, 142, 144 
See also College and university 
admissions; General Equivalency 
Diploma (GED) 
Educational services, 18, 35 
equilibrium effects on, 32, 58n5 
JTPA and, 17, 19, 23t, 73, 133, 251, 
253–258, 254t–255t, 256t–257t,
259t, 260t, 262 
WIA and performance on, 23t, 73, 115t 
Eligible nonparticipants (ENPs), NJS 
data on, 135–138, 158 
Employee status 
effect of, on JTPA impacts, 153, 155t,
156t–157t, 158–159, 283 
as NJS variables, 140, 149t,
156t–157t, 187t, 188t–189t, 191t,
193t, 194–195, 283 
relative to ALMPs, 20, 128 
Employment and training programs, 128 
U.S. public, 3–5, 8 
See also Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act; Job Training 
Partnership Act; Manpower 
Development and Training Act; 
Workforce Investment Act 
Employment barriers 
JTPA eligibility and, 133, 240, 248 
as NJS variable, 139, 158 
Employment rates 
demographic variation in, 79–81, 80t,
90n14 
as negotiated performance standard, 
114–115, 115t 
as performance measure, 41, 74t–75t,
76, 87, 90n9, 90n11, 113, 130 
program timing strategies and, 215–
218, 221 
Employment retention 
data grouped by age and gender on, 
276–277 
gender differences and, 283, 285–287, 
289, 290t–291t 
as negotiated performance standard, 
22t–23t, 83, 115t, 117 
shift toward, 235, 265n2 
Employment services, 18 
performance measures for, and JTPA/
WIA, 22t–23t, 24, 26n10, 71, 88 
England, public bureaucracies and 
performance in, 2, 3, 11n1 
ENPs. See Eligible nonparticipants 
Ethnic variables 
JTPA participation simulation results 
and, 168t, 170t, 172t, 174t, 176t,
178t, 180t, 182t, 184, 186t, 188t,
190t, 192t 
NJS and, 139, 141t, 275t 
Ex-offenders, employment barriers for, 
240 
Family income 
JTPA and, 160, 185 
JTPA eligibility and, 133, 142, 198n4 
as NJS variable, 140, 141t–142t, 158 
Federal-level programs, 25n3, 112 
funding for, allocated through states, 
17, 24, 25n5 
performance incentive system in, 20, 
65–66 
performance measures in, 73–77, 
74t–75t, 261, 262 
performance standards in, 78–82, 80t,
90n12, 110–120 
staff compensation in, 67, 70, 89–
90n8, 89n7 
Female workers, 142 
adult, in econometric analysis 
strategy, 280, 283–285, 284t–285t,
289, 290t 
adult enrollment rate at employment 
termination of, 79–81, 80t, 90n14 
JTPA participation simulation results 
for, 172t–175t, 180t–183t 
Florida, as NJS participant, 68t, 275t 
Food Stamp Program, 161 
JTPA eligibility and, 133, 152, 167 
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Food Stamp Program, cont. 
recipients of, as NJS variable, 140, 
158, 194, 280 
successor of (see Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program) 
Fort Wayne, Indiana 
ENPs in NJS data from, 135–138, 
137t, 139, 275t 
JTPA enrollment probabilities in, 160,
162t, 164t 
logit estimates for experimental group
in, 148t, 150t, 154t, 156t, 162t,
164t 
Free-riding problem, performance 
incentive system and, 72 
Gaming the system 
manipulation in, 48–50, 116, 203–
204, 208–209, 211, 219–222 
performance targets and, 3, 11n1, 57, 
197, 209, 218 
unintended consequences and, 8–9, 
203, 212, 223–224 
GED. See General Equivalency Diploma 
Gender differences 
adult eligibility determinants for JTPA
program, 141t–142t, 145–146, 145t 
earnings and, 281–283, 282ff, 287–
288, 289, 290t–291t, 299n8 
econometric analysis strategies and, 
278–292 
JTPA participation simulation results 
and, 168t–171t, 172t–175t,
176t–179t, 180t–183t, 185 
See also Female workers; Male 
workers 
General assistance. See Welfare 
recipients; Welfare-to-work 
programs 
General Equivalency Diploma (GED), 
youth achievement and, 23t, 41, 
73, 75t 
Georgia, 112 
as NJS participant, 68t, 86, 275t 
subjective performance measure in, 
83, 91n17 
Government performance, 127 
dysfunctional responses to 
performance incentives, 210–213, 
214–223 
(see also Gaming the system) 
measuring, and dysfunctional 
responses, 203–209, 222, 224–
225n3, 225n4 
public bureaucracies and, 2, 3, 10–11 
reform of, 65, 121, 305, 309 
GPRA. See U.S. Government 
Performance and Results Act 
Hard-to-serve persons, 43, 298 
enrollment of, 82–83, 91n16, 116–118 
special programs for, 104–105 
Hardship, criteria for, 19 
Health care systems, 2, 240 
gaming performance targets in 
English public, 3, 11n1, 212 
Heartland of Florida as NJS data site, 275t 
High school dropouts 
ENPs in NJS, 136, 137t 
as hard-to-serve persons, 82–83, 
91n16, 117 
JTPA services to, 19, 23t, 41, 73, 75t 
remedial education assigned to, 253, 
256t 
Hispanic workers 
as adults in JTPA program, 79, 80t,
90n14, 141t 
as ENPs in Corpus Christi, 136, 137t 
JTPA participation simulation results 
and, 168t, 170t, 172t, 174t, 176t,
178t, 180t, 182t, 184, 186t, 188t,
190t, 192t 
NJS data on, 139, 142, 274, 275t 
Human capital measures, value-added 
proxies in lieu of, 66, 205–206 
Human judgments, structural 
components of, 237–239 
Illinois, 294t 
JTPA awards in, 84, 85–86, 91n18 
JTPA training centers in, 9, 85–86, 
240 
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Illinois, cont. 
as NJS participant, 68t, 275t 
See also Service delivery case study 
Incentive awards and rewards 
functions of, 1, 21, 42–43, 55, 85–87 
political ramifications of, 72, 305–307 
qualifying for, 84–85 
relative to payroll, 67, 70, 89nn6–7 
size, 67–71, 68t–69t, 71t, 87 
state determination of the JTPA
award, 66–67, 84–87, 88–89 
Incentives research 
assumptions in, 293, 299–300n11, 
300n12 
clarify advancements in, 3, 10, 88, 
121, 225n2 
implications of, and program 
outcomes, 24–25, 203 
types of, 132, 197 
variables in NJS, 139–140, 185, 194 
Indiana, 84 
enrollment of target groups as 
performance measure in, 83, 
91n16 
Fort Wayne, and ENPs in NJS data, 
135–138, 137t, 139, 148t, 150t,
154t, 156t, 160, 162t, 164t, 275t 
JTPA incentive funding in, as NJS 
participant, 68t, 70 
Individual training accounts (ITAs), 
purchase vouchers under WIA as, 
18 
Iowa, 84 
enrollment of target groups as 
performance measure in, 83, 
91n16 
as NJS participant, 68t, 275t 
subjective performance measure in, 
83, 91n17 
ITAs. See Individual training accounts 
Jackson, Mississippi, as NJS data site, 
275t 
Jersey City, New Jersey 
JTPA enrollment probabilities in, 160,
162t, 164t 
logit estimates for experimental group
in, 148t, 150t, 154t, 156t, 162t,
164t 
NJS data from, 135–138, 137t, 139, 
275t 
Job clubs, 88, 258, 259t, 260t 
Job Corps centers, 109, 296t 
Job Opportunities in the Business Sector 
(JOBS), earnings impact of, 294t 
Job placement, 213 
logit regression estimations on, 249–
251, 250t, 252t 
probability of, as case study variable, 
245, 252t 
rates of, 235, 260–261, 260t 
Job-readiness activities, as JTPA/WIA
service, 17, 211, 253, 258 
Job search assistance, 19, 127 
as JTPA service, 17, 133, 159–160, 
219, 251, 253–258, 254t–255t,
256t–257t, 259t, 260t, 261 
short-run performance measure for, 
293, 299–300n11 
Job search services, as fallback position, 
136 
Job training centers, 18 
aka SDA and/or workforce 
investment areas, 17, 25n6 
awards to, 76, 85–86, 87, 88–89, 
90n9, 91n19 
budgets of, 43, 67, 70, 71–72, 71t, 87,
89n4 
bureaucratic behaviors in, 29, 30–36, 
67, 71–72, 87 
competition among, 85–86, 88, 109, 
112, 261 
ENPs sampled at, 134–138, 274–276, 
275t 
enrollment data of, 48–50, 79–81, 
80t, 90n14, 91n15, 159–161 
graduation from, 216–218, 217f 
performance incentives and, 20, 21, 
24, 56–57, 66, 82, 86–87, 91n15 
performance measures for JTPA, 
74t–75t, 76, 87, 90n10, 118–120, 
119t, 219–220 
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Job training centers, cont. 
service eligibility discretion retained 
by, 19, 56, 131, 221–222 
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), 9, 
296t 
appropriations for, 24, 69t 
enrollment data under, 48–50, 126 
experimental data and evaluation of, 
2, 3, 15–16, 25, 235, 265n1, 273–
277 
participation rates in, 8, 10, 15, 56, 
280 
state-level variation in, 6, 65, 67, 73 
successor of (see Workforce 
Investment Act [WIA]) 
Titles authorized under, 16–17, 
25nn3–4 
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), 
incentive system, 65–91 
awards and bureaucratic preferences 
in, 67–72, 87–88 
(see also Incentive awards and 
rewards) 
challenges of, akin to anywhere in 
public bureaucracies, 65–67, 89n1 
dysfunctional responses to, 204, 
214–222 
performance measures in, 72–83, 87 
state determination of the JTPA
award, 66–67, 84–87, 88–89 
state policies for, 66, 68t, 70, 89n3 
USDOL adjustment of, 78–82, 80t,
86, 88, 91n15, 91n19, 197 
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), 
program features, 5, 7, 16–18 
eligibility rules, 16, 19, 25–26n7, 
125–126, 133, 198nn4–6 
organizational structure, 17, 18, 25n3,
233–234, 240–243 
origins, 16, 65 
performance standards system design,
16, 20, 21, 22t–23t, 25n2, 58n1, 
95–96 
rewards in, 42–43 
types of services, 16–17 
See also under Cream-skimming 
behaviors, evidence of 
Job training services 
access to, 253, 263–265 
effectiveness of, 73, 82, 87, 121 
short-run vs. long-term activities and, 
40–42 
simulation assignment to, and 
multinomial logit analyses, 
251–261, 254t–255t, 256t–257t,
259t, 260t, 266n7 
state and local implementation of, 17, 
18, 233–234, 265n1 
Jobcentre Plus, U.K., marginal 
misallocation evidence at, 213 
JOBS program, earnings impact of, 294t 
Labor force status. See Employee status 
Labor market programs 
active (see ALMPs) 
enrollee outcomes as performance 
measures of, 66, 73, 222–223 
level playing fields among, 112–113 
outcomes of, as performance 
measures, 273–274, 278 
Language skills 
awareness of JTPA and, 144, 152 
as employment barrier, 133, 139, 
198–199n11, 240 
Larimer County, Colorado, as NJS data 
site, 275t 
Male workers 
adult, in econometric analysis 
strategy, 280, 285–288, 286t–287t,
289, 291t 
as case study variable, 245, 252t 
JTPA participation simulation results 
and, 168t–171t, 176t–179t 
Managerial performance, 67, 99, 108 
manipulation in, 116, 208–209 
marginal misallocations in, 203, 204, 
208, 209, 210, 212 
professional recognition for, 72, 87, 
89–90n8 
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Manpower Development and Training 
Act (MDTA), 15, 294t 
differences between, and JTPA, 133–
134 
Marion, Ohio, as NJS data site, 275t 
Marital histories 
as case study variable, 245, 252t 
effect of, and JTPA, 142, 153, 184–
185, 240 
Maryland, 113, 294t 
MDTA. See Manpower Development and
Training Act 
Medicaid programs, performance 
standards and bonuses used in, 2 
Medical issues, applicants with, referred 
to non-JTPA program, 240 
Mental health issues, applicants with, 
referred to non-JTPA program, 
240 
Minnesota, 84 
enrollment of target groups as 
performance measure in, 83, 
91n16 
as NJS participant, 68t, 275t 
Mississippi 
enrollment of target groups as 
performance measure in, 83, 91n16 
as NJS participant, 68t, 70, 275t 
Missouri 
enrollment of target groups as 
performance measure in, 83, 
91n16 
as NJS participant, 68t–69t, 70, 71, 
275t 
Montana, as NJS participant, 68t–69t, 70,
71, 275t 
Motivation as econometric analysis 
strategy, 278, 299n1 
Moynihan, Daniel, on performance 
management in governance, 10–11 
Multitasking behaviors, as effectiveness 
measure, 206, 207, 213, 214, 222 
National JTPA Study (NJS) 
data collection in, 6, 9, 42, 134–135, 
198n7, 198n9, 273–277, 275t 
findings of, corroborated by service-
delivery case study, 253, 258 
negative impacts of training 
participation for youth, 32, 58n4 
states participating in, 68t, 70, 89n3, 
275f 
See also under Cream-skimming 
behaviors, evidence of 
National Science Foundation grants, 
participation in, 127 
Nebraska, 113 
enrollment of target groups as 
performance measure in, 83, 
91n16 
as NJS participant, 68t, 275t 
Neighborhood Youth Corps Out-of-
School (NYC/OS) program, 
earnings impact of, 294t 
Netherlands, the 
public bureaucracies and performance 
incentive system development in, 2 
New Federalism era, 16, 65 
New Hampshire, WIA performance 
targets in, 112 
New Jersey 
enrollment of target groups as 
performance measure in, 83, 85, 
91n16 
Jersey City, and ENPs in NJS data, 
135–138, 137t, 139, 148t, 150t,
154t, 156t, 160, 162t, 164t, 275t 
JTPA awards in, 85, 86 
as NJS participant, 68t, 82 
New Public Management initiative, 
politicians and, 121 
New York, unemployment rates in, after 
September 11, 2001, 114, 121n2 
NJS. See National JTPA Study 
No Child Left Behind, performance 
standards and bonuses used in, 2, 
208 
North Carolina, negotiated performance 
standards and, 119 
Northwest Minnesota as NJS data site, 
275t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
   	  
 
 
   	   
 
 
 
      
 
	 	   
  
  
 
 
 
       
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
        
 
  
 
  
 
 
	 	  	  
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
      
 
Index 323 
Notation as econometric analysis 
strategy, 278 
NYC/OS. See Neighborhood Youth 
Corps Out-of-School program 
Oakland, California, as NJS data site, 
275t 
Obama, Pres. Barack, administration, 
1–2, 15, 17 
Ohio, 112 
enrollment of target groups as 
performance measure in, 83, 
91n16 
as NJS participant, 68t, 275t 
subjective performance measure in, 
83, 91n17 
OJT. See On-the-job training 
Older workers 
as hard-to-serve persons, 82–83, 
91n16 
probability of, and JTPA participation, 
153, 154t, 161, 184 
Omaha, Nebraska, as NJS data site, 275t 
On-the-job training (OJT) 
as JTPA service, 17, 88, 130, 133, 
136, 137t, 160–161 
NJS data on, 274, 275t 
provided by JTPA, 251, 253–258, 
254t–255t, 256t–257t, 259t, 260t 
as WIA service, 19, 30–31 
One-Stop Career Centers, 18, 19, 231–
232, 265n1 
Open Government Initiative, 1–2 
Performance Framework, as U.K. 
initiative, 212 
Performance incentive system, 72 
defined and enforced cooperatively, 
20, 21, 26n9 
development of, for public 
bureaucracies, 2, 10–11, 20, 65–67 
(see also Incentive awards and 
rewards) 
dysfunctional responses to, 210–223 
(see also under Government 
performance; Private sector) 
effectiveness of, 108, 206–207 
job training centers and, 20, 21, 24 
measuring dysfunctional responses to,
203–209, 222 
See also specifically, Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA), incentive 
system; Incentive awards and 
rewards 
Performance incentive system, model of, 
29–57 
cost-benefit framework of, 32–36, 56,
58nn6–7, 87, 208, 220, 221 
dysfunctional responses framework 
for, 203–209 
measures in practice within, 40–42 
motivating performance standards in, 
36–40, 58nn10–11 
reward functions in, 42–43 
standards and budgetary dynamics 
in two periods vs. stationary 
environment vs. the real world, 31,
36, 50–55, 58n9 
strategic behavior in dynamic 
environment, 55–56, 197 
strategic responses to standards in, 
48–50, 59n15 
training center choices in, 30–36 
See also entries beginning Cream-
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